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Foreword
I
HOSE who prior to World War II knew the chief
legal personalities of Europe recognized the outstanding position held by Ernst Rabel, the author of the
present treatise.
Born in 1874 in Austria, as a young man he studied law
in his own country, in Germany, and in France. His university
career has been most distinguished; he taught Roman and
modern civil law in Switzerland and Germany, the many invitations he received leading to celebrated professorates, notably at Munich and ultimately at Berlin, where he occupied
an influential position. His contributions to comparative legal
history have been noteworthy; he first introduced the comparative study of Egyptian papyri with the medieval documents; he is a leader in the efforts, through the modern search
for interpolations, to reconstruct the original Roman private
law; his services as editor of various research publications in
the field of legal history are well known. These broad interests
were complemented by extensive comparative work on the
modern Swiss, French, and German laws, later including the
Common Law as well;· his contributions in the preparation of
international drafts of unified law, especially that on sales of
goods, are widely recognized.
In Rabel, outstanding legal scholarship has been enriched
by wide and unusual practical experience. He practiced law in
Vienna and served as judge in the appellate courts of Basle
and Munich. Shortly after the First World War, he became
a member of the German-Italian arbitral tribunal. As a judge
of the Court of International Justice (World Court) at the
Hague, between 1925 and 1928, he took part in German and
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Polish suits. He was president of the International Association of Comparative Law and a member of the Council and
Executive Committee of the Institute for Unification of private Law in Rome. He received diverse honors in Italy,
Greece, Poland, Spain, and Norway.
The central interests and achievements of the author have
been in the deyelopment of comparative legal research. In
the course of the First World War, he recognized the danger
of a narrow legal nationalism and in I 9 I 6 founded and became Director of the Institute of Comparative Law in Munich,
the world's first research institute for comparative law. In
I 926, being appointed Director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Foreign and International Private Law in Berlin,
he was entrusted with the task of organizing and conducting
a much larger enterprise. This Institute, parallel to the Institute of Foreign Public Law and the Law of Nations, directed
by the late Viktor Bruns, was devoted to research as well as
to the giving of practical information and advice to the Foreign
Office in Germany, legislative authorities, courts, lawyers, and
business firms. Under Rabel's guidance, the Institute trained
a staff of experts in the various legal systems of the world,
some of whom are now in this country as law teachers or members of the legal profession, and, in conjunction with the sister organization, established the most comprehensive law
library in Europe. The opinions delivered by the Institute
under Professor Rabel's responsibility in matters of legislation, conflict of laws, international trade and international law,
numbered about a thousand. The Institute exercised a profound influence in the legal thought and methods not only
of Germany but also of those numerous other countries whose
scholars availed themselves of its facilities.
After the completion of the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws in I934, the American L~w Institute had under
consideration a plan to supplement the Restatement by a
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parallel work presenting to the American public the rules,
principles, and doctrines of the leading foreign countries. But,
until in I937 the Nazi insanity removed from the directorship of the world's then principal organization devoted to the
study of comparative law the director whose foresight and
leadership conceived and conducted it, it had seemed all but
impossible to find the right man for a task requiring so wide
and mature a background of learning and experience. The
opportunity thus offered to bring Doctor Rabel to this country
to do much to break down our isolationist legal attitudes was
unique. Doctor Rabel knows the private law systems of German and Latin-American countries. He knows much of the
common law of the English-speaking peoples. Furthermore,
he has not only the law professor's knowledge of legal theory,
but the practical knowledge of the similarities and differences
in the application of the legal principles of different systems
to the solution of concrete legal problems.
Accordingly, in the spring of I939, the American Law
Institute took steps to bring Dr. Rabel to the United States
with the guarantee of two years' employment. He arrived in
this country in September, I 93 9, and at once began work preparatory to the preparation of this treatise, of which the first
volume is now published. In the spring of I 942, his arrangement with the Institute having been fulfilled, the Law School
of the University of Michigan gave him a position, which has
now enabled him to complete the first of the volumes contemplated. His work in Michigan has been done under the
most fortunate surroundings, as he has had the active advice
and assistance from the point of view of a leading American
specialist in international law, Professor Hessel E. Yntema.
The present treatise is the confirmation of Doctor Rabel's
life work. Its primary purpose is to make a comparison of the
significant legal systems of conflict of laws with reference to
the specific problems arising in each topic. The first volume,
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besides containing a most interesting and comprehensive introduction dealing with the literature, theories, and sources
of the subject, is devoted to a study of the problems of what
may be described as family relations, such as the personal law
of individuals, marriage, divorce and annulment, and parental
relations. It is a field presenting a variety of interesting and
difficult conflicts problems. The second volume now well under
way will deal principally with Foreign Corporations, Torts,
and the General Problems of Contracts. It is hoped that there
may be further volumes, covering the other legal topics treated
in the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of
Conflict of Laws.
In the ~ourse of its preparation and completion, the plan
of the work has undergone substantial change.
The original plan was that of a work which, in arrangement, should exactly parallel the sections of the Restatement
of Conflict of Laws. This plan has turned out to be impracticable. The differences between the European and American
systems are too great to allow such minute comparison, section
by section. The major subdivisions, however, present sufficient analogy to those of the Restatement to draw attention
to the significant distinctions and similarities. Comparison between the foreign and American law has been emphasized
throughout. The book does not simply constitute a presentation of foreign law, but a painstaking and comprehensive comparison of the solutions accorded to the particular problems of
family law, botli here and abroad. It is this feature that gives
the work its special value and attractiveness.
The author conceives that comparison of laws requires study
in the legal systems compared of the solutions reached on particular practical problems rather than the review of general
theories. In thus emphasizing the comparative solutions of
concrete problems, he is in accord with our common law habit
, of thought. Consistently carried out in the present treatise,
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it greatly increases the value of the work in the Englishspeaking countries. The method does not ignore the necessary consideration of theories but obviously gives them less
significance than is usually found in most European literature.
The work offers not only comprehensive assistance to the
practicing lawyer or the judge who is concerned to know the
answers in other countries to a conflict of laws problem, but
will also furnish the English-speaking reader with foreign
law concepts of the rules of conflicts of laws and their application in a form easily comprehended by those whose legal
training is largely confined to our common law and statutes.
In all the topics treated, the author enables us to appreciate
the "other fellow's" point of view and compare its practical
results with our own. This is not an insignificant service to a
people just awakening from a self-centered legal sleep to an
appreciation of the fact that we must hereafter go forward in
a world which is increasingly one.
WILLIAM DRAPER LEWIS, Director
The American Law Institute

II
T is appropriate to add a few remarks from the viewpoint
of the University of Michigan. The foregoing statement
by the director of the American Law Institute outlines
the distinguished career of the author of the present work and
indicates the circumstances under which he was invited by the
Institute to undertake a comparative survey of the existing
systems of conflicts law. As therefrom appears, while the inspiration to bring to this country an internationally recognized
jurist with. unique qualifications for the task-an extraordinary opportunity afforded only by the malign policy that has
betrayed Germany and crucified millions in this generationis to be credited to the Institute and more particularly to the
generous wisdom of the director, the studies reflected in the
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present volume have been substantially accomplished at Ann
Arbor, in large part with the aid of funds and further assistance
provided by the University of Michigan.
This co-operation, illustrating an appropriate function, as
once suggested by the writer, for a nondenominational Institute in the world of academic rivalries, deserves a word of
commendation. On the part of the University, it has been
motivated not only by the liberal disposition of the Faculty
of Law to promote worth-while research and their longstanding interest in comparative legal studies, but more especially by the significance of the enterprise. This is no mere
tabula ex naufragio, thus rescued from the maelstrom in which
contemporary European culture is engulfed. The survey undertaken is essential at the present time for the proper development of a branch of law of special interest for interstate
and international trade, arising, as Story states, "from the conflict of the laws of different nations, in their actual application to modern commerce and intercourse." More generally,
it exemplifies a fundamental mode of legal investigation,
which each day becomes more nearly indispensable in the
modern world.
The latter consideration, the need in these times for comparative legal research, does not call for extensive comment.
The present conflict, multiplying contacts among the most distant peoples and through untold suffering and sacrifice uniting
them to vindicate the common values of humanity, like the
Napoleonic wars and the War· of I 9 I 4, again emphasizes that
no one is unconditionally immune from influences operative
within the effective orbit of international intercourse. In a
, universe progressively interrelated by the miracles of modern
communication, therefore, it is neither prudent nor even longer
possible for any nation to pursue a policy of self-sufficient isolation. In such a universe, the notion that the corresponding
legal order is compartmentalized exclusively within political
frontiers is inadequate.
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For legal science, so pervasively indoctrinated these hundred years by the preconceptions of sovereignty and nationalism, this spells the necessity of comparative reorientation, of
ampler realization that justice both comprehends and transcends local interests. If the price of peace and liberty is constant vigilance in an integrated world, it is expedient to know
what transpires abroad as well as at home. While legal science
in each country will and· should continue to cultivate first its
peculiar institutions and traditions, these can no longer be accepted as the horizon of legal knowledge. The practical,
specialized study of indigenous techniques, legislative, judicial, and administrative, must be complemented by scientific
comparison with other legal systems-to ascertain their manifold bearings on domestic interests; to prepare the reforms
that may be desired from time t~ time to bring the municipal
laws into harmony with advancing conceptions of justice and
the requirements of the international community; to share in
efforts to provide appropriate uniform legislation for the commerce of the world; in fine, to establish a more objective scientific basis for the consideration of legal problems. To attain
these ends, indeed even to appreciate the special genius of
each legal system, the comparative method, necessarily supposing intensive historical and functional investigation of particular institutions, is indicated. Without this perspective, as
Ihering pointed out long ago, there is no legal science worthy
of the name. Blind without history, jurisprudence without
comparative understanding can scarcely rise above the level of
provincial casuistry and empirical craft.
Obviously, such understanding of the existing legal systems
is most immediately needed in those branches of law that are
concerned with international relations. Of these, the law of
conflict of laws, devoted to the principles governing assumption of jurisdiction and resort to the proper law in the solution of private disputes of an international complexion, is in
a parlous state, permitted presumably by the fact that it is
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almost wholly administered in the ordinary courts in the
positivistic atmosphere of municipal law. For, in this subject
matter concerned with determining the application of the diverse legal provisions that may be involved in any such dispute, in consonance with, or at least without violating,
common standards of justice, emphasis is rampant upon territorialism and nationality, upon the dominant pretensions of
lex fori or ordre public, in other words, upon ideas that obscure, limit, or frustrate the very purpose in view.
This, it is worth recalling, was not always the emphasis.
More than a hundred years ago, Story founded the modern
law of conflict of laws on a broad, comparative basis, that
looked, despite uncertainty and diversity in the then existing
doctrines, "towards the establishment of a general system of
international jurisprudence, which shall elevate the policy,
subserve the interests, and promote the common convenience
of all nations." Fifteen years after Story penned these words,
in the preface to the eighth volume of the monumental System
des heutigen Romischen Rechts, Savigny voiced two interesting prognostications in like vein. Adverting to the variety of
opinions among both writers and courts respecting conflicts
of laws, he nevertheless conceived that, from the exceptional
and active common concern in the problems of this field of
law, there would develop a universal, existent community of
legal understanding and legal life. The further suggestion
that the principle of nationality, then coming into prominence,
would not make itself felt in a subject, the nature of which
involves the resolution of conflicts of national laws within a
recognized community of the various nations, equally reflects
Savigny's international point of view.
How soon and how far these anticipations were to be disappointed is writ at large in the illuminating introduction that
forms Part One of the present volume.
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Aetas parentum, peior avis, tulit
Nos nequiores, mox daturos
Progeniem vitiosiorem.
But two years after Savigny wrote, the doctrine of nationality,
which in its exaggeration has so much contributed to international disorder during the past century, was proclaimed by
Mancini as the fundamental principle of the law of nations
and shortly became the distinctive basis of legislation in Continental Europe. Consequently, to borrow the author's expression, the international community, as contemplated by
Story and Savigny, disintegrated. Story's broad understanding of the conflicts of law doctrines current in his time
eventually shrank in the United States to the dimensions of
the introverted treatment of the subject by Wharton and later
by Beale: in England, Westlake bridged the way to Dicey's
Anglican positivism; on the Continent, Savigny and his
international-minded successors were duly eclipsed by the intransigent, if despairing, nationalism of Bartin and Kahn.
Thus, by 1900, the dominant supposition was a caricature of
the truism that international private law is not international
but private law; absorbed in domestic legislation and precedents, the doctrine reflected the prevailing provincial
dogmatisms of legal science generally. Apparently, justified
recognition of the circumstance that, under existing conditions,
national courts-typically administer conflicts rules as a branch
of municipal law, was thought to warrant indifference to their
international raison d'etre. Consequently, legal theory in this
field in recent years, having lost sight of the underlying purpose to be had in view, has devoted itself with aprioristic
methods to unreal issues and become something of a logical
mystery. Essentially, it faces the problem of how to square
in terms of national interest or tradition a circle of internationally superior needs.
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In this country, the current isolationism of conflicts of law
doctrine has been accentuated by certain contributing factors:
first, by a quite natural preoccupation on the part of specialists
in the subject with the relatively frequent internal conflicts
of jurisdiction and law arising within the federal structure of
the United States; and second, by the extensive influence of
the theories expounded by Beale, including the belief that
reference in this field to civil law authorities is not one that
tends "to preserve the correctness and purity of the common
law." It deserves repeating-even after almost twenty years
-that this is a conceit, strange and for the United States inexpedient. Strange, since it disavows the considerable indebtedness of common law doctrines respecting conflicts of
laws to the civil law; inexpedient, since a great commercial
nation cannot afford to remain in ignorance, particularly in
this subject matter, of the laws of foreign countries with which
it trades. In consequence of these influences, despite the
pioneer work of Lorenzen ~nd more recent contributions by
Kuhn, Nussbaum, and others, inadequate attention has been
given in this country to the relations between the doctrines of
conflicts law as here evolved and those of foreign countries
other than England. It affords little consolation that the condition is paralleled elsewhere. But it does serve to explain
why no systematic effort has been made hitherto to provide a
comprehensive, critical comparison of the existing systems of
private international law.
Had it not been for this background, the preparation of the
Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, initiated in I 923
and promulgated in 1934, might well have been the occasion
for such a survey. This, however, was not to be-it was precluded by the prepossessions of the reporter, by the curious
determination, deviating from the original plan, to restate
"the law as it is," and still more effectually by unfamiliarity
with comparable foreign doctrines on the part of those invited
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to participate as advisers (except fora time Lorenzen). Hence,
the failure in this monumental codification of the Common
Law to take account of other systems was not merely an effect
of, but has become a cause to perpetuate an inappropriate view
of international private law, which no longer befits the United
States. On this count alone and apart from other limitations
duly noted by critics, we repeat, the Restatement needs to be
restated. But the preceding observations will suggest that it
is still more important to provide the indispensable basis for
such revision, including the comparative information without
which inbred doctrines remain unquestioned and their objective, scientific consideration in terms of international needs
is excluded a limine.
To supply this need, as the author justly observes in the
preface, is a large task. The requisite survey of the existing
systems of conflicts law involves critical examination and comparison of the significant rules on specific problems with reference to their evolution and purposes, as exemplified in these
systems, and in the light of the pertinent literature and jurisprudence for each country, preferably accompanied by corresponding suggestions for improvement. Moreover, as conflicts rules look to reciprocal recognition and understanding of
the respective specific institutions of local law, it is necessary
that any such survey should be made on the background, however succinctly adumbrated, of the historical development and
contemporary nature, significance, and interrelations of these
institutions, considered in the context of the legislations of
which they form part. The present volume is a first and substantial contribution to this undertaking; in addition to a
magistral review of the literature, sources, doctrinal development, and general theories of the subject, it provides a comparative conspectus of the rules applicable to conflicts in the
extensive field of family law. It is more than an annotation to
the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, as was at first
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contemplated. It is the first comprehensive comparative'legal
·study that has been published in English for many moons,
certainly the first in any language to take adequate account
of the laws of the Americas as well as of Europe. It is, in sum,
a pioneer, intensive exploration of a substantial part of the
labyrinth of the laws of conflicts from the indicated international point of view, a contribution not only essential for
progress in this field but also of general interest as an exemplar
of the comparative method in law.
In pursuance of its undertaking to support this enterprise,
the University has made substantial provision to maintain and
implement the author's individual researches, including,
among other things, accommodations in the Legal Research
Library, ministerial assistance as required from time to time,
and editorial collaboration, especially in adapting the author's
incisive expressions to the idiosyncrasies of English style, the
independent verification of all citations, and the preparation
of the various tables (except for the index, which was made up
by the author). In arranging this assistance, the responsibility
for which was cast upon the editor as a condition of the adoption of the undertaking for a time by the University, various
obligations have been incurred, which deserve to be acknowledged:
To the University authorities, to the Faculty of Law and
Dean Stason in particular, for their constant and generous support in the effective prosecution of the work. To all those who,
as members of the research staff, were engaged in one way or
another in preparing, editing, and seeing the manuscript
through the press, an exacting task in which the comparative
use of legal materials from many countries has presented an
unusual variety of questions, for their indispensable, respective
contributions, efficiently rendered. To Eldon R. James,
Law Librarian, Library of Congress, and Arthur C. Pulling,
Director of the Harvard Law Library, for the appreciated as-
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sistance of their respective staffs, which has made it possible
to verify all save perhaps a dozen of the limited number of
references to works not available in the Legal Research
Library. To Hobart R. Coffey, to whom the editor is indebted
equally with the author for expert relief unstintingly given in
the revision of the manuscript. And, not least, to the author
himself for unfailing co-operation and courageous devotion
to a complex task under disturbed conditions.
Yet this is to be added. However indispensable the assistance provided by the University has been for the prosecution
of the work, the product is in substance exclusively the
author's; he alone collected the materials, and the views expressed herein are his. It is fortunate that a jurist of the
author's attainments and scholarly sagacity has addressed himself to the task, which, it is hoped, may be extended in additional volumes to other significant branehes of conflicts law.
HESSEL E. y NTEMA

Preface

ULL application of comparative methods to the law of
conflicts requires a working plan of some magnitude.
We ought to take stock of the conflicts rules existing
in the different countries of the world, state their similarities
or dissimilarities, and investigate their purposes and effects.
The solutions thus ascertained should moreover be subjected
to an estimation of their usefulness, by the standards appropriate to their natural objective. Conflicts rules have to place
private life and business relations upon the legal background
suitable to satisfactory intercourse among states and nations.
They are valuable to the extent that their practical functioning, rather than their legal appearance, serves this purpose.
To meet the challenge of this program with limited forces
is a risky undertaking. Nevertheless it has to be attempted.
The conditions of the law of conflicts are deplorable. It may
be said, to the reader's and my own consolation, that the staggering provincialism apparent in the international family law
presented in this volume is not equaled in other parts. But if
conflicts problems have been cultivated by men of the highest
erudition, idealism, and endeavor, they have also been the object of prejudice and dogmatism. Suggestions of almost all
needed ideas may be found, but little agreement on a sound
choice. The courts of this country dealing with a wealth of
interstate cases have prevailingly shown sincere respect for
foreign legislation and applied an accomplished method of
comparative research. But this admirable attitude, which is
the most outstanding model for the practice of private international law, suffers exceptions, and in the field of international
relations throughout the world, despite enormous efforts, the
simple truth that harmony presupposes mutual understanding
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and tolerance, has not prevailed in conflicts law more than in
foreign affairs.
All considered, the further we extend our comparative survey, the less doubt can subsist about the need for a total reconsideration of the international purpose and the undeveloped
resources of this branch of law. The time has passed when we
may rest satisfied to state a rule and to regret it. Not that the
premature legislation or halfhearted treaty making, familiar
to the last decades, should be advocated. What this book is
intended to suggest is a patient and concerted world-wide discussion determined to relieve the present chaos. I am convinced that large results must not be deferred to a remote
future. The legal profession has great power and deserves
great confidence. If it decided to consider conflicts law as a
matter of general interest and gave it its unbiased attention,
much might be obtained that now seems Utopian. I am particularly hopeful of the lawyers in the United States.
According to the program, I have regarded my foremost
task to be the collection and grouping of the significant rules,
theories, critical views, and proposals, and the cases animated
by them. This task is comprehensive and worth-while enough
to dictate sacrifices. It has not been possible to spare the reader
and myself tedious enumerations and many a mosaic of incoherent pieces, and I have had to renounce historical and
theoretical developments. Neither is there space to describe
at length the institutions of private law that are the subject
matter of the conflicts rules. This compulsory limitation is the
more regrettable, as common law lawyers have not been introduced to the concepts of civil law as European lawyers
were informed of Anglo-American institutions during the
period between the two wars.
I have also restricted my own critical appraisals, and I have
doubted whether any recommendations for the future should
be added. Yet, in view of the personal encouragement that I
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have received from such scholars as Elliott E. Cheatham,
Max Rheinstein, and Hessel E. Yntema, and recently in
Ernest Lorenzen's great review of the last period of American
conflicts law, it seems to be the writer's duty not entirely to
conceal his impressions regarding the desirable path that the
evolution may take. Theoretical conclusions of more general
scope as well as specified proposals for elaborating the rules
may be expected, when comparative research in this singular
and disturbed field has become broader and bolder. I hope
the survey itself will almost automatically arouse the wish for
certain reforms.
Because of the war time, European rules and cases are
stated, in principle, as they were in 1939 at the beginning of
the war. This is a rather convenient date for a view back, while
a new epoch is starting. More recent materials coming through
have, of course, been registered.
The Legal Research Library of the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor has afforded me a hospitable haven and
ample facilities for work. Its farsighted policy has enabled me,
for the first time in a work of this kind, to include a substantial amount of Latin-American doctrine. My satisfaction in
this regard is somewhat impaired by the fear that my efforts
of analysis have not been entirely successful in regard to certain Latin-American formulations. As these countries possess
outstanding scholars in this field who are the natural intermediaries between common law and civil law, it is to be hoped
that they will participate in carrying on the work here begun
and supply the details not yet mentioned in the literature but
with which the courts must deal.
To the American Law Institute, the Dean and Faculty of
the Law School, University of Michigan, and the Research
Department of the W. W. Cook Foundation directed by
Professor Lewis M. Simes, I owe deepest gratitude.
Dean Emeritus William Draper Lewis, the eminent and be-
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loved dire.ctor of the American Law Institute, has rescued me
from the cataclysm of Europe; he has been the original sponsor
of this enterprise and has not ceased to manifest his friendly
interest in it. Professor Hessel E. Y ntema, since I 940, has fulfilled his task as editor with an unprecedented sacrifice of time
and labor. He has generously provided me with informations
and suggestions, constantly supervised during all these years
the comprehensive ministerial aid furnished by the research
staff of the Faculty, and devoted his command of English style
to an extremely delicate and exacting revision of the language
of my manuscript. Professor Hobart R. Coffey has liberally
shared in this burden, and to him, as Law Librarian, as well
as to his entire staff, who have been most kind, I am grateful.
I feel cordially obligated also for the devoted services of
Mrs. Lilly Melchior Roberts, who, with the assistance of
Miss Dorothy Karl, has been especially helpful in checking the
documentation, to Dr. Vladimir Gsovski, Chief of the Foreign
Laws Section, Law Library of the Library of Congress, and
to those whose contributions Mr. Yntema has deservedly acknowledged.
Finally, it is my privilege to thank publicly Professor
Max Rheinstein of the University of Chicago, the most faithful
of friends, for the help he has freely given to this book as well
as to me and my family. I am happy to see him represent in
this country our common scientific ideals. ·
ERNST RABEL

Ann Arbor, Michigan
March 5, 1945

NoTE: Chapter 11 was published in preliminary, condensed form
in volume 28 ofthe Iowa Law Review, January 1943, as "Divorce
of Foreigner~A Study in Compara.tive Law."
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Literature and Sources of Conflicts Law
I.

ScoPE oF CoNFLICTS

LAw

N the American literature, the law of conflicts includes
both choice of law, which contemplates the determination
of the particular state law applicable to specific cases
typically within the sphere of private law, and jurisdiction
of courts, regarded by some writers as an aspect of legislative
jurisdiction. In following this pattern, we shall observe the
limitations of private law more strictly than is usual and
only to the extent necessary explore the implications of constitutional, administrative, procedural, criminal, and public
law generally. Thus, the rules of judicial jurisdiction will
be considered in connection with those matters which are
governed in this country by the domestic or internal law of
the jurisdiction (the lex fori) and consequently depend upon
choice of court rather than on choice of law.
According to the French doctrine, "private international
law" combines choice of law, the law of nationality, and the
legal status of foreigners. This last subject, concerned with
the rules granting or refusing foreigners equal treatment
with nationals, in theory is thoroughly different from conflicts law conceived primarily as choice of law. It presupposes
that the law applicable to aliens has been selected and found to
be the internal law of the state. For this reason, it is not
regarded in Germany as part of private internationallaw. 1
In this country, likewise, rules relative to "foreign"
individuals-aliens and non-residents-typically do not appear in the treatises on conflicts law. The explanation given is

I

1 See I ZITELMANN zs6; KAHN, I Abhandi. z6J

3
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that citizens and non-citizens are not differentiated 2 in respect
to private law; this seems to contemplate exclusively relations
between the American sister states. Nevertheless, the rules
concerning foreign corporations, pertaining for the most part
to internal law and in fact. presenting many special features
in the United States and to some degree in Germany, are
included in the usual orbit of conflicts discussion. This practical method will be followed, although the regulation of
foreign corporations is different from choice of law and in
general forms part of administrative law.
Similar considerations make it desirable to give some attention to substantive provisions concerned with property situated or contracts performed or acts done in another state, or
that otherwise involve foreign elements. Such provisions often
appear as purely internal rules, but they may include genuine
conflicts rules. For instance, a rule stating that a money debt
expressed in foreign currency may be paid, at the option of
the debtor, in domestic currency at the exchange of a certain
date, is substantive merely. But the principle, enunciated in
certain American statutes and judicial decisions/ that statutory formalities prescribed for insurance contracts apply only
to contracts executed within the state, is not merely a rule of
municipal law territorially limited; it contains two rules, the
one substantive, imposing formalities, the other, a conflicts
rule, however delicate the borderline may be. 4 There are also
scattered throughout the national legislations numerous
provisions that are not intended or are unsuitable for appliz 1 BEALE 8. On the rules, see MooRE, 4 Digest of International Law (1906)
ch. XIII.
.
3
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen (1900) 179 U.S. 262; Johnson v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co. (1901-1902) 180 Mass. 407, 62 N. E. 733 (on Mass. Stat. 1894,
c. 522 § 73, now Mass. General Laws (1932) c. 175 § 131); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Long (1917) 177 Ky. 445, 197 S. W. 948 (on Ky. Stat.
§ 679, now Ky. Rev. Stats. (1942) § 299.13o),
'In fact, the provision cited in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Long (supra n. 3)
has been characterized as a "spatially limited" internal rule by NuSSBAUM,
Principles 7o.
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cation by foreign courts, as for instance, the peculiar English
provisions imposing upon certain persons the burden of support of indigents. 5 All such internal regulations, with potential
international significance, deserve systematic examination in
connection with the laws of the particular countries. In the
present survey, it will be possible only to make occasional
reference to such problems. On the other hand, in view of
their preponderant influence, internal rules embodying so~alled stringent public policies, and hence superseding the
operation of general conflicts rules, must be taken into account.
The observations in the present introduction are not
intended to serve as a general analysis of conflicts law.
Modern writers in this field have begun to develop a body of
generalized theories, 6 but most of the topics they deal with are
beyond present purposes. Certain problems, such as the attitude of the courts in the different countries with regard to
public policy or the methods of considering foreign law in
lawsuits, involve positive formulations of law, which ought
to be reported in a comparative survey and will be referred
to in their appropriate connections. Other long-standing
problems of deep scientific interest, such as the exact classification of conflicts law in the legal system, do not need more
international discussion. Others, including the dubious role
of the "preliminary question,m have not matured sufficiently
to warrant general observations.
Finally, there are problems regarding the structure and
application of conflicts rules that are of interest from the viewpoint of method and have attracted wide and vivid attention
6

See infra pp. 325, 6I I, n. 8, 6:u, n. 63.
A penetrating analysis has been made by MAURY in his Hague lecture,
"Regles generales des conflits de lois," 57 Recueil I936 III 32.5. Other lectures
under the same title by Aco, 58 Recueil I936 IV 2.47; DAVIES, an English
author, 62. Recueil I937 IV 427; and H. LEWALD, published separately,
Basel, I94I, (an elegant theoretical study). See, moreover, I. HENRI HUMANS
Algemeene Problemen van Internationaal Privaatrecht (I 9 3 7).
'
7
See CORMACK, "Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary
Question in the Conflict of Laws," I4 So. Cal. L. Rev. (I94I) 22.1, 2.43,
6
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during recent years. The purpose of this introduction is to
summarize the writer's view on these questions. This view
premises that each case should be considered on its merits;
therefore it does not presuppose the determination of individual problems by general dogmas.

II.
1.

LITERATURE

8

The International Historical Background 9

In its generally accepted sense, the law of conflicts or
private international law dates from the medieval school of
the postglossators (also named legists or commentators), who
in the late thirteenth century succeeded the glossators in
the universities of northern Italy and southern France. 10 Like
8 The titles of many of the works cited by authors' names in the following
brief survey are to be found in the bibliographical list on page 66I. The accompanying dates indicate the years in which the first considerable publications
•
of the respective authors occurred.
9 On the history of conflicts law: Outlines in English: 3 BEALE I 88o-I 97 5;
CHESHIRE 68; and RHEINSTEIN, "Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws in
Germany," z U. of Chi. L. Rev. (I935) 232-269.
Standard works: CATELLANI, 11 diritto internazionale privato e i suoi recenti
progressi, z vols. (I895, I9o2); LAINE, Introduction au droit international
prive, 2 vols. (I888, I892); NEUMEYER, Die gemeinrechtliche Entwickelung
des internationalen Privat- und Strafrechts bis Bartolus, 2 vols. (I90I, I916);
idem, "Zur Geschichte des internationalen Privatrechts in Frankreich und den
Niederlanden," in 2 Zeitschrift fiir Volkerrecht ( I92o) I9o; MEIJERS, Bijdrage
tot de geschiedenis van bet internationaal privaat- en strafrecht in Frankrijk en
de Nederlanden, (I9I4); idem, "~ieuwe bijdrage tot bet ontstaan van bet
beginsel der realiteit," 3 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis (1922) 61; idem,
"L'histoire des principes fondamentanx du droit international prive a partir du
Moyen-Age, specialement dans !'Europe occidentale," 49 Recueil 1934 III
5431 GUTZWILLER, "Le developpement historique du droit international prive,"
29 Recueil 1929 IV 287 (with full list of literature 395-397).
Historical summaries are given in almost every handbook; particularly recommendable are those by WErss, 3 Traite 8-n9, IJO-I49; GUTZWILLER, Internationalprivatrecht ISZI-I534; ESPINOLA, 7 Tratado II5-JIJ.
10
The last and most authoritative member of the school of glossators, AcCURSIUS, instigated the query by his brief annotation (A. D. 1228) to the first
Imperial decree of the Justinian Codex (C. J. I, I, I ) , the Constitutio ''Cunctos populos." The postglossators developed the treatment of the conflict of
statutes (i. e., those of the upper Italian cities) as glosses to this Constitution.
The most outstanding postglossators were also the main authorities for conflicts
law: BARTOLUS DE SAXOFERRATO (1314-1357) and BALDUS DE UBALDIS (IJ2.7JfOO).
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the Roman law into which it was artificially incorporated,
this branch of law was regarded as universally binding. The
territoriai realm of the doctrines of the postglossators exceeded
even the boundaries within which the canon and Roman laws
were received as "written reason," representing the law of
all Christendom. These doctrines, as accepted and t:ransformed by eminent scholars in France 11 and Holland 12 during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, gained recognition in England and in the United States.
The law of conflicts thus became one field, in which the
common and civil laws had a common doctrinal basis and
which could be thought of as a truly international law. This
conception of a world community was still prevalent when
in I 834 the great American, Joseph Story, merged the Dutch
doctrine with the Anglo-American cases. His treatise acquired
authority in both hemispheres and contributed to the continuation, in renewed form, of an internationally-minded school
on the European Continent. In particular, Germany's
greatest jurist, Friedrich Carl von Savigny (I 849) using
Story's materials and rational method, 13 established the
fundaments of modern conflicts law. It was significant that
his treatment of this subject formed the last part of the
celebrated System of Modern Roman Law; for him, there
was no doubt about the suprastate nature of the subject matter.
This work of the leader of the historical school became the
prin~ipal authority in all Europe and Latin America during
most of the nineteenth century and is still highly regarded
11 The most famous scholars were MoLINAEUS (CHARLES DuMOULIN) ( 1 50o1566), and ARGENTRAEUS (BERTRAND D'ARGENTRE) (15I9-I59o). On these
see also MElLI, "Argentraeus und Monilaeus und ihre Bedeutung im internationalen Prviat- und Strafrecht," 5 Z.int.R. (1895) 363, 4p, 554· For what
is now Belgium, NICOLAUS BURCUNDUS (rs86-r649), and for Holland, CHillS.
TIAAN RODENBURCH (r6r8-I668), may be mentioned.
12
"Dutch school," main representatives: PAULUS VOET (r6I9-1677); Uuucus HuBER (1636-I694); JoHANNES VoET (t6I7-I7IJ). See LORENZEN,
"Huber's De Confiictu Legum" in Celebration Legal Essays (in honor of John H.
Wigmore, 1919) 199.
13 See SAVIGNY iv (tr. Guthrie 44); GuTZWILLER, 29 Recueil 1929 IV at J41.
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in certain countries. The international conception of "international private law" was adopted by Foelix (1843) in
France, a professed follower of Story, by the Belgian Laurent
(188o), the Italian Fiore (1869), 14 the Swiss Bracher
(I 87 I) / 5 and by almost all outstanding authors until approximately 1890.16 These authors wrote on conflicts law in
a common atmosphere, among brethren of the same creed,
envisaging its application in all countries. So did also the
scholars who with the eminent German, Ludwig von Bar
(I 862), 17 protested against being classified among the internationalists 18 but who nevertheless thought that special
studies, restricted to the positive laws of particular legal
systems, unaided by general theory, narrow in perspective,
·are prone to choose improper premises or to misconceive the
sphere of individual principles in the "organism" of international private law. 19
In time, the international community disintegrated. The
common law lawyers, segregated from the civil law background, instinctively receded from na'ive cosmopolitan attitudes. Absorbed in the judicial decisions of their countries,
they gave slight attention to developments elsewhere. In the
civil law countries on the other hand, from the end of the
eighteenth century, there appeared an increasing number of
14 PASQUALE FIORE, Elementi di diritto internazionale privata (Firenze,
I869).
15
CHARLES BROCHER, "Theorie du droit international prive," Revue I 87 r,
411, 540, Revue 1872, I89, Revue I873, I37> 390.
16
NussBAUM, D. IPR. II, and in an extensive paper, "The Rise and Decline
of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws," 42 Col. L. Rev.
( I942) 189, I 94, accounts for the prevalence of universalism or aprioristic
thought from I87o to I930, on divers assumptions which the present writer
does not share. See also GuTZWILLER, review of NussBAUM'S D. IPR., 8 Z.
ausl.PR. (I934) 652, and see the list of "nationalists" by KAHN, I Abhandl.
3 n. 2 and 270 n. 29.
17
BAR, Das internationale Privat- und Strafrecht (Hannover, I862).
18
BAR, "Neue Prinzipien und Methoden des internationalen Privatrechts,"
IS Archiv des offentlichen Rechts ( 1900) 1 at 11, 45·
19
Preface to the second edition of BAR, I Theorie und Praxis des internationalen Privatrechts vii {tr. Gillespie viii).
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national codifications of private law, which divided the
European Continent into separate units, secluding them behind
progressively higher barriers of national legislation. Relatively late, the impact of this process reached the conflicts
law. The specialists in this branch of law, which seems predestined always to lag behind the currents of general jurisprudence, were tardily and rudely awakened by the discovery
that the supposed international source of law did not exist. 20
Former universalist conceptions gave way to the knowledge
that conflicts rules no less than other rules of law must have
their roots in the soil of some state and that international
rules in the proper sense flow only from international custom
or treaties, and at that in a very thin stream. Thus, the longestablished international community of conflicts studies was
dissolved, and the national conflicts rules succumbed to the
same spirit of isolationism that permeated other fields of law.
Against this background, the meager achievements of the
Hague Conventions of I 902 and I 90 5 appeared like a little
island of blossoming internationalism.
Although the doctrine of "national" or "positive" origin
of conflicts rules has been definitely established long since, a
few ingenious thinkers have resented its dismal consequences.
They have tried to revive universal rules by new ideas. With
this in view, Pillet (I 894) 21 distinguished two classes of
municipal law, viz., necessarily territorial general rules and
"permanent" rules of extraterritorial application, the distinctive criterion being the "social purpose" of the rules. 22 The
German professor Zitelmann (I897), in a work full of suggestive ideas, conceived the possibility of creating a vast
20
The scientific formulation of .the "positivistic" approach was given by
NIEMEYER, Zur Methodik des internationalen Privatrechtes ( 1894) 26.
21
PILLET, "Le droit international prive. Essai d'un systeme general de
solution des confiits de lois," Clunet 1894, 417, 711, Clunet 1895, 241, 5oo, 929,
Clunet 1896, 5·
22
Cf. GAUDEMET, "La theorie des confiits de lois dans l'oeuvre d' Antoine
Pillet et Ia doctrine de Savigny," 1 MELANGES PILLET (1929) 89.
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system of conflicts law upon the basis of the law of nations. 23
Belatedly, Frankenstein (I 926) has spun a whole web of
conflicts rules from the premise that the only "scientific"
choice of law is primarily predicated upon the dominance
of each state over its citizens and over things in its territory. 24
Such deductive systems have been commonly rejected.
A third movement was initiated by the Italian patriot,
Mancini (I 85 I). 25 His vigorous emphasis on the function of
the nation produced a wave of emotional nationalism in the
field of international law. When Mancini advised the drafting of the preliminary provisions of the Italian Civil Code of
I 86 5, his postulates were transferred from international
public law to conflicts law, as expressed in the principle that
all persons should be governed by the law of the state whose
citizens. they are, which by an eventful transition of ideas became identified as the national law. This principle was adopted
in all Central and Southern Europe, as well as in Brazil,
Japan, and China. It was advocated by internationalists such
as Laurent, Andre Weiss, and Bartin and appears in the
German, Swedish, Polish, and many other legislations,
clearly embodying the doctrine of positivism. No other
doctrine has found more fervent adherents; none has more
estranged the civil and common laws from each other.
These three schools, the aprioristic internationalists, the
faithful expositors of fragmentary statutes and cases, the
23
See GuTZWILLER, "Zitelmann's volkerrechtliche Theorie des Internationalprivatrechts," in Festgabe, 16 Archiv fiir Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie
(r923) 468. A pious apology for Zitelmann's doctrine was written by BETTI,
"Ernst Zitelmann e il problema del diritto internazionale privato," 1 7 Rivista
(r925) 33, continued at r88.
24
See the criticism by YNTEMA, Book Review, 40 Harv. L. Rev. {1927)
794; YNTEMA, Book Review, 42 Harv. L. Rev. (1929) ro92; LoRENZEN,
Book Review, 36 Yal.: L. J. (1927) 1030; LoRENZEN, Book Review, 39 Yale L. }. (1930) 921; NEUMEYER, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 26o;
LEWALD, 2 Blatter f. JPR. (1927) 65; GUTZWILLER 1534; PACCHIONI 65;
complete bibliography by GHIRON, 27 Rivista (1935) us.
25
"Della nazionalita come fondamento del diritto delle genti," inaugural
address at the University of Turin.

LITERATURE, SOURCES OF CONFLICTS LAW

11

propagandists of nationality as the standard of personal rights
and duties, have had their time, and their time is over. A new
epoch began about 1925. Previously, a few far-seeing scholars,
Bar, 26 Kahn, Anzilotti, Niemeyer, 27 perceived that conflicts
rules, though derived from a national source like other
ordinary legal rules, have special functions and purposes
requiring a method of international scope. Kahn, one of the
most acute advocates of positivism, went so far as to postulate
that both the international and the positivistic methods should
be integrated through the comparative method and so superseded.28
2.

Modern Treatises

The following are the most significant works on conflict of
laws of the nineteenth century and of the first quarter of the
twentieth.
Engla~d. 29 The English courts were slow and reluctant to
adjust themselves to the application of foreign law. Until
recently, the literature was sparse. 30 In the nineteenth century Westlake alone wrote a treatise (I 858) purporting to
establish a system of conflicts. With this exception, the English
writers refrained from criticism of the courts and left the law
in the incoherent state represented in the cases. The often reedited treatise of Dicey ( 1 896) illustrates this descriptive
method with its finest and its less desirable characteristics.
26

I5 Archiv des offentlichen Rechts (I900) I, supt·a n. IS.
KAHN, I Abhandl. 3 I I, 3 I 5, 3 2.2, 3 26; ANZILOTTI, 11 diritto internazionale
nei giudizi interni (I9o5) I5I (see his earlier Studi critici di diritto internazionale privato ( 1 898) I 30 V), declared the conflicts rules national in form
(source) and suprastatal in substance: this formula served as a basis of a
peculiar theory which was followed by numerous Italian and French writers.
Cf. AGo, Teorilj. 83 n. 2; MAURY, 57 Recueil I936 III at 366; NIEMEYER,
Das IPR. des BGB. so.
28
I Abhandl. 502 (written in I 900).
29 Treatises by WESTLAKE, FOOTE, DICEY, HIBBERT, BURGE.
30
See HARRISON, On Jurisprudence and the Conflict of Laws (I878, 1879,
reprinted and annotated by LEFROY, 1919) 12I. The fi~st writers were JABEZ
HENRY (1823) and BURGE (1838) according to HARRISON, Clunet I88o, 429;
see also GUTZWILLER, 29 Recueil 1929 IV at 338.
27
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The intercourse within the parts of the British commonwealth occasioned a certain interest in their different legislations. The early work of Burge on colonial law, including
private international law, is being published in a revised,
monumental, though unsystematic, edition.
United States. 31 Succeeding Chancellor Kent's influential
Commentaries (I826-I8Jo), 32 Joseph Story's work (1834)
was of immense importance. 33 Admittedly, Story, who employed an eclectic method to choose among the various
doctrines of his predecessors, the statutists, in substantial
measure preserved their conceptions and solutions, but his
touch modernized the wealth of casuistic practice that lay immersed in the literature of half a millenium. These materials
he enriched with the English and American case law, and he
was the first to master the huge subject with the wisdom of a
great judge.
Thereafter, only two notable treatises appeared during
many decades: Wharton's valuable and richly documented
two volumes (I 872), which recognized legislative action,
instead of "moral duty" or "comity" as assumed by the
Dutch writers and Story, as the source of conflicts rules; and
the instructive compendium of Minor (I90I), providing a
doctrinal analysis of the cases as of the turn of the century.
A radical change came with the extraordinary achievements
of Beale. In an admirable effort, he collected and sifted the
case materials, which had piled up to a gigantic height, and,
31 KUHN, "La conception du droit international prive d'apres la doctrine et
la pratique aux Etats-Unis," 2I Recueil I928 I I93·
Treatises: KENT, STORY, WHARTON, MINOR, GOODRICH.
Casebooks: BEALE, LORENZEN, HARPER and TAINTOR, and by CHEATHAM,
DowLING, GooDRICH and GRISWOLD.
For lists of Anglo-American articles in the field of conflict of laws see
CHEATHAM, DOWLING, GOODRICH and GRISWOLD, Cases and Other Materials
on Conflict of Laws (I 94I) p. xlix, and LORENZEN, Cases and Materials on the
Conflict of Laws (I9J7) p. xxi.
32 J. KENT, Commentaries on American Law (4 vols., ed. I, New York,
1826-1830).
33 See the praise by HARRISON, supra n. 30, at I 19; 3 BEALE 1912.
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after many special studies, undertook to reconstruct the
American conflicts law into a unified system. His life work
culminated in the Restatement of the Law of Conflicts of
Laws,S 4 inspired and primarily prepared by Beale, which has
been promulgated (1934) by the American Law Institute,
and in his Treatise ( 1935) which presents an authoritative
commentary on the Restatement. One might compare the
historic role of Beale's work in American conflicts law with
that of the Glossa Magistralis of Accursius in the late Middle
Ages. More than a century of Anglo-American case law was
condensed under the leadership of a strong methodical mind.
V~lues buried in the vast mass of decisions were brought to
light and preserved for the future. In various subjects, court
practice gained increased certainty, and theoretical thinking
received decisive impulses; indeed, a new literature grew up.
Goodrich, footing on Beale's theories but adding his own
experience and sense for social policy, has written an excellent
leading textbook.
Most American writers, however, though grateful for
Beale's work, have turned against his doctrines. Beale was the
last eminent advocate of the theory of territorialism that
dominated the Dutch statutists. In its proper sense, the·
territorial nature of law predicates exclusive control by
domestic law in each jurisdiction. This theory, however enfeebled by gradual concessions, is the exact antipode of private
international law. This foundation of Beale's system was
entirely destroyed by Lorenzen and Cook. The revived theory
of vested rights by which Beale tried to maintain the doomed
principle of territorialism was successfully attacked by Yntema,
Cook, Lorenzen, Heilmann, and, on the Continent, by
34 Abroad the Restatement was much noticed. See particularly HARPER, "Das
'Restatement of Conflict of Laws' des Amerikanischen 'Law Institute,'" 9 Z.
ausl.PR. ( 19 35) 8 21 ; MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY, "The American Restatement," 21 Grotius Soc. 19 35, 161 ; BARBEY, "L'oeuvre du Professeur Beale, de
Harvard," Revue Crit. 1936, 86; NoLDE, "La codification du droit international prive aux Etats-Unis d'Amerique," Nouv. Revue 1936, 7•
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Arminjon, Wigny, and others who simultaneously were particularly interested in combatting Pillet's kindred philosophy.35 In addition, many particular points peculiar to the
Restatement were the object of special critical studies. Thus,
a new school has arisen, paralleling German efforts and promising further improvements.
France and Belgium. 36 The French masters of statutist
doctrine in the sixteenth century, d' Argentre and Dumoulin,
and their many disciples in the two succeeding centuries 37
established a tradition that has continued until recently, just
as the method of the postglossators in private law survived
after the Napoleonic codes for a considerable period into the
nineteenth century. This heritage, it would seem, included
various traits-a certain conservatism in method, an inclination toward a priori assumptions, an alert interest in the
problems presented in the courts, and comprehensive elaboration of the arguments involved in particular issues. Concurrently, the influence of Story and Savigny added new
elements. A large number of talented authors assured the
French literature a leading role, more completely justified
in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth than in the sixteenth or the eighteenth.
Richly documented treatises by Laurent, Boucher, and Rolin
were followed by the original systems of Vareilles-Sommieres
(r897), Bartin (Etudes 189·7, 1899), and Pillet (Principes
1903, Traite 1923-1924). Andre Weiss (Traite r 892-1905)
consolidated theory and practice in a comprehensive work, in
which the nationality principle was brought to its climax.
Numerous periodicals, headed by the Journal de droit inter35 See infra pp. 2 3ff.
36 Treatises of FoELIX, BOUCHER, V AREILLES-SOMMIERES, BARTIN, PILLET,
WEISS, AUDINET, DESPAGNET, VALERY, SURVILLE, NIBOYET, LEREBOURSPIGEONNLERE, ARMINJON (the last three now leading).
Belgium: LAURENT, ROLIN, POULLET (the last now leading).
37
Most famous: FRoLAND (published 1729, died 1746); BouLLENOIS (r6&oI]6z); BouHIER (r673-1746).
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national of Clunet (I 874-) and the Revue de droit international published by Darras (I 90s-)' in addition to
the Dictionnaire de droit international prive published by
Vincent and Penaud in I 888, 38 collected so many French and
foreign decisions that, as early as 1905, H. Donnedieu de
Vabres was able to describe the "evolution" 39 of the French
practice in a monograph.
Bartin, Niboyet, Pillet's outstanding disciple, and
Arminjon, a critically-minded former judge at the Egyptian
Mixed Tribunals, continued this brilliant literature. These
and other modern writers have constantly studied the judicial
decisions and meditated on general problems such as public
policy, formalities of legal acts, capacity, matrimonial property law, etc., while the courts have been interested in the
theoretical as well as the practical aspects of the cases. The
Revue has been continued in two rival periodicals edited,
respectively, by Niboyet and La Pradelle, who formerly had
jointly published the useful Repertoire de droit international
prive in ten volumes.
The French manner of conceiving conflicts problems contains a two-fold weakness. The tradition deriving from
d'Argentre, the French predecessor of Ulricus Huber, has
laid an extraordinary emphasis upon the national interest.
The following chapters dealing with the law of persons will
show the devastating effect of innumerable open or concealed
considerations of French "ordre public." For decades, writers
sharply criticized the tendency of the courts to apply French
law despite the ordinary principles of conflicts law, but, more
recently, the Traite of Niboyet (I938) and the Precis of
Lerebours-Pigeonniere (I 928 ), undoubtedly the two leading French works, testify to a violent struggle between the
88 R. VINCENT et E. PENAUD, Dictionnaire de droit international prive (Paris,
r888-r889).
89
H. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES, L'cvolution de la jurisprudence fran!>aise en
matiere de conflits des lois (Paris, 190 s).
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nationality principle, expounded by Andre Weiss and his
followers, and the fears and wishes of an apprehensive,
ambitious territorialism, represented by a movement, reflecting
the interests of an immigration country, that accentuates the
peculiarities of French legislation. On the other hand, the
individualism and independent judgment characterizing
French judges and jurists, which produce an abundance of
ideas within the limits of their methods, have resulted in a
curious instability. In many topics of conflicts law, every
conceivable opinion has its advocate. Neither writers nor
courts feel bound by precedent. Consequently, French conflicts law as a whole presents a great wealth of inspiring conceptions, attended by a degree of uncertainty, if not chaos,
that is scarcely compatible with the very purpose of this
branch of law.
ltaly. 40 Dionisio Anzilotti, eminent scholar of international
public law, has devoted a part of his work to conflicts law and
is to be regarded in both fields as the founder of an important
school, which also includes Cavaglieri, Salvioli/ 1 and Udina.
At a relatively early date, Diena published monographs on
international commercial law (1900-1905) and the principles
of private international law (1908-I910). In the 1930's, a
succinct manual by Pacchioni (I 930) and a perspicacious
treatise by Fedozzi (1935), accompanied under his leadership by works of other writers on ecclesiastical, commercial
and procedural conflicts, continued the Italian tradition. This
tradition has been characterized by refined abstract theory,
nourished by intimate knowledge of the French and German
developments. While Anzilotti possessed a high sense of
practicality, his successors have more and more yielded to the
scholastic passion for formulae and dialectic argument.
40 Treatises: FIORE, DIENA, GABBA, ANZILOTTI, CAVAGLIERI, UDINA, PACAco, GEMMA, Bosco, SCERNI,
41 G. SALVIOLr, Storia del diritto italiano (Torino, 1930).
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Italian writers have been the last in Europe to consider court
decisions. Fortunately, the light has recently been seen by
the younger authors noted below.
The distinguished periodical founded by Anzilotti in I 906,
the Rivista di diritto internaz.ionale, includes important contributions to conflicts law, but only few selected decisions.
Fedozzi founded a promising Rivista italiana di diritto internaz.ionale privata e processuale (I 93 I-I 93 2), which was
ended by his lamented death.
0 ther Latin countries. Numerous meritorious compendiums
related to the French, Belgian and Italian literature on conflicts law have been published in Argentina (Zeballos,
Calandrelli, Alcorta, Romero del Prado and, now leading,
Vi co), Brazil (Clovis Bevilaqua, Rodrigo Octavia, Pontes de
Miranda, Eduardo Espinola and his son), Colombia (Restrepo-Hernandez), Cuba (De Bustamante), Guatemala
(Matos), Rum.ania (Antonescu), and Spain (Lasala Llanas,
Trias de Bes).
The Netherlands. During this period, three outstanding
works appeared, namely, those of Asser (I 8 So), Jitta (I 9 I 6),
and Kosters ( I9I 7 ).
Germany. In Germany there was a less known statutist
school from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century/ 2 when
Waechter destroyed the entire doctrine (I 842). 43 The
modern development was brilliantly inaugurated by Savigny
in I 849. 44 His theories were accepted both by Roman law
scholars such as Seuffert, Keller, Holzschuher,. Unger,
-1.2 Thorough survey and criticism by WAECHTER, 2.4 Arch. Civ. Prax. (1841)
2.30 ff., and BAR § 19 ff.; see for the names also GUTZWILLER, 2.9 Recueil
192.9 IV 32-9-331.
43
WAECHTER's series of articles entitled "Ueber die Collision' der Privatrechtsgesetze verschiedener Staaten," appeared in 2.4 Arch. Civ. Prax. (1841)
2.30 ff., 2.5 Arch. Civ. Prax. (1842.) 1 ff., 161 ff., 361 ff.
44
On SAVIGNY'S work and effect: GUTZWILLER, Der Einfluss Savignys auf
die Entwicklung des lnternationalprivatrechts (192.3), and same, in 2.9 Recueil
192.9 IV at 353·
'
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Windscheid, and Regelsberger and by students of German
legal history like Walter, Gerber, Beseler, Roth, and Gierke. 45
Although an admirer of Savigny, Bar (I862), in his works,
especially in the second edition of his treatise, entitled Theory
and Practice (I 8 89), took a distinct position, joining
theoretical conception with profound study of civil and common law cases and presenting, for the first time since Story,
a comprehensive comparative law of conflicts. Zitelmann's
highly refined system and the penetrating analytical studies
of Franz Kahn, as well as the historical works of Neumeyer,
characterized the high level of scientific treatment in Germany
at the turn of the century. Leading decisions were reproduced
in the Zeitschrift fur Internationales Recht of Bohm, later
Niemeyer. Gebhard's drafts of the Law of I 896 46 and the
commentaries thereon by Niemeyer, Habicht and Niedner
are noteworthy.
Nevertheless, this literature was sporadic and heterogeneous, without definite working plan and method. The
courts struggled for principles; their decisions, although by
no means negligible, were not conveniently digested and,
consequently, were for the most part unknown. The German
courts, otherwise meticulous, often ignored the conflicts
problems hidden in cases.
In striking contrast to the richness of the French literature,
for many years there was no textbook on conflicts law in
Germany, and a good Austrian handbook by Walker was used
in repeated editions by the few interested students.
Switzerland. 47 In the nineteenth century, only the legislation of Zurich aroused more than local interest from the viewpoint of conflicts law. At the beginning of the present century,
the work of Meili, succeeding Bracher, was well known. It
45 For details see GUTZWILLER, Der Einfluss Savignys auf die Entwicklung
des lnternationalprivatrechts so, s6.
46 Einfiihrungsgesetz of August x8, 1896.
' 7 Treatises of BROCHER, MElLI, STAUFFER, BEcK, ScHNITZER.
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has been followed more recently by the booklet of Stauffer,
by Beck's extensive commentary on the Swiss enactments, and
finally by treatises on private and commercial laws by
Schnitzer.
Greece. 48 Greek legal science has exhibited much devotion
to private international law. There are excellent contributions
of recent date by G. Streit and Maridakis.
3· New Orientation
Roughly speaking, it may be contended that, until about
192 5, in the Anglo-American orbit, the theoretical approach
and, in the Continental literature, the practical understanding,
left very much to be desired. Had minds such as those of
Story and Bar continued to illuminate the way, grave mistakes
and defects would have been avoided. The deplorable state
of this branch of law was worse than the experts would
acknowledge. A few overrated controversies were endlessly
discussed. Other problems, often involving the simplest questions of daily occurrence, were neglected. Few things were
certain, and there were more incongruities than in any other
field of law. It needed the unspoilt mind of a newcomer to
conflicts law to be appalled at the maze of confusion and
injustice. Mancini's outburst at the absurd, deplorable
anarchy in the conflicts rules is famous. In I 8 79 Frederick
Harrison stated:
"There is a department of Law, the first principles of which
have been furiously disputed by lawyers; the canons of
which are hesitating and contradictory; the sources of which
are themselves a matter of argument; having an authority
which is most differently interpreted by doctors and judges;
and a sphere which is understood in various ways;-and
yet this branch of Law is attaining in our day continual
development and fresh importance from a variety of causes,
and in a manner often unobserved." 49
48 Treatises of KALLIGAS, CEKONOMIDES, KRASSAS, STREIT, MARIDAKIS.
49 HARRISON, Jurisprudence and the Conflict of Laws 98.
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Each word of this indictment, despite all efforts, remained
true for half a century thereafter. Recently, Cook has described
the American cases as "hopelessly contradictory and chaotic,"
even on the simplest questions. 50 This situation, bad enough
in each particular country, is worse in a world in which conflicts laws are inconsist~nt. A marriage may be valid in one
jurisdiction, invalid in another, previously valid but dissolved
in a third. Such is the state of the contractual relation, regarded
as the most solemn and sacred, whose existence or failure
involves the most vital interests of the spouses, their issue,
and their relatives. The reaction bf the business world to the
desperate plight of national conflicts laws-in the words of
a terrified corporation lawyer, a veritable labyrinth, 51superimposed upon the divergent national commercial laws,
has resulted in a striking phenomenon; international commerce has devised an elaborate network of arbitration and
standard forms to eradicate these conflicts laws so far as
feasible.
It is reassuring that a thorough revision now appears in the
offing. On the one hand, the technical revolution of the means
of communication reducing distances and destroying isolation
and, on the other, the political and economic upheaval caused
by the first World War, have made it clear that international
life needs a better order. The peace and postwar treaties and
the numerous international tribunals created after the war
brought little improvement, but they did exhibit appreciation
of this need and at the same time added a great many new
problems.
In Germany/ 2 depressed and struggling for life, the situation was most acute, and the interest in foreign and inter-

°

5 CooK, Legal Bases 136.
R. FRANKEL, "Der Irrgarten des internationalen Privatrechts," 4 Z.ausl.
PR. (1930) 239,241.
52 Treatises: see text. Monographs and papers: DuDEN, ECKSTEIN, H. LEWALD, NEUNER, RAAPE, RABEL, RAISER, WAHL, WENGLER.
61
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national law became painfully alive. While, before the war,
the otherwise richest juridical literature of the world had
left comparative law and conflicts rules to very few scholars
and no funds seemed available in the prosperous prewar
times for research in these subjects, the distress of the war and
postwar years reversed this attitude. The change of views
was distinctively reflected in the creation of two comprehensively planned and broadly conceived institutes in Berlin,
devoted respectively to foreign and international private law
and to foreign public and international law (1924-1925). 53
In these institutes, facts and legal phenomena were to be collected, current problems defined, and the functions and purposes of legal institutions clarified by comparative research.
With respect to conflicts of laws, the German cases had first
of all to be collected. This undertaking was greatly facilitated
by the works of Lewald and Melchior, who each for his own
handbook assembled the materials, both the older and more
recent. In 1926, the Institute of Foreign and International
Private Law initiated a yearbook of German decisions 54 and
commenced in its Review 55 to provide surveys of the foreign
cases. To signalize this modified outlook, the Review
celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the Reichsgericht (I 929)
in a series of articles constructing special doctrines on the
basis of judgments of this, the supreme court of Germany,
comparable to the American style of treatment and entirely
dissimilar to the usual European literature. It was one of the
tasks of the Institute to answer inquiries of German courts,
attorneys, and administrative authorities; in many hundreds
53 "lnstitut fiir ausllindisches und internationales Privatrecht" and "lnstitut
fiir auslandisches Recht und Volkerrecht." For history and organization see
RHEINSTEIN, "Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws in Germany," :1. U. of
Chi. L. Rev. (1935) zp, :z4o.
54 Die Deutsche Rechtsprechung auf dem Gebiete des internationalen Privatrechts in den Jahren 1926 und 19:1.7 {Berlin, 19:1.8-).
56 Zeitschrift fiir ausHindisches und internationales Privatrecht (Berlin, 1926-).
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of opinions, information on conflicts matters was given, extending knowledge and intelligent use of the applicable rules
so that the gulf between theory and practice, which had existed
since the end of the statutist period, was almost closed.
German lawyers were amazed at the number and quality
of the newly discovered precedents, which were soon given
attention by several handbooks.· Lewald (I 930-I 93 I) was
the first to renovate the German conflicts law (excepting commercial matters) on the basis of decided cases, with wellconsidered conclusions. Melchior (I 9 3 2), following the form
of Dicey's treatise, regarded the decisions as a true source of
law, supplementary to the Code; in this belief, he inquired
primarily into the ideas underlying the cases and formulated
rules of impressive originality. All other German writers
deny the binding force of case law. Nevertheless, Nussbaum
(I 93 2) in his treatise devoted primary attention to cases and
procedure and preferred a practical treatment to theoretical
analysis. Raape (I 93 I) provided a profuse exegesis of the
provisions in the Introductory Law of I 896; because of its
explicitness, this book will be most frequently cited in our
survey as representing the German doctrines. Finally, Martin
Wolff (I933) masterfully condensed the subject matter in a
textbook, small in size but rich in content. More recently,
Raape, the only one of these writers still in Germany, published a commendable introduction to the present German
conflicts law (I 93 8-I 939 ).
Thus, the long-standing scarcity of production was replaced during a few years by a vigorous stream of literature.
As deductive considerations gave way to practical studies,
many values were modified. However, it is not in the nature
of German students to sacrifice entirely systematic thinking
to empirical considerations. 56 In addition to the treatises
56
This seems to be disapproved by NussBAUM, Book Review, 40 Col. L. Rev.
(1940) 1461, 1470, who condemns what he calls the new "logistic school."
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mentioned, the learned outlines by Gutzwiller (I 9 3 r ) and
a number of monographs (Neuner, Raiser, Wengler, etc.)
contain good science. But for the time being too much had
and still has to be corrected to allow much generalization.
This new German school quickly influenced other European
countries. In conservative England, the pitiful state of conflicts law was suddenly subjected to refreshing criticism by
Foster 57 and Beckett; 58 a new handbook by Cheshire challenged Dicey's leading treatise, the second edition appearing
shortly after and extending the reforms suggested in the first.
An admirable collaborative undertaking was initiated in Italy.
Through the endeavors of Salvatore Galgano, commencing
in I 9 2 7, several comprehensive periodicals were inaugurated,
covering and annotating foreign decisions; of these, the
Giurisprudenza comparata di diritto internazionale privata
continued after the outbreak of the present war. Authors such
as Babinski and Przybylowski in Poland, 59 and younger
scholars, including Vittorio Tedeschi and Balladore-Pallieri
in Italy, Fragistas, Vallindas and Zepos in Greece, von
Steiger and Niederer in Switzerland, participate in this
practical international co-operation.
A little later than in Europe, a corollary reform began in
the United States and Canada. 60 Here, the enormous case
material had been assembled by Beale as the basis of the
Restatement. Immediately, new studies, criticizing antiquated
doctrines and correcting inaccurate terminology, appeared
by such eminent scholars as Lorenzen, Cook, Yntema,
57

J. G.

FoSTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws,"

r6 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84.
58 BECKETT, "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private International Law," r ~Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I 934) 46.
59 LEON BABINSKI, Zarys Wykladu prawa miedzynarodowego prywatnego
(Outlines of Private International Law) Vol. r, 1935; KAZIMIERZ PRZYBYLOWSKI1 Prawo Prywatne Miedzynarodowe (Private International Law) Vol. r,

I9H·

80 See

Cheatham, Cases, he, x.
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Cheatham, Falconbridge in Canada, Harper, Griswold and
Stumberg, who also published a realistic handbook. Another
modern treatise was devoted to the conflicts law of one particular state, Arkansas, by Leflar. The methodological
postulates of this reform have recently been stated in Cook's
magistral Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws
(I 942). Numerous' law review articles and a monograph or
two, such as Hancock's book on torts, 61 are promising for the
future development of this branch of law.
The American literature has attracted much attention in
France and Belgium, where its importance has been stressed
by Barbey, Lepretre, Wigny, and Batiffol, the last being the
best informed French expert on foreign conflicts law and international needs.
A common feature of all these new attempts is the decided
turning from deductive methods to considerations "of policy.
There are many other points of agreement, but also many
controversies as respects method. Private international law
has again become a young science, and children do have
diseases.
It remains to summarize what has recently been done for
research in foreign conflicts law. In the first place, foreign
cases, enactments, and literature have been reproduced or
reviewed on a large scale in the publications of the abovementioned institutes in Berlin and Rome, 62 as well as in other
61 MoFFATT HANCOCK, Torts in the Conflict of "Laws, Michigan Legal
Studies (Ann Arbor, Chicago, 1942).
62 Institute of Berlin: Zeitschrift fiir auslandisches und internationales Privatrecht (since I926/27), containing continuous reviews of conflicts law in Austria,
Belgium, France, Italy, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, selected
decisions involving conflicts law in the United States, Scandinavian cases, and
reports from many other countries; Deutsche Rechtsprechung auf dem Gebiete
des internationalen Privatrechts (I928-); Beitrage zum ausHindischen und
internationalen Privatrecht (I 928-). Rome Institute for Legislative
Studies (Instituto italiano di studi legislativi), editor GALGANO: Annuario di
diritto comparato (I 9 27-) ; Giurisprudenza comparata di diritto internazionale privato (I932-) (among seven periodicals).
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periodicals 63 and books of reference. 64 For an excellent collection of the enacted conflicts rules in force throughout the
world, as of 1929-an indispensable work-we have to thank
A. N. Makarov. 65 Under the auspices of the Hague Academy
of International Law, many competent lecturers have
treated the laws of particular countries as well as special
problems of comparative interest. 66
In addition, Niboyet and La Pradelle, generously aided by
foreign contributors, have published the Repertoire de
droit international, which includes reports on the conflicts laws
of many countries, some not previously examined, as well as
articles on related topics in French law accompanied by comparative observations. Much information is given in the
Rechtsvergleichendes Handworterbuch of Schlegelberger,
in which the conflicts laws of the world were, for the first
time, described in an excellent, though sketchy, synthetic
review (I 933). 67 The treatise on Greek Private International
Law (1937) of the distinguished Greek diplomat and
scholar, G. Streit, and his valiant disciple, Vallindas, admirably
indicates the literary doctrines of all countries. In the United
States, Lorenzen 68 deserves commendation for attracting the
63 Especially for Eastern Europe the periodicals of the Institute in Breslau
(Osteuropa Institut): Zeitschrift fur osteuropaisches Recht (19z5-192.7), later
merged with Ostrecht into Zeitschrift fiir Ostrecht (192.7-1934) and finally
again, Zeitschrift fiir osteuropaisches Recht (Neue Folge, 1934-).
· Internationales Jahrbuch fiir Schiedsgerichtswesen, edited by ARTHUR NussBAUM (Berlin, 19z6-). American edition: International Year Book on
Civil and Commercial Arbitration (New York, 192.8-).
64
BERGMANN, Internationales Ehe- und Kindschaftsrecht (z vols., ed. z, Berlin,
1938-1940),
65 MAKARov, Das internationale Privatrecht der europaischen und aussereuropaischen Staaten. Erster Teil: Die Quellen des internationalen Privatrechts (Berlin, 19z9).
66
Published in Recueil des cours de 1'Acadcmie de droit international de Ia
Haye (192.5-).
67
Internationales Privatrecht, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. (1933) 32.o-542..
66 See in particular LoRENZEN, "The French Rules of the Conflict of Laws,"
36 Yale L. J. (192.7) 731; 37 ibid. (192.8) 849; 38 ibid. (192.8) 165. !d., "The
Conflict of Laws of Germany," 39 Yale L. J. (1930) 8o4; 40 ibid. (1931) 401.
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attention of the scholarly world to foreign conflicts laws.
Finally, Arthur K. Kuhn has coordinated on broad lines
American and European institutions of private international
law (I937) and Nussbaum has published a volume of comparative observations on the general doctrines of common
law and civil law (I943). 69
III.
1.

SouRCES

Codifications

The first considerable codification of conflicts rules was provided in articles 7 to 3 I, inclusive, of the Introductory Law
that accompanied-the German Civil Code of I 896. This body
of rules had been elaborated carefully by Gebhard but, for
somewhat obscure reasons, allegedly political, was reduced by
Bismarck and the upper House so as to cover in its final form
only a part of the subject matter. Contracts are left out entirely, and most rules are limited to cases in which the application of German law is required (so-called unilateral rules).
What is more, these provisions lack the elaborate detail work
for which the Code is famous. Nevertheless, the task was
novel, and the skill and precision employed were high enough
to impress contemporaries. Subsequently, this part of the
German law served as a model for a slightly more extensive
Japanese Law of June I 5, I 89 8, and for a similar Chinese Law
of August 5, I9I8. The Hague Conventions of I902 and
I 90 5 on divers matters of conflicts law were based on the same
principles, and they were in turn closely followed by the
Swedish statutes of July 8, I904, amended by later laws, and
of June I, I9I2. Also, the excellent Austrian draft of I9I3
of an international private law was conceived on the same
69
Unfortunately I do not know more than the title of LEVY ULLMANN, Cours
generalt de droit international prive selon la methode historique, jurisprudentielle et comparative (annee universitaire I9JI-I9J2) stenographic publiee par
"Les cours de droit" (licence, 3• annee).
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lines; it served as the basis of the important Polish. Law of
August 2, I 926 (whose principal author Zoll had been a member of the Vienna draft committee), as well as for the frequently cited Czechoslovak draft of I924 and I93I. Indirectly, the German law has influenced all more recent
legislative projects in Europe.
The Code Napoleon of 1804 devoted to the problem of its
territorial application only one article of the preliminary title
and a few other dispersed provisions, and in European France
there was no subsequent codification. Likewise, the Austrian
Civil Code (I 8I I), which is still in force in some regions,
was satisfied with a few superficial rules(§§ 4, 34-37, 300),
in contrast to the Prussian Landrecht (1794), which incorporated more comprehensive provisions, partly based on statutist
doctrine (see e.g., Introduction,§§ 27-49) and partly representing original ideas. The European and Latin American
civil codes of the French type have retained the custom of
touching on conflicts in a preliminary title, or law, but with
gradual additions, for instance, Italy (I 865, and enlarged in
I938 and I942), the Netherlands (I829), Quebec (I866),
Brazil (I942).
Recently, such preliminary provisions have taken the shape
of short codifications in the civil codes of Greece (I 940),
Rumania (1939), 70 and Peru (I936).
Moreover, the statutory regulations of French Morocco
(I 9 I 3) and Spanish Morocco (I 9 I 4), concerning relations
between subjects and foreigners, include a number of modern
conflicts rules based on the French doctrines. In the absence
of codifications in the motherlands, these provisions are often
cited. Suggestions for legislation have been made by learned
70 The Civil Code and Code of Civil Procedure appeared in the Monitorul Of.
on November 8, 1939, and were ratified by the Constituent Assembly by law
of December 21, 1939, but the effective date was delayed to September 15, 1940.
We are not informed whether these codes and the new Commercial Code, similarly
deferred, are in force.
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societies. In particular, a draft of the Society for Legislative
Studies, concerning the status of foreigners in France and of
Frenchmen in foreign countries, 71 deserves attention. Bartin
considers this project as the legislation of tomorrow/ 2 but it
is a singular document of overstressed nationalism.
A separate position has been taken by Switzerland. The
statute of June 25, I 89I, was mainly a regulation of the interstate conflicts between the Swiss cantons having at that time
full legislative power over private law. A few additional
provisions incidentally considered Swiss citizens abroad (arts.
2 8-3 I) and foreigners in Switzerland (arts. 32-34). · In
I9I2, when the Federal Civil Code of I907 became effective,
the significance of the statute of I 89 I was limited to cases of
the latter type; thus, international private law was left largely
dependent upon these not too well-drafted sections and certain additions (C. C., final title, art. 59). What the Federal
Tribunal has been able to do with this precarious legislation
is noteworthy.
The most extensive national codification of conflicts law has
been undertaken in the tiny principality of Liechtenstein; provisions dealing with conflicts have been inserted in the various
chapters of a recent civil code, which has been partially promul-·
gated. This codification is a curious mixture of clauses inviting big finance and reflecting inordinate nationalism. 73
2.

Special Legislation

Conflicts rules on special matters exist, of course, in many
countries. In numerous states of the United States, various
uniform laws and other statutes deal with the conflicts aspects
of marriage and wills; also provisions on immovable prop71 Deliberations and Project have been published in Bulletin de la Societe
d'etudes legislatives; see the tentative draft in 24 ibid. (1928) 399; discussion
26 ibid. (1930) 76; and definitive text in 26 ibid. (1930) 175· BARTIN was
·
president and NIBOYET reporter of the draft committee.
72 BARTIN, 2 Principes 201.
73
See the reviewby WAHLE, 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 134.
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erty, contracts and capacity are frequent. 74 There is but one
exceptional Federal enactment, 711 although Congress apparently has legislative power on the subject. 711
3· Multilateral Treaties
(a) Montevideo Treaties. The treaties on international
law of Montevideo of February I z, I 8 89, are a worthy object
of pride for the five countries that have ratified them, viz.,
Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. 77 The
first international agreements of their kind, they achieved an
extensive unification, remarkable despite the close relationship of the legislations involved, facilitating cooperation. Of
this unification, the treaties concerned with "international
civil law" and "international commercial law," in particular,
will be considered in the appropriate connections in the present
book. To celebrate the fifty years' anniversary of the treaties,
a conference wa~ held in Montevideo in I 93 9 and r 940, which
adopted considerable modernizations of the old rules. 78 How74 An attempt to collect these and certain other statutory provisions has been
made by MAKAROV, Quellen 24-2-266.
7S U.S. C. tit. 22 § p, see infra p. 238, n. 161.
76
CHEATHAM, "Sources of Rules for Conflicts of Laws," 89 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. (1941) 430, 441, 442.
77 Texts: Official (Spanish) text in ERNESTO RESTELLI, Aetas y tratados
del Congreso sudamericano de derecho internacional privado, Montevideo I888r889 (1928).
French: MARTENS, r8 Recueil general de trartes, 2. serie, 424-453; German:
HECK in I Z.int.R. (1891) 339-340, 477-482; MEru, Die Kodifikation des
internationalen Civil- und Handelsrechts (1891) 103-138.
History: Aetas de las sesiones del Congreso sudamericano de derecho internacional privado, Buenos Aires, r8 89.
Li~rature: PRADrER-FoDERE, "Le congres de droit international sudamericain et les traites de Montevideo," in 21 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1889)
217-2.37> 561-577; SEGOVIA, El derecho internacional privado y el Congreso
sudamericano de Montevideo (Buenos Aires, 1889); HECK, "Der Kongress
von Montevideo und das internationale Vertragsrecht der siidamerikanischen
Staaten," r Z.int.R. (1891) 339-346, 4-77-4-83, 592-6oo; BEWEs, "The
Treaties of Montevideo, Text of r889,'' 6 Grotius Soc. 1920, 59·
78
Segundo Congreso sudamericano de derecho internacional privado de Montevideo, 1 9 39-194o, published by Facultad de derecho y ciencias sociales, Instituto argentino de derecho internacional. For a first view of the contents, see
RABEL, "The Revision of the Treaties of Montevideo on the Law of Conflicts,''
in 39 Mich. L. Rev (t941) 517· English translation by J. IRRIZARRY y PUENTE
and G. L. WILLIAMS in 37 Am. ]. Int. Law, number 3, July, 1943.
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ever, the new texts have not yet been ratified. For the most
part, conflicts rules are contained in the treaties respectively
concerning international "civil" law, the law of land commerce, and the law of maritime commerce. In the present
volume, the first of these treaties is of special interest and will
be referred to as the treaty of Montevideo.
(b) Hague Conventions. Widely praised but much less
comprehensive, the Hague Conventions of I 902 and I 90 5
were concluded only after arduous efforts. 79 Their provisions
cover but a few selected questions, and these they answer with
many reservations on the part of the reluctant member states.
With the exception of the relatively popular procedural
79 Conventions of The Hague of I9o2 and I905. Official (French) text in
MARTENS, 31 Recueil general de traites, 2° serie, 706-7I5; 6 ibid. 3° serie,
48D-489.
English translation by ARTHUR H. KUHN, in F. MElLI, International Civil
and Commerical Law (I905) 532; German translation in German Reichsgesetzblatt I904 1 22I H.; RGBl. I909, 409 H., RGBl. I9I2; 453 H.; reproduced
in MAKAROV, Die Quellen des internationalen Privatrechts (I929) 336 H., 342
H.; Italian translation in AMEDEO GIANNINI, Le convenzoni dell'Aja di diritto
internazionale privata (Roma, I925).
On the history of the Hague Conventions see Actes de !a Conference de !a
Haye, chargee de reglementer diverses matieres de droit international prive
(13-27 septembre 1893) (2 vols. in I 1 LaHaye, I893); Actes de la Deuxieme
Conference de la Haye chargee etc. (25 juin-13 juillet I 894) (LaHaye, I 894);
Actes de la Troisieme Conference de la Haye pour le droit international prive
(z9 mai-18 juin I9oo) (LaHaye, I9oo); Actes et documents de la Quatrieme
Conference de !a Haye pour le droit international prive (I6 mai-I7 juin I904)
(La Haye, I 904). Provisions of national law and cases relating to the Conventions: J. KosTERS and F. BELLEMANS, Les conventions de !a Haye de I9oz et
190 5 sur le droit international prive (La Haye, I 9 2 I), continued by surveys in
6 Bulletin de l'Institut intermediaire international (I 9 2 2 ff.), since I 9 3 3 under
title of Bulletin de l'Institut j uridique international. Literature: F. KAHN, Die
Dritte Haager Staatenkonferenz fiir internationales Privatrecht, in Griinhut's
Z. vols. u, I3 1 and I5 (I90J 1 1905), also in KAHN, z Abhandl. 37-178, JOJ444· BuZZATI, Trattato di diritto internazionale priv~lto secondo le convenzioni
dell'Aja (Milano, 1907); also French by F. REY (Paris, 19II). MElLI and
MAMELOK, Das internationale Privat- und Civilptozessrecht auf Grund der
Haager Konventionen (Zurich, 19I I); LEWALD, "Haager Konventionen zum
internationalen Privatrecht," in STRUPP, 1 \Vorterbuch des Volkerrechts und der
Diplomatic 454-48I; HEINSHEIMER, "Haager Zivilprozessabkommen," ibid.
487. M. TRAVERS, La Convention de la Haye relative au mariage (z vols., Paris,
I91Z); TRAVERS, La Convention de la Haye relative au divorce et a la separation de corps (Paris, 1909); TRAVERS, "La Convention de la Haye relative
a la tutelle des mineurs et les accords anterieurs passes par la France," Revue
1912, 641·
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treaty, they were ratified by only a few, though important,
states and later partially deserted even by some of these.
In I9J8, the conventions were binding upon the following
states:
(i) Convention to regulate the conflict of laws in regard
to Marriage, of June I2, I902.
Danzig, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Rumania (old territory), Sweden, Switzerland.
(ii) Convention to regulate the conflict of laws and jurisdictions in regard to Divorce and Separation, of June 12,
1902.

Danzig, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Rumania (old territory).
(iii) Convention to regulate the Guardianship of Minors,
of June I2, I902.
Belgium, Danzig, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Rumania (old
territory), Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.
(iv) Convention concerning the conflict of laws relating to
the Effects of Marriage on the rights and duties of the
spouses in their personal relations and on the property
of the spouses, of July I 7, I 90 5.
Danzig, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Rumania (old territory), Sweden.
( v) Convention concerning Interdiction and similar Measures of Protection, of July I 7, I 90 5. (Interdiction means
the deprivation of an adult's competency to act legally.)
Austria, Danzig, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Rumania (old territory),
Sweden.
(vi) Convention concerning Civil Procedure, of July 17,
I 90 5 (treats only the participation of foreigners in lawsuits).
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Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Danzig,
Esthonia, Finland, France (as to the signatories of the
protocol of ratification of July 4, 1924), Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania (old territory), Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia.
During the first World War, it was disputed whether the
conventions were suspended as between the two belligerent
groups. Italian courts negatived the question, 80 but it may
be reopened in the present war.
A very important step has been taken by the Protocol signed
at The Hague, March 2 7, I 93 I, recognizing the competence
of the Permanent Court of International Justice to interpret
the Hague conventions on private internationallaw, 81 acceded
to by Belgium, Estonia, the Netherlands, and Portugal.
(c) C6digo Bustamante. This is a complete codification
in 43 7 sections, including the entire international private law
in 29 5 sections and in the remainder criminal and procedural
conflicts law. Drafted by the Cuban jurist, Antonio Sanchez
de Bustamante y Sirven, this Code of International Private
Law was adopted at the Sixth Pan-American Conference in
Havana on February 20, 1928,82 and has been ratified by
80 Especially App. Venezia (Oct. 9, I9I7) Giur. Ital. I9I7, I, 2, 440; also
KosTERS-BELLEMANS 493· For other opinions, see the survey by ROHLAND, 32
Z.int.R. (I924) 74, 78.
81 Came into force April 12, I936. I67 League of Nations Treaty Series
(1936) 341.
82
Spanish text with Portuguese, French and English translations in 86 League
of Nations Treaty Series ( 1929) 7 I I ; English and French in HUDSON, 4 Int.
Legislation 2279 No. I86, 2283 No. I86a; French by PAUL GouLi~ in NIBOYET
et GOULE, 2 Recueil de textes usuels de droit international (1929) so8. Also
in BusTAMANTE y SIRVEN, Le Code de droit international prive et la Sixieme
Conference panamericaine (1929) 150. In German, books I and II by MAKAROV
and REUPKE, in MAKAROV 397-418.
On the history of' the Code, see ANTONIO SANCHEZ DE BusTAMANTE y SIRVEN,
La Comision de jurisconsultos de Rio de Janeiro y el derecho internacional
(Habana, 1927), translated by GoULE: La Commission des jurisconsultes de
Rio de Janeiro et le droit international (Paris, 1928); El Codigo de Dere~ho
Internacional Privado y Ia VI. Conferencia pana~ericana (Habana, 1929),
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fifteen Latin American states, viz., 88
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.
Bolivia and Peru, having adhered to both the Montevideo
Treaties and the Havana Treaty, have authoritatively declared the former to prevail in their relations with each
other. 84
(d) Scandinavian Treaty. Extensive legislative cooperation among the Scandinavian countries, 85 fostered by their
historic affinity, has found significant expression with respect
to conflicts law in a convention concluded in Stockholm on
February 6, 1931, by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway,
and Sweden, containing "provisions of private international
translated by GOULE: Le Code de droit international prive et la vr Conference panamericaine (Paris, 1929).
Literature: See primarily the works of the author of the Code, ANTONIO
SANCHEZ de BusTAMANTE y SIRVEN (cited in the list of abbreviations), including his discussion of the application of the Code to Cuba in his Manual de
derecho internacional privado (Habana, 1939). AUDINET, "Un projet de Code
de droit international prive," Revue 1927, 'r; FRAGA, "Die Kodi:fikation des
internationalen Privatrechts in Amerika," 1 Z.ausl.PR. (1927) 563; KuHN,
Book Review, 20 Am.]. Int. Law (1926) 631; 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 480.
83 For ratification and accessions to this and the subsequently mentioned treaties,
see League of Nations, Official No. A.6.t939· Annex I. V.
84 In signing the C6digo Bustamante, Bolivia reserved its obligations under
the Montevideo Treaties. This has been held decisive for the relations between
Bolivia and Peru by the Supreme Court of the lat!er country. Decision of
Gonzalez, Dec. 7, 1935, 2 Tratados, convenciones y acuerdos vigentes entre el
Peru y otros Estados (19J6) sr6; Lurs G. ALVARADO, Apuntes de derecho in·
ternacional ( 1940) 6o.
85 Relatively uniform legislation on marriage, adoption and guardianship was
introduced in Sweden, Denmark and Norway from 1917 to 1927, and Finland
approximated its laws to this convention in 1925 and 1929. Conventions, including Iceland, followed on: Collection of Maintenance Allowances, of February ro, 1931 (English and French translations in 126 League of Nations
Treaty Series (1932) 51; HuDsoN, 5 Int. Legislation 885 No. 282); on
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments, of March r6, 1932 (139 League
of Nations Treaty Series (1934) 181; HUDSON, 6 Int. Legislation 6 No. 305);
on Bankruptcy, of November 7, 1933 ( 15 ~ League of Nations Treaty Series
(1935) 133; HUDSON, 6 Int. Legislation 496 No. 351); and on Inheritance and
Succession, of November 19, 1934 (164 League of Nations Treaty Series (1935)
279; HUDSON, 6 Int. Legislation 947 No. 397, 953 No. 397a). C/. UDDGREN, 9
Z.ausl.PR. (1935) 513; MARKS VON WURTEMBERG, to Z.ausl.PR. (1936)
711·
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law in the field of marriage, adoption, and guardianship," in
·
force from January I, I 93 2. 86
(e) Conventions on Negotiable Instruments. Substantial
success was attained in the two 9eneva conventions of I930
and I 93 I, providing a Uniform Law of Bills of Exchange and
a Uniform Law of Checks: 87
(i) Convention for the settlement of certain conflicts of
laws in connection with Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, of June 7, I930, in force from January I,
I934·
Austria, Belgium, Danzig, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal (without colonies),
Sweden, Switzerland.
(ii) Convention for the settlement of certain conflicts of
laws in connection with Checks, of March I 9, I 93 I, in
force from January I, I934·
Danzig, Denmark (except Greenland), Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Monaco, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Portugal (without
colonies), Sweden, Switzerland.
86 English and French translations in I :z6 League of Nations Treaty Series
(I93I) I4I; HUDSON, 5 Int. Legislation 877 No. :z8I, 884 No. 281a; German
translation and comment by BLOCH in 8 Z.ausl.PR. (I934-) 627; VIGGO BENTZEN-HAMMERICH, "La recente Union scandinave de droit international prive,"
Revue I934-, 855.
87 Official French and English texts in I43 League of Nations Treaty Series
(1934) 3I7, 332,409, 424; HuDSoN, 5 Int. Legislation 550 No. 2.59, 558 No.
259a, and 9I5 No. 284,92.4 No. :z84a.
Comments: HUDSON and FELLER, "The International Unification of Laws
Concerning Bills of Exchange," 44 Harv. L. Rev. (I93I) 333 at 370; FELLER,
"The International Unification of Laws Concerning Checks," 45 Harv. L. Rev.
(I932) 668 at 692.; ARMINJON et CARRY, La lettre de change et le billet a
ordre (Paris, I 9 38) ; LEscoT, La nouvelle legislation de la lettre de change
(Paris, I937); PERCEROU et BoUTERON, La nouvelle legislation fran<;aise et
internationale de la lettre de change, du billet a ordre et du cheque (Paris,
I 9 3 7) ; XAVIER ]ANNE, "L'unification internationale des lois sur les effets de commerce," 56 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I9:z9) sz, 1 SYMMIKTA STREIT
(1939) 477-483; LENHOFF, Einfiihrung in das einheitliche Wechselrecht,
(Wien, Berlin, 1933); QuASSOWSKI, "Die Genfer Abkommen iiber die Vereinheitlichung des Wechselrechts," 4 Z.ausl.PR. (1930) no; DE SEMO,
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In Yugoslavia, a law has approved all six Geneva conventions but no ratification seems to have occurred.
(f) Other multilateral efforts. On the fringe of our subject matter, recent important conventions have been concluded
on the following topics: 88
(i) Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, opened for signature
at Geneva, September 24, 1923. 89
Alabama, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Great Britain (and
many parts of the British commonwealth), Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Danzig, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand.
(ii). Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, opened for signature at Geneva, September 26, 1927. 90
Austria, Belgium, Great Britain (and parts of the British
commonwealth), Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Danzig,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Rumania, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand.
(iii) Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to
. the Conflict of Nationality Laws, opened for signature
at The Hague, April 12, 1930, in force from July I,
1937·91
Ratifications or accessions until August 28, 1939, by
Belgium, Brazil, Great Britain (all territories), Canada,
"L'unificazione internazionale del diritto cambiario," 7 Annuario Dir. Comp.
(1932) 220,
88 See list of ratifications and accessions League of Nations, Official No.
A.6.1939. Annex I.V.
89
27 League of Nations Treaty Series (1924) 157; MARTENS, 19 Nouveau
recueil general de traites 3e serie, I 56; HUDSON, 2 Int. Legislation I 062 No. 98.
90 92 League of Nations Treaty Series (1929) 301; HunsoN, 3 Int. Legislation 2153 No. 183.
91
Text from League of Nations Document, C.224.M.tii,I9Jo.V; HuDSON,
5 Int. Legislation 359 No. 249·
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Australia, India, China, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden.
(iv) Simultaneously with the Convention under (iii), a
"Protocol relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness" and
a "Special Protocol concerning Statelessness" have been
concluded, 92 the first of which is in force from July I,
I 93 7 in Brazil, Great Britain (with all territories),
Australia, South Africa, India, Chile, China, the Netherlands, Poland, El Salvador.
More conflicts rules have been established in multipartite
conventions providing uniform treatment of such matters as
communication and transportation, with respect to problems
that proved inaccessible to unification. 93
(g) Drafts. The tireless efforts of the Dutch Government
in promoting the Hague Conferences on conflicts law were
continued in I925 and I 928, 94 and resulted in elaborate treaty
drafts regarding the law of succession on death ( 192 5 and
I928) and bankruptcy (1902 and 1928), which were not ratified. Moreover, certain provisions supplementary to the
earlier conventions, referring in particular to persons without
nationality or having more than one nationality, were adopted
and, although not ratified, apparently have had some influence. Attempts to unify the conflicts rules on sales of goods,
however, did not succeed. 95 Both political contrasts and doctrinal controversies contributed to all these failures.
92 League of Nations Document, C.226.M.IIJ.193o.V; League of Nations
Document, (:.227.M.114.1930.V., HUDSON, 5 Int. Legislation 381 No. 251 and
387 No. 252.
93 For example, see the rules concerning aviation, enumerated by HuDSON, 4
Int. Legislation 2354.
9 ' Conference de la Haye de droit international prive. Actes de la Cinquieme
Session tenue du 12 octobre au 7 novcmbre 1925 (LaHaye, 1926). Documents
relatifs a la Cinquieme Session (La Haye, 19 26). Actes de la Sixieme Session
tenue du 5 au 28 janvier 1928 (LaHaye, 1928). Documents relatifs ala Sixieme
Session tenue du 5 au 28 janvier I928 (LaHaye, 1928). See accounts. by KosTERsinRevueDr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I926) I56, 245; (I928) 813; (I929) 308,
79r; TRAVERS, Revue I926, 220; VoLKMAR, JW. 1926 1 307; I928, 857;
]ULLIOT DE LA MoRANDJ:ERE, Clunet I928, 28I.
95 The remarkable last draft, by a Special Committee of June 2 I 9 3 I has been
1
published in 7 Z.ausl.PR. (I933) 957·
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4· Bilateral Treaties
In addition to the multilateral treaties concluded under the
auspices of the League of Nations, the postwar period of the
1920's and early 1930's produced numerous bilateraltreaties,
containing clauses promoting international intercourse. The
subjects treated include status of foreign persons, both individuals and business organizations, judicial assistance, enforcement of foreign judgments, and the like, with occasional true
conflicts rules interspersed. In this way, more progress was
achieved than in any other, and for the first time Great Britain
participated.

5· Case Law
It has already been noted that even in civil law countries
conflicts rules to a large extent are judge-made. French and
Belgian courts have to operate almost without any written
rules. The manner in which German courts, from early times,
have treated the problems in this field and have done so since
I 900 in the absence of provision by the Introductory Law, has
some similarity to Anglo-American practice. 96 The same is
true of Switzerland, whose statute is insufficient, and in many
other countries.
Consequently, the rules are flexible and incomplete, and
very far from being frozen or petrified as certain theorists
imagine. Precedents are reversed, when shown to be unreasonable.
· In the United States, it is problematical whether conflict of
laws is subject to general federal law, in addition to common
law as coined in the different jurisdictions. It seems now
settled that no such source of law is available to the federal
courts in diversity of citizenship cases. 97 Except in such cases,
96

See GUTZWILLER, 6 Z.ausl.PR. (1932.) 75·
Klaxon Company v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., Inc. (1941) 313 U. S.
487; Griffin, Administrator v. McCoach, Trustee (1941) 313 U.S. 498.
97
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the question is open 98 but has so far remained without practical importance. Federal courts may perhaps still subject conflicts rules regarded as procedural to an approach different
than in state courts. 99
However, as may be noted by foreign readers, this question
has nothing to do with the influence of the Federal Constitution, as developed by the Supreme Court of the United States,
on the application of the conflicts rules. As the cases, in their
overwhelming majority, involve the relations between two
sister states of the Union rather than international intercourse
with a foreign country, constitutional requirements respecting
due process of law, interstate commerce, privileges and immunities of citizens, full faith and credit of acts, documents
and judicial proceedings, or impairment of obligations, exercise a more or less intensive effect by unifying and controlling
the solution of conflicts in the separate jurisdictions. 100
6. International Custom
Apart from treaties, is there any international conflicts law
established by custom within the international community of
states? According to an opinion universally obtaining, each
member of this community is bound to have some sort of conflicts law, in order to leave to other states the power of adjudicating situations, persons or things, exclusively belonging to
CooK, Legal Bases 1o8, 143.
Note: "After Erie Railroad v. Tompkins: Some Problems in 'Substance'
and 'Procedure,"' 38 Col. L. Rev. (1938) 1472; Note: "Congress, the Tompkins Case and the Conflict of Laws," 52 Harv. L. Rev. (1939) 1ooz;. NussBAUM,
Principles 62 ff.
100
See the explanations to foreign readers by YNTEMA, "lnternational-privatrechtliche Entscheidurtgen in den Vereinigten Staaten im Jahre 1926," in
2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 856; and LoRENZEN, "The Federal Constitution of the
United States of America as a Source of Private International Law," 3 Recueil
d'Etudes sur les sources du droit, en l'honneur de Fran~ois Geny (1934) 437465.
98
99
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their respective domains. 101 What does this maxim practically mean, however, after Zitelmann's failure to derive the
conflicts law from the requirements imposed by the law of
nations upon states? Probably no tangible derivation can be
found. 102 Of course, outside of the domain of conflicts law,
public' international law has important aspects for the treatment of foreigners 103 and assumption of jurisdiction. 104
There are, finally, certain rules of almost universal force,
such as the rules that the law of the situs governs immovable
property, that a tort is governed by the law of the place where
the allegedly tortious act transpires, or that the formalities of
legal acts are determinable by the law of the place where they
occur. These rules were established by statutist doctrines at
a time when state borders did not exist as today. But now
these uniform rules are national. The law of nations never
was their source. They are simply customary law of a great
majority of states, though as such important. International
courts have been glad to avail themselves of such rudiments
of trans-national rules. The common law countries possess
in common numerous additional rules of customary origin,
which because of their significance are known as principles of
conflict. 105 No conflicts rule, however, has attained, on the
basis of international usage, a universal standing without ex101 Since SAVIGNY § 348, a constant principle. See for literature Aco, Teoria
70 n. I, 82 n. I, I 26 n. I, and for analysis BARTIN, I Principes I I z.
102 MELCHIOR (skeptical), 36; RuNDSTEIN, "La structure du droit international prive et ses rapports avec le droit des gens," Revue I936, 3I4, 5I2 at
536; FEDOZZI II6. Contra: CAVAGLIERI 49> so; ]ITTA, La methode du droit
international prive (LaHaye, I89o) 69; MAURY, 57 Recueil I936 III 325,
355· CHEATHAM, "Sources of Rules for Conflict of Laws," 89 Univ. of Pa. L.
Rev. (I94I) 430 at 434 ff., mentions three cases of diplomatic intervention
without result.
103
See M. WoLFF, IPR. 8.
104
See CHEATHAM, 89 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. (194I) 430 ff., supra n. 102.
105
BURGE, 2 Colonial and Foreign Law 29-36 (Statement of Principles); I
WHARTON I ("preliminary principles") ; DICEY (Table of Principles and
Rules) LXV-CXXXIV.
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ception, equivalent to that of the general principles of the jus
gentium.
7. Conclusion
It is notable that of the enacted or restated conflicts rules
existing today in the world, only the two Latin American
multipartite treaties and the Restatement, the latter not a law
but purporting to reproduce the law, are comparable in comprehensiveness and elaborateness to codifications of private
law as known to lawyers in most countries. The remaining
efforts, rudimentary if not poor, contrast strikingly with the
usual fondness of civil law countries for statutes and codes 106
and even with the recent increase of legislation in AngloAmerican jurisdictions. Niboyet once tried to justify the complete absence of French legislation on conflicts ,law by the elusive nature of the subject. 107 But the chaotic brilliance of the
French literature and practice suggests rather that the preparation for crystallizing the law has been insufficient. The German enactment as a whole is so unsatisfactory that, as early as
1927, a movement for a new codification appeared. 108
However, the two copious formulations of conflicts law
achieved in the Western hemisphere have remarkably analogous defects, despite their very different history, function, and
character. The American Restatement has been accepted in
the courts and, it seems, in the literature, to the extent that it
reflects the actual cases or clarifies controversial issues. Its
doctrinal background has been repudiated almost unanimously.
Hence, many rules asserted in the Restatement as flowing
from principles are devoid of authority. The Havana Code
introduced a great wealth of refined provisions in the laws of
106 For the predilection of civil law countries for statutes, attention may be
recalled to SPERL, "Case Law and the European Codified Law," 19 Ill. L.

Rev. (19z5) 505.
107
NJBOYET, z6 Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg. (1930) 77·
108

Mitt. Deutsche Ges. f. Volkerrecht, Dresden Meeting 1927.
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the participant 'states 1 09 and is admired throughout Latin
America. But, as the Code largely rests on a selection among
literary opinions, mostly of French writers, its practical usefulness has yet to be tried in the fire of litigation. Of such confirmation, nothing is known so far. As all doctrinal studies of
the Code evidently suggest, there are certain difficulties in
analyzing its rules.
Once more, the immaturity of this branch of law appears
and its need of intensive, prolonged cultivation.
109 Occasionally, the thesis has been adopted that the code represents the general law of the country. Thus, the Brazilian Supremo Tribunal Federal, senten<;a
estrangeira no. 993 (July 17, 1940) 58 Arch. Jud. 83 has applied its jurisdictional rules in relation to Po1·tugal. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Peru
(July 2, 1929) 2.5 Anales Jud. (192.9) 78 has termed the Montevideo Treaty
"the law of the land" in relation to Japan.

CHAPTER

2

Structure of Conflicts Rules
I.

THE PARTS OF THE RuLE

NTELLIGENT application or development of conflicts
rules requires full awareness of the two parts of which
these rules are necessarily composed. Thus, although it
need not exactly conform to the example, a typical conflicts
rule runs as, for instance, section 295 of the Restatement:
(I) The validity of a trust of movables created by a will
( 2) is determined by the law of the testator's domicil at the
time of his death. (Numbers added.)

I

The first part of the rule defines its object, that is, certain
operative facts, 1 the legal consequences of which are determined in the second part. From another point of view the
first part raises, and the second part answers, a legal question.
In comparison with ordinary legal rules, there is one, a fundamental, difference. The legal effects of an ordinary rule of
law are fully indicated; the question raised is immediately
solved by commanding or prohibiting or authorizing certain
conduct. ("Material," "substantive," "internal" rules, in
German, Sachnormen.) In contrast, conflicts rules decide only
which state shall give such immediate solution. The specific
quality of these rules resides therefore in the second part that
declares the municipal law to which the question should be
referred or "connected" (in German, angekniipft) or, in other
words, precribes the legislative domain in which the question
should be "localized." (There is no point in arguing which
mode of thinking represented by these expressions is prefer1 German: "Tatbestand," translated by LEA MERIGGI, Revue I 9 33, zo I at
zo 5, n. I, into Latin: "substratum" (subject matter) ; Italian: "presupposto"
(premise).
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able.) 'An essential element of conflicts rules, therefore, is the
indication of a "connecting factor" or "point of contact"
(A nknitpfungspunkt, point de rattachement) 2-the testator's
domicil as of the time of death in the case above, or in other
cases the situs -of property, the place where a contract was concluded or where it is to be performed, etc. In this line of
thought, the facts localized by the connecting factor appear
separately as the "thing connected." In the example above,
these facts form the first part of the rule, while the connecting factor appears in the second part. For the sake of
simplicity, we shall continue to conceive of the rule in the
manner stated, although, in some conflicts rules, the localizing
elements or some of them, are inserted in the first part.
Strangely enough, the misfortunes of the doctrine taken
over from the nineteenth century have been caused largely by
insufficient attention to-this nature of the conflicts rules. As
will be seen hereafter, the parallelism of the first part with
substantive rules was overlooked, and the basic peculiarity in
the second part was not consistently appreciated.
Part of the confusion lay in the traditional notion of "the
law of the forum." Lex fori once meant the entire set of legal
rules in force at the place of suit. In a system of pure territorialism, every tribunal either applies its own law as a whole
or dismisses a case found to belong to a foreign jurisdiction.
There is no choice of law, no application of foreign law in such
a system-a system which was observed in England with
more consistency than anywhere else and is still represented
in many conceptions of Anglo-American law. If the entire
"law of the forum" be considered a unit, conflicts rules are in
effect integrated with the internal law. But when assumption
2 Term introduced by KAHN, cf. NEUMEYER, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (192.9) 2.61,
translated as point of contact by LORENZEN, and as connecting factor by F ALCONBRIDGE. For recent discussion, see FALCONBRIDGE, "Characterization in the
Conflict of Laws," 53 Law Q. Rev. (1937) 2.35 1 537 at 549· CORMACK, "Renvoi,
Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Question in Confiict of Laws,"
14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) at 2.41 1 "localization."
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of jurisdiction no longer implies application of the domestic
rules and there exist choice of law rules, the latter must live
apart from the internal set of rules. At this stage of development, appropriate language can designate as law of the forum
only the pure internal law, strictly excluding conflicts rules.
Likewise, the extensive recent discussion, under the French
catchword of "qualification," 3 of the nature and function of
the law of conflicts has been a source of difficulty. Bartin, the
author of this expression, assumed that conflicts rules are an
inseparable part of the law of the forum 4 and that, a'Ccordingly, the legal terms used in a conflicts rule must by
logical necessity be explained ("qualified") in terms of the
peculiar concepts of the lex fori. Had it not been for this
theory, characterization would never have attained the role
it occupies in the present literature. In fact, as that theory has
suffered increasing exceptions and modifications, the term
qualification has become uncertain. The writers argue which
characterization problems are genuine and which false and
even :whether characterization is of immense or minimal significance. Such terminological disputes should be ended.
The real subject of the basic debate about conflicts law is
the interpretation of the rules of conflicts. This is essentially
broader than commenting on expressions. Moreover, it
furnishes a clearer objective than does reference to some substantive law, for evidently conflicts rules have to be interpreted by exploring their own meaning rather than the meaning of something else, e.g., an internal rule. Emphasis should
be shifted from "characterization" to "interpretation."
3 While KAHN spoke of "latent conflicts of law," BARTIN's term "qualification" became usual in Europe. BECKETT and CHESHIRE translate it by "classification," FALCONBRIDGE proposed "characterization" and is generally followed.
See FALCONBRIDGE, 53 Law Q. Rev. (1937) 2.35 at :1.39, supra n. 2. For another
survey, see VAN PRAAG, "Bijdrage tot de leer der kwalifikaties in het internationaal
privaatrecht," Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis 1939, 525·
4 See infra n. 9·

STRUCTURE OF CONFLICTS RULES

45

If nevertheless characterization is to retain a technical
meaning, it may be used to denote the problem whether or
not a certain expression in a conflicts rule has the same connotation as a similar word employed by domestic law or in a
foreign system. 5 Characterization of facts as such is not significant of conflicts law.
The most important objective in interpreting a conflicts
rule is to determine its scope. The borderline, for instance, delimiting the cases for which the conflicts rule on contracts
prescribes the applicable law from those subject to the conflicts rule concerning torts, must be marked in every conflicts
system. This process may be termed classification in the
proper sense.

II.

THE FIRST PART: THE OBJECT OF THE RuLE

The statutist doctrine classified each substantive rule of
positive law in one of three categories, territorial law (statuta
realia), extraterritorial law (stat uta personalia), and "mixed
statutes" (statuta mixta ), the last-named category being assimilated to the first by the late French and the Dutch school.
Thus, in the statutist conception, the object of conflicts law is
the substantive rule of law. The substitution for this of the
legal relations between persons or of persons to things by
Savigny constitutes the chief advance from this to the modern
conception. Savigny and his followers, who apparently are
still numerous, therefore deemed it to be the characteristic
task of conflicts law to connect each single "legal relation"
with a certain country.
This conception, despite its advantages, still was not quite
correct. Its consequences, as later deduced by Franz Kahn,
demonstrate that the mistake was not harmless. The starting
point of analysis, as should be obvious, ought not to be the
5 RABEL, 5 Z.ausl. PR. (1931) 253.
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legal relation, e.g., an obligation, a property right, the relation between spouses. Any such relation must be based on a
determinate legal system. Which system, when the applicable
law is not even yet contemplated? At this stage, there is
nothing but a factual or ((social" situation. 6 If two persons of
Greek Orthodox faith go through a marriage ceremony before
a Greek Orthodox priest in Paris, is this a marriage? The
answer depends on what law we apply: the law of the forum,
the French law, the Greek law, or perchance some other law.
No court except in Greece, however, would actually apply its
own internal law to the question. Nevertheless, Kahn and the
many who share his view assume that the legal relationship of
marriage as constituted under the domestic law of the .forum is
exclusively the object of the conflicts rule. This makes no sense;
it is simply a way out of embarrassment in order to find some
legislation containing the allegedly necessary definition of
such object. Evidently, conflicts rules must operate as do all
other rules, directly on the facts of life, not on a legally predicated, abstract subject matter. They refer to merely factual
events, such as the marriage ceremony before the Greek priest,
a document concerning the sale of a movable, a declaration
by a married woman, purporting to transfer property, the
death of an individual leaving no will, et cetera.
This statement is of cardinal significance; it ends all speculation about the necessary dependence of conflicts rules on
some legal system, whether the law of the forum or the
6
RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) at 243; reproduced in Revue 1933,1 at 5 if.,
followed by NEUNER, Der Sinn (1932); M. WOLFF, IPR. 1; DE CASTRO, "La
cuestion de las calificaciones en el derecho internacional privado," 20 Revista
Der. Priv. (1933) 2.17 at 2.40, 2.65 at 2.8o, 2.82.; VALLINDAS, Book Review, 1
Archeion Idiotikou Dikaiou ( 1934) 1 76; MEZGER, Decision Note, Revue Crit.
1935, 447; I STREIT-VALLINDAS (1937) 2.43; FALCONBRIDGE1 53 Law Q.
Rev. (1937) 235 at 242, supra n. 2.; RoBERTSON, Characterization 63; HussERL,
"Foreign Fact Element in Conflict of Laws," part II, 26 Va. L. Rev. (1940)
453 at 471. More precisely, the object has been described as a factual situation
taken in abstracto; see MERIGGI, Revue 1933 1 2.05, or as the facts underlying
the relation which is mentioned by the conflicts rule and taken in abstracto, see
NEUNER, "Die Ankniipfung im internationalen Privatrecht," 8 Z.ausl.PR.
(1934) 81, 85. (Erroneous criticism by DE CASTRO, 20 Revista Der. Priv..
(1933) 239 1 2.41, supra this note.)
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lex causae. This supposition was engendered by the short
manner in which conflicts rules have been generally framed,
as for example:
Immovables, even those possessed by foreigners, are governed by French law. The laws concerning the status
and capacity of persons govern a Frenchman, even restdent abroad. (French C.C. art. 3.)
Or, when the rules became more detailed:
The capacity of a person is to be determined according to
the laws to which the person belongs. Personal relations between German spouses, even though domiciled abroad, are
governed by the German laws. (German EG. art. 7 par. I,
art. I4 par. 1.)
Broad stretches of subject matter have thus customarily been
indicated by abbreviated terms, seemingly corresponding to
the captions of large chapters of private law, such as capacity,
relation between spouses, inheritance, et cetera. But this is
merely the technique of shorthand expression.

III.

INTERPRETATION AND CHARACTERIZATION

No doubt such legal terms ordinarily have been taken
from the headings used in the civil code or accepted legal
classification of the forum. But was that always so, must it so
remain; is the interpretation of such a term bound to its
specific significance in the internal law?
Lex Fori
Franz Kahn/ in his elaborate earlier opinion, which to a
vaguely defined extent he later revoked, 8 and Bartin, 9 who
I.

7
KAHN, Gesetzeskollisionen: ein Beitrag zur Lehre des internationalen Privatrechts ( I89I) I Abhandl. I, especially "Latente Gesetzeskollisionen" at 92.
8
KAHN, Ober Inhalt, Natur und Methode des internationalen Privatrechts
( I899), I Abhandl. 2 55 at 3 1.2.
$ BARTIN, "De l'impossibilite d'arriver a la suppression definitive des conflits de lois," Clunet I897, 22.5, 466, 72.0, reprinted in BARTIN, Etudes (I899)
I; BARTIN, I Principes (I93o) 22I; BARTIN, "La doctrine des qualifications
et ses rapports avec le caractere national des regles du conflit des lois," 31
Recueili93o I 565.
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first sponsored the theory, considered it a matter of course
that when a conflicts rule speaks of domicil or marriage settlement or tort, it meant exactly what such expression signifies
in the corresponding domestic law. This theory has had an
immense following 10 and has been adopted in the Restatement 11 and the C6digo Bustamante. 12 Logical as well as socalled practical arguments have been adduced in quantity to
prove this assertion; 13 they may now also be found reproduced in English 14 and need no repetition.
2.

Lex Causae

Another opinion went in the opposite direction; the terms
or concepts of the conflicts rule should be understood according
to the foreign internal law referred to by the conflicts rule
itself. Originated by the French Despagnet, and recently revived by Pacchioni and M. Wolff/ 5 this theory has been
1°For lists see MELCHIOR rro § 78; MAURY, "Regles generales des conflits
de lois," 57 Recueil I936 III 325 at 467. To mention the most significant
names, in France: ARMINJON, H. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES, LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE, NIBOYET, SURVILLE, WEISS; in Belgium: PouLLET, DEVos; in Germany:
GUTZWILLER, LEWALD, MELCHIOR, NEUMEYER, NUSSBAUM, RAAPE, ZITELMANN; in Italy: ANZILOTTI, Aco, BUZATTI, CAVAGLIERI, FEDOZZI, PERASSI,
SALVIOLI, UDINA; in the Netherlands: KoSTERS, MuLDER.
More recently in Britain and the United States: CHESHIRE; LoRENZEN, "The
Theory of Qualification," 20 Col. L. Rev. (1920) 247; LORENZEN, "The
Qualification, Classifica,tion, or Characterization Problem in the Conflict of
Laws," so Yale L. J. (I941) 743; FALCONBRIDGE, 53 Law Q. Rev. (1937)
24 s, supra n. 2; cf. "Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights," r 7 Can.
Bar Rev. (1939) at 373; RoBERTSON, Characterization 24; CoRMACK, Renvoi,
14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) 221 at 223, supra n. 2..
11 Restatement § 7.
12 Codigo Bustamante art. 6. Also the Rumanian Draft of 1 9 3 3, art. 6 6;
cf. ANTONESco, Revue 1933 1 I 55 at I7I·
13 See especially NIBOYET no. 4I6.
14 See BECKETT, "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private
International Law," IS Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1934) 46, esp. 53 .ff.;
ROBERTSON, Characterization 59·
~~ DESPAGNET, "Des conflits de lois relatifs a la qualification des rapports
juridiques," Clunet 1898, 253; DESPAGNET et DE BoECK, Cours de droit international public (ed. 41 19Ia) no. Io6 bis; M. WoLFF, IPR. 34 ff.; PACCHIONI,
Elementi I 67; partly also NEUNER, Der Sinn, and FRANKENSTEIN, "Tendances
nouvelles du droit international prive," 33 Recueil1930 III 245 at 313·
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generally rejected. 16 In the present writer's opinion, which is
not here elaborated, the solutions sought by Vvolff are acceptable in special circumstances, but not in principle. 17
3· Comparative Method
A third opinion, which, in opposition to both these dogmas,
advocates a method rather than a doctrine, 18 was expounded by
the present writer in 1929 and 1931.19 In this view, the
factual situation, which is the true premise of any conflicts
16
For a resume of the almost general rejection, see MAURY, "Regles generales des conftits de lois," 57 Recueil 1936 III 325 at 484.
17 See infra p. 6o.
18
Rightly MAURY, 57 Recueil I936 III 325 at 477·
19
RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I929) 752 at 755; RABEL, "Das Problem der
Qualifikation," 5 Z.ausl. PR. (I93I) 24I, (in Italian) 2 Rivista ltaliana (I9J2)
97, (in French) Revue I933> I.
In the same sense: in Belgium: WrGNY, Revue Crit. I936, 392; England:
BECKETT, "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private International Law," IS Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I934) 46; France: J. DoNNEDIEU
DE VABRES 765; Germany: NEUNER, Der Sinn (1932); SILBERSCHMIDT, 48
Z.int.R. ( r 9 3 3-34) 3 I 3 at 3 34 and 54 Zentralblatt (I 9 3 6) at I 7; Italy:
MERIGGI, "Saggio critico sulle qualificazioni," 2 Rivista Italiana ( 19 3 2) 1 89,
(in French) Revue 1933, 201, (in English) 14 B.U.L. Rev. (1934) 319;
ZANCLA, Sede di fatto del rapporto, Atti dell'Accad. Pelorit. (I936) 18;
Spain: DE CASTRO, 20 Revista Der. Priv. ( 1933) 2.40 at 2.45, supra n. 6 (in part
divergent) ; Switzerland: WERNER N lEDERER, Die Frage der Qualifikation als
Grundproblem des internationalen Privatrechts, in Zurcher Studien z. internat.
Recht, no. I (Ziirich, 1940); VON STEIGER, Die Bestimmung der Rechtsfrage im
internationalen Privatrecht, Abhandlungen zum Schweizerischen Recht, 12.9
Heft, (Bern, 19 3 7). (The Federal Tribunal has left the decision open; see
BG. (Feb. 2.4, 1939) 65 BGE. II 66, 71; BG. (Oct. 30, 194o) 30 Praxis 63 no.
I, at 64). NEUNER and MERIGGI, however, add essential propositions of their
own. Practical application of this method to particular problems has been made
by WERNER VON SIMSON, Die materiellen Wirkungen des rechtskraftigen
Urteils im internationalen Privatrecht (Thesis, Freiburg i.Br., I935); H. P.
ZscHoKKE, Die Rechtsstellung internationaler Kartelle, Schweizerische Vereinigung fiir Internationales Recht, Druckschrift no. 35 (1936); HANS H. RIEMANN, Die Schuldvertrage im internationalen Privatrecht (Dresden, 1939) v
and 9·
United States: CHEATHAM, "Internal Law Distinctions in the Conflict of
Laws," 21 Cornell L. Q. (1935) 570, warns against "two closely related practices" (p. 5 89), viz., (I) "the uncritical transfer to Conflict of Laws of the
meaning given to a term in internal law," and (z) "the use of a distinction
worked out in internal law as decision of an issue in Conflict of Laws without
adequate consideration of whether the internal law distinction is appropriate to
the other issue."
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rule, must be referable indifferently to foreign as well as
to domestic substantive law. Hence, if legal terms are used
to describe this factual situation, they must be susceptible of
interpretation with reference to foreign institutions, even those
unknown to the le:x: fori. This operation includes comparative
research. Thoughtful courts have always employed this
method, but systematic efforts are needed gradually to free
national conflicts rules from undue dependence on internal
conceptions.
For example, the first theory above was resorted to in the
English case, Lerouxv. Brown, 20 in which the parties in France
made a contract satisfying every condition of validity under
French law. However, the action failed on the ground that
the statute of frauds imposes a rule of procedure, which as
such must be observed by all litigants in England. Consequently, the conflicts rule on "formalities" was deemed inapplicable. This decision has been severely criticized. 21
Although the case conforms to the lex fori doctrine dominant in the United States, it has been generally disapproved
by American courts and writers. 22 Moreover, it appears that
in this country foreign statutes of frauds are deemed to prescribe formalities as defined by the conflicts rule relating to
formalities, though such statutes may be otherwise interpreted
in the various jurisdictions for other purposes. This construction agrees with the third theory above.
The reason for this solution is obvious. It offends justice 23
(x8s2) I2 C. B. 8oi.
See BECKETT, "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private
International Law," IS Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I934) at 69 § x8; CHESHIRE
248 and 636; FALCONBRIDGE, "Confiict of Laws: Examples of Characterization," IS Can. Bar Rev. (I937) 2201 2241 is doubtful, however.
22 Straesser Arnold Co. v. Franklin Sugar Refining Co. (1925) 8 F. (2d) 6oi;
Ohlendiek v. Schuler (1929) 30 F. (2d) s; WILLISTON, 2 Contracts§ 6oo.
23 See Lams et ux. v. F. H. Smith Co. (I935) 36 Del. 477 I78 Atl. 65I
1
1
Clunet 19371 873 1 LORENZEN, Cases (ed. 4, I937) 458; CHEATHAM, Cases (ed.2 1
I94I) 549; LORENZEN, "The Statute of Frauds and the Confiict of Laws," 32
Yale L. J. (1923) 3 u, 320; GooDRICH 207; 3 BEALE § 6o2.1.
2o

21
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to deny enforcement of an oral contract complying with local
requirements of form, for the mere reason that the domestic
law requires a memorandum in writing. Conversely, a contract unenforceable where executed, may be deemed to depend
on such other contacts as the conflicts rule of the forum admits;
thus, by the applicable conflicts rule, a contract may be considered valid under the law of the place of performance. But,
if under the conflicts rule the transaction has no connection
with the forum, it cannot be validated by the municipal law
of the forum. The object of the conflicts rule on formality
thus may include foreign statutes of frauds and exclude the
domestic statute, irrespective of domestic classifications.
The prescriptions of the domestic statute of frauds indeed
may be considered to relate to procedure in a court for the
purpose of their application ex officio, irrespective of formal
demand by a party, or to determine whether failure to observe
the statute constitutes reviewable error, as well as to decide
whether amendments thereof have retroactive effect. The
purposes of conflicts law are different. In fact, the English
writers seem to regret Leroux v. Brown only because of its
implications for conflicts law. French 24 and German 25 courts
classify provisions concerning oral agreements as formalities
in all respects, and certainly not as procedure, the only doubt
being whether they do not affect the substantive requisites of
consent to a contract.
In consequence, an American, French, etc., court has to
apply the English statute of frauds, or the special provision
of section 4 of the British Sales of Goods Act, respectively,
to an English transaction, in particular to an agreement to
24

Cass. (req.) (Apri118, 1865) S.t&65.I.317; Cass. (civ.) (June 29, 19:u)
D.1922.I.l27, 8.192.3.1.249·
25 Unanimous. For a foreign provision prescribing written contracts, see KG.
(Oct. 25, 1927) ]W.1929, 448, IPRspr. 1929, no. 7· See also the definition of
formalities in art. 3 of the Geneva Convention of 1930 for the settlement of
certain conflicts of law in connection· with Bills of Exchange and Promissory
Notes.
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sell concluded in England. (That this is true, although the
English courts reach the same result on procedural lines, in
the case of English transactions, needs some comment in our
later discussion.) 26
There is very little doubt, in fact, that conflicts law has its
own denotation of formality, independent of either the lex fori
or the lex causae. 21
Without resuming all arguments of the vivid controversy
that went on during the last decade, it may be stated that
the lex fori theory has visibly shrunk under the weight of
the attacks to which it has been subjected. In the first place,
there seems today little support for the once-pretended logical
necessity of resorting to domestic notions, Niboyet's argument
de necessite. There still are die-hards, 28 it is true. While even
Bartin conceded two "exceptions" to the principle of characterization according to the domestic ideas, some of his followers
have insisted on its pure application. In particular, Bartin saw
that the question whether foreign-situated property is movable
or immovable, is almost universally decided according to the
law of the situs and not to the lex fori. 29 This is clearly a sound
rule and, thanks to its adoption throughout the world, an oasis
of uniformity; but important writers have protested. 3 ° Franz
Kahn diluted his own axiom even more; he states that a rule
referring "parental power" or "tort" to some foreign law does
not mean exclusively what the civil code of the forum means
by such terms, but also includes "the corresponding and similar
foreign notions." Only the "nucleus of the foreign institu28

/nfra p. 66.
This problem will be treated in connection with the requirements for contracts.
28 A climax was reached by RUNDSTEIN, "La structure du droit international
prive et ses rapports avec le droit des gens," Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1936)
314, 51 z, who declares any separate development of contl.icts law "logically"
impossible. Contra: BALOGH, 1 Symmikta Streit (1939) 88.
·
29 This is now for BAR.TIN the "only true exception," 1 Principes 2.36.
30 NIBOYET no. 418 and :z. Repert. 4II no. z7; KAHN, 1 Abhandl. 76; and
others.
27
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tion" must be similar, not the "technical envelope." For
this acute thinker, a half-century since, the lex fori was not
an infallible guide, but rather a signpost showing vaguely a
direction.
At present, the advocates of the lex fori theory, conscious
that the theory must be justified by convenience rather than
logical necessity/ 2 are entangled in difficult efforts to avoid
absurd results. They feel, for instance, free to concede that
a concept such as contract or tort may have a much broader
scope in conflicts law than in private law. 33 Again, the German
conflicts rule (EG. art. 2 r) concerning the right of an unwed
mother to claim support from the illegitimate father of her
child, is strictly predicated upon a rule of the German Civil
Code specifically granting such right; Raape recognizes this
connection but nevertheless suggests the application of the
rule to an essentially different claim under Norwegian law
and to certain even more remote types of actions for damages
under other laws. 34 For such analysis of the compass of conflicts rules, he employs comparative methods as a matter of
course. Nussbaum, who on the contrary is a decided foe of
comparative methods in the subject, yet applies the conflicts
rules regarding wrongs to liabilities without fault, irrespective
of the treatment in internal law, construes terms such as "company" or "corporation" "in the freest manner," and particu31 KAHN, 1 Abhandl. 11 z ( 1891), generally followed up to 19 31, although
KAHN himself sensed the futility of this escape in I 899, see I Abhandl. 3 I I ; cj.
RABEL, Revue 1933, zo, 1.4.
32 RoBERTSON, Characterization 74; LEWALD, Regles generales des confiits de
lois 77·
33
AGo, "Regles generales des confiits de lois," 58 Recuei11936 IV z47 at 337;
MAURY, "Regles generales des conflits de lois," 57 Recueil I936 III 31.5 at 494;
FEDOZZI 186. See also the criticism by PACCHIONI, Elementi I8I. GUTZWILLER, also a follower of the lex fori theory, has seen that the Mixed Arbitral
Tribunals have applied numerous general legal concepts of the civilized world,
or of the civil law countries (see "Das Internationalprivatrecht der durch die
Friedens\.ertriige eingesetzten Gemischten Schiedsgerichtshofe," 3 Int. Jahrbuch
f. Schiedsgerichtswesen (I9JI) UJ at 149 ff.).
34
RAAPE, so Recueil I934 IV 401 at 45z, SZ+·
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larly recommends "flexible methods" and "broad" interpretation. 35 Maury 36 ends his apology for the lex fori with the
following recipe:
One starts from the lex fori, from its concepts. But these
concepts are adapted first to their international function and
then enlarged by a comparison with those of the foreign laws.
We approach the viewpoint of Mr. Rabel, but we do it rather
modestly.
This' dictum has been adopted by Robertson 37 with a qualification. He avows that
"some categories (of conflicts law) will be quite different from
any category of the internal law, because designed to make
provision for institutions of the foreign law not known to the
internal law of the forum."
Such independent categories, he confesses,
"are already known to have been developed for most types
of cases that are likely to arise, such as contract, tort, succession,
administration, matrimonial property, marriage, divorce,
legitimacy, adoption, and so on."
These writers clearly and consciously draw on comparative
law, although Robertson 38 disapproves of "international principles of comparati-ve law determining disputed characterizations."
It will be interesting to see what remains of the Bartin-Kahn
theory after dealing with particular problems in the course
of this book.
However, the "logical" argument has been overturned in
a striking manner, thanks to the special refutations by
Neuner 39 and, more recently, by Cook,40 both pointing out
as Nussl!AUM, D. IPR. 48, 194, 288; NussBAUM, Principles 73·
36 MAURY, 57 Recueil1936 III 325 at 504.
37 ROBERTSON, Characterization 91,
38 RoBERTSON, Characterization 31, 189.
39 NEUNER, Der Sinn, esp. 13 2; also "Policy Considerations in the Conflict
of Laws," 20 Can. Bar Rev. (1942) 479 at 484.
<lO CooK, Legal Bases, esp. 214.
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the mistake of seeking in internal law the concepts needed
in conflicts law. The nai've argument they criticize attributes
an absolute character to juridical concepts, irrespective of their
purposes; it presupposes that the concepts of domicil, contract,
capacity are identical in the laws of property, family, jurisdiction, taxation-and conflicts! Only the ancient "realism of
concepts," which had some force in Greco-Roman philosophy
and a disputed role in Roman jurisprudence/1 and the Begriffsjurisprudenz of the nineteenth century, ridiculed in Jhering's "Heaven of Concepts," present equal errors. The relativity of legal concepts is a mere commonplace in all other departments of law.
The chief reason why the present writer started the attack
against that theory and here stresses its utter unsoundness, is
illuminated by the very title of Bartin's paper, "On the impossibility of arriving at a definitive suppression of the conflicts of law." Naturally, if each conflicts law is nothing but
an annex to the corresponding internal law and receives its
sense and meaning only from this national and local source,
uniformity cannot be achieved, even though all conflicts laws
should be unified, without simultaneous unification of all
municipal laws. The temporarily complete victory of this
idea has weighed heavily on hopes and endeavors to reform
and unify the national bodies of private international law.
Black pessimism resulted, and it is no wonder that the excesses
of nationalism in our field were particularly serious in the
writingS of the many students who followed Kahn and Bartin.
This gloomy outlook, unfortunately, is still shared by certain
present writers.
As things now stand, few points respecting the writer's
opinion still seem to call for explanation. The most significant
is the objection on a priori grounds that this comparative41 SoKOLOWSKr, Die Philosophie im Privatrecht (z vols., Halle, 190Z-I907),
and for criticism, RABEL, Vierteljahrsschrift fiir Wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 1904, 108.
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analytical method, though representative of the future, is useless for existing law. 42
It has never been denied that the actual conflicts rules of the
European codifications or those usually applied by AngloAmerican courts originally had linguistic connections. The
question is merely that of "freeing," "emancipating," these
rules from their domestic background. Is this illicit? A few
Italian writers say so; in their opinion, rules must be interpreted within the perspective of the legislator. But, even if
this were true, do we have to assume that draftsmen of conflicts rules have been ignorant that foreign laws may differ
in many respects from their own conceptions? In laying down
the rule that wrongs are governed by the law of the place of
wrong, do legislators not consider the possibility that an injury
done abroad may constitute a wrong where committed, though
not in the forum? Or are conflicts rules not supposed to be
applied indifferently as respects all laws of civilized peoples?
In fact, their compass is generally world-wide, and, in the
absence of a universal language, they necessarily employ the
"word-symbols" of the domestic vocabulary.
Again, whether rigid limitations on the interpretation of
legal rules be inferred from the alleged intention of the legislator, as the Italian school seems to postulate, or from the
principle of strict construction of statutory texts, often followed at common law, such restrictions are inconsistent with
the methods of creative interpretation recognized in modern
legal practice. Formalism is particularly misplaced in construing conflicts rules, the overwhelming majority of which
are in an unsettled and formative stage throughout the world.
Most are unwrittert, and many of the written rules are vaguely
«<PACCHIONI, Elementi 18:z; FEDOZZI 190; DE CASTRO, :zo Revista Der.
Priv. (1933) 240 at 247; FALCONBRIDGE, "Characterization in the Conflict
of Laws," 53 Law Q. Rev. (1937) 235 at 245, followed by DAVIES, "Regles
generales des conflits de lois," 6:z Recueil 1937 IV 497; MAURY, 57 Recueil
1936 III 325 (definitely milder).
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drafted and defecti~ely constructed. As a matter of fact, the
art of interpretation, a versatile and fecundating implement of
modern private law, is not used with entire efficiency in our
field. Clumsy constructions and half-hearted attempts at adjusting antiquated maxims or correcting inexact texts abound.
Should progressive development from case to case and through
systematic effort be barred, this stepchild of jurisprudence
would be an orphan indeed.
Yet, in the case of many writers, one hand does not seem to
know what the other is doing. While Ago is the most intransigent adversary of-analytical comparison, he has selected from
a hundred cases discussed in the literature, one, the simplest,
to demonstrate with what perfect safety the lex fori theory
operates. 43 This is the case. Under German and other laws,
spouses may by settlement institute heirs to either of them.
The Italian legislation does not expressly allow such ap, pointment by contract of a successor upon death. How should
an Italian judge consider such a settlement by German
spouses? Ago agrees that the question is covered by the Italian
conflicts rule concerning intestate succession and wills, although these two grounds of succession do not include settlements. German law therefore governs. But Ago declines to
accept any extensive interpretation based on comparison of
the three grounds of inheritance involved. He takes the application of the conflicts rule respecting inheritance for granted,
because the Italian inheritance law, tacitly excluding settlements respecting succession at death, implicitly classifies them
as grounds of succession. By chance, the question came up in
the French Court of Cassation. 44 A prenuptial settlement concluded in France by Italian nationals contained a stipulation
by the wife, leaving at death the unrestricted portion of her
43 Aco, 58 Recueil 1936 IV 247 at 333·
""Cass. (req.) (May 7, 1924) Revue 1924, 406, Clunet 1925, u6. The
French law of the situs was likewise applied to a settlement of Spanish spouses,
Cass. (civ.) (April z, 1 884) Clunet 1885, 76.
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estate, including a French immovable, to the husband. It was
pleaded that the settlement was void under Italian law, since
it contemplated a donation of future acquisitions. The court
held the gift valid under the lex situs, viz., the French provision allowing devise by prenuptial settlement, thus emphasizing the contractual aspects of the transaction. Niboyet apparently conceives that, while the French court proceeded on
the basis of the law of succession, an Italian court would have
held the gift invalid specifically on the ground of the conflicts
rule concerning matrimonial property/5 However all this
may be, since the Italian Code does not recognize such agreements either in the chapter on matrimonial property or in
defining grounds of succession, the characterization cannot be
inferred from these chapters. Unconsciously, Ago did assimilate the foreign institution within the titles mortis causa on
the basis of a comparison of legislations.
The process required for such interpretations, in fact, is
necessarily of a comparative nature and has always been so
recognized by thoughtful scholars. 46 Assuredly, the comparison has not always been comprehensive, systematic, and
fully documented. But today, at least in civil law countries, it
is no excuse to neglect comparative studies on the ground of
unavailability of information. So much has been done in making the sources and literature accessible even in distant
countries that the existence of gaps should be an incentive
rather than a deterrent for scholars able to collaborate. So
far as interstate conflicts go, the studies in this country are
the most prominent example of continuous consideration of
some fifty internal laws. Never has comparative law been more
thoroughly utilized than in this country, and never so much
uniformity achieved.
fliSee NIBOYET 503 no. 417.
See for instance KAHN, 1 Abhandl. 31 s, 49 q

46

:t

Abhandl.
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It has been objected, nevertheless, that a scientific approach
to conflicts law by comparative critique is precluded by the
defective conditions of comparative research and that conclusions will be arbitrarily subjective. Such an assertion indicates lack of personal experience in such work. The common
law is a living refutation. In civil law countries, no serious
student of conflicts law has failed to consider neighboring legislations. Moreover, comparisons between the common law and
the civil law were undertaken by Story in America in I 834 and
by Bar in Europe in I 862 with patent success. To bridge the
gulf between these two halves of the legal world is the task of
the present generation of lawyers. Hidden behind apparent
dissimilarity, there are fundamental likenesses, suggesting international cooperation, though of course not necessarily
unification.
No doubt, existing comparisons of the kind required in the
field of conflicts of laws are of recent date and far from exhaustive. 47 General concepts, which may be used universally,
are being built up but slowly. However, a great deal of knowledge has been attained, and to gain more is within the capacity
of modern science. Researchers to a variable extent are of
course engrossed in the legal culture in which they have been
educated. 48 A lawyer is apt to state more accurately and to
give preference to the conceptions of his system over foreign
ideas. However, with increasing international collaboration
in comparative work, the qualities of the different scholars
will compensate for each other, and the multiplicity of views
in the world will provide a rich variety of outlooks. In any
case, an imperfect attempt to do justice to foreign institutions
41 The following are not new admissions by the writer. See RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.
PR. (192.9) 756; 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 2.87, Revue 1933, 1 at 61.
48
RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR) (192.9) 756; BECKETI, "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private International Law," 15 Brit. Year Book Int.
Law (1934) 46 at 59·
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is superior to any technique which ignores them. Judges are
fully entitled to limit their inquiries to the two or three laws
primarily influencing a case in which legal science has done
nothing to help. 49 Instinctively this is what the courts do.
With respect to the narrower subject of characterization,
expediency alone is decisive. It may be that categories as defined by internal law have a role to play in such subjects as
jurisdiction, procedure, taxation, etc., but ordinarily not in
the: case of conflicts rules. For conflicts law, characterization
according to the law declared applicable in the conflicts rule
also is by no means excluded, but only for special situations.
Martin Wolff was perhaps inspired by the problems of marital
property with which he first happened to deal, to suggest
this method of characterization. In principle, a private law
term used in a cdnflicts rule means what is common to the
various institutions of the national laws serving the same legislative purpose.
It is not even true that the so-called connecting factors
should always be understood as defined by domestic law.
Domicil cannot be so simply treated. Nationality is exclusively
defined by the state whose national an individual is claimed to
be. The place of contracting in negotiations between absent
parties is not to be determined by the law of the forum alone,
at least if under this law the place is found to be situated
abroad, et cetera.

IV.
I.

THE SECOND PART: REFERENCE TO A LEGAL SYSTEM

The Nature of the Reference

While American students of conflicts law but recently have
begun to discuss other general problems, as a rule they have
been interested in the controversy regarding the locus standi
of foreign law in court.
49

RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) z67, Revue 1933, 1 at 37·

STRUCTURE OF CONFLICTS RULES

61

The doctrine of territorialism initiated by d'Argentre and
perfected by Huber is predicated upon Huber's first axiom
that the laws of a state have force only within the territorial
limits of its sovereignty. This tenet, adopted in the American
cases, was solemnly formulated by Story, Dicey, and Beale.~ 0
The first section of the Restatement reproduces it literally:
"no state can make a law which by its own force is operative
in another state; the only law in force in the sovereign state
is its own law ... "
"Law" in this connection means internal law, and the contention therefore is that foreign internal law has no "force," even
though invoked by a conflicts rule. The flagrant inconsistency
of this thesis with actual needs and practices was initially relieved by Huber's invention of "comitas gentium" and, after
this shallow idea had finally exploded, 51 by Dicey's and Beale's
attempt to reanimate the theory of vested rights. 52 Hence the
Restatement, section I, continues:
" ... but by the law of each state rights or other interests in
that state may~ in certain cases, depend upon the law in force
in some other state or states."
This theory has also been employed in modern France by
Pillet and Niboyet 53 on the background of conceptions eminently hostile to the application of foreign law. However,
both the Anglo-American and the French theories of acquired
rights have been critically destroyed, 54 together with that of
neoterritorialism. 55
50

STORY §§18ff., DICEY 9 ; 1 BEALE 5z.
DICEY 8; 1 BEALE 53; GooDRICH 7; LoRENZEN, 6 Repert. 282 nos. 29, 30.
52 DICEY 58; BEALE, 3 Cases on the Conflict of Laws (19oz) §§ 1-5; 3
Treatise 1968; CHESHIRE (ed. r) 3, revoked in ed. 2, 86.
53
VAREILLEs-SoMMIERES V ff., XXXIV if.; PILLET, Principes 495-571;
NIBOYET, s Repert. 708 to 725.
54 United States: CooK, "The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of
Laws," 33 Yale L. J. (1924) 457, Legal Bases I; LoRENZEN, ~<Territoriality,
Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws," 33 Yale L. J. (1924) 736; YNTEMA,
"The Hornbook Methods and the Conflict of Laws," 37 Yale L. J. (1928) 468;
HEILMANN, "Judicial Method and Economic Objectives in Conflict of Laws,"
51
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The Italian writers think, nevertheless, that the phenomenon of the application of a law created by a foreign state still
presents a problem, and on independent grounds eminent
critics of Beale's theory in this country think the same. In the
opinion once proposed and then revoked by Anzilotti, which
has been perpetuated by others, a foreign rule cannot be applied unless it has been appropriated by the state of the forum
and transformed into a domestic rule. 56
This theory of "material reception" of foreign law supposes
an untenable fiction. Nobody really believes that Norwegian
marriage law is made the law of Oklahoma, just for the purpose of deciding in Oklahoma whether the parties years ago
celebrated a valid marriage i~ Oslo. Where one party sues for
annulment, a Norwegian enactment intervening in the meantime and modifying the conditions of annullability of previous
marriages, is applicable, 57 clearly because the Norwegian law
and not that of the forum governs.
Another opinion is that the foreign rule is adopted by
"formal reception" only; the cbnflicts rule is construed as
implying that the foreign rule is inserted into the body of the
43 Yale L. J. (1934) 1082; STUMBERG, "Conflict of Laws. Foreign Created
Rights," 8 Texas L. Rev. (1930) 173 and STUMBERG 9·
France and Belgium: ARMINJON, 1 Precis 271 and ARMINJON, "La notion
des droits acquis en droit international prive," 44 Recuei11933 II 5 esp. at 59;
J. DONNED!EU DE VABRES 754; WIGNY, "La theorie des droits acquis d'apres
Antoine Pillet," 58 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1931) 341 and WrGNY, Essai
159·
Germany: HoRST MuLLER, Der Grundsatz des wohlerworbenen Rechts im
internationalen Privatrecht, Hamburger Rechtstudien Heft :z.6 (1935), authoritatively reviewed by GUTZWILLER, 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 1056.
56 All European writers have protested against the principle of territorialism.
See for instance NIBOYET, 604, stating that the French courts, for some time
immediately after the Code came into force, were perhaps impressed by the
memory of the former strict territorialism of the statutists, but actually rejected
this nefarious principle.
56 ANZILOTTI, Studi critici di diritto internazionale privata, parte II (r898);
PACCH!ONI, Elementi 137; Contra: FEDOZZI 162.: "artificial," "a phantom of
studio"; MAURY, 57 Recueil 1936 III 32.5 at 382..
57 BARTIN, x Principes 2.98.
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domestic law of the forum but with the significance and value
it has under the foreign system. 58
The "local law theory" as developed in this country is
kindred to these conceptions, presumably more closely to the
idea of "formal" reception. It differs in the thesis peculiar to
this country that the judge creates the law according either to
his own or to foreign legal rules as the case may require. But,
for conflicts law more than any other branch of national law,
law must exist before and outside of lawsuits.
After all, why can the foreign rule not simply come into
court without crutches? Is it not sufficient that the court's own
conflicts rule orders application? Once more, the full power
of confliets rules seems to be greatly underestimated. On the
other hand, no kind of domestication invests a foreign rule
with exactly the same power that domestic rules have. For
example, the maxim jura novit curia is usually not extended
to foreign law. 59 The dominant opinion in Europe 60 as well
as in this country 61 has entirely discounted the remnants of the
doctrine inherited from Ulric Huber; there is no longer any
problem.
2.

The Extent of the Reference

The theory of Bartin, Kahn, and their followers purports
not only to determine the content of the first part of the conflicts rule but also that of the second part; not only should
58
ANZILOTII, Corso di diritto internazionale (Roma, 19~3) 75; GHIRARDINI,
"Sull'interpretazione del diritto internazionale privato," 13 Rivista ( 1919)
z9o; PERASSI, "Su l'estensione del diritto internazionale privato italiano alle
nuove Provincie," Rivista 19z6, 518; BALDONI, La successione nel tempo delle
norme di diritto internazionale privato (Roma, 193z) 9; AGo, 58 Recueil 1936
IV :t47; Bosco 95; also MAURY, 57 Recueili936lll 3~5 at 386.
59
BARTIN, I Principes Z95·
60 PrLLET, I Traite no. SI; BARTIN, I Principes zo § Io; LEREBOURS-PJGEONNIERE no. z I 6; RAAPE 12; CAVAGLIERI, Revue 1930, 3971 405.
61
CAVERS, "A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem," 47 Harv. L. Rev.
(1933) 173, 177, thinks that the majority of voices is contrary to the local law
theory.
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the matters referred to a foreign law be selected according to
domestic conceptions, but also the foreign rules to which these
matters are referred must accord with the domestic system.
Consequently, within the limits of a conflicts rule respecting
"torts," foreign substantive rules concerning what in the eyes
of the forum would be "quasi-contract" are inapplicable.
An example of this kind of argumentation is furnished by
the well-known English decisions relating to the statute of
limitations. In the leading case of Huber v. Steiner, 62 Tindall,
C. J., refused to apply the French rule of prescription to a
French promissory note. He declared the French rule procedural, on the ground of Story's test that a limitation imposed on enforcement only rather than upon the right is procedural in character. German law has been treated in the same
way in the English courts. 63 Actually, the undisputed German
conception and the dominant French opinion is that a limitation bars the action only and the right survives. This does
not mean that a limitation is procedural; it is substantive in
the precise sense here relevant, namely, that it provides the
debtor an exception to his obligation, a material right of defense.64 Consequently, the French and German courts characterize statutes of limitations as substantive for the purposes of
conflicts law. Modern English writers agree that the English
cases are wrong; they deprive the debtor of a defense because
of the accidental forum. 115 The American decisions in cases
62

2 Bing. N.C. 202 (C. P. 1835).
Societe Anonyme Metallurgique de Prayson v. Koppel, The Times, November z, 1933, 77 Solicitor's Journal (1933) 8oo cited by BECKETT, 15 Brit.
Year Book Int. Law (1934) 75, supra n. 48.
64
This alone is relevant. Neither BECKETT, 15 Brit. Year Book Int. Law
(1934) 46 at 75, supra n. 48, nor ROBERTSON, Characterization 248, 251, have
reported correctly on the Continental law.
65 BECKETT, 15 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1934) 75 ff., supra n. 48; CHESHIRE 3 8, 42; MENDELSSOHN BARTHOLDY1 "Deljmitation of Right and Remedy,"
16 Brit. Year Book Int. Law, (1935) zo at 41; RoBERTSON, Characterization
64; CoRMACK, "Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Question in the Conflict of Laws," 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) 22 I at 234.
63
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where the courts do not feel bound by the early doctrine, give
effect to foreign statutes of limitations. 66
While Kahn corrected his doctrine by suggesting some
latitude in recognizing foreign rules as applicable but protested against the applicatiQn of foreign law in its totality, 67
recently Bartin has radically restricted the scope of his
theory. 68 He has done so, following an argumentation usual
in Italy, namely, that, in the first instance, the lex fori, being
the legal order in which the conflicts rule originates, prescribes
the characterization to be adopted, but that, the applicable
law having been selected, it must be applied with its attendant
interpretation. 69 In other words, characterization by the lex
fori for choice of law-characterization by the foreign law
once chosen. This reasoning has found favor with several
Anglo-American writers under the name of "secondary characterization," 70 but seemingly they do not agree with each
other on numerous details.
This generous concession to common sense is welcome, but,
due to its faulty origin in the lex fori theory, it is not broad
enough and lacks a clear concept. For instance, it has been
recently suggested 71 that, if the object of a conflicts rule is
"primarily" characterized as property, those foreign rules that
66
See Maki v. George R. Cooke Co. (C.C.A. 6th, 194z) 124 F. (zd) 663,
and Note, 9 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (194z) 7Zl·
67
KAHN, r Abhandl. 190.
68
BARTIN, I Principes Z3I; 3I Recueil 1930 I s6r, 603·
69
ANZILOTTI, Corso di lezione ( r 9 r 8) 3 59 and Corso di diritto internazionale privato (1925) 79; CAVAGLIERI 104; PERASSI, Lezione di diritto internazionale, parte prima (1922.) 78; UDINA, Elementi sr; AGo, Teoria 145; FEDOZZI 183; Bosco 107. These authors, however, speak in a very fragmentary
manner.
7
CHESHIRE 37-45; UNGER, "The Place of Classification in Private International Law," 19 Bell Yard (1937) 3 at 17; ROBERTSON, Characterization
chs. v, II8 ff., and IX, 235 ff.; CoRMACK, 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) 221 at
234, supra n. 65. Contra: RHEINSTEIN, Book Review, 8 Brooklyn L. Rev.
(1938) 253 at 256; FALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired
Rights," 17 Can. Bar Rev. (1939) 369 at 373; NusSBAUM, Book Review, 40
Col. L. Rev. (1940) 1461, 1467.
71 CoRMACK, 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) at 235 and n. 86, supra n. 65.
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are considered property law in the foreign country should be
applied. Yet, in a court in state X, why should a claim recognized by the domestic law of the forum (state X), on the
theory that property is recoverable, not be sustained under the
"applicable" law of Y, which regards the property as lost
but provides recovery on some quasi-contractual or other
theory? Or, to return to the statutes of limitations, the German
Reichsgericht in a notorious early decision refused to apply
the limitation statutes of Tennessee, whose law was considered
controlling, because in America the defense was regarded as
merely procedural. 72 This refusal to apply a foreign provision because it is considered procedural in the foreign law,
illustrates the theory of secondary characterization; it is evidently absurd.
Recently, the Reichsgericht discovered the correct solution
long anticipated by many writers, namely, to apply the American statute. 73 The reasoning is, however, uncertain and
partly based on the precarious ground that in German eyes
the American remedy "also" possesses a "substantive" element
justifying its application.
All such doubtful and complicated manipulations are unnecessary. The needs are simply and efficiently fulfilled by
the application of the foreign law as it stands and, despite the
admonition of Kahn, "in its totality." 74 If the first part of
the conflicts rule, the description of the matter referred to the
applicable law, is correctly formulated, i.e., not burdened by
internationally impractical concepts, it contains in itself all
that is necessary for its purpose. All else belongs to the selected
system. In other words, the question which state's law governs
the case, is answered by the choice of law; there is no reason
72
73

RG. (Jan. 4> 1882.) 2. RGZ. 2.1.
RG. (July 6, 1934) 145 RGZ. 12.1, IPRspr. 1934, no. 2.9, Revue Crit.

1935> 447·

74
See the writer's detailed argument, s Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 2.73, Revue 1933,
at 44· No comparative law is needed for this purpose as certain critics have
suspected.
1

STRUCTURE OF CONFLICTS RULES

67

why reference should not be made to this law as a whole
instead of to parts prematurely chosen. (Whether some public
policy of the forum is involved is entirely separate and independent.) More precisely, the court has to decide the ques- i
tion exactly as a court sitting in the foreign state would do, if ·
such court had jurisdiction and had to apply its own domestic
law.

CHAPTER

3

The Development of Conflicts Law
I.
I.

I

RETAR.DING FACTORS

Preconceptio1;1s

T is gratifying that the majority of writers now advocate

emancipation from deductive methods. 1 Past theories
have left remainders too persistent, however, not to cause
mischief. As a matter of course, and without reference to the
desirability of doing so, the doctrine of territorialism has allocated broad fields to the law of the forum, including that
of divorce and support, which is to be discussed in the present
volume. There is still reluctance to attribute full legal effect
to foreign acts and judgments in cases where the original power
or jurisdiction of the foreign state is freely admitted, as is
shown in the treatment of foreign adoption and foreign corporations.
Moreover, foreign law, though "applicable" under the appropriate conflicts rule, may nevertheless be rejected on the
ground of "public policy" of the forum. Due formerly to the
jealousy of small communities and princes, recently to
chauvinism and worship of the state, this ground has abnormal
significance. 2 Though for a long time French courts were
1
See in particular ARMINJON, "L'objet et la methode du droit international
prive," :u Recueil 192.8 I 433, against deductive and for analytical method;
LORENZEN, "Developments in the Conflict of Laws," 40 Mich. L. Rev. (r942.)
781 at 8os, "There is some indication that our courts are prepared to adopt a
somewhat more realistic approach in conflicts situations. The immediate hopes
for the further development of the conflict of laws in this country would seem to
be in this direction."
2 JusTUS WILHELM HEDEMANN, former democrat, wrote in Dt. Justiz 1939,
152.3: "Slowly the so-called private international law will take another aspect.
It might be that the general clauses concerning public policy and reprisals (articles 30 and 31 of the Introductory Law) will overshadow everything else of
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generally attacked because of their exaggeration of ordre public, European writers now tend to outdo them.
The increase of national feeling in Europe in the midst
of the nineteenth century engendered Mancini's famous
doctrine of nationality. The "principle of nationality," administered on a world-wide scale as Mancini insisted, would
have been able to establish a balance in matters of personal
status. But, excluded from the Anglo-American realm and
from other countries, it created confusion on account of the
claim of European states to govern the status and capacity of
subjects who had emigrated to such countries. Moreover, as
we shall see, the principle was repeatedly interpreted without
sense of responsibility and reciprocity.
The doctrinal arguments generally adduced against such
practical necessities as "renvoi" and the right of the parties
to a contract to determine the applicable law are so significant
that these two institutions deserve preliminary discussion immediately hereafter. Both have been rejected as incompatible
with state sovereignty! The power of parties to choose their
law by agreement was even declared "impossible," because
there had to be first a substantive law allowing them such
choice!
In a similar misuse of logic,3 it has been declared that the
law governing the effects of a contract cannot "logically" control the extent to which error, fraud, or duress affects the consent of the parties-there must be a law to determine the validity of .the transaction, before the law governing its effects can
be selected. The law of the state of incorporation, or other
law regulating the life of a corporation, has been said to be
unable "logically" to determine the conditions of valid conthe private international law." In the first World War, the Reichsgericht upheld
firmly the conflicts rules, and the government in no serious respect interfered.
3 See on the following examples, RABEL, "Die Deutsche Rechtsprechung in
einzelnen Lehren des internationalen Privatrechts, Vorbemerkung," 3 Z.ausl.PR.
(19~9) 75Zi WAHL, ibid. 791; KESSLER, ibid. 768.
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stitution of the corporation. The settled rule that the law
governing torts decides whether or not an act is a tort has been
characterized as a "legal impossibility." 4 Remembering
the deduction of the clever Romanist, MUhlenbruch, that assignment of a chose in action is logically inadmissible, and
similar errors of eminent jurists/; we may derive consolation
from the thought that time will provide a remedy.
In the United States, courts and writers are cognizant of
such handicaps and are endeavoring to overcome them. Tradition and modernism are engaged in an interesting combat
with varying results. Circumstances differ in the parts of this
vast country. In respect to certain problems, it is difficult to
state what American law actually is, as the Restaters have
come to suspect. But the writers, practically without exception,
and the great majority of the courts are seriously conscious of
their duty to reach adequate solutions. When handbooks and
notes in law reviews report on a subject, they usually present
the forward trend of advanced courts in preference to formalistic decisions and precedents exaggerating local policy.
2.

Renvoi

The controversy on "renvoi" is the most famous dispute
in conflicts law, 6 a classic example of violently prejudiced
4
This was the expression of 2 FRANKENSTEIN 363.
s See RABEL, Aufgabe and Notwendigkeit der Rechtsvergleichung, Miinchener
Juristische Vortrage, edited by the Juristische Studiengesellschaft in Miinchen,
Heft x, reprinted from 13 Rhein. Z. f. Zivil- und Prozessrecht (1925).
6 Bibliography is to be found in PoTu, La question du renvoi en droit international prive (1913); up to 1929 in LEWALD, "La theorie du renvoi," 29
Recueil 1929 IV 519; and in the footnotes by MAURY, "Regles generales des
conflits de lois," 57 Recueil 1936 III 519 ff. On the history of the problem since
a French case of 1652 see E. M. MEIJERS, "La question du renvoi," 38 Bull.
Inst. Int. (1938) 191, 197.
Anglo-American literature in addition to the treatises: LORENZEN, "The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law," 10 Col. L. Rev. (1910) 19o,
327; same author, "The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws--Meaning of
'The Law of a Country,"' 27 Yale L. J. (1918) 509; idem, Cases (1932)
832-840; ScHREIBER, "The Doctrine of the Renvoi in Anglo-American Law,"
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literature confronting nai'vely consistent practice. Only where
courts finally succumbed to the persuasion of world-wide
learned criticism, did they falter, as in Greece, Italy, and in
the isolated Tallmadge case in New York. 7 On the other hand,
the constancy of the French, German, and Swiss courts has
been sufficient to impress their foremost Italian opponent,
31 Harv. L. Rev. (r9r 8) 5Z3; PoLLACK, "The 'Renvoi' in New York," 36 Law.
Q. Rev. (r920) 91; ALLEMES, "The Problem of Renvoi in Private International Law," u Grotius Soc. ( r 927) 63; FALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi and Succession to Movables," 46 Law Q. Rev. (r93o) 465, 47 Law Q. Rev. (1931)
at 271; also FALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi et succession mohiliere," in Revue 1932>
254, 451; FALCONBRIDGE, "Characterization in the Conflict of Laws," 53 Law
Q. Rev. (1937) s59-s67; FALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights," 17 Can. Bar Rev. (1939) 369 at 378; FALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi
and the Law of Domicile," 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 3II to 317, 329 to 334;
L. T. BATEs, "Remission and Transmission in American Conflicts of Laws,"
r6 Cornell L. Q. (1931) 311; DICEY, Appendix, Note r, 863 to 878; BENTWICH, "Recent Application of the Renvoi in Matters of Personal Status," 14
Can. Bar Rev. (1936) 379; MORRIS, "The Law of the Domicil," r8 Brit. Year
Book Int. Law (1937) at 32; CowAN, "Renvoi Does Not Involve a Logical
Fallacy," 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1938) 34-39; GRISWOLD, "Renvoi Revisited,"
51 Harv. L. Rev. (1937) u65; CoRMACK, "Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Question in the Conflict of Laws," 14 So. Cal. L. Rev.
(1941) at 249 to 2.75. See also LoRENZEN, 6 Repert. 284 nos. 40-44, 353 no.
366; Decision Note, 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 253; BENTWICH, "The Development
of the Doctrine of Renvoi in England in Cases of Succession," 4 Z.ausl.PR.
(1930) 433; BELLOT, "La theorie anglo-saxonne de conflits de lois," 3 Recueil 1924 II 99, 164 to r68; KuHN, "La conception du droit international
prive d'apres la doctrine et la pratique aux Etats-Unis," 22 Recueil 1928 I r86
at 2.7o-272. On the English cases, see furthermore MELCHIOR 194 n. 2; ELKIN,
"La doctrine du renvoi en droit anglais," Clunet 19341 577; MENDELSSOHNBARTHOLDY, Renvoi in Modern English Law (Oxford, 1937); GRASSETTI, "La
dottrina del rinvio in diritto internazionale privata e la 'common law' angloamericana," 2.6 Rivista (1934) 3-41, 2.33-2.6r, 350; DE NOVA, Book Review
of GRASSETTI, I2 Annuario Dir. Comp., parte prima (1937) 258; and DE
NovA, "Considerazioni sui rinvio in diritto inglese," 30 Rivista (1938) 388;
RHEINSTEIN, Book Review, 12. Annuario Dir. Comp., parte prima (1937) 314
at 3 r 6.
7 In re Tallmadge, In re Chadwick's Will (Surrogate's Court, New York
County, October, 1919) ro9 N.Y. Misc. 696, r8r N.Y. Supp. 336. DtAK,
Book Review, r La. L. Rev. (1939) 642 1 at 644 n. 141 notes that the court misunderstood the French rule. On a dictum of Steinbrink J. in Lann v. United
Steel Works Corporation (1938) r66 N. Y. Misc. 465, 1 N.Y. Supp. (2.d)
951, "cavalierly" dismissing the problem of renvoi, see FREUTEL, "Exchange
Control, Freezing Orders and the Conflict of Laws," 56 Harv. L. Rev. (1942)
301 at 42. ff.
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Anzilotti, 8 and recently their mam French adversary,
Niboyet. 9
In the course of the debate, many wrong arguments,
"logical" and "practical," were advanced on either side. 10
Most of these have cancelled each other long since. According
to the view shared by the writer and gaining favor in this
country, 11 the entire problem is not to be taken in the lump
and decided on a priori reasoning. The various categories of
cases merit individual consideration in the light of expediency.
Hence, in the subsequent treatment of each particular subject,
the prevailing opinions, and the chief countries concerned, will
be stated. Here we have to deal only with the basic issue. 12
Renvoi, translated as "remitting," "reference back,"
properly means that, when a conflicts rule of a state refers to
the "law" of another state and the conflicts rule of the latter
state directs the application of the former's own internal law,
such law is applied. Thus, in a French court, succession upon
death to the movables of an American citizen domiciled in
'France is governed by the "Ame~ican law" but, the law of the
domicil, i.e., French inheritance law, being applicable under
8 ANZIL01TI, formerly against renvoi, Studi critici di diritto internazionale
privato, parte 3, 193, 3oo, elaborated a system approaching the ideas of the English judges, Corso di diritto internazionale privato (1925) 66, 77; Decision
Notes, 12 Rivista (1918) 8x, 288.
9 NIBOYET, Decision Note, Revue Crit. 1939, 474-476, now accepts renvoi
as definitively adopted by the courts, moreover as convenient, but in addition
also as a tribute to territorialism.
10 Surveys on these arguments in English: LoRENZEN, "The Renvoi Doctrine
in the Conflict of Laws--Meaning of 'The Law of a Country,'" 27 Yale L. J.
(1918) 509; CoRMACK, 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) 221 at 252 to 26o, supra
n. 6. Cf. in favor of renvoi: LEPAULLE, "Nature et methode du droit international prive," Clunet 1936, 284, 296; Conclusions of M. REY in a French case
of 1935, Nouv. Revue 1936, 114.
11 GRISWOLD, 51 Harv. L. Rev. (I 9 3 7), II 65 at II 84, supra n. 6. See also
RAAPE, D. IPR. 41; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE no. 260.
12 The policy considerations involved in the following exposition were indicated by the present writer in "El fomento internacional del derecho privado,"
I8 Revista Der. Priv. (I93I) 367; RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (I93I) 28I; RABEL,
7 ibid. (I933) I99 n. I; RABEL, Die Fachgebiete u8; they are in essential
agreement with the opinions of MELCHIOR and GRISWOLD, fundamental for
German and American laws, respectively.
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American principles of conflicts, this law is applied by the
French courts.
When the principle of renvoi was first adopted in the Forgo
case by the French Court of Cassation/ 3 the avowed motive
was favor of the law of the forum, the law familiar to the
court and appearing to him the most suitable. In that case,
moreover, the French state had a material interest. The judgment gave the property of a deceased Bavarian citizen in the
absence of heirs to the French exchequer rather than to that
of Bavaria. This narrowmindedness is responsible for much
of the ensuing heated attacks on the doctrine. Nevertheless,
many courts applying renvoi exhibit a similar attitude, and
some writers, as well as a few projects, recognize only the
reference back to the law of the forum, in contrast to other
forms of reference. 14 However, renvoi ought not to be understood as a concession to judicial deficiencies or prejudices. It
represents the idea that a rule of conflicts of country X, referring to the law of country Y, should not be pursued to the
point where the court in X applies to an inheritance the law of
Y, and a court in Y the law of X. Except under the influence
of the learned literature, no normal judge would approve such
a result. The theoretical accoutrements for this feeling have
finally been furnished by a few modern writers. Reasonable
interpretation of conflicts rules, often, if not normally, restricts the application of foreign substantive rules of law to the
13 Cass. (req.) (Feb. 2.2. 1882.) Clunet 1883, 64; moreover, confirming the
1
doctrine, Cass. (req.) (March 1, 1910) Clunet 1910, 888, the vote of the
Counsellor Denis, published in Clunet 1912., 1013, declared: "J'aime mieux la
loi fran~aise que la loi etrangere."
14 STAUB, Kommentiu zum Handelsgesetzbuch, Anhang zu § 372. no. 5 (a);
HoLDER, 19 Z.int.R. (1909) 198; M. WoLFF, IPR. 49 (reference back as in the
leading case) ; NusSBAUM, Principles 99•
The drafts of the new Italian preliminary provisions allowed only reference
back and have been justly criticized as inconsistent by Aco, "Le norme di
diritto internazionale privato nel progetto di codice civile," 23 Rivista (1931)
2.97 at 349, 350.
In Soviet Russia, reference back is considered to agree with the spirit of the
law; see MAKAROV, Precis 123.

74

INTRODUCTION

territorial limits defined by the respective foreign legal systems
in their conflicts laws. 15 Hence, the reference to the "law" of
a foreign state may mean selection of the specific internal law
that such state itself applies, and even an express reference
to the internal law of a state may be conditional on its applicability by the state in question to the particular case. 16
The opposite opinion, generally prevaillng until recently,
takes it for granted that a sound conflicts rule must necessarily refer to the material rules of some country and not leave
the ultimate issue to foreign conflicts law. Why? One argument asserts that it is unworthy of a sovereign state to follow
the commands of a foreign state. 17 It appears that Italy, influenced by the intended universal significance of the Italian
conflicts rules, has been won over by this argument. 18 It seems
most curious that Italy's dignity should be offended when
Italian courts apply the Italian Civil Code instead of English
case law. Another, the most popular argument, states that
renvoi leads to a vicious circle. If the "acceptance" of renvoi
from the (American) country of nationality to the (French)
law of domicil is right, dominant opinion reasons, th~ same
method must continue with renvoi from the French law of
domicil to the American law of nationality. "Logical mirror,"
"international lawn tennis," "ping-pong," are celebrated
names of the supposed circulus inextricabilis, 19 time and again
designated as the "most powerful argument" for rejecting
1

~

MELCHIOR 242-244.
RAAPE 74I and RAAPE, D.IPR. 42.
17 The argument was invented in France: LABBE, Clunet I885, 5 at 9;
VALERY 486 nos. 372, 374; PrLLET, I Traite 532; BARTIN, I Principes 205,
and many others.
18 See MELCHIOR zoo; cf. 241. An entire book against the doctrine of the
Italian courts has been published by PHILONENKO, La theorie du renvoi en droit
compare (Paris, I 9 35).
19 KAHN, I Abhandl. 20; LAINE, Clunet I 896, 24 I at 2 57, 48 I; BARTIN, 30
Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I898) ISS; STREIT, 20 Recueil I927 V IOI;
LEWALD r 7 no. 22; In re Tallmadge, In re Chadwick's Will (Surrogate's
Court, New York County, October, 1919) 109 N.Y. Misc. 696 1 I8I N.Y.
Supp. 336.
16
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renvoi. 20 By parity of reasoning, it has been supposed that
an English or American court resorting to renvoi ought to
accept renvoi from the French law of domicil to the American
law ofnationality, and so forth.
A striking, though tacit, answer has been provided by the
English practice, more than a hundred years in development,
in the very field where renvoi originated, viz., where nationality and domicil principles conflict. The practice enables the
English courts to obtain results in harmony with the Continental decisions in specific situations and to avoid the circulus.
Basically, confronted with the French and German renvoi
practice, the English courts simply have given free play to
their own principle of domicil. The estate of an English decedent domiciled in France is distributed under French law,
both in French courts by renvoi and in English courts as the
law of domicif.2 1 Put to the test when Italian courts repudiated renvoi, disdained to apply Italian inheritance law,
and insisted on British law for British successions in Italy, the
English judges exhibited real wisdom in avoiding the absurd
result not of renvoi but of the rejection of renvoi. They
realized that the traditional form of their domiciliary principle refers to the same law which is applied by the court of the
domicil. Under the principle as now defined, the reference to
the law of domicil points primarily to the conflicts law of the
domicil. The cases use different language to express this policy
of forbearance. Undue attention has been given to inconsistencies and to sayings such as that the English court should
decide as if sitting at the place of the domicil. 2 .2
20 The "decisive argument" for innumerable writers and still so, for instance,
for LEWALD, "La theorie du renvoi," 29 Recueil 1929 IV 519 at 545, 595;
MEIJERS, "La question de renvoi," 38 Bull. Inst. Int. (1938) 191, 219. For this
"powerful" reason, the Italian drafts limited renvoi to reference back, and the
final text, C. C. (1938) Disp. Prel. art. 20, eliminated it entirely.
21
/n re Ross, r Ch. D. [1930] 377, 388.
22
Collier v. Rivaz, 2 Curt. Ecc. Ct. (r84r) 855, 863, per Jenner, J., often
quoted, and adopted by DICEY in his early thesis that "the object of our courts
is to deal with such a will exactly as the courts of the domicil would deal with
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In fact, several modes of stating renvoi are thinkable and
have been employed by writers, courts on the Continent, and
British judges. Falconbridge lucidly distinguishes three kinds
of renv~i/ 3 and some authors, who have contrived an intricate
system of distinctions, call the English method "double
renvoi." But these details do not touch the essential point,
namely, the policy behind the cases. The writers who seem
not to have understood this policy-unfortunately there are
many-may be excused, since even Luxmoore, J., in In re
Ross 24 and Lord Maugham, in In re Askew, 25 while confirming and fortifying the rule, evidently regretted that the precedents had abandoned the pure domiciliary test. The English
rule is a praiseworthy contribution to international harmony,
not difficult to derive from the principle of domicil. It was
prepared by the historic doctrine that jurisdiction implies application of the law of the court. 26 Finally, these principles
have been illuminated by the Privy Council in a recent case 27
"with all the weight of a considered judgment devoted to the
issue" of renvoi in general. 28 The reference from the lex situs
to the national law in the Palestinian Succession Ordinance,
it." DICEY, The Law of Domicile, as a Branch of the Law of England (London,
I879) 295·
The differences of language and certain errors in the decisions were subjected
to a meticulous criticism by MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY, Renvoi in Modern
English Law, followed widely by CHESHIRE (ed. 2) 44-67, in an unfortunate
contrast to his former view, "Private International Law," 51 Law Q. Rev. (1935)
76 at 77, (CHESHIRE, ed. 1, 135-139). Both authors, in the spell of the formalistic international t~eories, failed to appreciate sufficiently the policy questions.
The same is true of the subtle criticism by MoRRIS, 18 Brit. Year Book Int.
Law (1937) at 32, supran. 6. See GRISWOLD, 51 Harv.L.Rev. (1938) at II72,
supra n. 6, and his Book Review, 51 Harv.L.Rev. (1938) 573·
23
EALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights," I 7 Can.
Bar Rev. (1939) 369 at 378.
24
1
In re Ross, I Ch. D. [1930] 3 77·
25
In re Askew, 2 Ch. D. [1930] 259.
26
See the interesting discussion by MoRRIS, 18 Brit. Year Book Int. Law
(1937) at 32, supra n. 6; RHEINSTEIN, 12 Annuario Dir. Comp. (1937) 315
ff. KUHN, Comp. Com. 52; DE NovA, "Considerazioni sul rinvio in diritto
inglese," 30 Rivista 1938, 388 at 412-415·
27
Jaber Elias Kotia v. Katr Bint Jiryes Nahas [1941] 3 All E.R. 20, per
Clauson, L. J., the Judicial Committee (including Lords Atkin, Russel of
Killowen, Romer and Sir George Rankin).
28
KEITH, "The Privy Council on Renvoi," Journ. Comp. Leg. (1942) 69.
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1923, of a deceased owner is construed as pointing to the law
which the courts of the national country would apply to the
property in question, as distinguished from property in their
own country, the contrary construction being regarded as "deliberately cutting across the principle" 29 recognized by the
English courts.
What, then, of the mirror cabinet? If the world is split into
two contradictory systems, there must be some modus vivendi~
Renvoi is one of the best means to this end. It stands to reason
that it cannot be applied in the same manner by the two antagonistic groups and at the same time reach conformity. 80 The
English method, in turn, is not to be observed by courts following the nationality principle! Theorists should not de.mand
schematic symmetry just to obtain an argumentum ad absurdum. This understood, it need no longer be feared that
the English attitude will create new cases of circulus inextricabilis.31 The difference between nationality and domicil
as tests of personal law requires a different technique in each
29

[1941] 3 All E.R. at 25.
The view of the English courts has a striking parallel in an equally wise
old decision of the Appeal Court of Lubeck, of March :u, 1861, Krebs v.
Rosalino, 14 Seu1f. Arch. 644 no. I 07. The case was entirely analogous to the
Annesley case [1926] Ch. 692. The testatrix, a subject of Frankfurt on the
Main, according to the normal concept of domicil, had her last domicil in
Mainz, but, as she did not have the governmental authorization for domicil
according to the French Civil Code in force in Mainz, she lacked domicil there
in the meaning of the law of Mainz, quite as Mrs. Annesley did under French law.
The conflicts rule of Mainz was uncertain; possibly it subjected succession to
movables to the law of nationality of the deceased, i.e., the statute of Frankfurt.
The Court of Lubeck, under its own conflicts rule, referring the succession to the
domicil of the de cuius, declared that correct application of the principle required
that the entire law of the testator's domicil in its totality be applied and succession
upon death be adjudicated as in the courts of the domicil.
In his recent work, LEWALD, Regles generales des conflits de lois (1941) 49 1
56, again insists that thus the Court of Lubeck refers from domicil to nationality,
while the Forgo case and all its followers refer from nationality to domicil. But
why should this contrast which involves no contradiction, be cited as a reproach
to the renvoi principle, rather than to the diversity of conflicts principles arid
of concepts of domicil?
31 This is feared by MoRRis, "The Law of Domicil," 18 Brit. Year Book Int.
Law (1937) 32., 37; CHESHIRE 65; MAURYJ57 Recueil1936 III 32.9> 538; DE
NovA 441; CoRMACK, 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) 221 at z7z, supra n. 6;
NussBAUM, "Rise and Decline of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of
Laws," 42. Col. L. Rev. (1942) 189, zoz, and Principles 98.
30

INTRODUCTION

group of countries. Indeed, the nationality principle does not
mean that a foreign national is subject necessarily to the substantive law of his country; it means that the state to which
the individual belongs should determine his personal relations.
The law of domicil does not mean that everybody must be
subject to the substantive law of his domicil. The reasonable
construction is that the law of the place of domicil determines
what law should govern. Instead of following writers 32 who
with a certain pride declare that they intend to "explain away"
the English conception of renvoi, the English model should
be extended to other types of cases and to other countries in
accordance with the spirit of the principles guiding the forum.
As to such types of cases, the German 33 courts have consistently assumed that reference back must be accompanied by
the acceptance of reference to a third law ( W eiterverweisung,
transmission). u In the case of an English testator domiciled
in Germany who leaves immovables in Georgia (U.S.A.),
. the German rule refers to English conflicts law which refers
to the lex situs. The statute of distribution of Georgia, therefore, is applicable in a German court as well as in England,
although German conflicts law itself does not distinguish immovables for the purpose of succession. The persistent objections to this extension of the renvoi principle chiefly tend
to demonstrate that the chain of references may lead nowhere,
a fear not justified by any noteworthy case material 35 and
not significant in view of the standard set by the English
precedents. There must always be some hierarchy in the applicable laws. Renvoi is not just an aimless game.
32

MORRIS, MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY, CHESHIRE and others.
More doubt exi~s with respect to French courts, but transmissive reference
is recognized by Cass. {req.) (Nov; 7, 1933), Guez c. Ben Attar, Clunet 1935,
88, Revue Crit. 1934, 440,
3' For this translation see ScHREIBER, "The Doctrine of the Renvoi in AngloAmerican Law," 31 Harv. L. Rev. (1918) szJ.
35
See NussBAUM, 4Z Col. L. Rev. ( 194z) zoz, supra n. 31.
33
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Illustrations: 36 (a) A Danish national dies domiciled in
Rome, Italy, leaving movables in Germany. A German court
will consult the national "law," i.e., the Danish conflicts law,
which refers to the domicil and allegedly does not recognize
renvoi. Therefore, the Italian statute of distribution is applied. It does not matter that Italian conflicts law equally refuses renvoi so that an Italian court under its nationality principle would apply the Danish inheritance law. Hence a
German judge can without difficulty apply W eiterve:rweisung
in this case, although the two foreign conflicts laws involved,
the Danish and the Italian, do not agree with each other.
(b) A United States citizen domiciled in Rome leaves at
Italy is
death movables in Poland. The inheritance law
not applicable in any one of the three countries. An Italian
court would apply "American" 37 inheritance law. An American court, were it to adopt the English renvoi practice,
would give effect to the inheritance law of an American state.
A Polish court, on the basis of the nationality principle and
renvoi, should reach the same result.
(c) An Argentinian domiciled in Rio de Janeiro dies leaving movables in France. The French court is referred by its
conflicts rule to the Argentine principle of domicil, and thereby
to the conflicts rule of Brazil. Until recently, Brazilian conflicts
law "accepted" the Argentine "renvoi," and Brazilian inheritance law was applicable in Buenos Aires as well as in Rio de
Janeiro.
The present Brazilian Introductory Law of 1942, adopting
the domicil principle, leads to the same result. The circumstance that the two internal laws are not in disaccord is not
material in a French court, which simply follows the decision
that the national (Argentine) court would render.

of

In the only decision on renvoi since the five former highest
tribunals of Italy were replaced by the present Supreme Court,
88 The first example is solved by MELCHIOR zzs § 151 as in the text, while
1
WoLFF, IPR. so (z), uses the first and third examples in order to show that
renvoi to a third law should not be followed, if the two foreign laws involved
disagree in the choice of law. The case on which they agree is often excepted
from the doctrinal refusal of renvoi.
87 Which atate's law? See infra pp. u81f.
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the advantages of "transmission" or reference over, as distinguished from reference back, are recognized. 38 This case,
decided in 1937, is regarded as spectacular, since it is contrary
to the settled practice of other courts, to the great majority
of writers, as well as to the formal prohibition of renvoi expressed in the new Italian Code, then soon to enter into force. 39
While some authors accept only reference back 40 and others
solely reference over, 41 an increasing number advocate renvoi
in either form for situations in which the same law is indicated
by the conflicts rules of two or more foreign countries principally involved. 42 For instance, in case two Swiss nationals,
uncle and niece, whose intermarriage is prohibited by Swiss
law, were to marry in Soviet Russia while there domiciled, the
marriage would be valid according to both Russian law and
Swiss conflicts law. 43 Presumably, it is admitted, the validity
of the marriage would be recognized by any court. 44 Again,
by the admission, the existence of a preconception is at least
partially avowed.
In addition to references from the national law to the domiciliary law, others from the law of situs to the national or
domiciliary law and vice versa, and in the field of obligations,
have been admitted with good justification. The particular
situations need separate consideration.
Ordinary renvoi is not able to settle a "positive" conflict of
conflicts rules. Where a Spaniard dies domiciled in the United
States, his movables are distributed here under the statute of
38

Cass. ltal. (Dec. Z9, 1937) 9 Rivista Dir. Priv. (1939) II zz8.
See GRASSETTI, Note to the decision supra n. 38.
See supra ,n. 1 4·
41
The sovereignty of the forum is said not to be involved; BATE, Notes on
the Doctrine of Renvoi (1904) xu ff.; also, Austrian OGH. (May z, 19z9) JW.
1931, x66 (for obscure +easons).
42
LEWALD, z9 Recueil 19:i9 IV 519 at 574; MAURY, 57 Recueil 1936 III
32.9 at 5.49·
43
Example adduced by RAAPE, 24, 745, as support for renvoi in general.
44
LEWALD, Regles generales des confiits de lois (I 941) 58.
39

40
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the domicil and in Spain under Spanish inheritance law. This
thorny problem is best covered by bilateral treaties. Or it
may be obviated by extraordinary concessions, as in the Swiss
statute on conflicts. In an admirable effort to avoid collisions
regarding Swiss nationals abroad, the statute provides that
Swiss citizens should be subject to Swiss municipal law only
if the law of the domicil so prescribes; where the local domestic
law of the domicil claims to govern or where the local conflicts
rule remits the case to a third state's law, Switzerland conforms. 45 Hence, the national law extends to Swiss nationals
abroad only under certain conditions.
At present, renvoi is prescribed by statutory provisions in
Germany, Poland, Sweden, Hungary, China, Japan, Liechtenstein, and Palestine, 46 moreover by the Hague Convention
on Marriage, 47 and the Geneva conventions concerning negotiable instruments. 48 In practice, it occurs beyond the limits
of these provisions 49 and in other countries. 50 Under the
influence of the theoretical literature, the recent codes of Italy,
45

NAG. arts. 2.8, 3 I.
Germany: EG. art. 2.7, in five cases of status questions.
Poland: Law of I92.6 on private international law, art. 36.
Sweden: Int. Fam. L. of 1904 with subsequent amendments, c. I § 2., c. 2.. § 1.
Hungary: Marriage Law of I894, § 108.
Japan: Law of 1898, art. 2.9; China: Law of 1918, art. 4·
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 45; S.R. art. I3 par. 2.; see also for another
provision WAHLE, 2. Z.ausl.PR. (I92.8) 137.
Palestine: Palestine Order in Council, Sept. I, 192.2., art. 64 (:~.).
Cf. cases commented by WENGLER, "lnternationales und interreligioses Privatrecht in Palastina," 12. Z.ausl.PR. (I939) 772., 790.
47 Art. I,
45 Resolutions of the Hague (19I2.) concerning checks, art. 32., similar provision in Soviet Russia: Law on checks, of Nov. 6, I92.9, art. 36. ct. MAKAROV,
Precis 19I. Geneva conflicts rules on bills of exchange (1930) art. 2. par. 1.
49
The German Supreme Court especially applies the. principle of renvoi to
all matters of conflicts law. See MELCHIOR 2.07 § 139.
60
MELCHIOR I98, mentions Argentina (contra: VICO no. 304), Brazil
(but see note 52. infra), Belgium, Bulgaria, Luxemburg, Norway, Portugal,
Spain (doubting, LASALA LLANAS 2.46 ff.), Rumania, an<,! Venezuela. To be
added are certainly Switzerland and probably many other countries. See also
Anglo-German Mixed Tribunals (May 31.,. 192.6) 6 .Recueil des decisions des
tribunamt arbitraux mixtes 540.
46
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Greece, and Rumania 51 have rejected renvoi, as does the
Brazilian law of I 942, 52 while at the same time reducing
conflicts by its acceptance of the domiciliary principle. But in
the Continental literature, the traditional hostility, of the
writers is being abandoned. 53 In I 93 2, the Institute 'of International Law, which had censured renvoi in I 895, I 898, and
I900, recognized the ~onventional, legislative, and judicial
trend, manifesting itself in various countries in certain applications of the renvoi doctrine, particularly with respect to
personal status. 54
A like change of mind is to be hoped for the United States.
The usual case for resort to renvoi is here almost without
significance, as, in common with almost the entire British
Empire, none of the States accept the principle of nationality.
This evidently is the reason why the basic need has not been
felt as in Europe. Other conflicts, however, have occurred,
striking enough to compel the Restaters to admit some exceptions to their rejection of renvoi. 55 Cowan proves that renvoi
is "logically" possible/ 6 and Griswold vigorously pleads for
Ital. C. C. (194~) Disp. Prel. art. JO.
Greek C. C. (1940) art. 36.
Rumanian Draft art. LXIII (probably unchanged in C. C. 1940).
Also, one Belgian decision followed the pleading of Mr. van Hille against
renvoi, see VAN HILLE, 66 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1939) 764.
The Dutch decisions are few and divided; see MEJJERS, "La question du
renvoi," 38 Bull. Inst. Int. (1938) 191 at ~04 n. 5; HJJMANS 153.
5
~ Brazil, Lei de Introdu~ao, of Sept. 4, 194~, art. x6.
53 France: in addition to older writers (WEISS, VAREILLES-SOMMIERE, CoLIN),
LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE, "Observations sur la question du renvoi," 51 Clunet
19~4, 877; ARMJNJON, "Le renvoi," Revue 19H-19~3, 565 at 583 ff.
Belgium: RoLIN, POULLET.
Germany: NusSBAUM, M. WoLFF, in addition to the older writers recorded
by MELCHIOR ~01 § 137•
Italy: ANZILOTTI.
Spain: TRiAs DEBEs, "Regles generales des confiits de lois," 6~ Recueil 1937
IV 6~.
64 Annuaire 193~. 471,
55 Restatement § 8.
56 CoWAN, "Renvoi Does Not Involve a Logical Fallacy," 87 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. (1938) n-+9·
51
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renvoi wherever no special reasons militate against it. Even
from an opposed point of view, Cormack, in effect, accepts the
practical result of renvoi in all cases respecting status and
property, since he would determine these matters according to
the law considered applicable at the domicil or situs respectively.'58 It would accordingly seem that the critic who declared his appreciation for Griswold's advocacy of a cause
lost before the formidable array of the enemies of renvoi/; 9
may soon have to look for another ground of sympathy.
3· Choice of Law by the Parties 60

•

The doctrine of "autonomy of the parties" is also to be
noted in this connection as an example of obstinate theory opposed to universal practice. The details will be considered later
in connection with contracts.
The practice allowing parties to a contract to determine the
law applicable to their contractual relation, recognized in Dumoulin's theory, for centuries has been applied by courts
throughout the world with slight dissent. 61 In commercial
arbitration, this right of the parties is taken for granted. If
this time-honored view has recently suffered vacillation, it is
due to the fanatical campaign of the handbooks in the last
decades. After World War I, the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals,
S

7

GRISWOLD, "Renvoi Revisited,"

sr Har~. L. Rev. (1937) u6s.

58 CoRMACK, 14- So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) u1 at u9 supra n. 6; contra
1
F ALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi and the Law of the Domicile," 19 Can. Bar Rev, ( 1941)
J l l at 335> 337•
sg Annual Survey of English Law 1938, 388.
60
An excellent comparative study on the subject is the book by H. BATIFFOL,
Les conftits de lois en matiere de contrats ( r 9 3 8).
61
The Swiss Federal Court holds that the questions connected with the formation of a contract, such as those concerning consent, fraud, error, formalities,
power of attorney, are inaccessible to the parties' choice of law; it seems that
these questions are determined, preferably at least, under the law of the place of
contracting. See BG. (Nov. 7, 1933) 59 BGE.II 397,3991 BG. {July n, 1938)
64 BGE. II 34-6, 349; NIEDERER, "Die Parteiautonomie in der neuern Praxis
des Bundesgerichtes auf dem Gebiete des internationalen OR.," 59 Z.Schweiz.
R. N.F. (1940) 2.39, 2.45,
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which were free to choose their method, had no doubt about
the rule. 62
Despite this practice, prevailing theory 63 attacks the freedom of the parties to a contract to determine the law that shall
govern its validity, because this enables them to evade compulsory rules of a law otherwise controlling. It has been said
thatto allow parties to select their law would elevate them to
the rank of a legislature and delegate to them a sovereign
power. Hence, it is supposed, each contract must be localized
in one state whose law shall prescribe whether the contract is
valid and whether, or to what extent, the parties are allowed
to submit controversies to the law of another state. To recognize an agreement respecting applicable law before determining which law governs the validity of the agreement, is accordingly regarded as putting the cart before the horse.
On the other hand, courts operate on the unassailable basis
of a customary, extremely well-settled conflicts rule. Autonomy is needed in the first place by international and, in this
country, also by interstate commerce. For such matters, at
least in peace time, few compulsory, imperative rules of law
are provided in the national legislations; existing prohibitions
will more often than not be considered by the court in which
the contract is in issue either from the viewpoint of local public
policy or as a defense based on illegality of performance. Thus,
the danger that prohibitions established by one law may be
evaded ·by a party exercising the right to select another law
is practically negligible, so that a state ordinarily has no substantial interest, as the theory postulates, warranting intrusion
into the international freedom of contracting. On the contrary, the merchants have. an enormous interest that a certain
RABEL, I Z.ausl.PR; (19~7) .p.
See the endless lists of majority opinions by CALEB, Essai sur le principe
de l'autonomie et de la volonte en droit international prive (I9~7) 8I;
MELCHIOR 500 § 353 n. I; GUTZWILLER I6o6 n. I; BATIFFOL I I. Exceptional
positions were taken by KosTERS (I9I7) 733; SURVILLE (I9z5) 351·
· 62

63
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and preknown body of rules should govern future litigation.
They are surrounded by a chaos of national conflicts laws and
national legislations, private and commercial. Contracts between merchants of different nations are likely to touch several
territories. No attorney is able to predict the law under which
the various rights and duties of the parties will be adjudicated
in all courts in which litigation may occur. This primordial
need for relative certainty is documented by the multitudinous
usages and standard forms of the several branches of international trade and impels courts familiar with business requirements, British, French, German, and Swedish, to grant the
parties wide latitude. They usually assert without qualification
that the applicable law is determined by the parties. 64
Nonmercantile situations must be independently evaluated. The case in which Dumoulin advocated autonomy of the
parties involved marriage settlements; the French courts still
insist on free choice of law by the parties in this case. The prevailing view, however, is that the law governing in the absence of a settlement, controls the permissibility of the settlement, 65 including any agreement respecting the applicable
law. In fact, as contrasted with business contracts, marriage
settlements are frequently subjected to restrictions im9osed
by law.
The attitude of the courts has finally received the support
of a succession of Geqnan 66 and an increasing number of
French 67 writers. The dominant theory has also been criticized
64

See, e.g., for English dicta, CHESHIRE 250.
See infra, Effects of Marriage on Property, Chapter I o.
66 The first opposition to the dominant reasoning was expressed in my observations, 1 Z.ausl.PR. (1927) 42 n. 1, and Book Review, 4 Z.ausl.PR. (1930) 417;
also in 18 Revista Der. Priv. (1931) 321, 363, for the reasons explained above;
more study was given with arguments of varying kind by HAUDEK, Die
Bedeutung des Parteiwillens im internationalen Privatrecht, Rechtsvergl.
Abhandl. no. 7 (1931); MELCHIOR 498 § 351 ff. (1932); NusSBAUM, D. IPR .
.214 (1932); M. WOLFF, IPR. 84 (1933).
67 LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE, Note, DALLOZ 1931.2.33 and Precis 279 no.
250 (1937); WIGNY, "La regle de confiit applicable aux contrats," Revue Dr.
Int. (Bruxelles) ( 1933) 676; PLANIOL, RIPERT et ESMEIN, 6 Traite pratique
65
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of late in the United States; 68 that the cases do not confirm
the hostility of the Restatement to election of law by the
parties, is well known. 09
Hence, the recent literature interests itself more in the
limits to be imposed upon the autonomy of the parties' intention than in challenging its existence. 7 ° Consideration was
given to a particularly important phase of this problem in connection with the uniform conflicts rules in relation to sales
of goods prepared by the International Law Association and
the Sixth Hague Conference. 71 The British lawyers were in
significant opposition to the insistence of Continental scholars
that the validity_ of an agreement making a certain law applicable, should be subject to the same law that, under the
intended Convention, should be applied in the absence of such
agreement. The proponents of this restriction claimed that
this would ensure greater certainty for the parties than if the
law of the forum were to determine the validity of the agreement. However, the entire discussion and others that followed in the literature make it desirable to sound a warning
that business security will be further menaced by ensnaring
commercial autonomy in a network of limitations through a
combination of substantive and conflicts rules.
641 no. 467; PERROUD, Clunet 1933, 289; BATIFFOL 8; J. DoNNEDIEU DE
VABRES 253; also }EANPRETRE, Les conflits de lois en matiere d'obligations
contratuelles, selon la jurisprudence et la doctrine aux Etats-Unis (r936) 137.
Cf. RHEINSTEIN, Book Review, 37 Col. L. Rev. (1937) 327.
68
CooK, "'Contracts' and the Conflict of Laws," 31 Ill. L. Rev. (1936) 143
at 145; CooK, Legal Bases (1942) at 349; and ibid. 389; and see LoRENZEN
and HEILMANN, "The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws," 83 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. (r935) 555; WILLIS, "Two Approaches to the Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study of the English Law and the Restatement of The American Law
Institute," 14 Can. Bar Rev. (1936) r; YNTEMA, "The Restatement of the
Conflict of Laws," 36 Col. L. Rev. (1936) 183.
69 See the writers cited in the precedent note and in a detailed criticism by
NussBAUM, "Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases versus Restatement," 51 Yale
L.J. (1942) 893.
70 SeeM. WoLFF, IPR. 85, 86; and M. WOLFF, "The Choice of Law by the
Parties in International Contracts," 49 Juridical Review (1937) uo, 118.
71 A clear resume is to be found in Int. Law Association, 35th Report (1928)
136 fi.
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Of course, when the world enjoys a reliable uniform conflicts law, neither renvoi nor self-choice of law will be so
largely l)eeded as today.

II.
I.

THE PuRPOSE oF CoNFLICTs LAW

Uniformity

Since Savigny, it has been customary to regard the attainment of uniform solutions as the chief purpose of private international law. Cases should be decided under the same substantive rules,_ irrespective of the court where they are
pleaded. 72 We may gratefully note that this postulate has
continued in favor, if only as an ideal remote from reality,
at a time when separate conflicts laws have grown up in the
various countries and their diversities have been prized. The
real value of this postulate under present conditions is that it
forms a test for the relative convenience of conflict rules. 73
The time has come to approach the goal with more energy.
One of the considerations leading to a universally useful
rule is the legitimate expectation of the parties. Not to disappoint fair assumptions by persons disposing of property or
entering into engagements, was the justified motive of the
twisted doctrines protecting vested rights. 74 For example,
formalities are subject to the law of the place where a transaction has been concluded; the acquisition of property is governed by the law of the situs as of the time of the acquisition;
capacity to contract a business obligation partly is, or should be,
determined by the law governing the validity of the contract,
72 SAVIGNY § 348; recently, for instance, TAINToR, "'Universality' in the
Conflict Laws of Contract," 1 La. L. Rev. (1939) 695, 699; HANCOCK, Torts
in the Conflict of Laws (1942) 54·
73
See WoLFF, IPR. 6; WENGLER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 196; MAURY, 57
Recueil I 9 3 6 III 32 5 at 42 3; NEUNER, "Policy Considerations in the Conflicts
of Laws," 20 Can. Bar Rev. (1942) 479,483.
74
GooDRICH, "Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts," 36 W. Va. L. Q.
(1930) 156, 167ff. and GOODRICH 5; CHESHIRE 4, 90; NEUNER, 20 Can. Bar
Rev. (1942) at 482, supra n. 73·
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etcetera. "When a matter has been settled, in conformity with
the law then and there controlling the actions of the parties,
the settlement should not be disturbed because the point arises
for litigation somewhere else." 75 This "fundamental premise"
suggests that courts should search, in the absence of express
intentions with respect to the applicable law, for the "tacit"
and eventually the "presumed" intentions of the parties.
Moreover, as a European writer has recently postulated,
when a fact or an act is governed by a certain law according
to all the conflicts laws practically involved, this law should be
applied by any court before which the case may come as a
result of subsequent circumstances. 76
In a more general way, Savigny regarded it a guarantee of
uniform treatment of legal relations that the law of that place
where the relation has its legal "seat" should be applied everywhere-a conception that through Wharton has been admitted
in the Supreme Court of the United States. 77 Gierke substituted for "seat" "center of gravity"; Bar sought localization
"according to the nature of things"; and Westlake recommended the law of the state with which the relation has closest
connection. All these formulas tend toward the same goal,
the importance of which still is in no wise impaired. But the
obstacles barring the way to the goal have increased since the
world order envisaged by Savigny has been dissolved into
more than a hundred national legal systems.
In view of the difficulties of reaching uniformity, a more
modest aspiration has been correctly proposed by Cook,
namely, to attain "as much certainty as may be reasonably
hoped for in a changing world" and is compatible with
"needed flexibility." 78
75 GOODRICH, 36 W.Va. L. Q. (1930) 156, 164, supra n. 74·
76 MEIJERS, "La question du renvoi," 38 Bull. Inst. Int. (1938)
77 Pritchard v. Norton (1882) 106 U.S. 124 at IJO.
78 CooK, Legal Bases 432.
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Policy Considerations

A just result or the realization of prescribed policies is now
often viewed as the main purpose of conflicts law. 79 This is
right without doubt, if certain fundamental distinctions be
borne in mind. 80
(a) The usual confusion of private and conflicts laws has
engendered the conception that both have to follow the same
pattern of values and purposes. If this were true, all the
differences that permeate the national laws with respect to the
organization of the family, the categories of property rights,
freedom of contract, privileges and duties, public interests,
and so on, would be reflected, nay reproduced, in the conflicts
rules of the divers countries. The writers have formulated
their axioms according to their particular views. Kahn, 81 for
instance, who considered relationships created by internal law
to be the subject matter of conflicts rules, required conformity
with the fundamental idea of the internal institution. If, in the
doctrine of the internal law, parental power is regarded as
a mere right, the father's personal law should govern; if the
father's duty is accentuated, the law of the child. Under Pillet's leadership, French writers transformed their doctrine
of sovereignty 8,2 so as to require the determination of what law
ought to govern capacity to contract, succession on death, etc.,
in conformity with the "social purpose, of the state regulations pertaining to personality, family, security of commerce, etc.; the applicable law is that which most efficiently
79 See in particular NEUNER, Der Sinn (1932.); CAVERS, "A Critique of the
Choice-of-Law Problem," 47 Harv. L. Rev. (1933) at 173; NEUNER, "Policy
Considerations in the Conflicts of Laws," zo Can. Bar Rev. ( 1941) at 486;
HARPER and TAINTOR, Cases (1937) ss, recognize "a desirable result" in
their third and fourth classification of "social policies."
80
RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 284.
81
KAHN, 1 Abhandl. 1 u.
82
See DEVos, zs Revue Inst. Belge (1929) x, 97; z6 ibid. (1930) 133.
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connection. All these formulas tend toward the same goal,
the importance of which still is in no wise impaired. But the
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In view of the difficulties of reaching uniformity, a more
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75 GoooRICH, 36 W.Va. L. Q. (1930) 156, 164,

supra n. 74·
MEIJERS, "La question du renvoi," 38 Bull. Inst. Int. (1938) at 225.
77 Pritchard v. Norton (188z) xo6 U.S. 124 at. 130.
78 CooK, Legal Bases 43Z·
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A just result or the realization of prescribed policies is now
often viewed as the main purpose of conflicts law. 79 This is
right without doubt, if certain fundamental distinctions be
borne in mind. 80
(a) The usual confusion of private and conflicts laws has
engendered the conception that both have to follow the same
pattern of values and purposes. If this were true, all the
differences that permeate the national laws with respect to the
organization of the family, the categories of property rights,
freedom of contract, privileges and duties, public interests,
and so on, would be reflected, nay reproduced, in the conflicts
rules of the divers countries. The writers have formulated
their axioms according to their particular views. Kahn, 81 for
instance, who considered relationships created by internal law
to be the subject matter of conflicts rules, required conformity
with the fundamental idea of the internal institution. If, in the
doctrine of the internal law, parental power is regarded as
a mere right, the father's personal law should govern; if the
father's duty is accentuated, the law of the child. Under Pillet's leadership, French writers transformed their doctrine
of sovereignty 8.2 so as to require the determination of what law
ought to govern capacity to contract, succession on death, etc.,
in conformity with the "social purpose" of the state regulations pertaining to personality, family, security of commerce, etc.; the applicable law is that which most efficiently
79 See in particular NEUNER, Der Sinn (I932); CAVERS, "A Critique of the
Choice-of-Law Problem," 47 Harv. L. Rev. (I933) at 173; NEUNER, "Policy
Considerations in the Conflicts of Laws," 20 Can. Bar Rev. (1942) at 486;
HARPER and TAINTOR, Cases (I937) 55, recognize "a desirable result" in
their third and fourth classification of "social policies."
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RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (I93I) 284.
8l KAHN, I Abhandl. I 12.
82
See DEVos, I5 Revue Inst. Belge (1929) x, 97; I6 ibid. (1930) 133.

INTRODUCTION

protects the purpose fostered by the forum's own domestic
legislation. 83
This identification of motives, sometimes extremely consequential, aggravates the difficult task of the conflicts law beyond all limits. To care for social prosperity is the responsibility of the municipal private laws, which have to resolve the
merits of each particular problem. The principle, jus suum
cuique tribuere, instructs legislators and judges to ponder carefully private and public interests. But this is what each private
law does for itself; the function of private international rules
is to choose the applicable law with all its evaluations whatever they may be. Existing conflicts law presumes that all laws
of civilized countries are of equal rank, not to speak of sister
states in a federation. Assuredly, the origin of this idea was
political, and its modern theoretical foundation came from its
connection with the law of nations. But, as things are, to
inject national policies directly into conflicts law, will destroy
it. In such event, "international public order" would embrace
all internal laws.
(b) When preconceptions are eliminated, policy in the field
of conflicts law is of course the main object of concern. Conflicts
rules have never been entirelyuninfluenced by the underlying
social situation. This is pioneer ground. How the interest of
the state, of other states, of the parties, of third persons in good
faith, of commerce or trade in general, are to be valued against
each other in various situations and best reconciled with the
postulate of certainty, needs renewed and detailed deliberation. For the time being, it would be entirely premature to
try to enumerate or to analyze such considerations in a general way.
(c) The postulate that conflicts rules should have just results may be understood-or perhaps misunderstood-as
signifying that the outcome of lawsuits in every case should
conform, not to the !'ex fori, but to the judge's sense of justice.
83 See

the illustrations of

NIBOYET

soo no.

416.

DEVELOPMENT OF CONFLICTS LAW

91

We well know that courts will try many direct or devious
ways to satisfy this sense of justice. They will use the faculty
to reject a foreign rule on the ground of a public policy of
the forum. They will classify an unwelcome foreign rule as
inapplicable foreign procedure. They will, with a desired end
in view, affirm or deny a person's domicil. And we may trust
the courts always to select, of two accessible ways, that which
leads to the result to them appearing preferable. 84 These
expedients of judicial wisdom cannot be closed entirely, and
should not be, while conflicts rules remain crude and vague.
It is good to know that inscrutable judgments occasionally alleviate the conflicts chaos.
Yet, subservience to subjective and local values would be
dangerous and unsound as a general policy. Cavers seems to
envisage disintegration of conflicts rules as the consequence of
his postulate of just results and, by way of palliation, recommends re-enforcement of the doctrine of stare decisis and recourse to standards. 85 Such programs, not sufficiently detailed,
are disturbing.
Several points discussed in this chapter are illustrated in
the case of St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company v.
Cox. 86 The plaintiff, having been injured on a passenger train
in Missouri, for consideration released her rights to the local
agency of the railroad by a document executed in Missouri.
Under a statute of Missouri, she could not bring an action to
cancel the release without refunding the sum received. Without doing so, she sued in Arkansas, and the Supreme Court
held (I) that the failure of tender was characterized in Missouri as going to the basis of the right, but ( 2) that in Arkansas
84 American courts prefer to satisfy a desirable sol uti on in usury cases than to
have all decisions harmonized. See STUMBERG zrz, and WENGLER, Book Review,
11 Z.ausl.PR. (I937) 967.
85 CAVERS, 47 Harv. L. Rev. (I933) ·173 at I96, supra n. 79· Recently CAVERS
himself has confessed troublesome doubts concerning his reference to social and
economic considerations, Book Review, 56 Harv. L. Rev. (I943) I I 70 at I I 73·
88
St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company v. Cox (I9z6) I 71 Ark. IOJ,
z83 S. W. 3 I; HARPER and TAINTOR, Cases Z7Z•
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such a suit could be prosecuted without returning the sum,
and (3) that, therefore, the question being merely procedural
in the forum, the suit should be allowed. From the viewpoint
of a sound system (or of analytical jurisprudence), there are
three fundamental objections to be made. (I) The Missouri
provision is questionable, though possibly directed against
ambulance chasing. ( 2) Yet, even if wrong, the provision is
of course substantive, affecting the material rights of the plaintiff, any procedural consequence being merely accessory. The
law of Arkansas not requiring tender is equally substantive;
it denies what the other law affirms. (3) The Court evidently
applied the law of the place where the contract was made and
performed. On this ground, it should not have evaded its own
conflicts rule, as it did by a characterization according to the
alleged lex fori. What really was intended is obvious, however.
The Court wanted desperately to satisfy its own sense of equity
as against an objectionable foreign law.

III.
I.

RATIONALIZATION

Special Rules

Inductive methods include the creation of special rules for
typical situations. Case law in this country has produced a
wealth of such specific rules, whereas the European codifications have been satisfied to formulate conflicts rules in very
broad and generalized terms. Specialization of the rules has
recently become a recognized tendency, particularly in the
field of obligations, in which, even in this country, general
axioms have done much harm. The Institute of International
Law has been active in this direction since I 908. The Polish
Law of I 926 (art. 8) states different points of contact appropriate to the various types of contract--contracts executed
at an exchange or market, retail bargains, construction and
employment contracts with the state and other public corpo-
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rations, insurance contracts, contracts with attorneys and similar persons, employment by business enterprises, etcetera. The
Permanent Court of International Justice has held that a governmental loan by issue of bonds having several places of
payment is subject to the law of the issuing government. 87
Maritime shipping contracts have been made the subject of
special international conventions. 88 The scope of a power of
attorney is determined under the law of the state in whi_ch
the agent acts. 89 Courts in all countries have elaborated a
wide-flung net of specialized solutions by localizing contracts
according to the "tacit," "presumed," or simply the fictitiously
assumed intent of the parties. 90
This growing emphasis on the law corresponding to the
particular type of contract has two additional wholesome effects, namely, promotion of uniformity, since types of contracts are the same everywhere under modern circumstances,
and concentration-so far as feasible-on one convenient law.
In the latter regard-the problem of depefage 91-it is noteworthy that both American and Continental conflicts laws
suffer from cumulated application of several conflicts rules,
referring to different legislations, to one and the same contract. The Restatement, for instance, divides the problems
arising on a contract into two parts, subjecting one part to
the law of the place where the contract is concluded a~d the
other to the law of the place where the contract is to be performed. 92 The division is precarious and very objectionable
in several respects, but chiefly because a contract should not be
split on a priori grounds. A similar distinction between the
Judgments nos. 14 and 15 of July u, 192.9.
Cf. for instance, the provisions of the Montevideo Treaty of 1889 on commercial law, arts. 14 and 15 1 changed in the Draft of 1940 on' commercial
maritime law to art. 25.
89 Restatement§ 345; RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 8uff.
90 For a synthesis, see BATIFFOL.
91 For theoretical discussion of the method of connecting isolated parts of the
facts with different countries, see WENGLER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 230.
92 Restatement§§ 332 and 358; cf. in particular CooK, Legal Bases 345, 346.
87
88

94
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creation and the effect of contracts is admitted by the Swiss
Federal' Tribunal. 93 Still worse, the German courts allocate
the duties of the seller and the buyer to the laws of their respective places of performance, these, if not otherwise provided, being presumed to be at the corresponding domicils. A
bilateral contract cannot be broken up into such fragments
without distorting a number of problems. 94 All such rules will
vanish when the different types of contracts rather than different parts of contracts in general form the center of interest.
Another point will hold our attention in the next chapters.
Capacity to contract is generally determined in this country
by the law of the place where the contract is made, a law not
necessarily the same as the law governing the contract in other
respects, for instance, that intended by the parties. In Continental Europe, an individual's capacity is determined as a
rule by his personal law, a law potentially different from that
or those governing other aspects of the contract. In both
hemispheres, the respective rules concerning capacity appear
overextended, and the distinction between capacity and other
aspects of contracts, at least in certain cases, should be
abolished. 95
2.

Independent Conflicts Rules

The crucial point to be reformed is the blind subjection of
conflicts rules to the private Jaw of each country. The extremely broad and at the same time fragmentary rules usual
in the enacted conflicts laws of the nineteenth century, including the Introductory Law to the German Civil Code, incorporate language taken from provincial legal thinking. As
these rules are progressively refined, the more urgent is their
independence of notions defined by the law of the forum in
order to enable other legal systems in the pertinent cases to
be invoked.
93 Supra n. 61.
s. See NEUNER, 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 108.
115
Infra p. 195·
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This need is by no means limited to "characterization."
Cook has pointed out how often in this country confusion is
caused by applying the "law" of a state, without exact inquiry
whether such law is not limited to domestic cases and raises
no question of conflicts law. 96 Thus, a statute of Texas prescribing that a married woman cannot charge her separate estate to secure her husband's obligation, does not necessarily
impose such restriction upon a wife domiciled in another state,
even when the transaction occurs in Texas. 97 Resort to statutory construction is the usual method of avoiding faulty conclusions. This method, however, should be limited to its
natural domain. A statutory provision must be analyzed in
respect to the question whether it incorporates a fundamental
policy of the state (as in the case of the Texas statute mentioned). It may occasionally occur also, as we have remarked
before, that a private law rule is not intended or is not fit to
be applied in another jurisdiction, a situation that much more
frequently occurs in the case of administrative (police) regulations. But answers to the regular questions of conflicts law
are rarely contained in municipal statutes. Private law rules
ordinarily do not direct which persons or movables they include. It is as mistaken to apply such rules blindly to events
all over the world as to presume them limited to merely
domestic situations. They are simply neutral; the answer is
not in them. Generally, therefore, what is needed, or even
feasible, is not an interpretation of the statute but a rule of
private international law to accompany and delimit the rule of
private law. A striking example is the confusion exhibited in
determining the relation between adoption and inheritance
statutes in different states, a confusion chiefly attributable to
futile attempts to interpret one or the other of these statutes,
neither dealing with conflicts questions. 98
CooK, Legal Bases.
CooK, Legal Bases 438, 439·
95 Infra pp. 195 and 6sz..
96
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A full program for the needed reform cannot be outlined in
this place. There is no reason why this branch of law should
not enjoy the abundance of legal devices, characterizing
modern private or penal law.
3· Internationalization
Against the expectation of a priori theorists, it is remarkable
to what extent conflicts rules are able to serve in many
countries, once relieved from the burden of local legal techniques and related to situations in actual life. The modern
means of communication, the organization of international
trade, the progress of science, and some general trends in the
evolutior{ of social policy, provide a common basis. An unbiased examination of the actual facts represented by an international sale, an employment contract, a claim for workmen's compensation, or a negotiable instrument payable to the
holder, should and will result in similar solutions everywhere.
As a matter of fact, there exists a truly international consideration of all these and many other matters, which encounters
few obstacles in national legal peculiarities but many m
doctrinal traditions.
Here it is that comparative research again comes in to
indicate whether and, if so, to what extent unification or mutual
reconciliation is feasible and desirable. In one respect, this
statement requires qualification. With little justification, the
comparative method is often suspected to favor imitation of
alien ways and to sacrifice national characteristics. The facts
are to the contrary. 99 Not infrequently, foreign institutions,
99 See, for example, FusTEL DE CoULANGES, La cite antique z: "Pour a voir
mal observe les institutions de la cite ancienne, on a imagine de les faire revivre
chez nous." HEYMANN, Das ungarische Privatrecht und der Rechtsausgleich mit
Ungarn (1917) 96; EuGEN HUBER, Erlauterungen zum Vorentwurf des
Schweizerischen Zivil-Gesetzbuchs 7; RABEL, Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit der
Rechtsvergleichung, published as Miinchener Juristische Vortrage Heft t (19z5)
9> ZJ.
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naively adopted without adequate comparison, have been
transplanted from their natural soil to degenerate in uncongenial surroundings. Often also, "reception" of foreign legal
institutions has occurred without appreciation of the grave
defects inherent in an admired law. Scientific comparison discerns the essential from the accidental causes and effects of
legal rules; its purpose is to enrich, rather than to standardize
the juridical world.
Conflicts law, however, has its own measures. It urgently
requires sanctuaries from chaos. The more private rights are
protected by international justice, the more will unification
be desired. Federations such as the United States or Switzerland 100 know fr~m copious experience how indispensable is
a common background of legal concepts and principles to cope
with the peculiar terms and ideas of particular states or cantons. The Mixed Arbitral Tribunals of the 192o's plainly
exemplified the situation of courts that lack a "law of the
forum" in the ordinary sense of the term and have no conflicts rules other than those that happen to coincide in the
participating states. 101 The great expectations for a development of this branch of law by these courts, first dealing on a
large scale with international private causes, were disappointed.102 After the present cata~trophes, fervent hopes may
well attach to supranational courts adjudging private actions
of international significance. 103 But any substantial develop100
BG. (June 30, 1905) 31 BGE. I 2.87: for the purpose of intercantonal
conflicts law, the scope of matrimonial property law, as contrasted with inheritance law, is to be defined according to the general Swiss concepts and the nature
of things rather than to the cantonal laws involved in the case.
101
See RABEL, 1 Z.ausl.PR. (192.7) 33-47.
102 On the conflicts cases of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals see GUTZWILLER,
"Das Internationalprivatrecht der durch die Friedensvertrage eingesetzten
Gemischten SchiedsgerichtshOfe," 3 Int. Jahrbuch f. Schiedsgerichtswesen ( 19 31)

12.J.
103
The Institute for' International Law proposed in 192.9 to extend the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice to disputes concerning
the interpretation of the conventions on private international law; see Annuaire
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ment of such judicial relief will have to be accompanied by a
radical turn of choice of law rules from provincial to worldwide thinking.
The new trend can be summarized in the three-fold effort
toward realism, comparative method, and international
understanding.
1929 III 305. This suggestion has been taken up by the Protocol of March 27,
19 31 (supra p. 32), recognizing the competence of the Permanent Court of

International Justice to interpret these Conventions. In my opinion regional
international courts and a second division of the World Court should be created
to deal with various kinds of private claims having international significance.

PART TWO
PERSONAL LAW OF INDIVIDUALS

CHAPTER
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The Personal Law
I.
1.

NATURE AND ScoPE oF PERSONAL LAW

Personal Law Defined

T

HE term "personal law" had its origin in the doctrine
of the Italian school of postglossators (thirteenthfifteenth centuries) and their French successors (sixteenth-eighteenth centuries). This school divided all rules of
law into three categories, viz., statuta realia, statuta personalia,
and statuta mixta. Statuta personalia, "personal statutes,"
comprised those rules of law that followed a person from one
·jurisdiction to another, thus having "extraterritorial effect,"
while the rules of the "statute real" applied exclusively
within the territory of a single sovereign. Ever since the times
of the postglossators, the terms have been in use but with considerable variations in meaning. 1 Even today writers disagree
in defining personal law, and particular rules of law aire
variously characterized as pertaining to the realm of the statute
real or to the statute personal. 2
. Despite these differences, however, it is commonly assumed
that in certain respects the legal position of an individual
should normally be determined by the law of that state with
which he is deemed to be connected in a permanent way, rather
than by the divergent laws of those states in which he may
happen to be physically present, to act, or to engage in transactions. This proposition includes two parts:
First, that a person is attributed certain legal characteristics
of a comparatively permanent character; and,
1 :z ARMINJON (ed. :z) 70 ff. nos. z8-z8 ter.
C/. for instance, WALKER :z4.

2
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Second, that these permanent characteristics ought to be determined by one law for all purposes rather than from case
to case by different laws.
Scope of the personal law. The sphere of application of
the personal law has fluctuated in the course of time and is not
everywhere the same today. Under the broadest definition,
problems pertaining to the following subjects would be regarded as problems of personal law:
Personality or capacity to have rights in general (German
Rechtsfiihigheit, French capacite de jouissance);
Beginning and end of personality;
Capacity to engage in legal transactions (German Geschiiftsfiihighei!);
Protection of personal interests, such as honor, name and
business firm, privacy, and the like;
Family relations, especially the relations between husband
and wife, parent and child, and guardian and ward, also
transactions of family law, especially marriage, divorce,
adoption, legitimation, emancipation, and appointment
of a committee for an incompetent person;
Succession, both testate and intestate, to movables and in
more recent times also succession to immovables.
While in the various civil law countries this list is subject to
varying restrictions, it is sharply reduced in American law.
It is true, the general principle, repeatedly stated by British
courts and textwriters, that the "status" of a person is determined by the law of his domicil, a is plainly accepted in the
United States/ where it has even been called "the most widely
advocated rule of conflict of laws." 5 Nevertheless, current
3 DICEY

634; CHESHIRE 208.
Pfeifer v. Wright (1929 D. C. N.D. Okla.) 34 F. (2d) 69o; Strader v.
Graham (185o) 10 How. (51 U.S.) 82; Woodward v. Woodward (1889) 87
Tenn. 644)II S. W. 892 (emancipation in Louisiana); and others.
6 .HARPER and TAINTOR, Cases :1.71 n. 17. See STORY§§ 57 ff. and§§ 94-96
and 1 WHARTON§§ xox-xo4 z/3, both recognizing only restrictions of public
policy on the ubiquity of personal law.
4
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opinion in the United States is inclined to ascribe to the personal law a domain narrower than it receives in England 6
and much more limited than it enjoys on the Continent. In
particular, capacity to contract is now preponderantly regarded as being determined by the law of the place of contracting rather than by the law of the domicil, although in a
few American decisions 7 the domiciliary law has been recognized as governing an individual's capacity to contract and in
numerous cases it coincides with that of the place of contracting.8
Beale goes still further in reducing the significance of
"status," perhaps since he encountered difficulties in reconciling an ubiquitous personal law with the system of territoriality that he advocates. 9 In his treatise and in the Restatement, he proposes to delete what may be described as a
remnant of a former status law, except for a strictly limited
number of family relationships, such as marriage, the relation
between parent and child, adoption, and guardianship. Although status is defined in the Restatement in general terms 10
and although the topics dealt with in Chapter 5 of the Restatement are designated merely as "those of chief lmportance," they seem nevertheless to be all-inclusive. 11
6
See the results reached by DICEY 634-637, 9JI, 966, and more recently
CHESHIRE 208 ("a rule which regulates the capacity or incapacity of a person
is part of the law of his status"). For the entire problem, see below, p. I 90.
7
Especially Brown v. Dalton (I889) I05 Ky. 669,49 S. W. 443; also Huy's
Appeal (I854) I Grant (Pa.) 51; Ritch v. Hyatt (I879) 3 MacArthur 536
(Io D. C.); Matthews v. Murchison (I883 C. C., E. D. N.C.) I7 Fed. 760;
Freeman's Appeal (I897) 68 Conn. 533, 37 Atl. 420; cf. 2 BEALE II8o n. 4·
8 Cj. RUDOLF MUELLER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (I934) 888-890; BATIFFOL p8.
9
See WIGNY, Essai 75·
10 Restatement § I 19 and comment.
11
In the Restatement, "status" is not treated as containing permanent conditions or qualities, but it is limited to such "relationships" between persons as
have been described by BEALE as relative in contrast to absolute ones, 2 BEALE
649. This narrow definition has been criticized by KuHN as being made "wholly
from the viewpoint of one (i.e., the American common law) system," whereas, in
solving problems of conflict of laws, the attribution of capacity and incapacity
to persons has also to be considered. KUHN, Comp. Com. I I 5·
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This position will attract the attention of any civil law
writer as a striking contrast to established doctrines. In all
countries outside of the United States, the concept of personal
law has preserved a dominant position and has retained more
vigor than its ancient opponent, the territorial law, which has
found such eminent defenders in this country. On the other
hand, the traditional theory has been challenged in several
respects by recent European critics, and reference has repeatedly been made to the American rules for this purpose.
The broader conception of the personal law is to be found
authoritatively defined in recent treaties concluded between
Western and Oriental powers, whereby foreigners are exempted from the territorial jurisdiction in "matters of personal law." It is interesting to note that the United States has
participated in such treaties. The following definition is given,
for instance, in the Agreement between the United States and ·
Persia, concluded on July u, 1928: 12
"Whereas Persian nationals in the United States of America
enjoy most-favored-nation treatment in the matter of personal status, ... non-Moslem nationals of the United States in
Persia shall be subject to their national laws in the said matter
of personal status, that is, with regard to all questions concerning marriage and conjugal community rights, divorce,
judicial separation, dowry, paternity, affiliation, adoption,
capacity of persons, majority, guardianship, trusteeship, and
interdiction; in regard to movable property, the right of succession by will or ab intestato, distribution and settlement;
and, in general, family law."
By the Convention of Montreux of May 8, 1937, which
abolished the system of capitulations in Egypt, the Mixed
Tribunals were retained for a further period, running until
1949, and status and capacity were declared to be subject to
the jurisdiction of these tribunals in the absence of consular
jurisdiction where the religious courts are not competent. This
12

Published in U. S. Executive Agreement Series No.

2.0.

-
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Convention provided the following definition of personal
status:
"Personal status comprises: suits and matters relating to
the status and capacity of persons, legal relations between
members of a family, more particularly, betrothal, marriage,
the reciprocal rights and duties of husband and wife, dowry
and their rights of property during marriage, divorce, repudiation, separation, legitimacy, recognition and repudiation
of paternity, the relation between ascendants and descendants,
the duty to support as between relatives by blood or marriage,
legitimisation, adoption, guardianship, curatorship, interdiction, emancipation and also gifts, inheritance, wills and other
dispositions mortis causa, absence and the presumption of
death." 13
2.

Legal Problems

Status. Usually, "status," taken from the Roman doctrine
of status libertatis (freedom), status civitatis (citizenship),
and status familiae (position as head of the house or as free
person subjected to the pater familias) 14 refers to situations
subjected to the personal law. The word, "status," is commonly used but should not be taken as a precise legal term. Its
exact meaning in English law has been discussed in many
places but in a manner described by competent English writers
as confused. 15 "Of all the perplexing questions which the
13
Rules concerning Judicial Organisation in Egypt, art. 2 8, referred to in
art. I o pars. I and 2 of the Convention Concerning the Abolition of the Capitulations in Egypt, Montreux, May 8, I937· Text in U.S. Treaty Series, No. 939, in
34 Am. J. Int. Law Supp. (I940) 20I, I82 League of Nations Treaty Series
(I937-I938) .37, and in HuosoN, 7 Int. Legislation 684 No. 48o-48oc. The
Convention has been ratified by the United States, Egypt, Belgium, Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, Canada, Australia, Union of South Africa, New Zealand,
India, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal,
and Sweden. See comment in I STREIT-VALLINDAS 385-400. Cf. comment in
I9 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I938) I6I; MoRELLI in 29 Rivista (1937) 324,
329. Other provisions in the Regulations contain elaborate rules on conflict of
laws, prepa~ed on the basis of the Hague Conventions.
14
In the Roman sense status means a degree in legal capacity; cf. SIBER, 2
Romisches Recht (1928) 25.
15 See CHESHIRE 208 and for a survey ALLEN, "Status and Capacity," 46 Law
Q. Rev. (1930) 277.
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science of jurisprudence presents, the notion of status or condition is incomparably the most difficult," declared Austin. 16
Some American decisions also have considered the concept
nebulous, while unwarranted conclusions have been deduced
from it by others.17 In fact, modern law recognizes no absolute
legal characteristics inherent in a person as in the Roman or
medieval laws. Qualification of an individual as husband or
legitimate father indicates no more than the existence of legal
relations with another person, although it is true that third
persons may thereby to a certain degree be excluded from
challenging the relationship.
Prohibitive policy. It is universally agreed t.hat foreign laws
affecting a person's status are to be disregarded where they
have a political or penal character. 18 Hence, such impairments
of a convict's capacity to enjoy civil rights or to engage in
transactions as are provided by the English Forfeiture Act of
July 4, 1870, the French Law of May 31, 1854 (arts. 2 and
3), or American civil death statutes, are not enforced by the
courts of other states. 19
Likewise, a law or decree disenabling a person from disposing of his property, in a manner discriminating against
him rather than for the purpose of his protection, is generally
denied effect outside of the state of enactment. 20 Thus the
16
AuSTIN, I Jurisprudence (ed. s, I88s) JSI; 2 ibid. 943: "To fix the
notion of status with perfect exactness, seems to be impossible."
17 See the penetrating observations of T AINTOR, "Legitimation, Legitimacy
and Recognition in the Conflict of Laws," I8 Can. Bar Rev. (I940) 589, 591,
69I-697·
18
See STORY§ 104; r WHARTON I 8 § 4b; STIMSON, Conflict of Criminal Law
(I936) 1; I BAR § I46. It is no exception to this rule, that a person may be
considered incapable of being entrusted with a function, such as guardianship,
because of a foreign conviction; see e.g., Spanish C. C. art. 237 par. 2 and
TRiAs DEBEs 72 no. 99·
19
The Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text of 1940, art. I,
2nd sentence, provides that no incapacity of a penal character nor for reasons of
religion, race, nationality or opinion will be recognized. On the non-application
of foreign civil death statutes, see Note in 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (I939) 288.
20
See the recent decision of Trib. comm. Bruxelles (June 9, 1938) Jur. Comm.
Brux. I938, 412, and App. Ziirich (March r, 1939) 42 Bull. Inst. Int. (1940)
87.
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Soviet Russian monopoly of trade prohibiting all private persons residing in Russia from concluding contracts with foreign
countries except through the Commissariat of Commerce,
like other monopolies of public law, is inapplicable outside of
Russia. 21
Connection of a person with a given territory. What connection must exist between an individual and a particular state
in order to subject such person to the personal laws of that
state? There are two different systems. In certain countries,
the necessary connection is deemed to exist between an individual and a particular state, if the individual is one of its
nationals; in other countries, the necessary connection is found
in the fact that the individual is domiciled in the state in question.
3· Rationale
While, a generation ago, the existence of a personal law
was explained by such theoretical arguments as the nature of
law, the needs of sovereignty, the character of the power of a
sovereign over persons, and the like, in recent times the advocates of the theory of personal law customarily resort to
more practical considerations of convenience and expediency.
A first line of argument is based upon the interests of the
individuals concerned. The legal position of a person, it is
said, must be the same everywhere; it would be unjust and
impracticable to have it determined in different ways in different countries or in different situations, perhaps in some
instances even in the same court. In other words, the unity and
identity of a person should be respected and guaranteed by
the consistent application of one and the same law in all countries and in all situations.
A second line of reasoning has become singularly effective
today. Each state is said to have a profound governmental in" MAKARov, Precis 194 reaches the same result by another (mistaken) reason-

in:.
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terest in the regulation of the personal status and the family
relations of its subjects,22 an interest which every other state
ought properly to respect. In order to protect this interest
more effectively, exclusive jurisdiction over questions of status
is often claimed by the state of the personal law, or the rules
of the personal law are declared to belong to the domain of
public policy. Thus, a state which adheres to the principle of
nationality attempts to extend its own system of social regulation to its nationals living abroad, whereas a country adhering
to the principle of domicil imposes its own laws upon the
foreigners living within its borders. These tendencies, and
particularly that of extending one's own laws to nationals
living abroad, are so firmly rooted in the political traditions of
Europe that recent counter-currents have not only failed to
leave any deep impression on the legislatures but have even
suggested to an eminent French author that the scope of application of the personal law should be expanded far beyond
its present extent. 23
It seems, indeed, that uniform regulation of matters of
status is justified; at least with respect to the basic facts of
personal life. Whether a person shall be deemed to be married, divorced, adopted, subject to guardianship, or civilly
dead, should be decided at any place in the same way, if uncertainty and confusion is not to beset the individual, his
family, and other persons with whom he engages in transactions. The weight of this consideration may vary as regards
different problems, and careful investigation of the interests
at stake ought to be undertaken with regard to each situation.
But, essentially, the principle seems undeniable.
22
With respect to those matters that are recognized in the Restatement as
covered by status, this governmental interest is explained in § I I 9 comment c.
23 BARTIN, 2 Principes 20, 90. Throughout the four volumes of FRANKENSTEIN's work, the national law is considered as "the primary basic principle of
private international law." See vol. 4, 65o.
Recently the Danish writer BoRUM recommended that his country go over
from the domiciliary principle to that of nationality. See his Personalstatutet
552, 565.
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The most formidable objection against a single personal
law arises from the present state of international law; the
doctrine cannot be carried out consistently. Apart from the
intricacies caused by conflicting rules of jurisdiction, serious
conflicts are due to the difference between the principles of
domicil and nationality, resulting in the subjection in different
states of one and the same individual to different laws. Morc:;over, no agreement exists with respect to where a person is
domiciled, nor is nationality an unfailing criterion. It should
not be overlooked, however, that many such conflicts can be
remedied by special techniques, especially by application of
the "renvoi," an institution that, on account of its usefulness,
should be viewed without theoretical prejudices.

II.
I.

CoNTACTs DETERMINING THE PERSONAL LAw

Domicil

(a) Domicil of origin. In all the centuries since the postglossators, the traditional contact for the determination of a
person's status has been his domicil. In earlier, ancient and
medieval, organizations, the legal condition of an individual
in its totality was created by his "origin"· as a member of a
political unit, in Roman law his origo, signifying his citizenship in an autonomous city. Following the older fundamental
role of descent, some of the pandectists in various cases resorted to what was shortly and paradoxically described 24 as
the domicilium originis, generally the domicil of the father
of the individual at the time of the latter's birth. 25 Although,
naturally and legally, a child takes its father's domicil at birth
and upon attaining majority may acquire a new domicil, the
domicil of origin substituted for the actual domicil, when
doubtful or incorrectly obtained or where no domicil was to
24

See SAVIGNY § 359 at n. (q).
See SAVIGNY § 359 at n. (n). The same definition of domicil of origin is
still proper in, English law. See WESTLAKE § Z45; 6 HALSBURY zoo.
25
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be found. This subsidiary concept was employed in the
eighteenth century by French writers and in the Prussian
legislation 26 as the prime test for determining majority or
interdiction for prodigality. 27 Even today in Argentina, it is
applied to persons without an actual domicil. 28 In British
countries, this criterion has been retained and singularly developed; not only is the domicil of origin resorted to whenever
the domicil of choice cannot be ascertained or has been
abandoned without establishing a new domicil, but the courts
also require such strong evidence of abandonment of the
domicil of origin that it has been said to be "difficult to conceive of a case in which the domicil of origin can be shaken
off." 29 It corresponds to Continental nationality rather than
to Continental domicil. 30
(b) Domicil of choice. The normal concept of domicil is
presented by that domicil which is voluntarily chosen by an
independent person. The law of this domicil primarily controls personal relations in the following countries:
All English common law countries and, in addition, Scotland, South Africa, and Quebec (where the principle has
been laid down in the C.C. art. 6). 31
Denmark,a2 Norway, 33 Iceland. 34
26

Prussian Allg. Landrecht of 1794, Einleitung § 29.
It may be suggested that the same idea is implied in the much discussed words
of § 34 of the Austrian AUg. BGB. which may be translated as "laws of the
place to which the foreigner is subject (als Untertan unterliegt) by virtue of his
domicil or if he has no actual domicil by virtue of his birth."
27
Originally by FROLAND and BouLLENOIS; see PILLET, Principes 304 no. 143
n. I; 2 ARMINJON (ed. z) 8o ff. no. I 8 ter.
25
Argentina, C.C. arts. 96 and 89 zd part; cf. 1 Vrco no. 392.
29
CHESHIRE I74; cf. Lord Macnaghten in Winans v. Att. Gen. [I904] A. C.
287 at 291; Lord Hanworth in Boldrini v. Boldrini [1932] P. 9·
30 BENTWICH in: The Law of Domicile in its Relation to Succession and the
Doctrine of Renvoi (19II) Iz; 5 Z.ausl.PR. (I931) 57; 6 Z.ausl.PR. (1932)
715; 52 Jurid. Rev. (1940) 284, 285ff.
31 It seems to be recognized in Canada generally; cf. 1 JoHNSON I82, 454·
32 BORUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 216 no. 19.
33 CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 569 no. 66.
S4 4 LESKE-LOEWENFELD I 761.
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Estonia: Law of the Baltic Prov. (I864) introd. art. xxvii.
Latvia: C.C. (I937) §§ 8-25. 35
Argentina: C.C. arts. 6 and 7. 36
Brazil: Introductory Law (I942) art. 7·
Guatemala: Constitutive Law on Judicial Power (I933)
art. xvii; Law on Foreigners (I936) arts. I7 and I8.
Nicaragua: C. C. tft. prel. VI, I.
Paraguay: C.C. arts. 6 and 7·
Peru: C.C. (I936) tft. prel. art. V (for non-Peruvians).
The Treaty of Montevideo of I 8 89, article I (Argentina,
Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay) still in force among the
contracting countries, is to the same effect. Article I of the
text of I 940, not ratified, provides that the existence, the
·status, and the capacity of physical persons are governed by
the law of domicil.
(c) Domicil by operation of law. In most of the just
mentioned countries, although not in all, as for instance not in
Norway, certain groups of persons (wife, minor children, etc.)
are considered by law to share the domicil of other individuals.
The latter accordingly determines the status of the dependent
person.
(d) Residence. If, according to the concepts of the forum,
it is found that an individual has no domicil of choice or as a
dependent, either within or without the country, different
solutions obtain. English courts apply the law of the domicil
of origin. In this country, it is generally assumed that a domicil
once established continues until it is superseded by a new
domicil. 37 This proposition is a direct corollary of the axiom
that every person must have a domicil and is therefore cate35

SCHILLING, 11 Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 484, 491.
Domicil is decisive not only for capacity to contract but also for personality.
See 1 VIco no. 438, rejecting other theories.
37
Restatement § 23 and its various Annotations. See also 28 C.J.S., Domicile
§ 13•
36
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goric. In addition, it is presumed that an intended change or
abandonment of the last established domicil is not completed
until a new home has been acquired. 38
All these views are represented in Latin-American legislations. In addition, the subsidiary test of residence, well known
in such fields as jurisdiCtion and taxation/ 9 at times appears
in conflicts law. This method has been followed by the Montevideo Treaty 40 and the C6digo Bustamante/ 1 as well as by
the recent Brazilian law. 42 In default of residence, the latter
two enactments contain a supplementary reference to the place
where the individual is temporarily dwelling.
These expedients would seem to serve well also in this
country in cases where the continuance of a former domicil
cannot be affirmed without undue fiction.
Nationality
The pr.inciple that an individual's personal law ought to be
determined by his nationality was first established at the
beginning of the nineteenth century in the Code Napoleon,
which provided that the French laws concerning personal
status and capacity govern Frenchmen even when residing in
foreign countries (Art. 3 par. 3). In the converse case of a
foreigner residing in France, the French courts, after some
initial doubts, now generally apply by way of analogy the law
of the country of which he is a national.
While this French provision exerted a steady influence as a
model; an additional powerful impulse was started in the same
2.

C.J .S., Domicile § r 6. .
This rule has been adopted in following the doctrine of SAVIGNY 107 § 354
in an influential provision of the Chilean Civil Code art. 6 8: mere residence
·
replaces civil domicil with respect to persons not domiciled elsewhere.
40 Text of 18 8g, art. g, which is not really contrary to art. 5, as has been
claimed; text of 1940, art. s, 2 o - 4 •.
The Argentine C.C. arts. 8g, g6, resorts to the domicil of origin, and art. 98
declares that the last known domicil prevails when no new domicil is known 1
but art. go, 5o, provides for a legal domicil as the place of actual residence for
transients as well as for persons having no known domicil.
41 Art. 26.
•
42 Decreto-Lei n. 4.657 of Igp, Lei de Introdu!;ao, art. 7 § 8.•
38 2 8

39

THE PERSONAL LAW

113

direction by the Italian patriot, Mancini. In a famous lecture,
delivered in Turin in I 85 I, he proclaimed that a person
should be subject in all respects affecting his personality to the
law of his nation. The Italian Civil Code adopted this doctrine, referring the concept of nationality to political allegiance
to a given state and extending the sphere of the personal law
from problems of "status and capacity," to which it was applied in France, to the whole law of family relations.
In this way, the notion that an individual's private rights
should be determined not by his physical location but by his
political allegiance, owes its origin to the awareness of national
identity that was born in the French Revolution and strengthened in the Italian struggle for national unity. With the expansion of political nationalism, the idea that each country
should determine the legal status of its subjects, admitting the
analogous claims of other states, expanded likewise and has
been adopted in the following countries:
France and French colonies: C.C. art. 3 par. 3·
Italy and Italian colonies: C.C. (r865) Disp. Prel. art. 6;
C.C. (1938) Disp. Prel. art. 7 par. I; C.C. (1942)
Disp. Prel. art. I 7 par. I.
Belgium: C.C. art. 3 par. 3·
Luxemburg: C.C. art. 3 par. 3·
Monaco: C.C. art. 3 par. 3·
The Netherlands: Law of May I 5, 1829, arts. 6, 9; H. R.
(Jan. 5, 1917) W.roo73, N.J. (r9q) 143; Hof
Amsterdam (June 6, 1919) W.10444, N.J. (1919)
I032. Neth. Indies: Law of April 30, 1847, April 6,
I9IS, art. I6. Surinam: Law of Sept. 4, r868, art. 7·
Rumania: C. C. art. 2; for foreigners, App. Bucarest
(May 9, 1901) Sirey 1904,4.21 (with note by the procurator of the government at the court of cassation);
Plastara, 7 Repert. 62 nos. 141, 143.

114

PERSONAL LAW OF INDIVIDUALS

Bulgaria: Court decisions, see Ghenov, 6 Repert: 189 nos.
47, 51.
Finland: Law no. 379 of Dec. 5, I929·
Germany: EG. BGB. arts. 7, 9, I3-I5, I7-25.
Greece: C.C. (1940) art. 4·
Hungary: Customary law, cf. Szladits in 23 Grotius Soc.
I937, 27; von Szaszy, II Z.ausl.PR. (1937) I69.
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 23.
Montenegro: C.C. art. 788.
Poland: Law of Aug. 2, I926, art. I par. 1.
Portugal: C.C. arts. 24, 27.
Spain: C.C. art. 9; for foreigners cf. Trias de Bes 66;
Lasala Llana 2o-22, and decisions cited.
Sweden: Law of July 8, I904: amendment of June 27,
1924.
Turkey: Law of March I, I9IS for foreigners: for Turks
abroad see Salem, 7 Repert. 26I no. I99·
Iran: C.C. art. 962.
China: Law of Aug. s, I9I8, art. S·
Japan: Law of June IS, I898, art. 3·
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 3.
Cuba: C.C. art. 9·
Dominican Rep.: C.C. art. 3 par. 3. 43
Ecuador: C.C. art. I4.
Haiti: C.C. art. 7·
Honduras: C. C. art. I 3.
Mexico: formerC.C. (I884) art. I2. Seepages II7-:II8,
infra.
Panama: C.C. art. sa.
Venezuela: C.C. art. 9·
Treaty: Colombia-Ecuador of June I 8, I903, art. 2.
« See the reservation no. 1 of the Dominican delegation to their signature
to the C6digo Bustamante, 86 League of Nations Treaty Series (1929) No. 19501
24-01 24-11 3 76.
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The nationality principle was also adopted in the Hague
Conventions of I 902 and I 90 5, 44 and formed the base of the
Treaty of Lima, 1878. In the Treaty of Montevideo, on the
other hand, the domiciliary law was preferred. During the
preparation of the C6digo Bustamante, vigorous efforts were
made to overcome the cleavage dividing the American nations
with respect to the test of personal law, but unfortunately
without success. 45 Article 7 of the C6digo declares that
"Each contracting state shall apply as personal law the law of
the domicil or the law of the nationality or that which its
domestic legislation may have prescribed, or may hereafter
prescribe."
Hence, no unified rule whatever has come into existence.
3. Mixed Systems

Switzerland. Switzerland 46 applies Swiss private law to
foreigners domiciled in Switzerland and prescribes that a
Swiss national abroad shall be governed by the law of his
domicil. If, however, the state of the foreign domicil does not
subject the Swiss national to its municipal legislation, then the
Swiss courts have to resort to the law of the canton of which he
is a citizen. This proviso applies, for instance, to Swiss nationals
domiciled in France, Germany, or Italy, all of which follow
the system of national law.
In this way, conflicts with the law of the domicil are avoided,
the Swiss law being resorted to only where it is also applied
by the courts of the domicil. Fallowing this approach of the
Swiss law, the German courts are now in agreement that a
Swiss citizen domiciled in Germany is to be judged according
44
It also was adopted for the Egyptian Mixed Tribunals in their Regulations
of Judicial Organisation, art. 2.9.
45
See BuSTAMANTE, La commission des jurisconsultes de Rio :z r 3.ff.
46 NAG. arts. :z and :z8. Capacity to contr;tct, however, is excepted from the
rule stated in the text and is subjected to the principle of nationality; see below, p.

rss.
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to Swiss law and that Swiss law ought not to be interpreted as
containing a renvoi to the law of the domicil. 47
A ustria. The draftsmen of the Austrian Civil Code of I 8 I I
probably intended that the law of the domicil, either of choice
or of origin, should be applied to foreigners whether living in
Austria or abroad. 48 The relevant section of the Code 49 was
so badly drafted, however, that its meaning was never quite
certain. While the older annotators regarded the provision as
establishing the domiciliary test, 50 authors and courts of the
nineteenth century came to look upon it as a full-fledged
adoption of the principle of nationality. 51 This development
was motivated not only by the general trend of the period but
also by the provision which the Code had established for
Austrians living abroad. Under this provision, not all private
affairs of such citizens were subject to Austrian law, but only
acts and contracts of Austrians occurring abroad, to the extent
that the Austrian law limits personal capacity to undertake
such acts and contracts and these acts and contracts are intended to produce legal effects in Austrian territories. 52
Most annotators were inclined to regard this provision as a
general adoption of the principle of nationality so far as Austrians were concerned and to neglect the limitations expressed
in the text. 53 The Supreme Court, however, following a
47
See the following Swiss authors: STAUFFER, NAG. art. 28 no. 3; BECK,
NAG., 141 no. 36.
In Germany: RG. (Oct. 26, 1912) Warn. Rspr. 1913 no. 37; RG. (Nov. 8,
1922) 105 RGZ. 34o; Bay. ObLG. (Oct. u, 1917) 35 ROLG. 38o, cf.
MELCHIOR 224 § 150; RAAPE 750.
48 In the case of a person having no domicil at the relevant moment, presumably
the law of his domicil of origin was intended to be applied.
49
Allg. BGB. § 34·
50
SAVIGNY § 363 II; UNGER, 1 System 164; for further citations see WALKER
92 n. 19.
51
RANDA in 6 GriinhQt's Z. (I 8 79) 7 8 5; KRASNOPOLSKI in 2 5 Geller's
Zentralblatt ( 1907) 1o8; STEIN LECHNER in 2 Festschrift zur Jahrhundertfeier
des Allg. ,BGR (191 1) 65; WALKER 93 and n. z4.
52
Allg. BGB. § 4·
53
See WALKER 91 n. 16; I EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ (1925) 94 calls therestriction superfi uous.
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theory which had been established by an ingenious author, 54
imbued the limitations with new life by holding that the
numerous peculiar restrictions of Austrian marriage law would
not be applied to an Austrian marrying abroad and not intending at the time of such marriage to live in Austria. 5 5 This
decision has been criticized as opening the door to law
evasion. 5 6
Latin America. However, the ideas underlying the provision of the Austrian Code appeared so reasonable to Andres
Bello, the draftsman of the Chilean Civil Code of 1 855, that
he adopted it, in a modified form, for his own country. 57 His
example has been followed in several other Latin American
countries, where the Austrian rule has been adopted in combination with varying systems.
Under the Chilean Code, every inhabitant of the country,
even though he may not be a citizen or a domiciliary, technically speaking, is declared subject to the law of Chile. 58
Similar provisions, with or without textual modification, have
been included in the laws of Colombia,59 Ecuador,60 Mexico, 60a
El Salvador, 61 and Uruguay. 62 The provision in itself has
been vigorously criticized 63 and seems to have been made the
object of a diplomatic exchange of notes between Chile and
54

MAX BURCKHARD, 2 System des Oesterreichischen Privatrechtes ( 18 84) z z 3.
OGH. (May 24, 1907) 10 GlU. NF. no. 3787, 8 Amtl.S. NF. no. roo7,
Spruchrepertorium (Collection of binding precedents) no. 198; cf. WALKER 91,
622; see below, p. 283.
56
PERROUD, Clunet I922, 5; WALKER 625.
57 BELLo's notes, which indicate that he was influenced by the Austrian law
as well as by the French Code, are referred to by 1 RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 93 no.
148.
58
Chile: C. C. art. 14.
59
Colombia: Law no. 145 of I888, art. 9; Law no. I49 of I888, art. 59·
60 Ecuador: C. C. art. IJ.
60• Mexico: C. C. art. u.
61
El Salvador: C. C. art. 14.
62
Uruguay: C. C. art. 3·
63 Cf. CHAMPEAU (respecting Colombia) Clunet I 894, 932; BoRJA, 1
Estudios sobre el c6digo civil chileno (I 899) :u 1-2 I 3; URIBE (regarding Colombia) Revue I9II, 322.
55
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France. On the other hand, each of these legislations
declares the national law applicable to a national living
abroad: first, as concerns his capacity to engage in "certain
transactions" producing effects in his own country; and,
second, with respect to his family relations. 65 This combination of domiciliary and national law 66 has already been
noticed as anomalous. 67 The interpretation of these provisions
necessarily must cause difficulties; in fact, in Colombia 68 efforts looking to a reasonable interpretation have been made,
and recently, after thorough consideration, the commission.
for reform of the Civil Code has proposed that the entire
system be replaced by the simple law of domicil. 69
In addition, Costa Rica has adopted the principle of nationality, but prescribes that foreigners are governed by the law
of Costa Rica when they act in that country or if their contracts are made and are to be performed therein. 70 This provision has been superadded to the others in the Civil Code of
El Salvador. 71
Contrary to their Austrian prototype, which, at least in the
last period of the Austrian law, was used to mitigate the effects
64 WEiss, 3 Traite ::.55 mentions a diplomatic note of August zo, 1882, in
which the Chilean minister, Verga, refers to a restrictive interpretation of art.
14. Apparently, the French Government had protested again~t the application
of Chilean law to French citizens living in Chile. It has not been possible to
ascertain whether any practical results ever came from this correspondence.
65 Chile: C. C. art. 15. No provision in Mexico, but see former C. C. ( 1884)
art. 1::..
Colombia: C. C. art. 19·
Ecuador: C. C. art. 14.
El Salvador: C. C. art. IS·
Uruguay: C. C. art. 4·
66
MATOS 277 no. 175; SALAZAR FLOR 483.
67 BoRJA, op. cit. supra n. 6 3 at 2 I 3; I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 9 3 no. 149;
SoTo's observations in: Colombia, Comisi6n de Reforma del C6digo Civil
1939-1940, 92, 98 inter alia. The present system on that occasion was defended by ZULETA ANGEL (ibid.) and }ULL!OT DE LA MORANDIERE of Paris

(ibid. 116).
68

See I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 93ff. nos. I49-I59·
Art. 3 6 of the Draft on formation, promulgation, effects, interpretations
and derogation of the laws, Comisi6n de Reforma del C6digo Civil op. cit.
supra n. 67.
70
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 3·
71
El Salvador: C. C. 19u, art. I6 par. 3·
69
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of the principle of nationality, these various Latin American
countries expand their own national law beyond the limits of
the basic principle which they have adopted. These sophisticated modern endeavors are quite in line with recent European, especially French, 72 tendencies, claiming application of
the domestic law to nationals living abroad as well as to
foreigners domiciled within the forum. The principles of
nationality and of domicil are thus inconsistently combined.
A final stage of this unfortunate development has been
reached at present in the Civil Code of Peru of 1936. 73 This
Code generally adopts the law of domicil 74 to govern all
foreigners whether domiciled abroad or in Peru. Nevertheless, ·the Peruvian law on status and capacity extends without
any limitations to all Peruvians living abroad. 75 The Venezuelan Civil Code of I 942 follows this model. 76 The same excessive claim has been made with respect to marriage in the
recent Civil Code of Latvia. 77
A similar conception is said to control the problems of
capacity for contracting in the Soviet Union; everybody in
Soviet Russia and every Russian abroad is subject to Soviet
Russian law. However, this is not deemed to concern the
72

See infra p. 15 z.
A complete history of the matter is given by LuiS ALVARADO, Apuntes de
derecho internacional (Lima, 1940) 43-73.
7'A. GusTAVO CoRNEJO, 1 C6digo Civil (1937) so no. 49 points out that
the reference to the law of domicil is intended to include the conflicts norm of
the domicil (as in Switzerland).
75 C. C. (1936) Tit. Prel. art. V par. 1.
For this reason, the Peruvian
delegation appointed to revise the Montevideo Treaties declared, in a reservation to the text of 1940 on international civil law, that the provisions therein
respecting status and capacity should be understood not to affect the provisions
of the Peruvian national law applicable to Peruvians. Cf. RABEL, "The Revision of the Treaties of Montevideo on the Law of Conflicts," 39 Mich. L.
Rev. (1941) 517, szx. At the same time, under the original treaty provisions
actually in force, the new code is inapplicable to Peruvians domiciled in Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay; cf. ALVARADO, op. cit. supra n. 73 at 71.
Previously the Peruvian Code of Civil Procedure, art. I I 58, had reserved the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Peruvian courts over all questions of status, capacity and family relations as regards Peruvians domiciled at any place and foreigners domiciled in Peru; cf.RoGER, 7 Repert. 30 no. 49·
76 Venezuela: C. C. (194z) arts. 8 and 9·
77Latvian C. C.§ n; cf; SCHILLING, 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1937) :u6, u9.
73
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general capacity of having rights, which seems "not to be considered by the Soviet law as a faculty inherent to man as
such." 78

III.

SuPPLEMENTARY RuLEs

The principle of nationality cannot be applied to persons
who are not nationals of any country, and it causes difficulties
in its applications to persons who are nationals of more than
one country. For both types of cases, the principle of nationality must be supplemented by special rules.
I.

Multiple Nationality

In matters of status, a person who is simultaneously a
national of the state of the forum and of some other state is
usually considered by the forum as exclusively its own national,
his additional foreign nationality being disregarded. This
approach has been traditionally followed in France, Great
Britain, Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxemburg 79 and has
been adopted more recently by statutes in Japan and Liechtenstein, and by the courts of Germany and of other countries.80 The Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws (art.
3) has recognized the right of a state to apply its law in such
cases.
Where, on the other hand, a person is a national of two or
more countries but the litigation arises in a third country, the
law most consistently applied is that of the country of which
the person is not only a national but where he also has his
domicil or habitual residence or, in the absence thereof, his
78
79

See MAKAROV, Precis I 75 and I92.
Surveys by KAiHN, I Abhandl. 59, also in 30 Jherings Jahrb. (I 8gi) 68;
MAURY in 9 Repert. 297 no. I I 3·
80
Japan: Law of I 898, art. 27 par. I.
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 30 par. I,
To the same effect Brazil: Former in trod. art. 9 par, 2.
Germany: RG. (Jan. 241 I9o8) I8 Z.int.R. 533 1 539; RG. (March I3 1 I924)
Leipz.Z. 1924, 74li RG. (Nov. 5, I928) 43 Z.int.R. (I9JO-I9JI) 86, IPRspr.
1929, no. I.
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81

residence. This view was approved by the Sixth Conference
on International Private Law held at the Hague in 1928,
which formulated corresponding provisions to complement
the older Hague treaties on international family law; 82
eliminating reference to domicil, the test is "habitual residence" and, in its absence, simply the "residence" at the time
decisive for the particular purpose, for instance, when the personal capacity to marry is in question, the moment of the
marnage ceremony.
Another solution has been essayed by Japan, 83 and still
others have been suggested. 84 For the purposes of public international law, it has long been a well-recognized tendency to
prefer among several nationalities of a person that which in
a given case appears the most "effective" one. 85 This principle
has been formulated by the Hague Convention on Conflict of
Nationality Laws of 1930, as follows:
"Within a third State, a person having more than one
nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status
and of any conventions in force, a third State shall, of the
nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize ex81 Institut de Droit International, Resolution of Oslo I93z, art.

2.,

Annuaire

I9JZ, 47I (residence habituelle et principale).

Brazil: C. C. Former in trod. art. 9 (domicil, residence).
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 30 par. z (domicil, residence, last acquired citizenship).
Cf. for Spain: TRiAs DE BES in 6 Repert. Z4 7 no. 7 8; for Hungary: SzA.szy
in II Z.ausl.PR. (1937) I70 (domicil). On other theories, see z ARMINJON
( ed. z) 34ff. no. I o bis.
82 See the list of the various supplementary clauses in MAKAROV 4z I VIII la.
The Hague Convention of I930 on Conflicts of Nationality Laws, art. 5
(HuDsoN, 5 Int. Leg. 359, also in z4 Am. J. Int. Supp. (I930) I9Z) declares
not to prejudice the matters of personal status.
83 Law of I 898, art. z7 {law of the last acquired nationality).
Similarly, Thailand: Act on Conflict of Laws of March I o, I 939 (B.E. 248 I)
s. 6 par. I, see LEWALD, Regles generales des conflits de lois, no. 4Z n. 8 at 102;
cf. I BAR§ 88 at 26I, tr. by GILLESPIE at I94·
4
.g See Trib. civ. Bruxelles (May 29, I934) Clunet 1937, 570 and comment.
85 Greece: C. C. art. 31 par. 2; see FLOURNOY, "Dual Nationality and Elec"
tion," 30 Yale L. J. ( I92 r) 693; MAURY, 9 Repert. 298 no. 1 I4·
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elusively in its territory either the nationality of the country
in which he is habitually and principally resident, or the
nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he
appears to be in fact most closely connected." 86
2.

Stateless Persons

A person not being a national of any country is called an
apatride or apolide or heimatlos. 87 Such a situation could arise
under ordinary international circumstances, where a child of
parents whose home country adheres to the pure principle of
jus soli, was born in a country in which the jus sanguini.r· was
in force. The recent unrest of legislation respecting married
women has engendered other cases. Thus, where a Swiss
woman marrying a Frenchman fails to sign a declaration of intention to acquire French citizenship, under article I 9 of a
French law of November 12, 1938, she does not acquire
French nationality, though not retaining her former citizenship. 88 Untold numbers of individuals have also been rendered stateless by the political events of this century. Many
thousands of emigrants have lost their nationality by Soviet
decree and many more by the ruthless legislations of Italy and
Germany, introducing the system of "expatriation" as a political measure against real or alleged political enemies. Furthermore, the peace treaties following World War I and later
events have made it frequently impossible in fact to ascertain
the nationality of a person, who in such a case must practically
be treated as an apatride, as is done in the case of gypsies. 89
At present, individuals lacking a definite nationality are
generally subject to the law of their domicil or habitual resi16 Art. S·
17 This German

expression is used by French and other writers, while the
official German term is "staatenlos."
as swiss Department of Justice, BBl. I939 II, 184 no. I4. This case would
not arise under art. 8 of the I930 Convention on Conflicts of Nationa\ity Laws
which Switzerland did not ratify.
89 Poland: Law of I916 art. I par. I,
1
Hungary: Law XXXI of 1894 (Marriage Law) § 119.
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 31 par. 1,
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dence, and, in default thereof, to the law of their temporary
residence. This has been the view of the Institute of International Law since I 8So. 90 Most countries accede to this position. 91 It was also adopted by the Sixth Conference on
International Private Law at the Hague in I 928 92 in the complementary drafts just mentioned, in which, as in all recent
treaties, the term "domicil" is abandoned in favor of "habitual
residence" or, in its absence, "residence." The new Italian
Code has intentionally chosen the test of residence. 93
Another solution was formerly adopted by the German Civil
Code (EG. art. 29), providing that a person who had once
held but subsequently lost the nationality of a country without
acquiring another, was declared to remain subject to his former
90 Institut de Droit International: Resolution of Oxford, art. 6 pars. 2. and s,
Annuaire I88I-I88:., 57; Resolution of Oslo, art. 3, Annuaire I9]3, 47I, 472.
Unfortunately the Institute has changed its attitude in a Resolution on "Statut
juridique des apatrides et des refugies" voted in Brussels in I936, Annuaire
I936, II 292.. Art. 4 provides that the law applicable in the case of a stateless
person will be that of the country either of a nationality possessed previously
or of his domicil or, in the absence of either, of his habitual residence at the date
regarded as relevant by the court.
91
Belgium: PouLLET 307 no. 255; Congo: Decree of Feb. :.o, I89I, art. 8
(for foreigners domiciled in Congo) •
France: Trib. civ. Nantes (Nov. 28, I90I) Clunet I9oz, 590; Trib. civ.
Seine (Feb. 14, I9o8) Revue 19Io, IIZ; Cour Paris (Nov. 25, I9I3) Revue
19I4, 130; App. Nancy {June Io, 19I4) Clunet I9I5, 6zo, Revue I9I4, 579;
French Morocco: Law of I9I3, art. 5 (for foreigners domiciled in Morocco).
Hungaryt Marriage Law of I 894, § I 19.
Italy: C. C. (1942.) Disp. Prel. art. 29 (residence). Previously the law of
June I3, I9IZ on nationality, art. I4, subjected the apoUdi residing in Italy to
Italian civil law, but for other apatrides there was controversy, although residence was the test most frequently adopted. See UDJNA, Elementi I zz. The new
code substitutes domicil as the test.
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 3 I par. 2.
The Netherlands: KosTERS 289 (domicil).
Poland: Law of I926, art. I par. I.
Rumania: 7 Repert. 63 no. ISI·
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7a.
Japan: Law of I898, art. 27 par. 2.
China: Law of I9I8, art. z par. z.
Brazil: C. C. Former introd. art. 9·
Cj. TRACHTENBERG, "Heimatlose-Heirnatlosat," 8 Repert. 565 no. 72 et
seq.; MELCHIOR 449 n. I.
92
Cf. MAKAROV 4ZI VIII I b.
93
Italian C. C. (I 9 38) Disp. Prel. art. I 9; cf. Relazione I 9 3 8, no. Is; C. C.
(I942.) Disp. Prel. art. 29.
'
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national law. This provision compelled the German courts
to decide the private status and the incidents of family relations of Russian emigres in accordance with the legislation of
the Soviet Union, i.e., the country which was their very
enemy and which had refused to accept the role of successor to
the former Russian Empire. 94 With respect to succession upon
death, the situation between Germany and Russia was at first
remedied by a treaty. 9 ~ Recently, however, Germany has adhered, by a new law, to the rule proposed by the Sixth Conference at the Hague. 96
In addition, two multipartite treaties of 1933 and 1936 on
. the status of refugees (the one treaty, in case they have no
nationality, the other irrespective of nationality), determine
the personal law of refugees by the law of the country of
domicil or, in default thereof, by that of the country of residence.97
The test of domicil or residence has thus proved to be
indispensable in important cases.
3· Nationals of Countries with a Composite System of Private
Law
Composite law on personal basis. In Algeria, Tunisia, Syria,
Egypt, Iran, India, China, and other Eastern coun~ries, per94RG. (Oct. 6, 1927) Warn. Rspr. 1928, no. 13, IPRspr. 1928, no. 22.
95 German Law of Jan. 6, 1926, on the German-Russian Treaties of Oct. I 2,
I925 (based on the "Rapallo" Treaties of I922) RGBI. 1926 II x, art. 4· '
96 German Law of April 12, 1938 (RGBI. I938 I 38o) art. 7, altering the
text of EG. art. 29, states that insofar as the laws of the state to which a person
belongs are declared decisive, the legal relations of a person without nationality
are to be decided according to the laws of the state in which he has, or if the
decisive moment lies in the past, had at the moment, his habitual residence, or,
in the case of lack of habitual residence, his residence.
Cf. a comment by VON STACKELBERG, I 2 Z.ausl.PR. (I 938) 66. The "motives" of this legislation explain that Germany accepts the generally, adopted
principle in the form proposed by the Sixth Hague Conference, which now
governs the personal law so far as it goes, while other matters remain subject
to their own special rules, as e.g., C. Civ. Proc. § 114 par. 2.
9 7 Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees, Geneva, Oct.
28, 1933, arts. 4, 5 in 159 League of Nations Treaty Series (1935-1936) 199,
6 HuDSON, Int. Legislation 483ff. No. 350; Provisional Arrangement concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany, Geneva, July 4, 1936,
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sonal status is determined by religion, class, or race. 98 In India,
for instance, the law is different for Buddhists, Hindus, Mohammedans, and whites, although it is in every case a "law of
the forum." 99 Some elements of this system also survive in
Eastern European countries.
Such diversity of personal law is a part of the substantive
law of the country concerned. When a conflicts rule refers to
the "law" of such a country, either because it is the law of the
domicil of an individual or because it is his national law, no
uniform law being in force in any part of the country, the reference can only be to the particular set of rules that governs
the group of persons to which the individual belongs. 100
Under this approach, it is obvious that the conflicts rule is quite
sufficient in itself and that it does not need any additional rules,
complementary to those which invoke the law' of domicil or
nationality.
Difficulties may arise, it is true, from the fact that the
regulation of interreligious or interracial relations in the
oriental countries concerned is often so obscure and incomplete
that it may not be easy for a foreign judge to cope with their
ascertainment and application. 101
arts. 5, 6, in 171 League of Nations Treaty Series 75 1 7 HUDSoN, Int. Legislation 3 76 No. 448.
98 Cf. on Egypt and other Islamic countries: ARMINJON, in Clunet 1912., 698,
I025; Clunet I91J, 34, 435, 812.; and r Precis 102. On Palestine, TransJordan, Cyprus, Syria and Iraq: GoADBY 79, I07 1 142.; WENGLER, lnternationales und interreligiiises Privatrecht in Pallistina," 12. Z.ausl.PR. (I 9 39)
772-8o8. On Hindus in Zanzibar before the British courts: HUGH E. KINGDON,
The Conflict of Laws in Zanzibar (I94o) 15. On the Belgian Congo,:
MAURICE VERSTRAETE, "lntergentiel Recht," 9 Rechtsk. Wkbl. I 940, col. I I 69.
On the Netherlands Indies: KoLLEW!JN, "Interracial Private Laws," in The
Effect of Western Influence on Native Civilizations in the Malay Archipelago,
·
edited by SCHRIEKE (Batavia, I92.9) 204.
99
On the contrary, in an Indian court a Chinese Buddhist custom is foreign
law. See the careful judgment by Sir George Rankin in Tan Ma Shwe Zin v.
Khoo Soo Chong [1939] A. C. 52.7 (Privy Council). Cf. Casdagli v. Casdagli
[I9I8] P.(C.A.) 89 at IIo, per Scrutton, L. J.; and, in general, ARMINJON,
Clunet I9I3 1 39·
100
GRASSETII, 5 Rivista Dir. Priv. ( 19 35) II I o.
101
See for Palestine: GoADBY II9; For Latvia (where classes are distinguished): BERENT in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 577; For Bulgaria: DANEFF, 38
Bull. Inst. Int. (I 93 8) •
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Composite law on territorial basis. 102 As contrasted with the
grouping of population according to personal qualifications,
the law of conflicts is directly affected when the law of a country
to which a conflicts rule refers is split into territorially different
systems. A composite system of law on a territorial basis makes
nationality an incomplete criterion. The United States, the
British Empire, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Mexico
are examples of political units lacking a unified law on personal
status; their territories are divided into parts where different
bodies of rules are in force. A court which has to apply the
"Polish law" relative to a Polish subject's capacity to marry,
would be unable to find an appropriate set of rules, except by
locating such person in the former Prussian or former Russo-.
Polish or old-Russian or Austrian or Hungarian part of
Poland. A secondary rule of conflicts is necessary.

First case: Where interregional rules exist.

If the country to whose law reference is made possesses
a unified internal regulation declaring which one of the several
private laws applies to the individual concerned, this regulation is universally accepted for the purpose of secondary reference. For instance, the Polish law of "internal relations"
(interloca:I private law), enacted simultaneously with the
Polish law on international private law, August 2, 1926/03
102 Cf. I ZITELMANN 403; RAAPE 2.9 and I D.IPR. 94; WALKER I04;
MELCHIOR 451 § 310; DE NovA, in 30 Rivista (1938) 388 and 11 richiamo
di ordinamenti plurilegislativi: Studio di diritto interlocale ed internazionale
privata (I940) (not available); GRASSETTI 1 5 Rivista Dir. Priv. (1935) II 3;
I STREIT-VALLINDAS §§ I 6, 1 7 (the best survey of facts and literature) ;
CHESHIRE I6I; FALCONBRIDGE1 "Renvoi and the Law of the Domicile," 19
Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 31I. The aggrandizement of Germany caused problems
in view of which the doctrine of interregional law has been discussed again;
see quotations by DE NovA, 15 Annuario Dir. Comp. (1941) 338, 339· See
furthermore the Swiss NAG. in its original main application to intercantonal
conflicts and the French law of July 2.41 192.1 concerning the conflicts between
the French and the local law of Alsace-Lorraine.
103 Arts. 1 and 3· Another example is art. 14 of the Spanish Civil Code, providing that the conflicts rules established with respect to the persons, the trans~
actions and the property of Spaniards abroad and of foreigners in Spain are
applicable to the persons, transactions and property of Spaniards in territories
or provinces of different civil legislations; see BEATO SALA, I Revista Der. Priv.
(I9IJ-I9I4) 2.01; TRiAs DEBEs, 6 Repert. z66 no. 165.
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provided that the status and the capacity of an individual of
Polish nationality, domiciled abroad, is to be determined by
Polish courts in the first instance under the law of the last
domicil he had in Poland and, in the second, under the law
of the Polish capital. Accordingly, German, French, Italian,
etc., courts apply the same expedients. This method was
recommended by the Institute of International Law 10' and
has been adopted in several statutory enactments.105
It is easily understandable that a foreign court looking for
the "national law" of an individual, should adopt the localizations effected by the sovereign of the foreign nation. But
the theoretical background of this operation has been a subject
of discussion. An essential resemblance between interregional
and international private laws cannot be denied; both are types
of conflicts rules. Yet the reference leading from the conflicts
rules of the forum through the interprovincial rule to a particular family law of a territory must not be treated as identical
with a regular renvoi; the foreign interregional rule is not
in competition with the forum's own conflicts rules. 106 As a
matter of fact, the $trongest adversaries of renvoi agree with
this use of foreign interregional statutes. 107
It must be presumed that the interlocal rules are to be
adopted with all their characteristics, e.g., what they understand as "domicil," the domicil concept of the forum being
immaterial. Also, such particular notions must be applied as
the Swiss cantonal citizenship 108 or the "town settlement"
104

Resolutions passed at Oxford, x88o 1 art. 3 par. 31 Annuaire x88x-x8811 57•
Sweden: Int. Fam. L. of 1904 with amendments, c. 6 §I.
Japan: Law of 18981 art. '1.7 par. 3·
China: Law of 19181 art. '1. par. 3·
11i6Cj. RAAPE 34 against I ZITELMANN 398 and NIBOYET 493 no. 411;
GRASSETTI, 5 Rivista Dir. Priv. (1935) II 41 against other Italian writers; and
see the survey by I STREIT-VALLINDAS 354•
107
NIBOYET1 op. cit. supra n. 106; LEWALD1 '1.9 Recueil I9'1.9 IV 590; see
RAAPE 34·
105 "Heimat," is still important for the matters of cantonal legislation that
have not been unified.
10 5
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(Heimatzustandigkeit)

109

which was a basic concept in the
Austro-Hungarian monarchy and remained in force in the
successor states. 110 In Hungary it was abolished but
recently. 111
Second case: Where no interregional rules exist and the
individual is domiciled within his national country.
·Most countries that have no uniform private law also lack
a unified set of interlocal rules. Such a situation existed in
Germany before the Civil Code took effect on January I, I 900,
and after World War I the same was true in all countries
that had annexed new provinces and in which legal unification
was not yet achieved. Yugoslavia and perhaps Rumania are
still in this situation. But the foremost examples are presented
by the British Empire and the United States. With respect to
the former, it is hardly doubtful that "there is in fact no
system of conflict of law common to all parts of the British
Empire," 112 that would enable a foreign court to discover
all-British rules connecting British subjects with their several
jurisdictions. Neither is it permissible to apply the English
rules on conflicts or on the law of status to all British subjects,
for the English law cannot be construed as "the true national
law" of all British subjects. 113 Perhaps in the future, some
109 The French text of the Treaty of St. Germain of Sept. 1 o, 1919, art. 3
uses the term "indigenat" with the Italian equivalent "pertinenza" in parentheses. The German translation in the Austrian Staatsgesetzblatt 1 9 20, at 1048
is "Heimatrecht". The English version "citizenship" as published in British
and Foreign State Papers (1919) sos, is wrong.
110 See e.g., for parts of Yugoslavia, PERITCH in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 879 n.
15 and LoVRIC, ibid. 1038 n. 172 (Croatia-Slovania). See also PERITCH, 32
Bull. Inst. Int. (1935) 3·
For Czechoslovakia, HoCHBERGER, 4 Z. osteurop. R. (1938) 621, 629 reports
that Czechoslovakian nationals domiciled in Czechoslovakia are considered
having the capacity of their domiciliary law, but if domiciled abroad, that of
the law of their township.
1l1 In Hungary it has been replaced by domicil for interlocal purposes by Law
XIII of 1939; cf. 13 Z.ausl.PR. (1940) 258, 259.
112
FALCONBRIDGE, 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 322, supra n. 102.
113 This was·contended by DICEY 873; see contra: CHESHIRE 162 n. 4;
FALCONBRIDGE 1 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) p8, supra n. 102.
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point of localization might be found in local conceptions of
nationality, Canadian, South African, etc., which seem to be
in a state of development, in addition to the notion of British
subject; 114 but the new conception of dominion nationality
apparently has not yet been taken into consideration for such
purpose 115 and in any event would not specify the law of one
of the several component states or provinces of the dominion
in question.
However, unanimity is still to be found in one group of
cases, viz., where the individual is domiciled at some place
within the entire territory of the country whose legal system
is divided, or where, as to matters of inheritance, the individual
was there domiciled at the time of his death. The rule is quite
generally re~ognized that the law of such place constitutes his
personallaw. 116 Thus, the principle of domicil has retained a
further supplementary hold in Europe.
Although this rule is well settled, it is nevertheless not
certain whether it follows that "domicil" is to be defined under
IMSee KEITH, The Dominions as Sovereign States (1938) 184-199. Cf.
EMMETT, "Nationality in the Union of South Africa," 17 Brit. Year Book Int.
Law ( 1936) 187; 18 ibid. ( 193 7) 18 I; see also GEY VAN PITTJUs, Nationality
Within the British Commonwealth of Nations (1930) 223.
1!5 The problem has scarcely been discussed; in 2 Encyclopaedia of the Laws
of England (ed. 3, 1938) 467ff. it is observed that at present colonial nationality is not distinguished from the British, although in the future the principles
embodied in the Statute of Westminister, 1931 (c. 4) might affect nationality
within the Empire.
The latent significance of the new local nationality for the purpose of jurisdiction, in particular divorce jurisdiction, has been pointed out by KEITH,
"Das Verhaltniss des Statute of W estminister von 19 31 zum internationalen
Privatrecht," 6 Z.ausl.PR. (1932) 301, 308 and op. cit. supra n. 114 at 193;
EASTMAN, "Australian Nationality Legislation, Nationality of Married Women,"
18 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1937) 179. A more radical development toward
the criterion of local citizenship for personal status might be expected with
respect to Eire.
116
I ZITELMANN 405 at n. 7i RAAPE 36 (b) I MELCHIOR 452 § 3II n. 3•
With respect to their interprovincial rules, the Court of Cassation of Rumania
(March 3, 1937) 5 Z.osteurop.R. (1939) 654, Clunet 1938, 946 held that
divorce is governed by the law of the domicil of the parties at the time of the
action, not by that of the place of celebration of the marriage nor by that of
the origin of the parties, and, therefore, applied the Austrian Civil Code to the
divorce of parties domiciled in Bucowina (the actual local law of that province).
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the law of the forum and not, as in the first case described
(where interlocal rules exist), in accordance with the conceptions existing in the territory where the individual is said
to reside.
Third case: Where no interregional rule exists and the individual is domiciled outside his national country.
A troublesome situation arises where there are no interregional rules, and the individual is not domiciled in any part
of his national country. Several opinions have been put forward.
(a) The prevailing doctrine in Germany, 117 followed by
the Swedish legislation, 118 applies the law of that district of
the national's country where the individual now domiciled
abroad had his last domicil 119 or, if he never had any domicil
in his national country, the law in force at the capital of that
country. 120
This doctrine is satisfactory in certain cases. The connecting factors evidently were borrowed from procedural
models; 121 to allow nationals domiciled abroad to sue or be
sued locally, jurisdiction, ordinarily based on actual domicil,
in emergency cases may be based upon the last previous domicil
or, as a final resort, may be assumed by the courts of the
capital. Such provisions make sense in the intranational rules
of a country like Rumania. Rumanian citizens are not subject
to foreign personal laws even when domiciled abroad and
therefore must be connected with one of the territorial laws
117 NIEMEYER, Das IPR. des BGB. 68; LEWALD 13; RAAPE 3'6; MELCHIOR
452·
118 Swedish Int. Fam. L. of 1904 with amendments, c. 6 §I par. 2; Law of
March 5, 1937 on Conflict of. Laws in regard to Succession, c.3 § r. See II
Z.ausl.PR. (I 93 7) 93 ,, 39 Bull. Inst. Int. (r 93 8) I s8.
.
119
RG. (Nov. 30, 19o6) 64 RGZ. 389 at 393; OLG. Karlsruhe (May 6,
1898) 9 Z.int.R. (1899) 311, 315.
120
KG. (Aug. 20, 1936) JW. i936, 3582 (Soviet Russian subjects); LG.
Hamburg (Sept. 2, 1936) JW. 1936, 3492 (Rumanians).
121
NIEMEYER, Das IPR.·des BGB. 68; German Code of Civ. Proc. §§ I5·
27 par. 2, 6o6 par. 2, 642, 648.
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of Rumania. A French or German court, adhering to the same
principle of nationality, may very well agree to locate a
Rumanian citizen somewhere in Rumania. For analogous
purposes, in order to secure Frenchmen living abroad a
domicil in France in case they need one, the French private
draft of 1930 establishes an artificial domicil: (i) at the
Frenchman's last domicil in France, (ii) subsidiarily at his
last residence, (iii) otherwise at his birthplace, and (iv) in
the last resort at any place chosen by him in a declaration
before 'a French consul. 122
On the other hand, such subsidiary rules of the forum are
obviously unsuitable for connecting a British subject with a
determinate part of the British Empire. As a matter of fact,
no German or French court is likely to apply them to a British
subject. Where an Englishman is domiciled in France, French
courts as well as other Continental courts apply French law,
by renvoi.
(b) Italian courts reject renvoi 123 and are confronted with
a problem that has been called insoluble. When the Courts
of Cassation of Florence and Naples, in leading cases of I 9 I 9
and I 920, respectively, 124 proclaimed the anti-renvoi doctrine,
they recognized at the same time that the British laws did not
contain any rules linking British subjects domiciled abroad
with any British legal system. The only possible result was
to adopt the law of the domicil of origin. 125
Thus, the English judgments in the cases of Johnson and
122
Art. spar. :z, :z6 Bull Soc. d'Etudes Leg. (1930) 176; cf. NIBOYET, :z6
ibid. 78.
l23 This well known rule was stated by Luxmoore, J., In re Ross, [1930]
I Ch. 377,403. It is expressly confumed by the Italian Civil Code {194-:z)
Disp. Prel. art. 30.
124
Cass. Firenze (July :z1, 1919) Giur. Ital. 1919 I 1 104-0.
125
BUZZATI fully approving of the Naples decision, Cass. Napoli {Jan. s,
19:zo) Foro Ital. 1920 I 348. The same suggestion is made by CHESHIRE, "Decisions of National Tribunals Involving Points of International Law," u Brit.
Year Book Int. Law (1931) 174 at 176, and in his Private International Law
161.
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O'Keefe/ which in fact (by renvoi) resort to the domicil of
origin to determine the distribution of the estates of British
subjects who die domiciled in Italy, are not without support
in Italian law.
But, of course, it does not correspond to the spirit of British
laws that a person firmly settled in Naples for forty-seven
years, should be traced back to the origin of his father; at
least, even in the eyes of a British court, the domicil of origin
of the father of Miss O'Keefe was undoubtedly superseded
by the domicil of her choice. For this reason alone the solution
ofthe O'Keefe case is absurd. 127
(c) Recent Italian writers, with Falconbridge's approval,
conclude that it is impossible to fix the status of a British subject living abroad and suggest that the Italian court apply the
lex fori, viz., Italian municipal law. 128 Such a gesture of
despair seems to be uncalled for, however, if proper regard be
paid to the historical development of the personal law; domicil
was replaced by nationality in the nineteenth century, but not
so as to exclude the test of domicil whenever the new test of
political allegiance should fail to operate reasonably. Certainly, reference to domicil is preferable to a resigned resort
to the lex fori. The practical consequences illustrate what the
choice of law means in this case:
Suppose Canadian dies domiciled in France, and an Italian
court has to determine the intestate succession to his movables.
If the Italian court were to apply Italian inheritance law qua
.lex fori, instead of French law qua lex domicilii, the solution
would be senseless and completely destroy harmony between
the conflicts rules of the forum and those of the domicil, as

a

126
Jn re Johnson, Roberts v. Att. Gen. [19o3] 1 Ch. 8:u per Farwell, J.;
. In re O'Keefe, Poingdestre v. Sherman [ 1940] Ch. U4 per Crossman, J.
127
FALCONBRIDGE, 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 324, 326, supra n. 1oz. An-,
other argument is advanced by GRASSETTI, 5 Rivista Dir. Priv. (1935) II 3,
7, supra n. 106.
128
DE NoVA and GRASSETTI, supra n. 102 and FALCONBRIDGE, 19 Can. Bar
Rev. (1941) 323, supra n. 102.
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well as with those of the Canadian courts which seek to follow
any solution chosen by the court of the domicil but are unable
to follow the law of the forum of a third country.
(d) Zitelmann suggested taking domicil alone as the test. 129
He would limit the reference to nationality to the case where
the actual domicil is situated within the national country. It
has been objected that this view runs directly counter to the
principle of nationality, 130 but this argument is evidently
wrong. It is true, on the other hand, that the lex domicilii
and the theory of renvoi result in the same decision in this
case and are often hardly distinguishable from each other.
But the case of a British subject domiciled in Italy induced
the leader of the Italian school of international law and the
prominent opponent of renvoi, Dionisio Anzilotti, to abandon
his opposition. 131
Adoption of the law of domicil by the Italian courts, either
as an independent secondary test or, more appropriately, as
the result of renvoi, is the only way leading out of the impasse.
Renvoi is the better method, since harmony is preserved with
the British rules, especially in relation to the definition of
domicil. One cannot reject renvoi and hope for anything
.tolerable.
It has been observed that the law of domicil has not the
same domain of application in all British countries. 132 This,
however, involves only special points immaterial for the general rule.
129

I ZITELMANN 405, followed by WALKER 105 n, 57·
RAAPE 37•
131
ANZILOTTI, in approving notes to Trib. Firenze (Jan. 23, 1918) in 12
Rivista (1918) 81 and App. Firenze {Jan. 23, 1919) in the same cause, ibid.
288. The judgments were reversed by Cass. Firenze, supra n. u4.
132
FALCONBRIDGE, 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 322, supra n. 102. His example, however, that under the primary rule in Quebec the lex loci. actus, not
the lex domicilii, governs the formal validity of a will, is not entirely relevant,
since in this situation the law at the place of contracting is recognized-alone
or optionally-by the Continental conflicts rules, and to such extent no re~voi
problem is involved.
130
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(e) The problem is not much different with respect to
American citizens. If an American citizen is domiciled within
a state of the United States, the reference to his "national"
private law means the law which will be applied to him by a
court sitting at his domicil. It has been properly noted in
Europe that in this case the nationality principle needs no
supplementary rule, because such domicil constitutes local
citizenship in the state.
Where an American citizen is, however, domiciled in a
foreign country, renvoi has been adopted by numerous
European courts upon the erroneous view that the conflicts law
of the American state in which he had his last American
domicil, referring to the law of his present domicil,133 applies.
The conception in this country is that such an individual is still
an American citizen but no longer a citizen of a particular
state. 134 Consequently, if there were Federal rules of conflicts,
they might appropriately be resorted to in such case by a
Continental court. But there are no such rules. Since the Supreme Court's decisions requiring Federal courts in diverse
citizenship cases to follow the conflicts rules of the states
where they are sitting,ta!j it is doubtful to what extent an
independent Federal system of conflicts law can be developed.136 However, in the United States, the scope of the
law of domicil is substantially more uniform than in the British
Commonwealth, with exception only of certain peculiarities
in the law of Louisiana. Hence, it seems quite justified 137 for
133 See the critical exposition by RHEINSTEIN, 1 Giur. Comp. DIP. 141.
1M See Prentiss v. Brennan, 19 Fed. Cas. (1851 C.C. N.D. N.Y.) 1278, per
Nelson, J.; Hammerstein v. Lyne (1912 D.C. W.D. Mo.) zoo Fed. 165.
135 Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (1938) 304 U.S. 64; Sampson v. Channell
(1940 C.C.A. ISt) 110 F. (zd) 754 and notes in 18 N.Y.U. L. Q. Rev. (194o1941) 1191 128 A. L. R. 4051 and now especially Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co. (1941) 313 U.S. 487 and Griffin v. McCoach (1941) 313 U.S.
498.
1311
Supra p. 37·

131
Professor Lawrence Preuss has attracted my attention to a somewhat
eimilar problem which has been discussed in matters of extradition. Under the
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French, German, Chinese, and other foreign courts to treat
the questions that are generally decided in American courts
by the municipal law of the domiciliary state, in the same way
and under the same construction of domicil.
Conclusion. To summarize, where nationality alone is insufficient for ascertaining the applicable law, resort must be
had in the first place to the rules respecting interregional relations of the country whose national the individual is. If no
such rules have been established in that country by an authority covering the entire national territory, the spirit in which
its courts generally solve the problem of demarcation between
the legal systems included may reasonably be followed by
foreign courts. Where, as in the United States and in the
British Empire, domicil is generally decisive, a court of any
other country has good reason to apply the same criterion with
all of its implications. Only in the last resort need independent
conflicts rules be applied, based on a former domicil of choice
or some other contact.
Except for the last point, the attitude of the forum may
thus. be similar to that observed in dealing with religious,
racial, or class differentiations.
treaties, extradition usually depends on the recognition, by both the requesting
and the requested countries, of the criminal character of the alleged offense.
How is the "principle of double criminality" to apply to the United States where
the administration of criminal law has not generally been unified? Is "country"
in such case the United States or the state involved? In the case of Factor v.
Laubenheimer and Haggard (1933) 290 U.S. 276, 28 Am. J. Int. Law (1934)
149, the United States was requested to extradite to England, Factor, who had
been found in Illinois. The Supreme Court, by a six to three vote, held it
sufficient that the criminal character of the act was recognized in twenty-two
states, although not proved to be such in lllinois. (It has even been said that
the number, twenty-two, is too high; see HUDSON, "The Factor Case and Double
Criminality in Extradition," 28 Am. J. Int. Law (1934) 274, 303 n. uo.)
BoRCHARD, "The Factor Extradition Case," ibiJ. 744, has given the more
cautious explanation that the considerable recognition in American state stat•
utes was evidence of the American recognition of the criminality in question.
The dissenting judges and HunsoN, Joe. cit., maintain the older conception that
the law of the state where the fugitive is finally arrested is decisive. Evidently
our own problem is easier to solve.
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PERSONAL LAW OF INDIVIDUALS
DETERMINATION oF NATIONALITY AND DoMICIL

Determination of Nationality

Whether a person is a national of a certain country is a
problem that is determined exclusively by the law of that
country/ 38 a settled rule of international law confirmed by
the Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws of 1930.139
No other law than that of Brazil determines whether or not
a certain individual is a Brazilian national; no other law than
that of the United States answers to the question whether an
individual is a citizen of the United States. The statement in
a former American nationality law that "any American woman
marrying an alien shall take the nationality of her husband,m 40
if taken literally, surpassed the powers of the United States. 141
The same formula was incorporated, however, in many old
European statutes, as for instance, article 19 of the Code Napoleon, sometimes interpreted to the effect that the wife should
be subject to the personal law of the husband, irrespective of
whether she acquired his nationality by the law of his national
country. 142
13 8

See Mr. Justice Gray in United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898) 169
'
Art. 2: "Any question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of
a particular State shall be determined in accordance with the law of that State."
140
Act of March 2, I907,,ch. 2543, sec. 3, 34 Stat. I228, repealed by the
Cable Act, Sept. 22, 1922, ch ..p 1, sec. 7, 42 Stat. 1021 and later statutes; cf.
8 U.S. C. (1940) ch. r, notes to§§ I-I8.
141
See WALDO E. WALTZ, The Nationality of Married Women (I937) 2I
notes I 5 and I 6.
An analogous charge of trespass upon foreign sovereignty has been made by
several authors with respect to legislations attaching a certain foreign nationality to corporations. See TRAVERS, 3 3 Recueil I 9 3o III 2 5; CAVAGLIERI,
II diritto commerciale internationale 203; 2 ARMIN JON (ed. 2) 460, no. I 79·
To the same effect 1 PoNTES DE MIRANDA 46o objects to the Polish Law of I 926
on private international law, art. I par. 3, and P.G.R. of Liechtenstein, art. 235,
on the ground that these provisions choose the business center of a corporation,
even if in foreign territory, as the contact for determining the personal law of
the corporation, although contrary to the local law of the place, and that the
Liechtenstein provision seems in this way to determine the nationality of the
corporation. This attack is unjustified at least inasmuch as merely the determination of private law rules is meant and renvoi is applied.
142
CoLMET-DAAGE, 1 Revue de droit fran~ais et etranger (I844) 40I.

u.s.139 649> 668.
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The principle that acquisition and loss of nationality depend
exclusively upon the law of the country concerned, is universally recognized not only in public but also in private international law; it is expressly stated in recent codificati~ns. 143
Occasionally, however, there have been refusals to recognize
certain foreign nationality regulations deemed to be contrary
to public policy. French courts, for instance, have declined to
recognize a Brazilian law of December 14, I 8 8 9, which bestowed Brazilian nationality upon all foreigners who resided
in Brazil on November 15, 1889, and who did not expressly
object to such en bloc naturalization. 144
This rule of international law is applicable without doubt
to the determination of status under the nationality principle.
In two cases, moreover, the conflicts law itself is affected:
Suppose a divorced French woman goes through a second
marriage ceremony in France with a Catholic Spaniard. To
ascertain whether the woman by this marriage acquires Spanish nationality, Spanish law exclusively is consulted by all
courts. Accordingly, as (i) Spanish matrimonial law prohibits
the marriage of a Catholic with a divorced person, and (ii)
under Spanish conflicts law this nullifying prohibition is extended to foreign marriages of Spanish nationals, consequently
(iii) by Spanish nationality law the wife does not acquire the
nationality of Spain. Thus, a French court, in determining the
question, would not apply its own conflicts rule designating
the law applicable to the validity or invalidity of the marriage.
This is a remarkable case; the preliminary question relating
143
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 29.
C6digo Bustamante: arts. 12, I4, I5·
Greece: C. C. (I 940) art. 29.
Convention of the Hague on Conflict of Nationality Laws of I 9 30: art. 2.
144
Trib. civ. Seine (July 13, I 9 I 5) Revue I 9 I 6, 67; cf. WEISS, I Traite 768;
the Brazilian law has been recognized, however, by Ct. Sup. Lisbon (May I 5,
I934) Nouv. Revue I935, 424. In another case the same tribunal refused to
recognize the acquisition of nationality by birth under a foreign country's jus
soli: Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. I, I916) Revue I9I6, 217. Contra: JoRDAN, 4
Repert. 6 75 no. I 44·
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to the marriage apparently is ansvvered in accordance with the
law applied in deciding the main question. On the other hand,
for some other purpose the same court may declare the marriage valid under French law. The distinction between these
two solutions has baffled some writers unduly.
When according to this rule that nationality depends on the
municipal law applied by the country involved, 145 the nationality of an individual has been ascertained (or found unascertainable), the ordinary conflicts rules of the forum determine his status. In a second group of problems, however,
the French courts, considering that French nationality is at
stake, have gravely altered their conflicts rules.
The decision of the French Supreme Court in the A1areschal case illustrates the practice. 146 An illegitimate child was
acknowledged in Switzerland by his Swiss mother's declaration on the birth register. Under Swiss law, an illegitimate
relationship was created between the child and the mother, and
the child acquired Swiss nati~nality. 147 French conflicts law
would have recognized this state of affairs, had not the father
who was of French nationality ultimately also acknowledged
the child in a document sufficient under French law. Because
this entailed a question of French nationality, the court examined the entire situation from the viewpoint of French
municipal law, under which the mother's recognition was
found insufficient. Accordingly, the father's was the first and
decisive acknowledgment, and the child was deemed a French
national. This doctrine subjects the determination of private
law questions relating to acknowledgment, to considerations
derived from a nationality law instead of the law of conflicts. 148
145

See, as to German law LEWALD 8 no. ro; MELCHIOR 253 § r6g.
Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 25, 1930) D.I930.r.Ir3, S.I930.1.32I. See infra p.
6rg, n. 40.
147
Swiss C.C. art. 324; cf. BG. (June 29, 1928) 54 BGE.I 230, 232.
148
CoLIN, Note D.r92r.r.r and in his report to the Court of Cassation,
Clunet r 92 3, 8 9, 9 3; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE no. 349 A.
146
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That this is not a foregone conclusion is demonstrated by
the German law respecting legitimation, which, only if valid
under the German laws, 149 including German conflicts rules, 150
is a ground for acquiring German nationality, and not inversely. The conflicts rules operate independently and determine whether there is German citizenship.
2.

Determination of Domicil

Variety of domicil concepts. In much of the literature, the
diversity of domicil concepts is emphasized. 151 It is opportune
to note just what the differences are. Primarily, the British
doctrine of domicil is to be distinguished from that of all
other systems; it is more or less unique, first, because of the
abnormal place occupied by the domicil of origin, second, because of the prevalence of tendentious casuistry. The English
writers, recognizing that the decisions of the House of Lords
have done much to alienate the legal concept of domicil from
its natural lines, 1 " 2 are frankly unhappy with the artificial
character of their doctrine and its arbitrary results. On the
other hand, in some countries, such as Denmark/ 53 the notion
of domicil is undeveloped.
Apart from these anomalies, however, it should not be
supposed that in the doctrines of the great majority of coun149German Nationality Law of July 22, I9I3, § I7 (5).
150
RAAPE 562.
151 See the surveys given by BARBOSA DE MAGALHAES in 23 Recuei! I928
III 121; LEVASSEUR, Le domicile et sa determination en droit international prive
(193I); WERNER VON STEIGER, Der Wohnsitz als Ankniipfungsbegri:ff im internationalen Privatrecht (Bern, I934) II9; VITTORIO TEDESCHI, II domicilio nel diritto internazionale privato (I 9 3 3) and the same author's review of
STEIGER'S book, IO Z.ausl.PR. (I936) 1067; see also NEUNER, 8 Z.ausl.PR.
(1934) 89-92. On the differences of municipal conceptions of domicil see the
comparative study by VITTORIO TEDESCHI, Del domicilio (1936).
152 KErTH, "Some Problems in the Conflict of Laws," I 6 Bell Yard (Nov.
I935) 4, 5· In the Winans case, [I904] A.C. 287, KEITH recalls, the propositus
had not found a domicil in England during 3 7 years; Ramsay, in Ramsay v.
Liverpool [I930] A.C. 588, lived from I89I or I892 to I927 in Liverpool and
ordered himself buried there, but the Lords unanimously declared him domiciled
in Scotland and seemed astonished that another view should be taken.
153 HoECK, Personalstatut 6.
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tries there exists no common simple idea of domicil, at least at
bottom. It would be unfortunate to press to such conclusion
the multitude of learned definitions of domiciU 54 All countries deriving their laws from Roman conceptions agree in
requiring both physical presence or actual abode (residence)
and intention to maintain this residence for an indefinite time
on the part of the person concerned. The American law shares
this view, although terminology and definitions sometimes
vary. Despite the frequent use of the term "residence" in
Ameri••an statutes involving questions of status/ 55 it is the general opinion that an appropriate intention is also required; in
the Restatement, it is made plain that the proper term is
"domicil." 156
The apparent divergence of cases concerning the domicil of
choice is due not so much to national diversities as to the broad
latitude of discretion which the courts all over the world seem
to reserve to themselves in determining where a person is or
was domiciled. In part, this is attributable to the desire of the
courts to decide individual cases in accordance with what they
regard as fair justice; the individualized exercise of such discretion has often given the appearance of an arbitrary or inconsistent handling cf the problem. 157 But in part the courts
also seem to react against the exaggerated generalization by
154 MAHAIM, reporter to the Institute of International Law, I 9 3 r, has collected fifty different definitions of domicil given in the world literature. See
Annuaire 1931 II r8o. He thinks this shows, against the current belief, that
the concept of domicil is far from being similar in all countries. On the contrary, it shows that the literature has spoiled a fairly uniform subject by scholastic definitions.
155 r BEALE rro § ro.3; 4 Proceedings American Law Institute (192.6) 348.
156
Cj. Restatement § 9 e and the use of the term "domicil" as indicated by
the Index sub "domicil."
157 For instance, Englishmen and Americans are declared to be domiciled in
France (see NIBOYET 6ro) or in Switzerland (as in the decision of the Trib.
Zurich, Oct. zs, 1935, 32. SJZ. zoz no, 41 and others of the same tribunal)
in order to assume jurisdiction for divorce. The same occurs daily in this
country. T4us, for example in the famous case of Gould v. Gould (192.3) 2.35 ,
N.Y. 14, 138 N.E. 490 the matrimonial domicil for obvious reasons was declared to be in New York, although the divorce decree of Paris was recognized
(infra p. 470, n. 40).
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which one basic notion of domicil apparently has been adopted
for such different fields as jurisdiction and venue, taxation,
poor relief, exercise of civil rights, voting, and conflicts law. 158
Where an individual is not free to establish his domicil but
is subject to the interference of legal rules, differences are more
deeply rooted. Thus, the domicil of dependent persons, particularly of married women, gives rise to problems. 159 Again,
the former singular provision of the French Civil Code (art.
I 3) that a foreigner had to obtain authorization by the French
government to have a domicil in France, greatly disturbed
the international order. A British subject who was permanently
located in Paris but had not obtained such authorization, for
the purposes of the French courts, was not there domiciled,
although so regarded under German, Italian, and even
English standards. Thus, the English courts declared that
Mrs. Annesley acquired a domicil of choice in France, although she never had applied for governmental permission. 160
By law of 1927, this peculiar doctrine was repealed, and the
French courts proceeded in accordance with the ordinary concept of domicil. Recently (1938), however, a French decree
has required an alien to possess a police identification card allowing him to stay in France for more than one year, in order
to acquire, exercise, or enjoy statutory rights presupposing
French domicil or residence. 161 In France, adoption of children depends on this condition (C.C. art. 360), and the cele158
This is well known; cf. 3 Proceedings American Law Institute (1925)
224, esp. W. W. CooK, ibid. 226; CoUDERT, "Some Considerations in the Law
of Domicil," 3 6 Yale L. J. ( 1 9 2 7) 949 ; Restatement, New York Annotations
6. Cf. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Texas v. Florida (1939)
306 u.s. 428.
159
For illustration take the case of German RG. (Jan. 12, 1939) HRR. 1939,
no. 3 76 (the legal domicil of a child whose legitimacy is attacked, but is not yet
avoided, is determined according to the conflict law of legal paternity (EG.
BGB. art. 19), whereas the court of appeal had applied the lex fori). See in
respect of the wife, below, p. 3ro, of the child, below, p. 6os.
160
In re Annesley, Davidson v. Annesley [1926] Ch. 692. See also the discussion in Harral v. Harral (r884) 39 N.J.Eq. 7.79·
1.6! Decret-loi (Nov. u, 1938) J. OH. u-13 Nov. 1938, art. r; SIREY
1939·4.1o8o, D.1939·4·16z-x63, Clunet 1939, 315.
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bration of marriage is expressly subjected to it. 162 But the
prohibition does not invalidate an act in violation thereof. 163
Finally, the dogmas that every person must have a domicil,
and that no person can have more than one domicil at a time 164
-in force in British countries, the United States, France,
Switzerland, Argentina, etc.-have been discarded in the
German Code as contrary to the realities of life. 165
Despite these embarrassing variances, it should not be impossible to arrive at a reasonable unification of the conditions
under which domicil may be acquired. This is demonstrated
by those bilateral international treaties that incorporate a definition of domicil in their text, as well as by the determinations
of domicil by international courts for the specific purpose
of treaties lacking such definition. 166 A far-reaching unification has been· achieved in this country, as a result of the
insertion of the topic in the law of conflicts instead of regarding
it as a matter of domestic law. The rules provided in sections
I I to 4I of the Restatement are uniform rules of private law,
transferred into conflict of laws. The British common law
countries and the countries unified by the Treaties of Montevideo have attained an analogous result.
Which law decides? As the answer to the question of domicil
thus may vary, the question arises under what law a court
should define the elements constituting domicil,l 67 This problem is of evident interest in the countries where domicil is the
general test of status rights, but it is also of importance else162
Art. 7 of the decree. Cf. TAGER, "Statut des etrangers," Clunet 1939> 278,
288, critical of the marriage prohibition and the immature character of the

decree.
163
This seems to be the meaning of Circ. Letter, Dec. 13, 1938, J. Off. 6
Jan. 1939, A. 1939. Lois annotees 1346, Circ. 3, par. 2.
164
NEUNER regards this dogma as the chief reason for the confusion complained about by the lawyers of the common law countries, see NEUNER, "Policy
Considerations in the Conflict of Laws," 20 Can. Bar Rev. (1942) 479 at 494·
165 BGB. § 7·
166
Permanent Court of International Justice, Judgment of May 25, 1926,
Serie A no. 7, 79; Arbitral Decision (July 10, 1924) of President Kaeckenbeeck,
33 Z.int.R. (1924-1925) 321; cj. TEDESCHI, Domicilio 105-112,
167 See literature, supra n. 1 5 I.
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where; for instance, in France and other countries succession
to movables upon death depends on the law of the last domicil
of the deceased. That this problem usually is identified by
writers and courts with the question under which law domicil
(or residence) required for judicial jurisdiction must be determined, is unfortunate. In consequence, the application of
the lex fori, natural where jurisdiction is concerned, has been
advocated as if it were equally natural in matters of choice of
law.
Lex fori. Thus, the English courts, after some vacillations,
now take it for granted that they have to apply the English
concept whenever they determine an individual's domicil. 166
The same approach seems to prevail in the United States, 160
where it has been adopted in the Restatement. 170 The courts
of the Netherlands likewise determine domicil in accordance
with the concept of the forum and refuse to apply the national law of the person, because they believe that the definition of domicil does not pertain to the functions of the personal
law.ln
In a broad way, the same result has been reached through
the theory that the determination of a person's domicil is a
problem of "characterization" and therefore must be answered
in accordance with the lex fori. 172 This means that the conflicts
168
In re Martin, Loustalan v. Loustalan [I9oo] P. 2II, 227; In re Annesley,
Davidson v. Annesley [I926] Ch. 692; Fleming v. Horniman (I928) 44
T.L.R. 3I5; CHESHIRE I68.
169
Harral v. Wallis (I883) 37 N.J.Eq. 458; Harral v. Harral (I884) 39
N.J.Eq. 279· Cf. I BEALE § IO.I.
170 Restatement § I o.
171
H.R. (Jan. 5, I917) W.too7J. It must be noted, however, that the case
dealt with jurisdiction, in a suit against a ward of German nationality; for this
purpose the minor was consider~d domiciled with his Dutch guardian, according to BW. art. 78, irrespective of German law; recently Rb. Amsterdam
(Apr. 9, I926) Clunet 1928, 1296; Rb. Amsterdam (Nov. 26, 1926) Clunet
I928, 1293; Rb. Dordrecht (Dec. 9, I936) W. 1937, no. 921 (domicil by
operation of law for a minor foreigner in the Netherlands with his guardian,
BW. art. 78); see also Rb. Almelo (May 13, I936) W. 1937, no. 258 (German
illegitimate child, but domicil for the purpose of the child's bastardy proceedings).
172
See MELCHIOR I77 n. 7; DE NovA, 30 Rivista (1938) 388, at 399·
LEWALD, Regles Generales des conflits de lois 91 n. 23 (with other citations).
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rule of the forum referring to the law of the domicil necessarily refers to the law of the place considered to be the domicil
under the private lawof the forum. If, for instance, an American citizen resides in Paris, a French court would determine
at what place he is domiciled solely in accordance with the
French concept of domicil, as indicated by examination of the
French law.
Yet, in the common opinion/ 73 it is not inconsistent with
this theory that, to use the same example, the American and
not the French definition of domicil should be decisive for
the problem of renvoi. Where an American citizen lives in
France at the time of his death, a French (or German) court
in determining succession to his movables, will consult first
his national law, i.e., the American, which is deemed to refer
to the inheritance law of the last "domicil." To comply with
this reference, the court must ascertain whether the last residence constitutes a domicil in the meaning of the American
rule, because this is the rule (of back reference, loi renvoyante)
to be applied. 174 This construction of domicil is not considered
an exception to the supposed principle of characterization according to the lex fori, for in this case it is the American conflicts
rule, not that of the forum, that applies and with it the American concept of domicil.
173

See particularly KAHN, r Abhandl. 66; also in 30 Jherings Jahrb. (1891)
NIBOYET 686 no. 565; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 378 no. 323, z
ARMINJON (ed. z) s8ff. no. 14 sub. (3) (with restrictions, n. 15) j and
among the French decisions Cass. (req.) (Dec. 30, 1929) D. H. 1930.65; Trib.
sup. Colmar (Nov. 30, 1921) Clunet 1922, 379; App. Colmar (Jan. 14, 1925)
Clunet 1925, 1044; Trib. civ. Seine (Apr. 27, 1933) Clunet 1934, 901, Cf.
BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1935, 625. RG. (June 2, 1932) 136 RGZ. 361, 363; RG.
(Apr. 6, 1936) 151 RGZ. IOJj OLG. Karlsruhe (Jan. 21, 1930) IPRspr. 1930,
no. 89 (British subject died in Fr.eiburg; his domicil has to be ascertained according to British rules relative to British subjects born in India).
174
Great Britian: In re Annesley, Davidson v. Annesley [1926] Ch. 692, 707.
France: Affaire Forgo, Cass. (req.) (Feb. 22, r882.) Clunet 1883, 64;
Cour. Rennes (July 24, 1923) Clunet I924, 410; Trib. Civ. Seine (Dec. 19,
192 7) Revue I 928, 5 I r. But there are controversies in literature and in the
courts. See J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES, Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1939) 167
at I 84. NIBOYET 6r o thinks even that in most cases domicil of Englishmen was
assumed in contrast to English conceptions.
76;
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Is it not strange, however, that, to determine the status of a
person according to his domiciliary law, a court in State X,
when in doubt whether such person is domiciled in Y or Z,
should follow its own internal law in localizing the domicil? 175
Even in the French school of thought, in which the doctrine
of characterization of legal concepts according to the law of
the forum has gained its strongest foothold, other theories
have been advanced in startling variety. Some of the older
authors, emphasizing the nationality principle, have proposed
that domicil be defined in accordance with the national law
of the individual. 176 Recent discussions have put forward two
further points of contact. One opinion is that the law of the
place of actual residence should be consulted to determine
whether such residence constitutes domicil; this law is sometimes called the territorial law 177 and is favored as such by
neo-territorialists such as Niboyet. 178 Another opinion, or
rather formulation of the same trend, postulates that the law
of domicil which should govern under the choice of law rule
of the forum should determine also where the domicil is. 179
In fact, the Swiss rule referring the status of a Swiss domiciled
abroad to the legislation of the domicil is said to imply the
notion of domicil in the foreign law. 180 A similar interpretation-on doubtful grounds-has been given to the Argentine
domiciliary rule by the court of Paris; in the eyes of the
175 In contrast to the domiciliary principle itself, see NIEMEYER, Das IPR. des
BGB. 69; NEUNER, 8 Z.ausl. PR. (1934) 90.
176
WEISS, 3 Traite 321;VALERY 113 JlO. 116; cf. LEVASSEUR, op. cit. supra
n. I 5 I. Some writers claim that the Hague Convention on Divorce of 1902., art. 5
no. 2. has adopted this view, and some decisions, including German RG. (Apr.
5, I921) I02. RGZ. 82., 84, have followed these writers. See MELCHIOR I8o n. 3;
3 FRANKENSTEIN 520.
177 1 BROCHER 2.4 7ff. His theory was advocated also by 1 ZITELMANN 8 3, 17 8
and adopted by the C6digo Bustamante arts. 2.2. and 2.5 as well as (in respect of
jurisdiction) by the Swedish Law of July 8, 1904 with amendments, c. 6 § 3·
178 See infra n. I 83.
179
STEIGER, op. cit. supra n. 151, especially at 161 ; TEDESCHI recognizes this
law as determining domicil for certain status questions as a broad exception to
the lex fori doctrine.
180 Swiss NAG. art. 2.8; HUBER.-MUTZNER. 403.
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Argentine l!!gislator, the domicil acquired by an Argentine national in Paris, if not authorized by the French authorities and
therefore not recognized under the then French law, is insufficient to determine the law applicable to his inheritance. 181
Actual residence in the foreign country is presupposed, however, in such cases. In these polemics, the main argument
against the lex fori is that domicil, like nationality, establishing
a social and political tie between an individual and a state,
should be construed under the law of that state. Particularly,
it has been considered strange to determine an individual's
personal status on the ground of his domicil in a country which
does not recognize him as one of its domiciliaries. This is the
argument anticipated in Westlake's statement that "no one
can acquire a personal law in the teeth of that law itself," 182
a consideration which has much impressed Niboyet, formerly
the strongest advocate of the lex fori doctrine. 183
A draft treaty worked out by the League of Nations 184 attempted to eliminate the "conflict of the conflict of laws relating to domicil" by combining the theory of "territoriality"
with the lex fori principle. A similar spirit is shown in the
rules adopted in I 93 I by the Institute of International Law, 185
according to which the courts in each country determine under
its own domestic legislation whether an individual is or is not
181
Argentina: C. C. art. J2 8 3 (new 3 JI 7) ; Cour Paris (May I o, I 9 29) Cl unet 1930,405, Revue 1930, 126, affirmed by Cass. (March 7, I938) Revue Crit.
1938,472, Nouv. Revue, 1938, 143; cf. }. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, "Le renvoi
et !'affaire de Marchi della Costa," Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I939) 167.
182
WESTLAKE § 2 54·
183
NIBOYET inS. 1929.2.162; S. I930.2.129; Revue Crit. 19351 762; and
among others 1 Traite (1938) nos. 514-5I5, 552ff.
184
See Pub!., League of Nations C.343.M.tor.I928.V: BARBOSA DE MAGALHAES, Memorandum, p. I 4 and Draft Convention for the Settlement of Conflicts
of Laws in the Matter of Domicil, p. I 7 art. 2: Questions connected with change
of domicil except such as concern a person's capacity at law or the existence of a
domicil by operation of law shall be settled in conformity with the law of the
court if the latter be that of one of the States concerned, otherwise, in accordance
with the law of the place in which it is claimed that the last domicil was acquired.
Cf. also Draft by BARBOSA DE MAGALHAES in 23 Recueil I928 III I38.
185
•
Annuaire 1931 II 239·
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domiciled therein; the Institute also provides for the case
where two or more foreign laws conflict in respect of domicil
and declares that, between two or more voluntary domicils,
the place of actual residence, if any, should be preferred. The
Institute has shown a possible solution through this auxiliary
conflicts rule. Further · progress toward unification of
"domicil", considered as a connecting factor, will perhaps be
reached if future writers not only distinguish the concept as
a category of status law from other meanings of domicil, but
also differentiate rules dealing with capacity of contracting,
succession upon death, recognition of foreign judgments, etc.,
in order to ascertain which kind of domicil is a desirable connecting factor for each of these separate matters. 186

v.

CHANGE OF PERSONAL LAW

Under the system of personal law, a person's status is
changed whenever he changes his nationality or, where the
domicil principle prevails, when he changes his domicil.
I.

Change of Nationality

In the countries that determine personal status in accordance
with the law of the country of which the individual is a national, the problem arises how a change of nationality affects
an individual's status as a person of full age. Under German
law, infancy is terminated upon an individual's completing his
twenty-first year of life. 187 In Illinois a woman is regarded
as of age when she has completed her eighteenth year. 188 When
a nineteen-year-old American girl from Illinois is naturalized
in Germany, is she again reduced to the status of infancy?
186 Cf. FRANCIS, "The Domicil of a Corporation," 38 Yale L. J. (19z9) 335,
341 and TEDESCHI, Domicilio 8. GUTTERIDGE, "Conflicts of Jurisdiction in
Matrimonial Suits," 19 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1938) 19, z6ff. thinks a
worldwide definition of domicil for the exclusive purpose of jurisdiction for
divorce quite possible.
187 German BGB. § z.
188
Probate Act,§ 131. Laws, 1939, p. 4, at p. 37·
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Article 7 paragraph 2 oi the Introductory Law to the German
Civil Code contains an express provision by which this result
is prevented. Even though she is now subject to German law
as her personal law, the girl continues to be treated as of age
by the German courts. Can the same result be reached without
such a provision of the new personal law, for instance under
article 3 of the Japanese Law of I 898, which, although following literally the German article 7, has omitted the said
paragraph 2? This question has been answered in the affirmative, 189 but it has been objected that full age does not constitute a vested right and would have to be reacquired under the
new statute. 190
2.

Change of Domicil

Since domicil can be changed more easily than nationality,
the problem is even more acute in those countries where an
individual's personal status is determined in accordance with
the law of the country where he is domiciled. That a once acquired status as a person of age is preserved in spite of a change
of domicil to a country where infancy is terminated at a
later age, has been recognized in the conflict of laws of Denmark/91 and Norway/ 92 as well as in the Treaty of Monte.video.193
189
Austrian decisions, see WALKER r2.8 n. 42.; I BAR§ 144; NIEMEYER, Das
IPR. des BGB. 12.6; RoLIN, 2. Principes I96 n. 655; PouLLET 319 n. 2..
190
WEISS, 3 Traite 344; I FRANKENSTEIN 42.6 n. 82.; RAAPE 79; and French,
Italian and other German writers quoted by these authors.
191
BoRuM and MEYER in 6 Repert. 2.I6 no. 22. (doubtful).
192 CHRISTIANSEN in 6 Repert. 573 no. Ioo (generally recognized).
193 Treaty on international civil law (I889) art. 2, provides that change of
domicil does not affect capacity acquired by emancipation or coming of age.
The new text of I 940 readsl to the effect that change of domicil does not affect
capacity.
Argentina: C. C. arts. 138 and I39· SCHLEGELBERGER interprets art. 138 as
not applying to a change of domicil from one foreign country to another
(4 Z.ausl.PR. (I93o) 75I). The opposite view is taken by VICO (vol. I, nos.
493, 494) who refers for support to the ancient statutist theories.
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In the United States, however, capacity is generally independent of domicil; in the exceptional case where domicil is
determinative, it seems that the actual domicil alone is taken
into consideration.

VI.
I.

RATIONALE

194

Tradition

Before modern states arose and developed the concept of
allegiance, the only and obvious test of personal law was
domicil, either of origin or of choice, special considerations
applying to dependent persons.
This test is still important in those states where private law
is divided into different systems. Domicil is still the natural
criterion in the British Empire and in the United States, as it
formerly was in France before the Revolution, in Italy before
I 8 66, and in the old German Empire and in most parts of
the second German Empire before the Civil Code took effect
on January 1, 1900. It goes too far, however, to pretend that
the principle of nationality is absolutely impracticable for a
country that lacks uniformity of private law throughout its
territory. 195 In such a country, domicil is the best element of
contact in the relations between the several territories, but
in the relations of the country as a ·whole to foreign countries
either test may be used. As a matter of fact, in I 926, Poland
chose the domicil test for interlocal relations among her several
territories under Warsaw-Polish, Russian, German, Austrian,
and Hungarian laws, but declared nationality to be decisive
for problems of personal law in international relations. Thus,
19• Mere reference is made to the selected bibliography and the treatment of old
and recent so-called "theoretical arguments," by 2 ARMINJON (ed. z) 28ff.
no. 9·
195 See z BAR§ 91 at 267, z68 discussing WHARTON§§ 20 ff, whose arguments
against nationality have been reassumed, however, by POLLOCK, Book Review,
31 Law Q. Rev. (1915) 106 and 3 BEALE 1934.
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a foreigner domiciled in Poland stands under his national
personal law, and a Polish citizen living abroad has to obey the
laws which Poland applies to all her nationals as well
as the law of that Polish territory where he had his last
domicil, or in the absence of any former domicil, the laws
of the state capital. Such a system would be theoretically conceivable for other composite countries. In the United States
especially, despite the fact that states constitute the territories
of private law, the constitutional circumstances are somewhat
analogous, considering that state citizenship has become subordinate to federal nationality; the American system has been
determined, however, by other elements.
2.

Political Considerations

An important role has been played not only by tradition but
also by political considerations which have influenced the lawmaking agencies of the various countries, consciously as well
as unconsciously.
The unilateral rule of article 3,' paragraph 3 of the French
Code, although reflecting traditions of the old coutumes,
represented the idea that a French citizen should enjoy the
achievements of the great Revolution wherever he might happen to be and that he should be bound everywhere by its laws
by virtue either of tacit agreement or simply by natural law.
Mancini held the idea that, in contrast to the strict territoriality of public law and public policy, the needs of an individual
were served best by rules of family, inheritance, and status
law of universal application; since the laws dealing with these
topics are the product of all those factors that determine a
people's national character, the laws of a person's national
community should be considered most suitable for him wherever he may live. These notions of the French revolutionists
and of Mancini were widely discussed; they appealed to the
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trend of nationalism of the nineteenth century; and they were
widely adopted in the numerous national codifications of the
period. When the German Civil Code was enacted in I 896,
the test of nationality had won such a firm hold that the traditional system of domicil could be discarded almost without
discussion. Whenever new waves of national feeling were
stirred up in the twentieth century, they resulted almost invariably in the adoption of the principle of nationality as best
fitted to protect the needs of the national community. 196
3· Economic Considerations; Migrations
While these ideological arguments have been working in
favor of the principle of nationality, the domicil principle has
found support in the desire of immigration countries to incorporate new immigrants into the legal life of their country
as soon as possible, and thereby to avoid the difficulties that
would arise if each new immigrant prior to naturalization were
to be judged in accordance with the laws of his home country.
These considerations have been of crucial influence in the
United States/ 91 as well as in Switzerland and Argentina. 198
They have been gaining ground in Brazil: 199 the new Introductory Law of September 4, I 942, has radically substituted
the principle of domicil for that of nationality, previously incorporated in the code. 200 A few other S~uth American coun196 Cf. PILLAUT, Revue I 9 I 6, I4, 32, and see National-Socialist writers such
as REu in 57 RVerwBl. (1936) 52I and HoRST MuLLER in DJZ. I936, col.
Io6s. LoRENZEN, in a Book Review, 33 Am. J. Int. Law (I939) 427 observes
that RAAPE's recent manual on German international private law greatly extends
the principle of nationality.
197
See 3 BEALE I 9 35.
198
Argentina, which had adopted the principle of nationality in I 8 57 and
re-affirmed it in I 862, later went over to the domiciliary law in the C. C. of I 869.
199 RoDRIGO OCTAVJO, 0 direito positivo e a sociedade internacional (Rio de
Janeiro, I9I7) II3, quoted by 1 VICO 365 no. 424; Report of the Brazilian
Delegate (EsPINOLA) to the Third Commission of the Sixth Panamerican Conference, see Diario de la Sexta Conferencia Internacional Americana (Habana,
I928) no. 30 p. 420; cf, BusTAMANTE, La nacionalidad y el domicilio (1929).
200
Lei de IntrodU<;ao, r 942 Decreta-Lei no. 46 57, art. 7.
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tries have changed in recent years from nationality to domicil,
obviously yielding to the influence of immigration policy. 201
Especially in France, where considerable masses of foreigners had come to live before the outbreak of World War II,
the advantages of the domiciliary system for an immigration
country began to be appreciated. Characteristic of the change
of mind is the attitude of the treatises edited by Niboyet. As
late as 1928, he reprinted the opinion of Pillet 202 explaining
the French doctrine as follows:
The French sovereignty has no interest in subjecting all individuals in France to the provisions of the Civil Code in
matters of status and capacity. It has, on the other hand, a
marked interest not to let its nationals evade the operations of
its laws ...
But at the same time he declared 203 the problem to be more
political than doctrinal and shortly thereafter became the
leader of a movement aiming to control all inhabitants of
France by French law. Extended discussions of the Comite
Francais de Droit International Prive were devoted to this
endeavor, which almost all French experts seem to approve. 204
201 Guatemala had the nationality rule in its Law on Foreigners of r 8 94, art.
48, 2d sentence, and adopted the principle of domicil in the C. C. of 1926, libro I,
art. u, from which the provisions on conflicts law were transferred in 19 3 3
to the Constitutive Law of Judicial Power, and more recently to the Law on
Foreigners of 1936, arts. !7 and r8. See MATOS nos. q6, 172.
In Peru, the Civil Code of r 851 had no express rule but was often interpreted
in the sense of nationality test. Despite Peru's participation in the Montevideo
Treaties of r889, the Commercial Code of 1902 seemed to confirm this theory,
art. 15, following art. 15 of the Spanish Commercial Code and determining the
capacity of foreigners according to their lex patriae. Draft and text of the Civil
Code of 1936 have followed the domiciliary system; cf. supra p. 119.
202
NIBOYET 699. See moreover PILLET, 2 Manuel ( ed. r) 515: how would
we conceive that an individual minor in his country of origin could become
capable or incapable according to the countries where he would be contracting?
203
NJBOYET 702 no. 587.
·
204
See Travaux du Comite fran~ais de droit int. prive, Annees 1-4 (19341937) and in Revue Crit. 1939, 171, report on the meeting of May 23, 1938,
concurring "le statut de l'etranger ." These studies started significantly with an
Exposition by M. Louis-Lucas on the territoriality of law and the new tendencies towards it. NIBOYET, Traite Vols. 1 and 2; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNJ:ERE 266;
BARBEY, Le Conflit 215, and respecting the question of capacity, see below.
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Countries from which large portions of the population emigrate, are attracted, on the other hand, by a principle which
tends to preserve the ties between the emigrant and his home
country. Great Britain furnishes a striking illustration of this
tendency, namely, the doctrine of domicil of origin, which
has often been compared with the bonds effected by the principle of nationality, a doctrine maintained and developed to
satisfy the natural desire of a home country from which innumerable colonizers have gone out into the world. Even in
the United States where in theory only one kind of domicil
is known, courts usually have been reluctant to recognize that
an American citizen has transferred his domicil to a foreign
country, especially when there are assets in this country to be
distributed or taxes to be assessed. 205 This, in practice, is a
domicil of origin.
Similar considerations have contributed to the popularity
of the nationality principle itself in Germany and Italy, from
which millions emigrated to the New World in the latter part
of the nineteenth century. However, this circumstance should
not be overestimated. Until very recent times, neither
Germany nor Italy pursued any consistent policy in preserving
relations with their emigrants. Until 1913, a German citizen
living abroad even lost his citizenship after ten years, unless
he had himself expressed his desire to retain allegiance by
formally registering with the German consulate. 206
Wherever in those countries the principle of nationality
did not satisfy nationalistic tendencies, there could scarcely
have resulted a change from the principle of nationality to
205
CouDERT, "Some Considerations in the Law of Domicil," 36 Yale L. J.
(I927) 949, 96I; comments in 37 Yale L. J. (I928) I127, II29, and particularly the cases commented upon, by CoUDERT: Matter of Spencer, N.Y. L. J.
June 2, I908 (not reported); United States Trust Co. of New York v. Hart
(I9I2) ISO App. Div. 413, 135 N.Y. Supp. 8I, aff'd (I9IJ) 208 N.Y. 6I7,
Io2N.E.III5.
206
German Law on Nationality of I 870 (StaatsangehOrigkeitsgesetz), replaced
by Law of July zz, 1913.
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that of domicil but rather an extension of the application of
the principle that "laws of public safety and police" apply to
every person sojourning within the territory of the forum.
By such an order of ideas, the principle of nationality is maintained for nationals abroad and narrowed with respect to
foreigners living in one's own territory. This unhappy result
has been achieved in the Latin American codifications indicated
above. 207
4· Practicability
Respecting the practicability of the alternative tests, it has
often been alleged that citizenship is not changed so easily nor
so often as domicil or residence, and in consequence that a
law based on nationality could not be evaded so smoothly as
a law based upon domicil. The former is therefore said to be
better fitted to govern the conditions of such transactions as
marriage, adoption, or testament, than a law which the propositus can voluntarily renounce. Moreover, nationality is
credited with being a relatively clear and simple concept compared with the uncertainties and multiformity of domicil,
especially in its British varieties. Recent critics in England
have admitted that the English conception is "both artificial
and complex." 208 The force of this argument is somewhat
questionable, in view of the complexity of modern citizenship
laws and the circumstance that the British domicil of origin
is not a domicil at all. On the other hand, it has been argued
in favor of the principle of domicil that it is closer to facts
and more consistent with the principle of territoriality. 209 But
neither are these considerations in themselves advantages. It
is noteworthy, however, that, after the first World War, the
practical difficulties caused by the consideration of strange or
207

See supra pp. 1 1 7-1 19.
"Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," 16 Brit.
Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84 at 85.
209 NIBOYET, in z Melanges offerts a M. Mahaim 679 ("chant de la terre")
quoted by VAN HILLE, 65 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1938) z94, z96.
208 FosTER,
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obscure foreign laws under the principle of nationality were
acutely felt in Germany. For this reason, the same suggestions
were made, as in France for reasons of immigration policy,
that the local law should again govern the status of domiciled
foreigners. 210
So far as outside parties are concerned, either system opens
the door to prejudicial mistakes respecting the legal capacity
of foreigners.
The perplexity of the situation is illustrated by the strange
fact that while many Continental writers are quite set upon
restoring the principle of domicil, 211 it has been said in
England that "the best course would seem to be to adopt the
doctrine of nationality as applied on the Continent." 212 All
agree, however, that for the time being there is no hope of
any such radical modifications. It may naturally be concluded
that efforts should be directed to fundamental improvement
of both criteria.

5· Efforts to Reach a Modus Vivendi Between the Two
Principles
The contrast between the two systems of determining personal status is deeply rooted in traditions and policies, and
the near future holds no prospect of its elimination. It appears
therefore the more necessary to devise ways and means to
achieve practicable decisions in individual cases in spite of the
coexistence of the two different systems.
(a) The most effective means has proved to be the renvoi,
of which, in fact, the chief field of application is status and
capacity to engage in transactions.
210 See 4 Z.ausl.PR. (1930) 390 on proceedings of the law commission of the
Prussian Chamber of Representatives (particularly p. 396 on marriage requirements, see infra p. 291) and 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 633 an opinion of Schilling recommending retention of the domicil principle for the Baltic States.
211 Also in the Netherlands, an address by Kollewijn in Batavia (1929) against
the "degenerated" principle of nationality is regarded as a characteristic sign;
cf. 0FFERHAUS1 in Gedenkboek 1838-1938, 705.
212 FOSTER, 16 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84. Cf. supra p. 108, n. 23.
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(b) The Hague Conferences simply adopted the principle
of nationality; the Treaty of Montevideo adhered to the
domicil principle. During the making of the C6digo Bustamante, serious but inadequate proposals were made to bridge
the gulf: 213
First, the principle of the Hague Convention on Marriage
that the national law should govern except where it refers to
another law (renvoi); second, an analogous idea, advocated
by the Uruguayan delegate, Varela, that the law of domicil
should govern, except where it refers to another law, particularly to that of nationality; and third, the notable suggestion of De Bustamante that every contracting state shall
apply to a national of another state that law which is applied
to him by the state to which he belongs. Cubans would thus be
treated in all states according to the national principle, and
Argentinians according to the law of domiciP 14 This would
give nationality a certain preference in the outcome, quite as
the renvoi theory does, and evidently produce an adequate
solution.
More recently, however, at the Scandinavian Convention of
February, I 93 I, establishing conflict of laws rules for matrimonial relations, adoption, and guardianship, 215 the problem
was more successfully resolved. Sweden and Finland apply
nationality as the test, while Denmark, Norway, and Iceland
retain domicil as controlling. To regulate the relations between
the 'five countries, the Convention admits the law of domicil
in the first instance and secondarily the law of nationality.
Article I provides, for instance, that where a national of one
of the participant states is domiciled in one of the other states
for at least two years, his marriage is governed by the law
213 BusTAMANTE, Tres Conferencias sobre derecho internacional privado

(I 929) 46ff.

214 BusTAMANTE, La Nacionalidad y el domicilio (1927) 6x. In twenty different situations ten times nationality, and ten times domicil would result as
test (pp. 641 6 7) .
215
Cf. BLOCH, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 627.
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of the state of domicil; otherwise, the law of the state to which
he belongs controls.
At its meetings in Cambridge, 1931, and Oslo, 1932, the
Institute of International Law, formerly a strong supporter
of the principle of nationali-ty, attempted a compromise with
a marked tendency toward the Anglo-American doctrine; but
the issue did not appear hopeful. 216
(c) The following case illustrates a recurrent problem,
which particularly needs efficient relief:
A marriage between German parties was dissolved by a
divorce decree of an American court. Subsequently, the husband became an American citizen and married another wife in
this country. The judgment not being recognized in Germany
because of alleged lack of reciprocity of recognition, it seemed
certain that, in Germany, the second marriage would be held
invalid, the issue thereof illegitimate, and as such not entitled
to share in the husband's estate. However, the court of appeals
in Berlin upheld th<:: validity of the second marriage for
several reasons, of which the most effective seems to have been
the court's desire not to upset a factual situation that had been
established in the United States. 217 Judgments of this kind,
if more frequent, would hollow out the extraterritorial effect
of the personal law. But the problem is comprehensive. States
with nationality as the test extend their regulations beyond
their frontiers to their citizens abroad, more often than not
colliding with the states of immigration imposing different
rules upon the same persons. 218 Even if this extension of au216 See BRIERLY, observations on the Draft mentioned above, n. I 84-, Publ. of
League of Nations C.J4-J.M.Ioi. I92.8. V p. I9. From the British angle, GuTTERIDGE, 65 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I938) I5; cf. TEDESCHI, Domicilio
I 7•
217
KG. (Jan. 13, I9:zs) JW. I925, :ZI4-6; cf. MELCHIOR, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929)
74-5, also MELCHIOR, Grundlagen 4-14- § 2.79. See, moreover, LG. Berlin (Aug.
6, I934-) 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. :z8 (a German national was divorced andremarried in Czechoslovakia; the court recognized the divorce only because of the
following remarriage); contra: MASSFELLER, StAZ. I936, 335; EcKSTEIN,
7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 33·
218
This is seen by FEDOZZI :ZJo, arguing with CAVAGL!ER! I4-5·
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thority, so much resented in Latin America, were justified in
itself, it should certainly not be allowed to produce effects
beyond the time of acquisition of a new nationality by a former
citizen of the forum. But even without a change of nationality,
it is shocking that the national law should lay hold of a man
who abandoned his country many years ago, and of his children and grandchildren, who live in different surroundings
and never think of themselves as subject to any law other than
that of their new country. If the principle of nationality is to
survive, its claim should cease at least when the propositus
has established himself in a new country and has founded new
family relations, or simply when considerable time has elapsed.
The Harvard Research in International Law in its Draft Convention on Nationality has proposed to restrict the acquisition
of nationality by birth (jure sangttinis) to the second generation of an emigrant. 219 This solution would be of some
help, but the pretensions of the old personal law should be
limited even more strictly.
6. Conclusion
We may well conclude that both systems of testing the personal law are seriously defective. The principle of nationality,
however, suffers not merely from its complicated nature. We
shall see that its unpopularity, so conspicuous in the French
literature, has reached critical proportions in court decisions
and legislation, in particular with respect to divorce.
There is one more circumstance apt to destroy what usefulness nationality may still have as a criterion for status.
Many millions of people have emigrated in the course of the
war, in the estimate of some experts as many as thirty millions
in Europe alone, and others will do so; millions have also lost
their former citizenship or will not be able to prove to which
state they belong. In European countries where the nationality
219

23 Am.

J. Int. Law Spec, Supp.

(Harvard Law School) (1929)

13,

art. 4·
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principle had its origin, a formidable intermixture of populations is about to render it obsolete. Moreover, should federations be created, the relation of individuals to the federal
governments will be so important as to offset the ties of nationality.
Thus, domicil, the dominant concept of the Englishspeaking part of the world and the emergency concept considered above in connection with the cases of apatrides, holders
of several nationalities, citizens of composite empires, etc., in
Europe, might resume its old importance, if only it were not
of such uncertain nature.
Can the domiciliary test be improved? It should be possible
to obviate at least the clandestine establishment of a domicil
of choice, which renders doubtful the determination of so
many cases. In Europe, it would seem quite feasible to require that any voluntary change of domicil be reported to a
public authority empowered to investigate. In European countries, residence and domicil of individuals are constantly being
controlled by official agencies for the purposes of defense,
police, and taxation. Little innovation is necessary to establish
the personal law by a formal record. In this country, such
intrusive bureaucratism is probably out of the question. But
the divorce statutes present an alternative method of assuring
that one party is actually domiciled at the forum; they usually
require, not a public record of the establishment of domicil,
but the lapse of a certain period, ordinarily a year, during
which domicil must have existed. 220 Very remarkably, the
Polish Interlocal Law of 1926 has generally provided that
a person changing his domicil from one part of Poland to
another, only after the lapse of one year, becomes subject to
the law of his new domicil with respect to his capacity, his
family relations and his inheritance. 221 An analogous idea ap220
221

See 2 VERNIER§ 82; infra pp. 4o8-410, 460.
Law on interlocal private law of Aug. z, I 926, art. z.
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pears in the above-mentioned French decree of 1938 requiring
that in order to avail themselves of their French domicil or
residence, foreigners should possess police permits to sojourn in
the country for more than a year. 222 However questionable this
novelty, a product of prewar apprehensions, may appear, it is
true that the existence of a voluntary domicil can be ·better
ascertained, if a period of factual residence is added to the
ordinary requisites, as in the American divorce law, or if the
individual has secured official authority to reside more than a
year in the country, as prescribed in the French emergency
decree.
222

See supra p.
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5

Specific Applications of the Personal Law
I.

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

N the conflict of laws, especially in civil law countries, the
sphere of application of the personal law is extensive.
The branches in which the personal law is of the greatest
importance are the law of family relations and that part of the
law of contracts and other transactions which regards capacity.
The application of the personal law to these branches of the
law is to be discussed separately. The present chapter is concerned only with its application ·to the remaining personal ,
relations.

I

r. General Capacity to Have Rights and Duties
While in the days of slavery personality was not enjoyed by
all human beings, 1 it is now taken for granted that every
human being is a person and as such capable of having rights
and duties. However, some exceptions still persist. Under tpe
canon law of the Roman Catholic Church, an individual is
deemed to lose his personality upon joining certain monastic
orders. In a few countries, this rule of the canon law is still
recognized as exerting an analogous efi~ct in the temporal
order of affairs. 2 The German Reichsgericht once decided,
applying the rules of the then prevailing principle of domicil,
that the personality of a woman who had become a nun in a
1

Restatement § I

20

comment d.

2 For instance: in Ecuador C. C. arts. 92-94. In the Chilean C. C., arts.
95-97 have been canceled by Law no. 7, 612 of Oct. 11, I943, art. 2.

In Argentina the canon law rule is expressly denied recognition C. C. art. IOJ.
In Austria a monk was held incapable of acquiring any new rights; the assets
owned by him at the time of his entry into the order were placed under curatorship, I EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ (I925) I6I § 70.
161
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Russian convent was extinguished to exactly the same extent
that it was under her personal law, i.e., the law of the place
of the convent. 3
A few countries and states, among them several of the
United States, have retained the old punishment of civil death.
The meaning of this term is quite doubtful under the modern
statutes. Constituting a penal measure, such a diminution of a
person's legal status is generally disregarded by other states
or countries. 4
Capacity of having rights and duties includes capacity to
sue and be sued in the sense of what the Continental doctrine
terms capacity of being a party 5 or of "standing in court." 6
As individuals generally have full personality, they enjoy
such capacity, while it may be wanting in the case of unincorporated associations. It seems that procedural rules everywhere acknowledge that capacity to sue and to be sued in this
sense is determined by the personal law, in this country the
law of domicil. 7 The question is entirely distinguishable from
that of the procedural capacity of a person, i.e., to effectuate
procedural acts on his own behalf or on behalf of another person, a capacity that is affected by incompetence. 8
For a long time, Continental authors have discussed socalled "special capacities." 9 This term covers a variety of
different problems which preferably should be discussed individually.
3 RG. (July I 3, I 893) 32 RGZ. I 73, I 75 (capacity of a Russian Catholic nun
to be a party to a German lawsuit, decided according to the law of the place of
her nunnery).
4
For details see Note, 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (I939) 288.
5 See, for instance, German Code of Civil Procedure, § so: Capable of being
a party to a lawsuit is he who is capable of having rights.
6
"Stare in judicio " (Roman law), "ester en justice" (French law), "capacity
to stand in judgment" (Louisiana lawyers).
7 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule I 7 (b).
8
Cf. German Code of Civil Procedure, §52 apd infra p. I 8 I.
9
C/. SAVIGNY § 364; for French theories of BouLLENOIS and FROLAND see
2 LAINE 207, 2 I I; for a theory of BROCHER cf. GEBHARDSCHE MATERIALIEN 70,

SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS
The term "special capacity" has been used, first, to indicate
those characteristics which an individual must possess. in order
to qualify, for instance, for the office of guardian or administrator or for membership in a cooperative association or for
eligibility as a member of a board of a corporation. Such requirements, not affecting the individual's general personal
standard, are regulated by that law which determines the other
incidents of the legal relation in question. 10 Hence, a person's
capacity to serve as administrator of a decedent's estate is
determined by the law of the state in whose court the estate
is being administered, and a person's capacity to be a member
of a corporation is determined by the law of the state of incorporation.
The term "special capacities" is used, secondly, as referring
to the numerous rights and privileges enjoyed by a country's
citizens as opposed to resident or sojourning aliens. As said
before, this vast topic, traditionally covered in the French
books on private international law, exceeds the boundaries of
the law of conflicts and pertains to internal administrative law.
The term "special capacities" is employed, finally, to designate requirements for certain transactions,· such as that of a
certain age for marrying or that the parties be not married to
each other as a condition for the validity of a gift. \Vhere such
requisites are not regarded as mere applications of the personal
law, they must be considered separately.
2.

Beginning and End of Personality

The determination of the exact moment at which an individual's personality begins 11 is generally referred to the
10
German courts, see LEWALD 39, no. 43, NEUMEYER, IPR. (ed. r) §zo;
GUTZWILLER 1626.
11
The various municipal laws are not all alike in this respect. § 1 of the
German Civil Code provides, for instance, that an individual's personality
(Rechtsfahigkeit) begins with the completion of his birth. According to the
Civil Code of Spain (C. C. art. 30), however, an individual is not recognized
as a person until he has lived at least twenty-four hours.
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personal law, which also determines the legal status of a child
en ventre sa mere. 12
Difficult problems of conflict of laws are caused by the
differences of municipal laws with respect to absentees. The
two world wars have given this subject ominous importance.
Most laws follow one or another of three different-systems:
First: the rebuttable presumption of the common law, according to which an individual is presumed to be dead when he
has been absent without being heard of for a stated number of
years, for instance, seven years;
Second: the French system, according to which a perso-!l's
unexplained absence for a stated period of time is judici~lly
investigated and established and certain effects similar to those
of death are incurred; 13
Third: the German system, of much influence upon recent
legislations, according to which the legal effects of death take
place when and only when a judicial decree has been issued
providing that the absentee shall be regarded as dead ( declaration of death) and as having died at a certain moment. 14
12

Art. z 8 of the Codigo Bustamante reads:
"Personal law shall be applied for the purpose of deciding whether birth
determines personality and whether the unborn child shall be deemed as born for
all purposes favorable to him, as well as for the purpose of viability and the
effects of priority of birth in the case of double or multiple childbirth." (Translation in u Am. J. Int. Law Supp. (192.8) 2.76). See also HUBER-MU"IZNER
410.

On the other hand, art. 53 P.G.R. of Liechtenstein applies the law of that
principality to persons born within its territory, in matters governed by Liechtenstein law. Application of the territorial law is also advocated by GEMMA, Revue
1930, 48, and by FEDOZZI 370.
13
This system prevails in most countries whose private laws follow the general
pattern of the French Code, including Italy. For Switzerland, where it has been
modified in several respects, see below n. I 6.
14
German BG:!J. §§ IJ-19. War emergency laws of 1916, 1917 and 192.5.
Although French writers had disapproved of this institution, it was imitated in
the first World War for persons missing in war; see RHEINSTEIN, 13 Rheinische
Z.f. Zivil- und Prozessrecht (1924) so. Shortly before World War II in 1939,
Germany and Italy modified their laws on absentees according to the model of
the rules concerning persons missing in war; see R. SCHMIDT, "Das neue,
italienische Verschollenheitsrecht," 13 Z.ausl.PR. (1940) 103. While Italy,
however, retained the declaration of absenteeism, Spain, by Law of Sept. 8, 1939,
adopted the German system, see 42. Bull. Inst. Int. (1940) uo.

SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS
A workable solution of some of the most important problems of conflict of laws respecting absentees has been provided
by article 9 of the Introductory Law to the German Civil
Code, as modified by the Law of July 4-, 1939, § 12, which
may be summarized as follows:
( r ) An absentee is declared dead by a German court in
accordance with German law, if he was a German citizen
the time of his disappearance (§ I 2 par. I); a foreign declaration of death will not be recognized in such case by a German
court.
( 2) Upon the application of his wife, a male absentee of
foreign nationality is declared dead by a German court in accordance with German law, if the wife is domiciled in Germany
and is a German national or was a German national before
her marriage ( § I 2 par. 3); this provision is designed to enable
the wife to remarry.
(3) Irrespective of whether or not he has been a resident
of Germany, a foreign absentee is declared dead pursuant
to German law with respect to such of his assets as are situated
in Germany and to legal relations governed by German law
(§ 12 par. 2).
These rules have been used as a model in several countries,
either for statutory enactments 15 or in judicial practice. 16
Austria, which is among these countries, considers a foreign

at

15 Poland: Law of I9z6, art. 4·
China: Law of I9I8, art. 8.
Japan: Law of I898, art. 6.
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 57 par. z.
18
Belgium: Trib. Antwerp (July IJ, I939) cited by VAN HILLE, 66 Rev.
Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I9J9) 758, 76o.
Switzerland: particularly, the third rule stated above is followed, see App.
Basel-Stadt (Feb. r9, I9JZ) 30 SJZ. (I933-1934) z69 no. 53 (a man born in
Basel, naturalized a citizen of Minnesota, not heard of since I 906; assets inherited
by him in r 9 I a were taken in public deposit; in absence of a written rule, the
judge decides as in the case of a Swiss citizen); cf. Just. Dep.I, BBl. 1933, II
75 no. 9, 30 SJZ. 120 no. 94; FRITZSCHE and PESTALOZZI, 9 Z.ausl.PR. (1935)
7oz; SCHNITZER 139. On other controversial points see BEcK, NAG. 424.
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absentee's last domicil in the country as a ground for jurisdiction.17
The principles that problems of the law of absentees should
be determined in accordance with the personal law of the absentee, and that jurisdiction for judicial action belongs primarily to the state of which he is a national or domiciliary, as
the case may be, have been recognized in France 18 and Italy 19
and in many other countries. 20 Hence, for instance, the
Austrian law was applied in both Germany and Switzerland
to determine whether the former Austrian Archduke Johann,
who had become a ship's captain, had assumed the name of
Johann Orth and had disappeared without being heard of, was
to be regarded dead. 21 Local rules are in force, however,
practically everywhere, providing for temporary care and custody of the property of a foreign absentee. 22
Under the principle of personal law, a court recognizing
a declaration of death pronounced by the competent national
17 Austrian Law of February 16, 1883, §I, amended by Law of March 3I,
9 I 8. With respect to an absentee whose last domicil was in Austria, the courts
of the country of which he was a national have been declared to lack jurisdiction
by the Austrian Supreme Court (Nov. 3, I909) I2 GlU. NF. no. 4776; contra:
WALKER 221. On Czechoslovakia see HocHBERGER, 4 Z.osteurop.R. (I938)
I

623·

For Switzerland, see Civil Code arts. 35-38; Just. Dep., BBl. I916, II 522;
HUBER-MUTZNER 411. The question whether Swiss courts may pronounce a
foreigner absent was declared unsettled by the Swiss Department of Justice on
July 12, 1933, 30 SJZ. (1933-1934) I20 no. 94·
18
Trib. civ. Seine (April 24, I93I) Clunet I9J2> 83, Revue 193I, 504. Swiss
law was applied not only with respect to the family relations of a Swiss absentee
but also with respect to his property. The decision has been criticized by J.
DoNNEDJEU DE VABRES 436, 437·
19 See FEDOZZI 271; no decisions seem to have been published, however.
20 The Belgian Trib. Antwerp (July IJ, I939) 9 Rechtsk. Wkbl. 1939, 44
no. 8 excepts the first period of absence from being exclusively governed by the
Polish law, but contra the opinion of the State Attorney Van Hille and the note,
ibid.
21 German RG. (June 28, I893) 4 Z.int.R. (I894) 72; Swiss BG. (Jan. 22,
I897) 23 BGE. I 166, I7I. The remarriage of the wife of a missing Russian
husband was held invalid by a German court because the Russian absentee was
not declared dead and was deemed to be living under Russian law, OLG. Kiel
(Nov. 30, I926) Schlesw.-Holst. Anz. I927, I45· See also LEWALD 41 no. 47
and NussBAUM, D. IPR. II7·
22 See I V1co 433 no. 499 with respect to the countries of Latin America.
r __
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court, will also recognize restrictions imposed upon the effects
of such a declaration. Thus, the wife of a Czechoslovakian
national declared dead in Czechoslovakia ~as not permitted
to remarry in Germany, since an additional decree was necessary to dissolve the marriage under Czechoslovakian, though
not under German, law. 23
The approach which regards a man as either alive or dead
for all purposes is more satisfactory than to regard the same
person as alive for some purposes and as dead for others. For
instance, whether a missing heir or legatee is to be regarded as
dead can more consistently be answered in accordance with his
personal law than in accordance with the laws governing the
descent or the distribution or the administration of assets,
possibly lying in different jurisdictions. 24
There also are different rules in the case where two or more
persons perish in a common disaster: some laws presume
that the deaths have taken place in a certain order, others reverse that order, and in a third group no presumption exists.
Is this problem a question of the personal law? Writers are
in disagreement. 25 The Brazilian Law suggests application
of the national law; the C6digo Bustamante also applies the
23
Czechoslovakian Law of June 30, 1921, art. V; KG. (Sept. 25, 1931)
IPRspr. 1932, no. 12; cf. WENGLER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 238 n. r.
24 The law governing the distribution of the estate has been applied in the
following cases: German RG. (Jan. 7, 189o) 25 RGZ. 142, Clunet 1892,1191;
KG. (May 31, 1897) 9 Z.int.R. (1899) 468, Clunet 1900, 163; OLG. Hamburg
(Nov. 27, 1896) Hans.GZ.Beibl. 1897, 243; OLG. Colmar (June 12, 1912)
Els. Lothr. J. Z. 1913, 38. The personal law of the absentee has been applied by
Ob. Trib. Stuttgart (July 8-1o, 1862) 15 Seuff. Arch. 321; Bay. ObLG. (May
17, 189o) 13 Bay. ObLGZ. so no. 17 (a man who had emigrated to the
United States in 1869 and was declared dead in 1886, was considered to have
inherited a share in the meantime, as he was presumed living at the time of the
succession under the law of his last German domicil). A third solution was
adopted by OLG. Dresden (Dec. 20, 1909) 66 Seuff. Arch, 68, 70. The application of the lex successionis has been approved by LEWALD 41 no. 46, and M.
WoLFF, IPR. 59, and disapproved by NussBAUM, D. IPR. 117,
25
Cf. WEISS, 4 Traite 571. and DESPAGNET 1046 no. 365 (advocating personal
law); z BAR§ 365, p. 311, tr. by GILLESPIE 8os (law of succession on death);
VALERY 1194 no. 841. and NussBAUM D. IPR. 117, n. 1. (lex fori).
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national law, but only to the field of distribution of estates, a
limitation of the principle which has been criticised. 26
3· Name
(a) Individual name. Beale has stated that the determination of an individual's personal name is not regarded in
common law countries as a problem of status, since a person is
traditionally free to assume a name and to change it at his
discretion. 27 However, today most American states allow
special court proceedings to aid and confirm a change of name,
and a name thus acquired cannot again be changed without the
intervention of the court. 28 Moreover, the right to use a name
is governed by important legal rules. 29 In civil countries it is
well recognized that a person's name is determined by law and
that, therefore, problems of conflict of laws can arise with
respect to the determination of an individual's name and to the
manner and extent of his protection against abuse of his name. ·
Traditionally, these questions are decided in accordance with
the individual's personallaw, 30 except such as are controlled
by imperative local regulations. 81
26 C6digo Bustamante art. 29; cf. the criticism by PoNTES DE MIRANDA, 39
Recueil I932 I 555,622, 671.
27
Linton v. First National Bank (I 882) r o Fed. 894; Application of Lipschutz
(I94I) 32 N.Y. S. (2d) 264. Cf. 2 BEALE§ 120.3.
28
CoHEN, "The Law Concerning Change of Personal Names," 2 Conn. B. J.
(I928) IIo, 1I5 n. 14; Note, I6 Chi. Kent Rev. (1937) 65, 66 n. 15.
29
See 45 C. J., Names 382 § r8.
30
G~many: RG. (April II, I892.) 29 RGZ. 123, 127; RG. (Dec. 12, I918)
95 RGZ. z68, 272. KG. (Aprilzz, 1927) IPRspr. 1927, no. 19. KG. (Aprilrs,
1932) JW. 1932, 28I8, IPRspr. I9J2> no. II.
Switzerland: NAG. art. 28; BG. (Oct. 24, 1907) 33 BGE. I no, 776; BG.
(July 14, I91o) 36 BGE. I 39r, 395; BG. (Nov. 22, 1934) 6o BGE. II 387, 388.
G!ESKER-ZELLER, Der Name in lnternationalen Privatrecht (in Festschrift fiir
Georg Cohn (Zurich, I9I5) 167ff); HuBER-MUTZNER 419.
France: Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 28, 1935) D.H. 1935. 276; a.ff'd by Cour
Paris (Dec. 15, 1936) D. H. 1937.72, Revue Crit. 1937, 690 (Prince ColloredoMansfeld, right of divorced wife to carry the name of her former husband).
Italy: FEDOZZI 362, quoting a decision of Cass. pen. Feb. 17, 1928.
31
The reported judgment of the court of Paris (n. 30) supposes French
laws respecting names possibly to have public interest but discounts expressly any
influence of French public policy.
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Thus, it has been held by German courts that an individual's
right to use a title of nobility is to be determined by his national law. 32 Such titles having been entirely abolished in
Czechoslovakia, a citizen of that country is denied the right
to call himself a count in Germany. On the other hand, the
Reichsgericht has held a Swiss citizen entitled in accordance
with Swiss custom to append to his own name the titled name
("von B") of his wife. 33 Whether a foreigner's change of name
is recognized depends on the recognition or non-recognition
of such change of name by the country of which he is a national.34
In suits for damages for abuse of a person's name, or in
suits for an injunction against such abuse, a tendency exists,
however, to resort to the local law, or to the law applicable
to delictual actions, even where the personal law provides
actions on other theories. In Germany it has been held, for
reasons of public policy, that the measure of damages in a
foreigner's action for wrongful appropriation of his name, is
not higher than in an ~nalogous action by a German national. 35
It has also been suggested that it should never be lower. 36
Within the realm of application of the personal law, doubts
have arisen with respect to families whose members are not
all of the same nationality. Where, for instance, a wife's nationality is different from that of her husband, the Swiss Federal Tribunal has held her name to be determined by her own
32
KG. (Sept. 19, 1904) 15 Z.int.R. (r9o5) 329; KG. (Dec. 19, 1907) 19
Z.int.R. (1909) 244; KG. (April 15, 1932) JW. 1932, 2818, IPRspr. 1932,
no. r r.
33
RG. (Dec. u, 1918) 95 RGZ. 268,272.
34
Switzerland: The Justice Department refuses, in the case of a child of
Swiss nationality (BBl. 1907, I 539), and recognizes in the case of a German
child (BBl. 1921, III 836), the name given to the child by a German stepfather according to a German institution unknown to Swiss law (viz., the
cantonal law in 1907 or federal law in 1921),
Dutch decisions; see VAN HASSELT §I,
35
KG. (April29, 192o) JW. 1921, 39; KG. (AprilS, 1914) Leipz.Z. 1915,
1327; RG. (Nov. 2.9, 1920) roo RGZ. 182, 185 (both referring to the "Gervais"
case). Cj. EG. art. 12 restricting tort actions against German nationals to what
may be claimed under German law.
36 RAAPE, z D. IPR. 38o; see also J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 437·
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nationallaw, 87 while in Germany the general rule governing
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marital status presumably applies, and the wife's name is
determined in accordance with the national law of the husband.88
(b) ·Commercial name (firm). In Gemany 39 and Switzerland/0 it is held that the firm or official name of a commercial
enterprise is determined by the law of the principal establishment. On the other hand, in Belgium national and foreign
firms are equally protected under the local law. 41 In France,
a foreigner is held not to be entitled to any protection of his
commercial name, unless such protection is provided by treaty
or reciprocity is otherwise assured. 42 The most important
treaty, to which France, together with the majority of the
commercial countries of the world, is a party, is that of the
Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property. 43 Under
article 8 of this convention, the commercial name of a citizen
or corporation of any signatory country is protected in every
other signatory country without any preliminary registration,
deposit, or other formality being required.
4· Status as Merchant
In most of the countries of the European Continent and
of Latin America, merchants are subject to duties which are
37

BG. {July I4, 19Io) 36 BGE. I 39I, 395; see STAUFFER, NAG. art. 8 no.

15.
38

GEBHARDSCHE MATERIALIEN I8J; RAAPE 290; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. IZ5·
The Reichsgericht (Nov. 23, I 927) I I 9 RGZ. 44 has applied in an analogous
way to the name of an illegitimate child the law governing illegitimate relationship rather than the child's personal law. An obscure rule is in force in Liechtenstein, P.G.R. art. 45·
39
RG. (Oct. z, I886) 18 RGZ. 28; RG. (Nov. I3, 1897) 40 RGZ. 6I, 64;
RG. (May 31, 19oo) 46 RGZ. us, 132.
40
z MElLI z6z § I 67; tr. by KuHN 450.
41
Cass. beige (Dec. z6, 1876) Pasicrisie 1877.1.54; PouLLET 155 no. 150.
42
Decisions in Clunet 1902, 304; Trib. Bordeaux (Aug. 4, 1902) Clunet
1903, 866. In the Netherlands, however, protection to a foreign commercial
name depends on a Dutch Law of July 5, 1921 (S.842) cf. the liberal decision
of H. R. (May 31, 1927) W. 11675, VAN HASSELT 653; to the con.trary effect
Kg. Amsterdam (Sept. 30, 19:1.4) NJ. 1925, 142,
43
English text in U.S. Treaty Series, No. 834.
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not incumbent upon other individuals and, correspondingly,
entitled to special privileges not enjoyed by non-merchants.
Special rules also apply to numerous types of contracts where
the parties, or in certain cases one of the parties, belong to
the class of merchants. Wherever such special rules are in
force, the determination of a person's status as merchant or
non-merchant is generally regarded as a problem of personal
law. However, in consonance with the traditions of the law
merchant, in the determination of the personal law nationality
is disregarded in favor of the law of the "commercial domicil,"
i.e., of the place where the business is established. 44 The French
Committee for Private International Law, after full discussion, recently voted a legislative motion to amend the French
law accordingly. 45
Distinguishable from the quality of being a merchant is
the capacity of carrying on a business as a prerequisite to becoming a merchant; this question is commonly regarded as
governed by the law determining the legal acts of minors,
married women, insane persons, etc. 46
44
Germany and Italy: dominant opinion cf. FICKER in 4 Rechtsvergl.
Handworterb. 462.
Poland: Law of 1926, art. 2.
Switzerland: cf. HUBER-MUTZNER 420.
Argentina: cf. 3 VI co, nos. 221, 243, etc.
Treaty of Montevideo on international commercial law of 1889, art. 2;
Treaty of Montevideo on international terrestrial commercial law, text of 1940,
art. 2. More detailed provisions in C6digo Bustamante arts. 232ff.
Other opinions: 2 BAR § 290 (2) at qo and in 1 Ehrenberg's Handbuch des
gesamtc:n Handelsrechts (1913) 330; MELCHIOR 151 § 105; NuSSBAUM, D.
IPR. 211; SCHNITZER IJ4, 151·
45
Travaux du Comite fran<;ais de droit international prive, Seconde annee
( 1 9 35) IJ 2, on t):le capacity to be a merchant in international relations (text of
proposition at 169). See also the resolution of the Institute of International Law
in Cambridge (1931 ), 36 Annuaire II 1931, 181, on NIBOYET's proposal. Against
the unfortunate application of the lex fori in the Hague Draft of 1925 on Bankruptcy, see NIBOYET 519, no. 426.
46
BAR, 1 Ehrenberg's Handbuch 343; 3 VIco, nos. 234, 237.
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Insofar as the character of a transaction as commercial or
non-commercial ("civil") is determined by elements other
than the status of the parties, the law that governs the contract
in general is held to be decisive. 41

5· Infancy
Another situation regarded by civil law lawyers as pertaining to status is that of infancy. An infant's capacity to
engage in transactions is limited; he is subject to parental
power or guardianship; his domicil is fixed by operation of
law; his position as a party to a lawsuit is peculiar; and a
variety of other special rules apply to him. Hence, the personal
law determines the age at which infancy generally terminates,
as well as the events which may affect the individual's position
during infancy.
A basically similar view obtains in England and has sometimes guided American courts, for instance, in affirming the
power and duty of the domiciliary state to decree custodianship 48 or to terminate guardianship 40 over infants. It has occasionally been recognized that attainment of majority at the
domicil is sufficient to terminate ancillary administration of
a minor's property in another jurisdiction. 5° Story, however,
speaking of the disabilities of minors as well as of other incapacities, associated himself with those among the statutists
who, in this then much debated question, 51 instead of conceiving infancy or majority as aspects of personal status, regarded
incapacity to take part in legal transactions as incidental to
specific contracts or other acts. 52 As indicated below, this has
become the general doctrine of this country. (See Chapter 6.)
47

DIENA, I Dir. Commer. Int. 62.
Griffin v. Griffin ( 192o) 95 Ore. 78, I 87 Pac. 598, 604.
49
In re Honeyman (I922) II7 N.Y. Misc. 653, I92 N.Y. S. 9io.
5
For cases see 2 BEALE 663 n. 2.
51
See STORY, throughout c. IV; I FoELIX ( ed. 3) c. II I 8 I.
52 STORY § I03.
48

°
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In the Continental discussion, the two following points have
attracted interest:
(I) In certain jurisdictions, marriage ends the period of
infancy, whether of females or of both males and females,
either unconditionally or with certain provisos. This is illustrated by the statutes of twelve American jurisdictions 53
as well as by a number of European laws. 54 Under the
European conflicts rule, such attainment of majority by marriage depends upon the personal law of the infant. Since, for
instance, under Hungarian law women reach majority by
marriage, a nineteen-year-old Hungarian girl who marries an
American and, by this fact, neither acquires American citizenship nor loses Hungarian citizenship, will be regarded as
being of full age by every court applying the nationality test. 55
On the other hand, a young Englishman marrying in Italy is
not em~mcipated, as the Italian rule on emancipation does not
apply to his status. 56 The case of a bride who acquires her husband's nationality on marriage under the nationality law of
the husband's country is more doubtful. If a Swiss girl of
seventeen marries a German and thereby changes her nationality, is the Swiss rule, "Marriage imports majority," able to
terminate her infancy, although she abandons her Swiss personal law at the very moment of her marriage? Affirmation
of this question is favored in recent German literature. 57
(2) Under the German and related systems the status of
a person of full age may be granted to an infant by decree of
a court or an administrative agency-"declaration of major5 VERNIER§ 271,
The Netherlands: BW. art. 385.
Hungary: ALM.Asr, 1 Ungarisches Privatrecht (Berlin, 1922) 54·
Switzerland: C. C. art. 14 par. z.
Turkey: C. C. art. 1 r par. :z.
55 RAAPE 69,
56 Dr EN A, z Prine. 115.
57
WALKER u8 n. 39> 788; WAHLE, :z Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 142, mentiomng
Austrian decisions to this effect; RAAPE 77; M. WOLFF, IPR. 61. Contra: 1
53
54
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ity" -whereas in France, Italy, Spain, etc., less effective
forms of "emancipation" are provided. 59 Similarly, at common law and under certain American statutes, a judicial decree
may eliminate a part of a minor's disabilities. 60 At civil law,
jurisdiction to render such a determination is generally held
to rest with the country which furnishes the personal law of
the infant. 61 This law also determines whether emancipation
is possible at all, for what causes it may be conferred, and what
effect it produces; it decides in particular whether the minor
thus emancipated enjoys unlimited legal capacity or whether
he needs special authorization or consent in particular situations. 62 As will be discussed in detail below, the general rule
of capacity in this country forms part of the law of the contract, while in the Continental system it refers to the personal
law.

II.

PuBLIC PoLICY

Foreign law in the field of "status" is more often denied
application on account of local policy considerations than in
FRANKENSTEIN 423, 3 FRANKENSTEIN 235 n. 31; LEWALD 57; BECK, NAG.
175n0.72.
As to the effect of a newly acquired nationality of the bride, see RG. (Jan. Io,
1918) 91 RGZ. 403,407 dealing with the question of whether guardianship over
a German girl ended by her marrying a Russian in Czarist times. It seems that
the court classified the question as one of the effects of marriage; this is why it
quoted EG. arts. I4 and 15 and the Hague Convention of July 17, 1905 on
Marriage Effects, arts. I and 2.
liS Germany: BGB. §§ 3-5.
Austria: Allg. BGB. §§ I74, 252.
The Netherlands: BW. arts. 473 ff.
Brazil: C. C. art. 9; cf. PoNTES DE MIRANDA, 39 Recueil I932 I 622.
59
France: C. C. art. 477·
Italy: C. C. (I 865) art. 3 I I; C. C. ( 1942) arts. 39off.
Spain: C. C. art. 322.
60 5 VERNIER § 282.
61 On general principles, it would not appear unthinkable for a decree of
emancipation to be rendered by a court of a country not that of the nationality, in
accordance with the substantive law of the infant's national law. On this question
I FRANKENSTEIN 427; STAUFFER, NAG. art. 7 no. 7i RAAPE 9I (who thinks
that it could be done where the procedure required by the personal law limits the
cooperation of an authority to mere recordation (blosse Beurkundung).
62 DIENA, 2 Prine. r I4; 0. VON GIERKE, I Deutsches Privatrecht (Leipzig,
1895) 22 I ff.; WEISS, 3 Traite 342, and following these writers Swiss BG. (May
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any other field of law. Regrettable as the disharmony caused
thereby may be, it is a common trait of existing laws, a trait nowhere more distinct than in France where, to quote Julliot
de la Morandiere, each day the application of the personal
law is progressively restricted in favor of French law. 63
However, a peculiar doctrine has been expressed by Dicey
and repca ted in America by Beale and the Restatement
( § I 20), that a foreign status of a kind unknown at the forum
(English or American law respectively) will not be recognized. 64 No other authority exists for this proposition than a
few English cases which have been critically destroyed by
Cheshire. 65
Thus, prodigality is "not a status at common law." 66 If a
Frenchman domiciled in France is judicially declared a spendthrift by a French court, American courts will certainly
recognize those effects of the decree which relate to transactions carried on in France. 67 But the question is whether an
American court will ascribe effects to the French decree with
respect to American transactions. In France, for instance, the
spendthrift can bring a lawsuit only through a committee
(family council). Can he sue without any guardian in the
United States or in England? No doubt, appointment of a
conservator in one American jurisdiction under a local statute,
has been said to be inoperative on transactions in another jurisdiction, a statute being bare of extraterritorial meaning under
an ancient statutist doctrine. 68 Whatever the actual merits of
this antique rule, a French interdiction of a prodigal does in:q, 1912) 38 BGE. II 1, 3 (the declaration of majority is governed by the
national law).
63 Colombia, Comision de Reforma del Codigo Civil (1939-1940) :1.18.
64 DICEY 531 Rule 136 (I); 2 BEALE§ 120.1.
65
CHESHIRE 144. He thinks that In re Selot's Trust [1902] 1 Ch. 488, is to be
explained upon other grounds and that Worms v. De Valdor (t88o) 49 L.J.
N.S. (Ch.) 261, has been decided wrongly.
66
2 BEALE§ 120.8.
67
Restatement § 120 comment c; 2 BEALE § 120.1 : "The existence of the
foreign status is a fact and should be recognized as a fact by a court in any state.''
68
Gates v. Bingham (1881) 49 Conn. 27 5·
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tend to restrict the capacity of the individual everywhere.
Dicey and Beale derive their thesis that such decree can not
be recognized in a common law jurisdiction from an English
decision, Worms v. De V aldor/ 9 in which Frey, J ., erroneously reasoned that the French adjudication of prodigality did
not change the status of the person, although he asserted in
addition "that if a change of status were effected by an order
of a French court, this (English) court would not take notice
of a personal disqualification caused by such change of status."
No such problem is known in civil law. A French decree
declaring an individual of French nationality and domicil a
spendthrift is recognized in any other country, including
Guatemala 70 and Chile, 71 as affecting the individual's personal status. The principle has been well formulated by the
Swiss Department of Justice with respect to foreign declarations of death, which are unknown to Swiss law; if not contrary to public policy, the foreign decree must be granted the
same effect as conferred upon it by the foreign law. 72
With respect to legitimation and adoption, the implications
of the Dicey-Beale theory are even more serious. Is such an
act, performed abroad, not to be recognized by a court whose
domestic law has not yet introduced the institution of legitimation or adoption? If such institutions are known to the forum,
but the particular variety adopted by the foreign law is not,
should the effect of the foreign act be limited to that given
locally to the most nearly related type, rather than simply
recognized to the same extent as in the foreign jurisdiction? 73
American cases show a strong tendency to limit recognition of
the foreign institution. An analogous opinion is widely held
69
(188o) 49 L.J. N.S. (Ch.) 261; followed in In re Selot's Trust [1902.]
Ch. 488.
70 See MATOS nos. 218 219,
1
71
Chile: App. Santiago (Nov. 7, 1934) 34 Revista Der. J. y Cien. Soc.
(1937) II sec. 2r_J4 (interdiction by judgment of the Italian Court of Genoa;
exequatur granted by the Supreme Court).
72
BBl. 1916, II 522 no. 5·
73
See GooDRICH § I42.; STUMBERG 309; see also LORENZEN, 6 Repert. 349
no. 340. But see FALCONBRIDGE1 Case Note, 19 Can. Bar Rev. (I 941) 3 71 39·
I
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in the case of a foreign business organization whose exact type
is not included in the domestic commercial order. 74 Or, in accordance with a recent suggestion, should the "status" created
in a foreign country be recognized but its specific "effects" or
"incidents" be reserved for close inspection under the light
of the internal law of the forum? 75 This line of thought seems
to result directly or indirectly in an extensive application of
public policy, much as French courts and writers invest the
provisions of the Code Napoleon with the dignity of international public order. 76 A foreign adoption of an infant was
not recognized in France before such act was permitted in
France in 1923 by an internallaw. 77 The Codigo Bustamante
declares that none of its provisions relating to adoption will
apply to states whose legislations do not provide for adoptions. 7 s All such rules are indefensible, inasmuch as they deny
effect to foreign institutions without an urgent national interest in the particular case, a point clear to most French
writen; but often ignored by courts. Vlhy should a country's
own civil code rule the world?
On the other hand, English courts, before the Legitimacy
Act of r 926, did not hesitate to recognize legitimation by subsequent marriage executed under foreign domiciliary law, 79
and at present they recognize California legitimations by recognition, though unknown to English statutes. 80 Argentine
courts seem to treat foreign adoptions in the same way, their
internal law notwithstanding. 81 The Portuguese Supreme
Court, recognizing a Brazilian adoption under analogous circumstances, held it a constant international rule that the nonexistence of an institution in the lex fori does not prevent the
74

This will be discussed in the second volume.
This theory has been proposed by T AINTOR, "Legitimation, Legitimacy and
Recognition in the Conflict of Laws," I 8 Can. Bar Rev. ( 1940) 691 at 708.
76
Cf. NIBOYET nos. 382, 66o and note in Nouv. Revue 1935, 425.
71 SeeApp. Paris (Jan. z, 1936) Gaz. Pal. 19J6.I.551.
8
7 Codigo Bustamante art. 7 7.
79
In re Wright's Trusts (1856) 25 L. J. (Ch.) 621, 2 K. &. ]. 595·
80 In re Luck [1940] A. C. Ch. 864.
81
:t VICO no. 172; RoGER, 6 Repert. 683 no. 44·
75
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rights flowing from it from being given effect. 82 The legal
situation of a French illegitimate child recognized by a parent
is enforced in Germany where this type of status is unknown. 83
The prevailing opinion certainly favors simple recognition of
foreign legal situations without provincial restraint.
A third problem is illustrated in the Restatement by an
English case, Atkinson v. Ander.son: 84
"By the law of state X, the inheritance tax imposed upon
'strangers in blood' who inherit is at a higher rate than that
imposed upon inheriting relatives and the term 'strangers in
blood' is construed as including natural illegitimate children.
The status of 'recognized natural child' exists in state Y but
not in X. A dies domiciled in Y, bequeathing chattel~ in state
X to C, who, according to the law of Y, is A's recognized
natural child. C, on taking the chattels in state X, pays a succession tax as a stranger in blood." 85
However, this is an interpretation of a tax law and not a
problem of international private law. It may well appear that
an inheritance tax statute is intended to apply a higher tax rate
to all illegitimate children. In such case, it would make no
difference whether such children are or are not "recognized."
Hence, the English decision in the case of Atkinson v. Anderson may be an entirely correct interpretation of the English
tax statute, but it is not at all necessary to resort for its justification to a general theory of non-recognition of a foreign status
unknown to the lex fori. For example, the Argentine tax em
gratuitous transfer of property has been held applicable to a
foreign adopted person "by simple interpretation of the tax
statute" without regard to a conflicts rule. 86
82 Sup. Trib. Lisbon (May I 5, I 934) Nouv. Revue I935, 424, 427.
Prussian Minist. Ord. of Aug. 29, 1924 (StAZ. 1924, 198): cf. RAAl'E

83

szz.
64

Restatement § 12.0 comment b; 2 BEALE § uo. I relies on Atkinson v. Anderson (r882) 21 Ch. D. roo.
ss (I882) 21 Ch. D. roo.
86 App. B~nos Aires (Dec. 10, 191.6) 1.3 J. A. 856.
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6

Capacity
I.

OBJECT OF THE DISCUSSION

HE laws of the various countries differ widely with
respect both to the grounds on which certain individuals are denied normal competence and to the
scope of the disabilities imposed. Also, the term, "capacity," is
not used with quite the same meaning everywhere. For the
purpose of the conflict of laws, distinction should be made
between a general rule of capacity and numerous exceptions
thereto defined by special rules.
The purpose of the general rule is to determine the law
that is to govern a person's ability to bind himself by contract
with other parties or by unilateral acts. In most countries, the
general rule applies also to dispositions of property, though
in some the law governing title to property, especially tangible
assets, movable and immovable, extends to capacity. 1 The
most important qualifications of the general rule are as follows:
(a) The personal characteristics necessary to hold a person
liable in tort are generally subject to the law governing tort. 2
(b) The effects upon property interests of such events as

T

1 For the United States see z BEALE 1180 § 333·3; GooDRICH §145. Also
art. 10 of the Argentine C. C. seems to have been drafted in accordance with
SToRY §§ roz and 42.4, and, following this model, to determine capacity with
respect to immovables by the law of the situs; this has been demonstrated by
CHAVARRI 76 nos. 67ff., contrary to various opinions hitherto held. For Hungary, VON SZLADITS in 23 Grotius Soc. 1937, z8 explains that every woman,
whether of Hungarian or foreign nationality or domicil, has free disposition of
immovables on Hungarian soil. This subject is very difficult and cannot be
treated here.
2
To be treated in succeeding volume.
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marriage, bankruptcy, or appointment of a committee are the
object of special conflict of laws rules. 3
(c) Questions pertaining to the borderline zone between
the law of capacity as a general topic and the law of distribution of estates, must be discussed in connection with the latter
subject. But it may be noted that the provisions in the French
law designed to protect minor heirs in the distribution of a
decedent's estate have been declared to be a part of the personal law of the heirs and therefore to be inapplicable to
foreign heirs. 4 In the United States, provisions that protect infants against the effects of statutes of non-claim apparently
are considered part of the procedural law of the state where
the assests are administered; 5 the parallel with the French
law is, of course, not perfect.
(d) Capacity to marry and to engage in other transactions
of family law constitutes a particular topic to be discussed
below.
In numerous countries, married women are still subject
to restrictions of various kinds upon the legal effectiveness of
their promises. The Restatement classifies the problem to what
extent a married woman is subject to such restrictions as a
problem of the law of contracts, which, both in accord with
the general approach of the Restatement and in agreement
with the majority of decisions, is declared to be determined by
the law of the place of contracting. 6 There is respectable
authority, however, for the view that the state where a married
woman is domiciled is justified in holding her incapable of
3

Restatement §§ 237, 238, 289, 290; Germany: M. WoLFF, IPR. 61, II.
Cass. (civ.) (April q, 1932) S.I9J2.I.J6I and Note by AuDINET;
D.t932.1.89 with Note by BASDEVANT; Revue 1932, 549· Cf. ]. DoNNEDIEU
DE VABRES 507. The estate of the late Robert of Bourbon, Duke of Parma,
was distributed in accordance with the family statute of the house of HapsburgLorraine, which was recognized as his personal law by Austria, the country of
which he was a national. Hence, the French Supreme Court held that his
family statuw~determined what protection was to be extended to minor heirs.
5
Cf. Restatement § 498.
6 Restatement§ 333 comment.
4
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contracting under its own rules, even where the contract was
made in another state under whose law such contract would be
binding upon her. 7
Recognizing that limitations on the contractual capacity of
married women are closely connected with the structure of
the family and are motivated to a large extent by a desire
either to protect families against financial ruin or to safeguard
the dominating position of the husband as family head, the
European laws tend toward classifying the problem of contractual capacity of married women as a problem of the law
of family relations. Consequently, the law by which these
problems are determined is that applying generally to the
personal relations between husband and wife. This law need
not necessarily be the personal law of the wife. 8 •
(e) The legal consequences of insanity are determined by
the personal law. Under the system of domicil, however, the
voluntary acquisition of domicil by an insane non-resident
presents difficulties, 9 and the claim of the law of the domicil to
govern transactions in such situations has been doubted. 10
(f) The capacity of an individual to determine the conduct
of a lawsuit to which he is a party, as distinguished from
capacity to be a party, which has been trea,ted above, 11 seems to
be considered in this country as a matter of procedural law
and governed, in consequence, by the internal law of the
forum. 12 In the eyes of a Continental lawyer, this is a question
of capacity to exercise rights, and therefore the answer depends on the personal ~aw. Thus, it has been decided in the
Netherlands that Swiss law governs the question whether a
7
Union Trust Co. v. Grosman (1918) 245 U. S. 412, per Holmes, ].;
BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1936, 59·7, 619-621.
8 See infra p. 302.
9 CHESHIRE 403.
1 CHESHIRE 406 proposes the law with which the transaction of an insane
person· is most closely connected.
11
See supra p. 162.
12 See Restatement § 58 8 and cf. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule r 7
(b) and (c).
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Swiss married woman can bring a lawsuit in a Dutch court without the consent of her husband. 13 In an analogous way, the
Swiss Federal Tribunal has declared that the power to do so
affects capacity and therefore in the case of Swiss nationals is
to be governed by the Swiss federal statutes rather than by the
cantonal laws of procedure. 14 However, as an exception to
this rule the German Code of Civil Procedure declares that
a foreigner lacking procedural capacity under his national law
is deemed to have it when he would possess it under the law
of the court. 15
II.
I.

THE LAw GovERNING CAPACITY

Capacity Governed by the Law of the Place of Contracting

The notion that the permanent characteristics of an individual are all to be regarded as incidents of his "status" and,
therefore, all governed by the individual's personal law, is
not current in the United States.
In this country, excepting Louisiana, the almost universal
rule, clearly supported by commercial expediency, is, as stated
by Goodrich, that the capacity of married women-which is
typically involved in capacity cases-is governed by the lex
loci contractus. 16 "Some authorities seem to hold that capacity
is to be determined by the 'law of the contract,' " 17 which may
be different from the law of the place of contracting; but
"many courts hold that capacity is governed by the lex loci
contractus, even while they assert that some other law may
13

Hof Amsterdam (July 13, 1923) W.xxx63, N.J. 1924, II8. Belgium:
Trib. comm. Bruxelles (Oct. 30, 189o) Pasicrisie I89I.3·5·
14
, BG. (Dec. 27, 1916) 42 BGE. II 553, 555; BG. (April 7, 1922) 48 BGE.
I 24, 29.
15
German C. Civ. Proc. §55; KG. (March 3, I 936) JW. 1936, 3570
(English minor), see infra p. x86, n. 38.
16
GoODR!CH 266 § xos; Restatement§ 333a; Milliken v. Pratt (x878) 125
Mass. 374, 28 Am. Rep. 241.
17 GooDRICH 267, excluding the possible influence of the intention of the
parties, because a circulus vitiosus would result.
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govern the obligation and validity (in other respects) of the
contract." 18 At present, it is true that some courts of agricultural states are inclined to protect married women domiciled
in the forum against their out-of-state creditors. This is
scarcely a domiciliary rule; it represents rather a public policy
of the forum in preference to a recognized conflicts rule. But
the law of the domicil also has it advocates, especially when
it agrees with the lex fori. 19
In the less frequent cases relative to the capacity of infants,
the law of the place where the infant acts is generally applied.20 Minor 21 explains the rule by the particular character
of the infant's disability, evidenced by the fact that his contract is not void but only voidable; the infant is not incapable
"in his person" but has a privilege to disaffirm the contract.
Beale 22 denies the existence of a status of minority at common
law b~cause "the effects of minority are not so uniform or
clearly fixed as to be described as the incidents of a status."
These are obscure arguments. The true reason of the rule,
commercial expediency, has been well indicated by Story himself 23 and has been accepted .by the courts as necessary in a
country where a large part of the population is constantly
moving from one state to another.
In consequence of the rule, an individual reaching full age
at his domicil, for instance at the completion of his eighteenth
year or by marriage, is nevertheless treated as an infant, even
at his domicil, with respect to transactions executed in a state
where full age is attained only at twenty-one years of age. 24
Capacity for the purpose of contracts relative to immovables,
18 2 BEALE§ 333·3 at II77•
19 Cf. Union Trust Co. v. Grosman (1918) 245 U.S. 412; STUMBERG :u6;
and supra p. 103, n. 7·
~ 0 GooDRICH 267.
21 MINOR§ 72; cf, §§ 5, II.
22 2 BEALE§ 120.II.
:za STORY§ 102 a, b, quoting Burge; cf. § 76 at p. 97, n. 2,
24 0'Dell v. Rogers (1878) 44 Wis. 136 at 181 (majority of a woman conferred by marriage).
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correspondingly, is governed by the lex situs. 25 And a decree
based on a local statute, which in part removes an infant's disabilities for certain purposes, does not enlarge his capacity for
acts in another state. 26
The American view 27 has been keenly observed in recent
years in Europe 28 and has served as a major argument for
the opponents of the traditional European approach.
The notion that capacity should not be separated from other
problems of validity of contracts was once advocated by a few
statutists, such as John Voet 29 and Bi j nkershoek,S 0 and applied during the first half of the nineteenth century in Denmark.31
The rule that capacity to contract is simply determined by
the law of the place of contracting is also said to prevail in the
Soviet Union. 32
25

Beauchamp v. Bertig (1909) 90 Ark. 351,119 S. W. 75·
State v. Bunce (1866) 65 Mo. 349 (authorization by Arkansas court);
Philpott v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. (1884) 85 Mo. 164 (emancipation
in Texas); Beauchamp v. Bertig (1909) 90 Ark. 351, 119 S. W. 75 (authorization in Oklahoma to sell).
27 Beauchamp v. Bertig (1909) 90 Ark. 351
1 119 S. W. 75; Deason v.
Jones (1935) 7 Cal. App. (2d) 482 1 45 Pac. (2d) 1025. This approach is
consistently followed by the Restatement; capacity to contract is declared to
be determined by the law of the place of contracting (§ 333); capacity to
transfer land and chattels by the law of the situs (§§ 216 and 255 1 respectively),
capacity to marry by the law of the place where the marriage is celebrated
(§§ udf.); see also the statement about capacity to be held responsible for
a tort implied in § 3 79· With respect to the theoretical basis of BEALE's opinion, see his Summary,§ 55 1 522, and the criticism by WIGNY, Essai 19, 103.
28 The American cases down to 1933 have been collected and analyzed by
RUDOLF MUELLER, "Die GeschaftsHihigkeit natiirlicher Personen in der international-privatrechtlichen Rechtsprechung der Vereinigten Staaten," 8
Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 885.
29
See STORY § 54 a.
30 BIJNKERSHOEK ( 1673-1743), 1 Observationes Tumultuariae (edited by
MEI]ERS, DE Bd:coURT and BoDENSTEIN, 1926) no. 71 expressly invokes
}oannes Voet. He applied the lex loci actus as to capacity to marry; see LEE,
"Bijnkershoek's Observationes Tumultuariae," 17 Journ. Comp. Leg. ( 1935)
3 8 at 43·
31 See BORUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 216 no. 21.
32 See MAKARov, Precis 190 •
26

.
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2.

Capacity Governed by Personal Law

Outside of the United States and the Soviet Union, problems of capacity are generally treated as belonging to the
domain of personal law. Even in the United States, this approach is followed in Louisiana, 33 although it appears
weakened recently. 34 A peculiar position is occupied by Switzerland, where problems of capacity are determined by the
national law of the individual, 35 while problems of personal
status in general are referred to the law of the domicil.
Since Mancini's time, the European rule has been justified
upon the ground that the country of nationality is the one
best qualified to determine· whether and to what extent restrictions should be imposed upon the individual citizen in his
own and his family's interest. Rules determining capacity are
regarded as the very core of the rules that permanently determine an individual's legal status. It is obvious, of course, that
incapacities accompanying an individual wherever he goes may
endanger others who bona fide enter into transactions with
him, but the principle is based upon the consideration that anyone who engages in a transaction with another must ascertain
at his own risk whether such other party has sufficient legal
capacity, or, as stated ~n the Roman maxim, Qui cum alia
contr.ahit, vel est vel debet esse non ignarus condicionis eiu.r
(Dig. so.q.r9). (He who contracts with another either
knows or ought to know the other's condition.) In interstate
or international transactions, the results of this maxim are
even harsher than in transactions involving parties both subject to the same law. While it may often be difficult to ascertain
33 Marks v. Loewenberg (1918) 143 La. 196, 78 So. 444; Lorio v. Gladney
{1920) 147 La. 930, 86 So. 365; National City Bank of Chicago v. Barringer
(1918) 143 La. 14, 78 So. 134.
34
See as to capacity to sue Matney v. Blue Ribbon, Inc. (1942) 2o:z La. sos,
12. So. (:zd) 253, Note, r8 Tul. L. Rev. (1943) 319,321.
35
BG. (Nov. :z1, 19o8) 34 BGE. II 738, 741; BG. (May :z3, 1912) 38 BGE.
II r, 4; BG. (Feb. 7, 1934) 61 BGE. II z:z, 17 (:z).
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whether an individual is under age, married, or of unsound
mind, it may be more difficult to find out that he is a foreigner
and that his capacity is restricted by his personal law.
As a matter of fact, in order to alleviate embarrassments to
national business life, exceptions to the rule have been found
necessary for transactions contracted wholly within the territory of the forum.
(a) In the famous Louisiana decision, Saul v. His Creditors, it was recognized that a foreigner twenty-two years of
age, a minor under the law of his domicil, could not plead this
foreign law against a contract entered into by him in the
state. 36 The same rule was adopted occasionally in other jurisdictions at a time when the law of domicil was held to govern
capacity. 37
(b) In the Prussian and other German codes since the
eighteenth century, the validity of transactions in which consideration is given and the capacity of standing in court, were
in one way or another declared independent of foreign-created
disabilities. 38 By the German law (EG. art. 7 par. 3), it is
provided that a foreigner who engages in a transaction in
Germany is considered to have the same capacity as he would
36 Saul v. His Creditors (I 827) 5 Mart. N.S.569, I6 Am. Dec. :u2, discussed
by LIVERMORE, Dissertations on the Questions Which Arise from the Contrariety of the Positive Laws of Different States and Nations 32 § I 7; STORY
§ 76; I WHARTON§ II4ff.
37 See in particular Woodward v. Woodward (I889) 87 Tenn. 644, II
s. 38w. 892, 897·
.
Prussian Allg. Landrecht of I7941 Einleitung §§ 35, 38, 39 provides that
the rules of the Code shall be applied to foreign-domiciled persons engaging
in contracts within the territory if these rules are more favorable to the validity
of the contract than the laws of the domicil; cf. DERNBURG, I Lehrbuch des
Preussischen Privatrechts (ed. I, I875) 46; Prussian AUg. Gerichtsordnung
of I 793, I§ 5: the capacity of a foreigner to stand in court is determined by the
law of his domicil, § 6: but if he has completed his 25th year, it is immaterial
whether the law of his domicil, or of the situs of the res, or particular acts that
have not been presented to the court determine a later coming of age.
Baden: C. C. of 18o8, art. 3 (a).
Saxony: C. C. of 1863, § 8.
Germany: Code of Civil Procedure (I877) §53·
Greece: C. G~of 18561 art. 4 par. 2.
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have if he were a German, even if his capacity be more limited
under his own national law. This provision, designed to pro. teet German business, is not applicable to transactions concerned with land outside of Germany, family relations, or inheritance, but applies to donations between living persons. 39
Moreover, this provision is strictly limited to transactions
made within Germany, and does not protect anyone when he
contracts in a foreign country. Varying provisions of this type
have been adopted in numerous codes! 0
Another kind of rule of more general scope was contained
in article 84 of the German Bills of Exchange Law of r 848,
and now appears in the Geneva Conflicts Rules on Bills of
Exchange and Promissory Notes of 1930. 41 Article 2 reads as
follows:
"The capacity of a person to bind himself by a bill of exchange or promissory note shall be determined by his national
law. If this national law provides that the law of another
country is competent in the matter, this latter law shall be
applied.
"A person who lacks capacity, according to the law specified
in the preceding paragraph, is nevertheless bound, if his signature has been given in any territory in which according to the
law in force there, he would have the requisite capacity."
Und~r these provisions the

signature is valid not only in the
country where it has been made but also in every other country
39 After removal of doubts, the Italian C. C. (I938) Disp. Prel. art. 7 par. 2
1
C. C. ( I942) Disp. PreI. art. I 7 par. 2 states the same rule, see Relazione I9 3 8,
no. 7·
40
Switzerland: art. 7b, par. I of NAG. provides that a foreigner who has
engaged in a transaction in Switzerland cannot plead his lack of capacity if he
would have capacity under Swiss law.
Greece: C. C. (I940) art. 9·
Italy: C. C. (I942) Disp. Prel. art. I7 par. 2.
Japan: Law of I898, art. 3 par. z.
Iran: C. C. art. 962.
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 24.
Montenegro: C. C. art, 7 88.
,
For Hungary see SZLADITS, 23 Grotius Soc. 1937 1 25 1 27.
41
See supra p. 34·
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signatory to the Convention. The country of which the signer
is a national is allowed, however, to treat the signature as invalid.42
Under neither of these provisions does it matter by what
law the contract is generally governed, of what country the
parties are nationals, or where they are domiciled. Nor is it
relevant whether the incapacity of the foreigner was known
or unknown to the other party. A purely objective test is believed best to serve the interests of commerce; this policy of
disregarding individual circumstances in laws intended to protect trade was consistently carried out in German law before

I9JJ.
(c) A subjective test is applied in France, however, as
established by the Court of Cassation in the celebrated Liz.ardi
case. 43 A twenty-two-year-old Mexican, being still a minor
under Mexican law, bought jewels in Paris; he would have
been of full age had he been a Frenchman. The court, considering that the seller had acted "in good faith and without
negligence or imprudence," declared the buyer bound by his
contract. This decision has been followed consistently by the
French courts. 44 Under this so-called "doctrine of national
interest," protection is given against excusable ignorance of
foreign incapacities, dependent upon the circumstances of each
individual case. 45 Accordingly, the courts are disinclined to
accord the benefit of the doctrine to bankers or other business42
Germany has availed herself of this permission: German Bills of Exchange
Act of June 2I, I933> art. 9I par. 2, 2d sentence.
43
Cass. (req.) (Jan. I6, I86I) S.I86I.1.305.
44
Cour Paris (Feb. 8, I 883) Clunet I 883, 29I; Trib. civ. Seine (July I,
I886) Clunet I887, I78; Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 23, I89I) D.I892.I.29; Cour
Paris (July zz, I933) Gaz.Pal.I933·2.724, Clu'net I934, 9Io. In the last-mentioned case, a contract was made in France by a Rumanian married woman, who
exhibited to the other party an instrument purporting to be a judicially legalized general power of attorney of her husband. The instrument was ineffective
under Rumanian law. The court characterized the conduct of both spouses as
"truly tortiouf'_! ("un veritable quasi-delit"). J. DONNED!EU DE VABRES 509
in discussing this case, notes an increasing tendency of the courts to limit exceptions from the application of the personal law to such grave situations.
45 This "serious defect" of the French solution has been admitted by 2
ARMINJON no. 2I.
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men who can reasonably be expected to investigate the personal status of their customers. Relief is generally granted, on
the other hand, against a foreigner who fraudulently represents that he has his capacity. 46
This French approach is well-known throughout the Latin
countries, but opinions are divided;17
More emphatically than the French courts, the Swedish
Law of r 904-, as amended June 27, I 924- (c. 4- § 5), provides
that transactions shall be valid in cases where the other party
has not known of and has been unable to ascertain the incapacity.48
(d) A combination of the German and the French rules has
been undertaken in article 3 of the Polish Law of I 926 on
private international law, prescribing that the capacity of a
foreigner who lacks capacity under his personal law and who
in Poland has entered into a transaction intended to have effect
in Poland, is to be determined in accordance with Polish law
when such determination is necessary for the security of honest
commerce. This provision is as complicated and impracticable
as that recently proposed by the Institute of International
Law. 49
(e) · These various exceptions to the principle of the personallaw have resulted in widespread doubts on the propriety
of the principle itself. Nevertheless, the only exception basically affecting the principle is the provision of the Uniform
46

France: SURVILLE, Clunet 1909, 6:1.5.
Spain: Trib. Supr. (April 21, 1892) 71 Sent. 504.
Austria: Allg. BGB. §§ 866, 1041.
47
Especially in Italy, the doctrine was not adopted by the courts and has
been advocated by only a few writers, such as ANZILOTTI I53 no. 2; I FroRE
no. 449· Now the German model has been followed, supra n. 39· In Belgium,
PERROUD's hostile attitude (Clunet 1905, 305) has been followed by the authors
of Novelles Belges, I D. Civ. 221 no. 157.
48
The provision does not apply, however, against a foreigner who is a national of a state which is a signatory to the Hague Convention of June 12, 1902
(Ord. of Oct. 10, 1924).
.
In Norway, the domiciliary law is applied without exception. See CHRIS·
TIANSEN, 6 Repert. 573 no. 99·
49
Resolution of Cambridge 1931, Annuaire I931, II 69-93, 237; cf. on
Resolution of Oslo 19321 BAAK in Revue 1932, 820.
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Geneva Conflicts Rules noted above. Other existing exceptions
are intended strictly to protect businessmen (and not even all
of them) operating in the state of the forum, while the rule
shields the forum's own nationals who engage in transactions
abroad. 50 Indeed, a German court would allow the plea of
incapacity of a twenty-year-old Frenchman who contracts an
obligation in Switzerland (because of the principle of nationality), although he would be barred from such a plea in a Swiss
court (because of the Swiss provision, analogous to the German exception). 51 On widely different theories, writers have
criticized the exceptions as well as their limits. 5.2
3. Mixed Systems
(a) English law. No English decision has decisively settled
the question whether an individual's capacity to contract is to
be determined in accordance with his personal law, i.e., the
law of his domicil, or in accordance with the "proper law of
the contract." Dicta can be quoted for either approach. 53 The
text writers increasingly tend toward advocating the application of the proper law of the contract insofar as mercantile
transactions are concerned. 54 This opinion has been followed
50 See for instance Trib. civ. Seine (June 30, 1919) Clunet 192.0, 184 (a
Frenchman who was placed under guardianship in France entered upon a
contract abroad; when he was sued in France his defense of incapacity was
sustained). Cf. also for Bulgaria, GHENOV, 6 Repert. 189 no. 48.
5! RAAPE 84, 85; PLANCK, 6 Kommentar zum BGB. (ed. x) art. 7, no. 6 (d).
sz Cf. NIEMEYER, Das IPR. des BGB. 125; WALKER I I Iff.; LEWALD 59, no.
74; M. WoLFF, IPR. 63. Only NEuBECKER 62. believed that the exception stated
by EG. art. 7 par. 3 could be extended by interpretation.
53 For application of the domiciliary law: Udny v. Udny (1869) L. R. 1 Sc.
App. 441, 457; Sottomayor v. De Barros (no. x) (I877) 3 P. D. C. A. x, s;
Cooper v. Cooper (x888) IJ App. Cas. 88.
For application of the proper law of the contract: Sottomayor v. De Barros
(no. 2) (1879) 5 P. D. 94, Ioo, per Sir James Hannen; Ogden v. Ogden
[I9o8] P. (C. A.) 46; Chetti v. Chetti [I909] P. 67; Simonin v. Mallac
(186o) 2 SW. & Tr. 67, per Sir Cresswell Cresswell. Cf. also ALLEN, "Status
and Capacity," 46 Law Q. Rev. (I93o) 277 at 2941 309.
54 DICEY 63 7 Rule 15 8 Exc. 1 ; WESTLAKE 40; CHESHIRE 217, who cites the
Scotch case of M'Feetridge v. Stewarts and Lloyds [19I3] S.C. (H. L.) 773,
and the old and Goubtful English case of Male v. Roberts (x8oo) 3 Esp. 163.

CAPACITY
by a Canadian court. 55 Both Cheshire, who is the most
vigorous advocate of this view among the text writers, and
the Saskatchewan court seem to be influenced by American
ideas. There remains, however, a twofold difference from the
American rule: on the one hand, not all contracts are exempted from the law of the domicil; on the other hand, the
law of the place of contracting is not followed unless it governs
the whole of the contract. We shall have to examine this latter
point when discussing the law governing contracts.
(b) Former I talian system. The rule that an individual's
capacity is determined by his personal law is clearly established
by the Italian Civil Code. 5 6 Hence, a contract made by a married woman of Italian nationality is held valid by the Italian
courts, even if made in a country where a married woman cannot contract without her husband's authorization,57 and her
husband happens to be a national of that country. So far as
mercantile transactions are concerned, however, article 58 of
the Commercial Code of I 882 provided that capacity of the
parties is determined by the law of the place of contracting. 5 8
The coexistence of these two different rules raised some minor
problems that might have been overcome. But the fact that
the two rules are theoretically antagonistic was much stressed.
Recent critics have expressed their preference for the rule of
the Commercial Code which is based upon the consideration
that commercial transactions are concluded speedily and without the felt necessity of inquiring into the other party's nationality and capacity. 59 Nevertheless, the commercial rule has
55

Bondholders Securities Corp. v. Manville [I933] 4 D. L. R. 699 (Sask.).
3 Giur. Comp. DIP. ISS, IS6. There seems no doubt, on
the other hand, that the law of the domicil governs capacity for engaging in
other transactions, see I JoHNSON I83.
56
Italy: C. C. (I86s) Disp. Prel. art. 6; C. C. (194z) Disp. Prel. art. 17
par. x.
57 DIENA, Clunet I9zo, 77· Under Italian law a married woman as such is
no longer subject to any incapacity (Law no. II76 of July 17, 1919).
58 See DIENA, Clunet 19zo, 79·
69 See FORMIGGINI, z9 Rivista (1937) 39, 40 n. t; he criticizes art. 2 of
the Geneva Convention, where the national law is adopted as the general rule
(see supra p. 187 ), as a step backwards.

Cf.

FALCONBRIDGE,

192

PERSONAL LAW OF INDIVIDUALS

been sacrificed to the nationality principle in the recently recast legislation. 60

III.

PROBLEMs RAisED BY INCAPACITATING PRoVISIONS
oF THE LAw oF THE PLACE oF CoNTRACTING

A peculiar problem arises when a person who is fully capable
under his personal law makes a contract in a foreign country
where persons of his class are not capable of contracting. This
case presents no difficulty to a court which follows the personal
law principle, as his personal law gives this individual capacity.
What, however, is the position in a court applying the law
of the place of contracting? Does it consider the contract
invalid?
This question has been discussed in connection with the
former Italian commercial rule (C. Comm. art. 58), which
established the principle of the lex lod contractus, as well as
with reference to the exceptional rule contained in the
Uniform Bills of Exchange Conflicts Convention. By prevailing opinion, it has been answered in favor of the validity
of the transaction, in view of the basic function of the national
law. 61
The considerations involved may be illustrated by the following hypothetical case:
A Swiss national, twenty years old, having his domicil in
Geneva, Switzerland, goes on a trip and buys a car on the instalment plan:
(a) in Paris;
(b) in London;
(c) in New York.
Being of full age under Swiss law, he is considered of age in
France under the nationality principle and in England under
60 Art. sS of the Comm. C. has been repealed by art. 11 z of the R. D. of
April 24, 1939, containing provisions for the introduction of the First Book
of the Civil Code.
61
FoRMIGGINI,r.:-9 Rivista (1937) at 46 n. z, supra n. 59·
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the domiciliary principle (if applied), in respect to all three
contracts. Therefore, he would probably be held capable also
by an American court in cases (a) and (b), although this
decision would amount to a sort of renvoi. In the third case,
the propositus is incapable under the law of the place of contracting. It would hardly be correct within the meaning of the
theory of vested rights to consider the full age required by
the young man in his country as a "right." Such an approach
has been refuted in analogous situations. 62 In the case of a
married woman who is incapable under the law of the place
of acting, but capable under her domiciliary law, the American
authorities tend to hold her incapable/ 3 and contracts of a
person of full age in his own state, who acts in a state where he
is regarded as a minor, seem generally to be held voidable, 64
except under the domiciliary system of Louisiana. 65
A similar question arises where an American who is
domiciled in the United States and is more than twenty-one
years old, contracted an obligation in Chile, while the old
law was in force under which minority lasted until the completion of the twenty-fifth year. 66
Must an American court prefer in these cases the place of
contracting to the domicil? Lorenzen's 61 suggestion that
capacity should be determined by domicil in international
See change of domicil, supra p. I48, n. I go.
Burr v. Beckler (19I4) 264 Ill. 230, Io6 N. E. 206; Nichols & Shepard
Co. v. Marshall (1899) Io8 Ia. SI8, 79 N. W. 282; Pearl v. Hansborough
(I8.48) 28 Tenn. (9 Humph.) 426; criticized in II Col. L. Rev. (I9II) rsn
DeFur v. DeFur (1928) 156 Tenn. 634,4 S. W. (2d) 341. Cf. 2. BEALE 674
n. 3·
64
See I WHARTON§ ''4 and cases supra n. 2.7, probably not allowing the
doubt expressed by I Wharton§ usa after n. 5·
65
Saul v. His Creditors (I82.7) 5 Mart. N. S. 569, I6 Am. Dec. 2r:z, states
the case expressly, as similarly did Woodward v. Woodward (r889) 87 Tenn.
644, I I S. W. 892., 897•
66
C. C. art. 26, modified by Law no. 7, 6I2 of Oct. 1 I, I943·
67
LoRENZEN, "Uniformity Between Latin America and the United States in
the Rules of Private International Law Relating to Commercial Contracts,"
rs·Tul. L. Rev. (1941) 165 at 168, 170.
62

63
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transactions, as contrasted with interstate business, would do
justice in these situations.
IV.

CoNcLuSIONS

The proper approach to capaci_ty problems in conflict of laws
has been repeatedly discussed in recent years in Europe, and
an approximation toward the American system of lex loci contractus has been advocated in various quarters. In particular,
Batiffol who studied American conflict of laws in the United
States, recommended in 1934 in the newly founded French
Committee of Conflict of Laws, a cautious application of other
criteria than nationality. 68 Some critics of the present European system have expr.essed themselves in favor of the proper
law of the contract or, for special cases, that of the place of
contracting, while others have wished to substitute the law of
domicil for the national law.
The main argument against subjecting capacity to the law
of the place of contracting or to the proper law of the contract is that either alternative greatly facilitates evasion of the
statutory disabilities imposed by the domiciliary or national
law. In addition, the domiciliary or national courts employing
either conflicts rule are confronted by the dilemma whether to
observe this rule and sanction evasions or to enforce their statutory provisions on grounds of public policy. Such a casuistic
approach causes a great deal of uncertainty.
In this country, the uncertainty is somewhat mitigated by
the circumstance that a sizable majority of the courts unqualifiedly prefer the law of the place of contracting to any
domiciliary policy. Dissenting cases exist, however, and there
is increasing emphasis on the interests of the domiciliary state.
68
Travaux: du Comite fran~ais de droit international prive, Premiere annee,
1934, :u-66. Cf. BARBEY, Le Conflit 35; BATIFFOL 325 no. 363:ff. Contra:
]. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 5101 who defends the French case law, described

above, p. x88, \8 infinitely more flexible and more richly detailed than the
American system.
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Moreover, if the advice of Cook were to je heeded, the picture would change. He recommends that statutes restricting
the capacity of married women be examined to determine
whether they involve only married women domiciled and
acting within the state, or also foreign domiciled women acting
in the state, or acts of locally domiciled women out of the
state, or all these categories. 69 This suggestion seems to favor
as narrow as possible a construction of the statutory prohibitions. Its effect would probably reduce the scope of the restrictions upon capacity, whether under the law of the place of
contracting or under the law of domicil, whichever is applied.
Nevertheless, statutes do not easily lend themselves to such
construction; although the results may be beneficent, this
method of inquiry would considerably complicate the task of
the courts and, at least for the time being, render it more
difficult to ascertain the validity of contracts.
A retrospective view of these various attempts to solve this
old and not yet liquidated problem, indicates a compromise
useful in all countries and adequate to all interests concerned,
which also promises more definite results than those reached
thus far in the two opposite camps. The transactions in which
an incompetent individual participates should, by reference to
an objective criterion, be divided into two groups: one in which
local interests prevail sufficiently to justify the application of
the law of the contract; another in which the domiciliary or
national protective policies are entitled to be effectuated everywhere by means of the personal law. For the purpose of conflicts rules, business contracts already are distinguished from
transactions regulating family relations and decedents' estates
in the statutes of Germany, Switzerland, Poland, Italy, etc.,
as well as in the English doctrine, though particulars vary.
Following this lead, capacity to engage in transactions should
be determined, consistently and without exceptions, by the
69

CooK, Legal Bases 438ff.
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law governing personal status, when family relations and
other personal matters are concerned, and by the law governing the contract in general, when exchange of property or
services is involved. This approach, which would need to be
elaborated more specifically, could be further refined by a
carefully developed distinction between those incapacities
which businessmen may justly be expected to investigate, and
disabilities which may justifiably be ignored. Where the interests of third parties empirically appear worthy of protection, there should be no room whatever for interference by the
personal law. Vice versa, the American rule extends the law of
the place of contracting beyond any possible justification. It
is even applied to the capacity to marry.
The law thus in part replacing the personal law should conveniently be the law governing the contract as a whole rather
than the law of the place of contracting. 70 This is evident in
the case where a contract is clearly localized in a place other
than that of execution.
70
Lorenzen's suggestion (supra n. 67) of a compromise between North and
South American laws also tends toward the law governing the validity of
contracts in general, rather than that of the place of contracting. He assumes,
moreover, that the domicil of persons engaged in international trade is sufficiently stable to furnish a standard. The proposition above may not be far away
from his idea.

PART THREE
MARRIAGE

CHAPTER

7

Marriage1
I.

ENGAGEMENT TO MARRY

No American case seems to be in point. We have to deal,
therefore, with foreign conflicts rules only.
I.

Groups of Conflicts Rules

TIL recently the problems arising out of an engagement to marry have received little attention in the
conflict of laws. Insofar as they have been dealt with
at all, their treatment has suffered from divergency of classification in the various municipal laws.
Numerous countries treat a betrothal as a contract pertaining to the field of family relations and similar to the contract
of marriage itself. Where this notion prevails, as for instance,
· in England, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the
Scandinavian countries, the choice of law rules concerning the
subject matter have been developed by analogy to those relating to marriage. 2 Formal requirements are accordingly
treated as being determined by the law of the place of celebra-

U:

1
For surveys on the substantive marriage laws, see: HERMAN CoHN, The
Foreign Laws of Marriage and Divorce, Part I, The Countries of the European
Continent (Tel-Aviv, 1937); LESKE-LOEWENFELD, Rechtsverfolgung im internationalen Verkehr, vol. IV, I. Teil, Das Eherecht der europaischen Staaten und
ihrer Kolonien (Berlin, ed. 2, 1932-1937); BERGMANN, lnternationales Eheund Kindschaftsrecht, 2 vols. (Berlin, ed. 2, 1938-1940); Articles "Ehe,"
"Ehehindernisse," "Eheliches Giiterrecht," "Ehescheidung und Ehetrennung,"
"Eheschliessung," "Ehevertrag," by different authors, in 2 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. (Berlin, 1929-1938); EVERSLEY'S Law of the Domestic Relations,
ed. 5 by ALEXANDER CAIRNS (London, 1937).
2 In the United States also, the action for breach of promise is recognized as
being "in form at least ex contractu," although damages are awarded as in
tort matters. See DAGGETT, Legal Essays 44, 78.
In Italy the contract theory has been defended by FUNAIOLI, 9 Annuario Dir.
Comp. (1934) 3, 383; 5 Giur. Comp. Dir. Civ. 55·
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tion, whereas the intrinsic validity of an engagement to marry
is determined in accordance with the personal law of the
parties. 3 Sometimes, however, an old view is still followed,
according to which engagement and marriage are treated like
ordinary contracts; consequently the conflicts rule concerning
rescission of contracts is applied. 4
The personal law is also applied for the determination of
the consequences of a breach of engagement. In this respect
the difficulties that arise wherever the parties have different
personal laws are particularly noticeable, for the various
national laws attach widely different consequences to a breach
of promise to marry. Nowhere, it is true, will a promise to
marry be enforced by a decree of specific performance, 5 but
with respect to the duty to pay damages the laws vary from
non-recognition of any such duty to recognition of a duty to
pay compensatory damages for special injury, damages for
mental pain and suffering, or even punitive damages. In this
wide variety of domestic laws, the two solutions most frequently advocated are to determine the extent of either party's
liability (I) by his own personal law 6 and ( 2) as limited to
3 Germany: the rule has been applied in all cases; for particular applications
see footnotes infra n. 6 and n. 7·
Switzerland: App. Zurich (May I, I9o5) Bl.f.Ziirch.Rspr. (I905) 247 no.
I 59 (in the absence of a federal conflicts rule resorting to the former Ziiricher
Privatrechtl. Gesetzbuch) .
. The Netherlands: Rb. Almelo (Dec. 2, I925) W.II568, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I929)
53I; Rb. den Haag (Aprilu, I935) W.I936, no. 409, II Z.ausl.PR. (I937)
204.
Iceland; Law of domicil, EYJOLFSSON in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 761.
4 Switzerland: the law of the place of performance, identified with the common domicil of the parties and, in the absence of such, the intended :first marital
domicil; see BEcK, NAG. I77 no. 76, followed by App. Luzern (Oct; I9 1 I938)
36 SJZ. (I938-I939) 2I9 no. I5o.
5 Even the mere unenforceable obligation to marry has disappeared from the
canon law, still in force in several countries in Latin America and Eastern
Europe, under the Codex Juris Canonici, c. I o 17 § 31 which instead grants
damages for rescission of an engagement without just cause.
6 OLG. Koln (Dec. 4, I925) Leipz.Z.I926, 6o2, IPRspr. I926-I927, no.
63; KG. (Feb. 23, I933) IPRspr. 1934, no. 4I; particularly KG. (Feb. 71
1938) ]W.1938, 1715 1 Nouv. Revue 1939, 26o; KG. (Jan. xi, 1939) Dt.
Recht 19391 xou. See also :z. ZITELMANN 8ox; RAAPE 266, 270.
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the extent to which liability is recognized by the personal laws
of both. 7 Both opinions are influenced largely by a regard for
the law of the forum, for in most cases the personal law of the
defendant is that of the forum. 8
The majority of the countries following the French system,
consider liability for breach of promise to marry to pertain to
tort law. Consequently, in conflicts cases the law of the place
of the wrong is held to be applicable, 9 but no clear rules exist
for the determination of the place of the wrong in such instances.10
The C6digo Bustamante 11 and other recent codifications 12
simply declare the law of the forum to be applicable.
2.

Cases

The functioning of the various choice of law rules may be
illustrated by the following cases, one hypothetical and one
real.
(a) A Frenchman, engaged to marry a French girl, repudiates his promise, while both he and his fiancee are
temporarily residing in Germany.
If an action for breach of promise is brought against him in
a French court, German municipal law, as the law of the place
of the wrong, would have to be applied. The fact, however,
7
0LG. Miinchen (March 13, 1929) IPRspr.
1932) IPRspr. 1932, no. 66; see also NEUMEYER,
Familicnrecht (1928) § 7; also M. WoLFF, IPR.
VALLINDAS 272 n. 8.
8 Cf. the dicta quoted by 3 FRANKENSTEIN 46

1929, no. 69; KG. (May 2,
IPR. (ed. 1) 19; M. WoLFF,
II5; LEWALD 77; 2 STREIT-

n. 34; ibid. 47 n. 42. The
Kammergericht, however, in its decision of Feb. 23, 1933, supra n. 6, applied
the personal law of the Turkish defendant without regard to the law of the
forum.
9
Trib. civ. Valenciennes (Dec. 19, 1935) Nouv. Revue 1936, 325 (French
law applied to Polish parties living in France as the law of the place of wrong,
and Polish personal law rejected).
10 In France receipt of a "letter of rupture" by the fiancee regarded as decisive: Trib. civ. Seine (June 16, 1936) Gaz. Pal. 1936.2.744·
11
C6digo Bustamante art. 39·
, 12 Finland: Law of Dec. s, 1929, on certain family relations of international
character, § 46, In the English case of Hansen v. Dixon (1906) 23 T. L. R.
56, English law was applied with scant justification.
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that the German law treats liability for breach of promise to
marry in the fourth book of the Civil Code, which is entitled
"Family Law," has led a text writer 13 to believe that French
courts, in view of their treatment of breach of promise to
marry as a tort, would apply not the rules applicable under
the German classification, but rather the German rules on
torts. Strange consequences would result from this view. The
defendant could be held liable, only if shown to have been
aware that his conduct would cause pecuniary damage to his
fiancee and, furthermore, his behavior constituted a violation
of good morals. Then the additional question might be raised
whether this is to be determined by German or French standards. Obviously, the French court would do better to apply
the rules of family law provided for the case in the German
Civil Code.
If the case arose in a German court, the German judge
would have to apply French law as the personal law of the
parties; but inasmuch as the French law would regard the
question as one of tort and refer it to the German law as the
law of the place of the wrong, the German court would accept the renvoi so as to apply the provisions of the fourth book
of the German Civil Code. Thus, although the courts in
France and Germany would start from different premises, the
decision would be the same in both. 14
(b) An American citizen domiciled in New York, while
temporarily residing in Germany, seduced a German girl by
13

RAAPE 267.
Decisions, subjecting one party to a law recognizing liability and the other
to one which does not, are considered inequitable, by M. WoLFF, IPR. I I 5;
contra, RAAPE, loc. cit. This latter author's more recent book (z Deutsches
Internationales Privatrecht I68, I7o) proposes use of the choice of law rule
applicable to obligations neither contractual nor delictual, i.e., roughly the
quasi-contractual obligations of the common law, as once used by the Reichsgericht, (Oct. zi, I887) 20 RGZ. 333 and (Feb. 28, I889) 23 RGZ. Ip, and
by the Trib. Baselstadt (Sept. 9, I89I) II Z. Schweiz.R. N.F.64. There is,
however, no choice of law rule generally recognized that can be used for the
purpose. RAAPE'S own suggestion is to apply the domiciliary law of the innocent or, alternatively, the female party. This,, indeed, would be a universal
rule.
14
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promrsmg to marry her and subsequently repudiated his
promise. The German court denied the girl's action, holding
that the German conflict of laws rules referred to the law of
New York as the personal law of the defendant, under which
actions for breach of promise to marry are not recognized. 15
3· Public Policy
In those countries where choice of law rules refer the courts
to some foreign law, the lex fori is frequently resorted to in
order to prevent the enforcement of liabilities regarded as
contr:.try to the public policy of the forum. In the Netherlands,
for instance, damages allowed by German law for breach of
the contract to marry could not be recovered unless the marriage banns, a prerequisite to such suits in the Netherlands, had
been published. 16 Enforcement of penalties agreed upon in the
contract of engagement is generally denied. 17 Some countries
consider damages for breach of promise to marry, whether
based on domestic or foreign law, as contrary to public policy. 18
Even where public policy is resorted to more sparingly, doubts
have been expressed with respect to such enormously high
claims as are allowed in England and in some American
states. 1 9 A recent Finnish statute expressly limits the amount
15
New York Laws I935 1 ch. 263 amending C.P.A. by inserting art. (2a).
The German case is KG. (Jan. I I, I939) Dt. Recht, I939 1 Io12.
16
Dutch BW. art. I IJ par. 2. See Hof s'Hertogenbosch (Jan. 5, I9J2) W.
I2416, II Z.ausl.PR. (I937) 204; Rb. Rotterdam (May 12 1 I922) W.I0996
and (July 27, I932) W.12584, II Z.ausl.PR. (I937) 204. These decisions
were criticized by VAN DER FLIER, Grotius I927, Io8; ibid. I924, 123, at
I25 and ·OFFERHAUS, Gedenkboek I838-I938, 7I3 1 but recommended for
Italian law by FEDOZZI 401.
17
Penalties are still used in Greece; see 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 274. They are
considered contrary to public policy by the German KG. (Jan. 23, I901) 2
ROLG. 132, II Z.int.R. (1902) 99, Clunet I902, 629 and by most other courts.
C01ztra: 3 FRANKENSTEIN 45·
18
Norway: see LUNDH 'in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 7I 7•
More often it is alleged that the law of the forum fixes the maximum damages
that can be awarded, e.g.:
Italy: FEDOZZI 401.
Iceland: EYJOLFSSON in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 761.
19
Against awarding: NussBAUM, D. IPR. I3I n. 2; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS
274 n. I5; contra; DEMERTZES1 Family Law 91 1 § 24, cited by STREITVALLINDAS; RAAPE 27I.
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recoverable to that allowed by both the plaintiff's personal
law and the law of Finland. 20 On the other hand, a foreign
law occasionally has been denied application because it failed
to recognize a claim for damages for breach of promise to
marry/ 1 to that extent frustrating the elimination of such suits
by the so-called "heart balm" statutes. Almost all these applications of public policy are obviously arbitrary.
4· Conclusion
An Anglo-American writer recently suggested application
of the foreign characterization of a breach of promise where
the foreign systems of law applicable to the situation concur
in characterizing it (as breach of contract or as tort), but where
the engagement and the breach occur in two foreign jurisdictions having different characterizations, that the forum
should apply its own characterization. 22 This exception to the
author's theory of lex fori characterization is inconsistent with
any general theory, nor does it help in the more important
cases.
It would be preferable for the conflicts rule to be free
from interfering substantive law; the rule should simply refer
the rights and obligations flowing from an engagement to the
law of the place regarded under the circumstances as the center
of the social relation between the parties at the time of engagement.

II.

THE CoNCEPT oF MARRIAGE IN THE CoNFLICT oF LAws

Experience has shown that marriage must be defined in the
conflict of laws in broader terms than those in which it is
20 Law of Dec.

21

s,

1929, § 46.

OGL. Kiiln, cit. supra n. 6; contra: M. WoLFF, IPR. I 15 n. 4· The
cision of the Kammergericht of 1939 (supra n. 6), declares expressly that
American statute denying a claim for seduction of a betrothed woman is
contrary to the international public policy of the court, though contrary to
German Civil Code.
22 RoBERTSON, Characterization 76-78, 177.
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understood, legally and sociologically/ 3 in the several systems
of municipal law. Two groups of cases have been given
practical consideration.
r. Soviet Marriage
In 1929 a man was sued in the Probate Division of the English High Court for separate maintenance by a woman with
whom he had entered into an agreement of marriage in the
Soviet Union. The defendant contended that this so-called
marriage did not correspond with the English notion of marriage because, under the Soviet law at the time in question,
such a rrl.arriage could be dissolved by the simple unilateral
act of either party without the necessity of any reason being
specified. Following this argument, Hill, J., held that the
relation existing between the parties was not such as to constitute a marriage and, therefore, that the plaintiff was not
entitled to recover. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision on the grounds that, although Soviet law may thus
permit the relation to be voluntarily dissolved, the parties may
be presumed to have intended it to be permanent. Thus, the
relation created in the Soviet Union was not considered to
be fundamentally different from the English notion of marriage.24 The Supreme Court of Hungary, on the contrary,
declared a Soviet marriage not in accord with humanity and
ethics, constituting nothing more than concubinage. 25
23
On the relation between the sociological and the legal concept of marriage
and the function of law with respect to the regulation of sex relations, see
LLEWELLYN, "Behind the Law of Divorce," 32 Col. L. Rev. (1932) 1281,
33 Col. L. Rev. (1933) 249·
24
Nachimson v. Nachimson [1930] P. 85; [1930] P. (C. A. ) 217.
25
Hungarian Royal Court (Feb. 23, 1926) P. III 1616/1926, German
translation in Z.f.Ostrecht 1927, 62o; cf. 5 Z.ausi.PR. (1931) 783, Clunet
1929, 1202; Hungarian Royal Court (Nov. 6, 1928) P. III 841r/27, cf. JW.
1931, 167 and the article by SZLADITS, "Some Features of Hungarian Private
International Law," in 23 Grotius Soc. 1937, 25 at 34 ff.
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In virtual agreement with the English Court of Appeals,
the Reichsgericht recognized first a "recorded" 26 and later
a "non-recorded" Soviet marriage/ 7 consid~ring it essential
that, although the Soviet law does not r~cognize any mutual
rights and duties between the spouses, yet they have intended
to unite themselves for a life to be lived in common. The
court, indeed, has felt it impossible to deny validity to all
Russian marital unions.
The possibility that a marriage of non-Russians, and especially of persons subject to the law of the forum, might
occur without formalities, was not at issue. This matter and
the common law marriage will be discussed in connection with
the formalities requisite for marriage.
2.

Polygamous Marriage

Polygamous marriages formerly were absolutely excluded
from recognition, inasmuch as English doctrine limits the notion of marriage to "Christian marriage," which is necessarily
monogamous. On numerous occasions, however, British courts
have had to concern themselves with the polygamous marriages of Mohammedans, Hindus, Chinese, and other peoples
not belonging to the realm of Western civilization, 28 while
in the United States Indian tribal marriages and those
formerly practiced by the Mormons have been recognized.
Whereas the celebration of such unions within the forum is
rigidly prohibited, it is neither workable nor convenient to deny
that for~ign marriages of such a nature function within the territories of the peoples concerned. ~ 9 Moreover, there is not
sufficient public interest to do so in cases where the existence
or nonexistence of a foreign marriage is only a consideration
preliminary to the decision of a problem of property law, tax
26
RG. (Oct. 22, 1930) ]W. 1931 1 1334 no. 1. Similarly Brazil: App. Rio
de Janeiro (June ro, 193:1.) Clunet I9JZ 1 1124.
27
RG. (April 71 1938) 157 RGZ. z57, z6z, 2.65.
28 For details see 2 BEALE§ rzr.r and CHEATHAM, Cases 871 no. 5·
29
See the basic exposition by KAHN, r Abhandl. 161 ff.
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law, or some other matter not immediately affecting the mores
of the forum. 30

III.
I.

FoRMAL REQUIREMENTS oF MARRIAGE

Survey of Problems: Requirements of Form and Intrinsic Validity Distinguished

It has been customary from old times to permit foreigners
to marry; the churches ·have not made distinction on account
of nationality in the administration of marriage ceremonies.
It is a singular exception to this usage that the French decree
of 193 8, mentioned earlier, disallows the marriage of foreigners unless they possess a police permit of sojourn for more
than a year. 31 On the other hand, nationals may marry abroad,
although they may have to observe certain prescriptions of
their national laws.
In legal systems outside of the United States, conflict rules
distinguish the form and the intrinsic validity of marriage.
The former is referred to the law of the place of celebration
and the latter to the personal law of the parties. This difference
is steadily gaining in favor in the literature of the United
States.
Generally defined, the terms "formal requirements" and
"formalities" of marriage mean the external conduct required
of the parties or of third persons, especially public officers,
necessary to the formation of a legally valid marriage. These
formal requirements are distinguished from the substantive
30
See GooDRICH 319. The cases are discussed by BECKETT, "The Recognition of Polygamous Marriages under English Law," 48 Law Q. Rev. (1932)
341; cf. FoSTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws,"
16 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84, 88. An interesting discussion has
been held in Canada: see FALCONBRIDGE, Annotation [1932] 4 D. L. R. 19 and
contra: 1 JoHNSON 312. The view adopted in the text, as explained by FALCONBRIDGE in Rivista Dir. Priv. (1932) I 297-307, has been recommended for
Italian use by FEDOZZI 456.
31
Circular letter of the Garde de Sceaux of Dec. I 3, 19 3 8 concerning the
marriage of foreigners in France, J. Off. Jan. 6, I939; cf. Nouv. Revue I938,
935 and supra pp. 141, 142, n. I 62.
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conditions for validity such as age, race, religious affiliation, or
health of the parties.
The purpose of the distinction in the conflict of laws is obvious. On the one hand, the personal law of the parties leaves
the determination of formalities to the law of the place of
celebration but reserves to itself the determination of the
intrinsic conditions of marriage. On the other hand, the law
of the place of celebration scrupulously takes into consideration the requirements of the personal law as to intrinsic conditions but disregards its prescriptions as to form.
The borderline between the two categories, however, is not
traced uniformly in the various systems of municipal law. Although differences of such classification in the conflict of laws
systems are not accentuated, there is sometimes a tendency
to classify certain conditions precedent as substantive merely
for the purpose of giving these conditions extraterritorial effect. This is a natural tendency where social policies or ecclesiastical conceptions are regarded as too important to be
sacrificed in any instance, irrespective of where the marriage
may be celebrated. Internationally relevant rules, however,
should be expressed in an adequate common language. To deal
with such divergences in classification, two methods are available. One is to let each court accept as for~ality what internal
law regards as such; the ensuing chaos evoked criticism long
ago. 32 The other is to define the notion of formalities in a
universally acceptable sense. As a matter of fact, although there
seem to be four principal points which have occasioned difficulties for an international understanding, it does not appear
that agreement to eliminate them would be impossible. These
are controversial matters:
(a) Proclamation of banns and similar proceedings preliminary to the celebration of a marriage were occasionally
32 NIEMEYER in 2.6 Z.int.R. (1916)
3, MENDELSSOHN BARTHOLD¥,
zz Z.int.R. (1912.) 364, and 3 FRANKENSTEIN IJo, who attempt various other
solutions. NrBoy;ET 732, however, follows the lex fori, though he is exclusively concerned with the point mentioned, infra p. 2.14.
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classified in early times as substantive requirements. But it is
now generally agreed that they are to be regarded as mere
formalities. The same opinion prevails with respect to recordation and similar acts required under some laws when parties
have married abroad.
(b) Except in England, the requirement of parental consent to the marriage of a minor is universally characterized
as closely connected with the intrinsic requirement of consent
of the party. The English qualification itself is open to criticism.33
(c) Classification of the requirement of freedom from mistake has caused some writers difficulty. 34 Their doubts can be
resolved easily when two different situations are kept separate.
On the one hand, due form requires that the parties make their
declarations at the time and in the words or by the conduct
demanded by the applicable law. If, for instance, A says "no"
but is understood to have said "yes," the law governing
"formalities" should be resorted to in order to determine
whether there exists a validly declared consent. On the other
hand, whether a declaration of intention must be supported
by an intention in fact or whether the declaration is to be
considered valid even where the intention of the party does
not coincide with his expression, is a matter which concerns
the essentials rather than the formalities of the contract. Thus,
if both parties use the correct ceremony but have secretly
agreed to be married only nominally (simulation), the law
governing substantial requirements should determine whether
or not they are bound in marriage. This has been denied by
canon and English law but affirmed by Italian law and the
German Code before its amendment. 35
33 See below,
34 CHESHIRE

p. 267.
346 classifies a "fundamental mistake" as pertaining to formalities and hence refers it to the law of the place of celebration, while he claasifies "capacity" only as personal law. This reasoning neglects the essential
distinction between intention and declaration of intention. In accordance with
the text, e.g., }EMOLO, Matrimonio 97·
36 See infra p. 272.
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(d) The last and most discussed problem concerns the requirement made in some, but not all, of the states which still
regard marriage as an essentially religious institution: that
their subjects observe the religious ceremony even when they
celebrate marriages abroad. In these countries, dependence
on the religious rites is considered to affect the capacity of
the parties and, hence, to be properly a matter of the personal
law. In the rest of the world, comprising by far the majority
of states, the religious celebration, whether indispensable or
not, is treated as a formality. This point will be examined
later. 36
The domain of formality as distinguished from that of procedure has been considered with respect to the rebuttable presumption of British law that a man and a woman having
cohabited and having enjoyed the reputation of being married
are deemed to have been duly married. A presumption of this
kind has been characterizedas relating merely to the manner
of proof and therefore as a rule of procedure of the forum. 37
A contrary decision of British Columbia, however, has been
defended 38 and seems to be the right answer. If the core of
a law suit depends on whether a man and woman have been
merely regarded as married in the eyes of their community or
whether they were, by being so regarded or otherwise, legally
married, then the essential elements constituting marriage
are involved. Moreover, it would be impractical to try to
submit to different conflicts rules the existence of a marriage
by repute and the choice of facts determining the existence
of such a marriage.

Locus Regit Actum
Formalities of marriage have been, from the middle ages,
a particularly important field for the application of the maxim
2.

36 See infra pp. 214-216; cf. 2pff.
See particularly FALCONBRIDGE, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. 214.
38
Leong Sow Nom v. Chin Yee You (1934) 49 B. C. R. 244, [1934] 3
W. W. R. 686, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 9o, with approving note by CANSACCHI
37

2I
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locus regit actum, a maxim not everywhere understood in quite
the same sense nor applied with entire consistency. We may
distinguish in the following survey three types of provisions:
(a) Compulsory rule. In one group of countries, including
the United States,S 9 England, Denmark, and Japan, 40 the law
of the place where a marriage is celebrated is decisive, irrespective of whether the marriage be concluded within or
without the territory of the forum. No other law is allowed
any influence on the formalities of marriage. The personal
laws of the parties are irrelevant, and the parties have no
choice other than to select the place of celebration. In countries
following this principle, the marriage ceremonies of their own
countries or churches are not available to the parties, unless
these formalities happen to coincide with those permitted at
the place where they are being married.
Illustration: Under Danish matrimonial law a marriage
may be celebrated before a minister of some religious denomination. But a marriage of two Danish subjects before a
minister of their church in Berlin will not be recognized in
Denmark because in Germany civil marriage is compulsory. 41
(b) Optional rule. Most countries adhere to a double
system: parties celebrating a marriage within the forum must
comply with the domestic formalities; parties marrying
39

For the state statutes see I VERNIER§ 32; for the cases 2 BEALE 671ff.
England: Berthiaume v. Dastous [1930] A. C. 79·
Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 2I8 no. 38; MuNCH-PETERSEN,
4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 745 n. 78.
Japan: Law of I898, art. I3'J>ar. I sentence 2.
The Austrian Supreme Court has held the same way beginning with a decision of March 11, 1913 1 so GlU. NF. no. 6345; see decisions of Sept. 20,
1927, 9 SZ. no. 127; Oct. 24, 1934, Zentralblatt I935> no. 1; May 21, 1937,
66 J. Bl. (I937) 296; even after the conclusion of the Austrian Concordat with
the Holy See, a marriage celebrated before a Catholic clergyman in a country
where civil marriage ceremony is compulsory, is invalid in Austria; this decision, however, adds: "at least if one party is a foreign national." Cf. WALKER
666.
Presumably Liechtenstein, where Austrian marriage law is still in force,·
follows the saine doctrine, but it has been ranged within the group described
under (b) by an official German handbook; see BERGMANN, Der Auslander im
Deutschen Recht (I934) 66 n. 70.
41
See BoRUM and MEYER in 6 Repert. 2 I 9 no. 40. See another example
under (b).
40
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abroad must observe either the formalities prescribed at the
place of contracting or those of the personal law or laws. 42
This system also is adopted in article 7 of the Hague Convention on Marriage. Where the parties are of different nationalities, in accordance with the opinion prevailing in most
countries/ 3 the Convention provides, however, that a marriage not complying with the formal requirements in the
country of celebration must satisfy the national laws of both
parties in order to her recognized by other participant states. 44
The practical difference between the two systems described
so far may be illustrated by a case decided a few years ago by
the Privy Council. Two Catholics domiciled in the Province of
Quebec participated in a marriage ceremony before a Catholic
priest in Paris. The marriage was void in France but would
have been good if performed in Quebec. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, speaking as the final appellate
court of Canada, felt itself compelled to hold the marriage
invalid. 45 If, however, the parties had been Swedes marrying
in Paris before a minister of the Swedish Established Church,
their marriage would have been held valid in Sweden. 46
An analogous question is apt to arise when a marriage by
mere consent is invalid under the local law but may or may
42 Instead of the personal law, a former system had the law of the place of
"performance," which was understood as the intended matrimonial domicil,
as an alternative to the local law. In ·this senge the Law of the Baltic Prov.,
introd. art. XXXVI was applied in I92.8 in Latvia; cf. BERENT in 4 Leske.
Loewenfeld I 576 n. 2.II.
43
See e.g., Austrian OGH. (May 2.I, I937) I9 SZ. no. I66 (Austria was
not a participant in the Hague Convention).
44
An illustration of the difficulties arising from this rule is the decision of
the German Reichsgericht (April 6, I9I9) 88 RGZ. I9I.
4
"Berthiaume v. Dastous (I92.9) [I93o] A. C. 79, [I93o] I D. L. R. 849,
.
99 L. J. (P. C.) 66. Cf. FALCONBRIDGE, Annotation [I9J2.] 4 D. L. R. 8.
For the same reason Italian courts and writers consider a religious marriage
of Italian Catholics in France invalid, even after the Concordat; see BALLADORE-PALLIERI, Dir. Int. Eccles. 2. I I against an isolated decision of Trib.
Milano (April 2.7, I938) cited by him.
46 Sweden: Law of I 904 with amendments, c. I § 8 par. x.
The problem is well known in Latin America; cf. I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ
xio no. I97·
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not be recognized by a personal law which admits such marriages.47
(c) Rule modified by religious requirements. The principle, locus regit actum, compulsory in every case under the
first system described above, (a), and optional in foreign
marriages under the second system described above, (b), is
profoundly modified in a group of countries emphasizing the
importance of religious rites. This group of countries, which
is characterized by strong ties between the state and an established church, formerly included Turkey, Czarist Russia,
and after the Russian Revolution the parts of Poland and
Lithuania formerly in Russia. Today it embraces Palestine
in part, Bulgaria, Greece, parts of pre-war Yugoslavia, 48
Egypt/ 9 Malta, Cyprus,0° Iran, and after 1938 with respect
to Catholics also Spain. 51
Since in these countries a religious ceremony is required, a
marriage celebrated abroad by civil ceremony is not recognized. In Greece it was doubted whether this rule applied to
citizens other than those of the Greek Orthodox faith, but
it is now agreed that it includes Roman Catholics, Moslems,
4 7 A third case where a marriage invalid under the local law could satisfy the
requirements of the personal law is construed, quite hypothetically it seems, by
BEcK, NAG. art. 7£ no. 36, and RAAPE 251 (b) par. 3·
48 For details of the very complex legal situations, see the reports in 4 LeskeLoewenfeld I: on Serbia, by PERITCH at 982 1 (see also PERITCH in 40 Bull.
Inst. Int. (1939) 1, 186, 41 Bull. Inst. Int. (1940) 1); on Croatia-Slavonia,
by LOVRIC at 1034; on Bosnia-Herzegovina, by EISNER at 1050; on
Montenegro, by EISNER at 1056.
49 Under their own law however, Moslems and Oriental Jews may marry simply
before witnesses of their people without any religious ceremony; see GoADBY 148.
50 For Cyprus see the facts in the English case of Papadopoulos [1930] P. 55
(infra n. 68); where only one party, however, is of the Greek Orthodox faith and
the other a member of another church, certain difficulties have been cleared away
by the Marriage (~lidation and Amendment) Law, No. 3 of 1937 1 s.4 and
s.5 (e).
51 Law of March 12, 1938; C. C. art. 42 allows marriage before the municipal
judge to non-Catholic and such Catholic parties who declare not to practice the
Roman Catholic religion.
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and Jews. Moreover, it is held sufficient that one of the
parties be of the Orthodox creed in order to necessitate the
attendance of a priest (pope) of this denomination. 53
Grave complications are bound to occur when a national o'f
a country where such an imperative rule is in force attempts
to marry in a country where observance of a civil ceremony
is indispensable. 5 4 The only certain way for the parties in such
case to effect a valid marriage is to go through both ceremonies,
the civil one prescribed by the local law and the religious rite
required by the personal law. 5 5
It is noteworthy that this conflict is often designated by
theorists as an insoluble conflict of qualifications. In connection with the idea that marriage is a sacrament to be administered in the proper way and with the attendance of the
persons required by the particular denomination, it has been
denied that these religious conditions of marriage can be
treated like other forms of contract; rather must they be considered part of the personal status of the party concerned. This
position was once taken by the Czarist Russian Church, 5 6 and
it is so firmly rooted in Greece that in the new Civil Code the
52

See z STREIT-VALLINDAS 3 r 9 n. 3 6, who quotes the former opinions (3 I 7

n. p).
The rule was generally applied in former Russia too; see MAKAROV in 4 LeskeLoewenfeld I 48 8, as well as under the Marriage Law of I 8 3 6 of the Kingdom
of Poland until I 9z6. See infra n. 56.
On Lithuania see Z.f.Ostrecht I93r, 65; RuTENBERG in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld
I sos.
~ 3 See z STREIT-VALLINDAS ·3ro, 320 and the evidence in the case of Stathatos
v. Stathatos (I9IZ) [I9IJ] P. 46.
For Bulgaria see KG. (Jan. 19, I934) IPRspr. 1934, no. I6.
54
See infra p. z3zff.
55
Civil officials are required so to advise the parties in Prussia; see BERGMANN,
Der Auslander im Deutschen Recht (1934) 66 n. 70.
In Switzerland the parties must even give assurance that the religious ceremony
will follow; see GMOR, Familienrecht art. r I 8 n. 6.
~ 6 Decision of the Civil Department of Cassation (April rs, I898) Decisions
I 899, no. 39· This conception was maintained in Eastern Poland until the
Polish Law on international priva~e law of I9z6, which made the law of the
place of celebration govern the form of foreign marriages. But it took a decision
of the Polish Supreme Court in Plenary Meeting on April rz, I9Z9 (Z.f.Ostrecht
I930, srz) to state that "forms" include the ecclesiastical manner of marriage;
for details see 0STROWICZ, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 445 n. zsz; WERMINSKI, Note,
6 Giur. Camp. DIP. no. ro6.
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necessity of a religious ceremony was not formulated as an
exception to the maxim locus regit actum, since this maxim,
applying to formalities only, does not include the necessity
of a religious ceremony regarded as a substantive condition. 57
Formerly as well as recently, 58 some Western writers, too,
have been greatly impressed by this characterization. For a
time, French courts considered a civil marriage celebrated in
France by a Greek Orthodox or Catholic foreigner, if not
recognized in his homeland, invalid even under French law. 5 9
But no such concessions to foreign laws are made any longer
by any country requiring its own subjects to ,observe a civil
marriage ceremony. The true reason for this attitude is not,
or at least should not be, any method of characterization. 60
By classification as "mere" form, the secular ceremony is not
degraded but, on the contrary, is emphasized as the objective of an intransigent public policy, quite as cogent as
the mandatory requirement of a religious ceremony. Indeed,
those countries that regard ecclesiastical acts either of marriage or divorce, even in the case of foreigners, as private
transactions without legal effect so far as the state is concerned,
have been accused of intolerance. 61 Nevertheless, while, on
the one hand, the dominant American conflict rules concerning
marriage minimize the personal law of the parties, it certainly
is not cl~ar, on the other hand, why the forum should yield
to the pretensions of foreign countries to regulate local mar.
.
nage ceremomes.
The problem of classification in this case is not more than a
mere question of terminology. For the purpose of technical
57 MARIDAKIS, 11 Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 121. For complete literature see z
STREIT-VALLINDAS 318.
SSUNGER, I System 210j 2 FIORE no. 528; PERROUD, Clunet 1922, 5; 1
FRANKENSTEIN 524; 3 ibid. 133; RAAPE 253· Contra: 1 BAR§ 169; WALKER
662 n. 55, and in I KLANG'S Kommentar 337; NEUMANN-ETI"ENREICH and
SATTER in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 206 and particularly BALOGH, 57 Recueil 1936
III 6 8 5-702.
59 See infra p. 2 r 8, n. 69.
60 NrBOYET 731 no. 623, applies this very method.
613 FRANKENSTEIN 137.
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understanding in matters of international law, it is submitted,
religious marriage, including the participation or mere presence of an ecclesiastical officer, like any secular solemnization,
constitutes a formality in which the contract is "clothed." This
conception is traditional in almost the whole world and has
been confirmed for the Catholic Church by the Codex Juris
Canonici, which clearly distinguishes form of celebration
(c.I094-II03) from impediments (c.I03S-I08o) anddefects
of consent (c.I08I-I093). 62 For international terminology,
such a common denominator of formalities is the only convenient one. Formalities have more than one function-among
others, those of guaranteeing the finality and seriousness of
the solemnized act, of publicizing the marriage, and of furnishing trustworthy evidence of its occurrence. All such purposes
are common to any kind of marriage ceremony. Furthermore,
the fact that an omission of the prescribed words or acts may
adversely affect the validity of the transaction is not peculiar
to religious marriage. At any rate, the policy of Greece,
Bulgaria, and the other countries enumerated above on page
213, is sufficiently summarized by saying that these countries
regard the religious form as essential for all marriages of their
nationals.
3· The Law of the Place of Celebration as Applied to Domestic Marriages

General rule. In spite of doubts occasionally expressed, the
almost general rule is that a marriage celebrated within the
:62 The same classification has, quite naturally, now been confirmed by the
Italian writers on the Catholic marriage with civil effects, established by the
Concordat of 1929 with the Holy See, Bosco, "Le Nuove leggi sui matrimonio,"
22 Rivista 1930, 363, 372: FEDOZZI 418 n. 2. To the same effect in other
Catholic countries, see in 6 Repert.; for Austria: KuNz, 110 nos. 199-201; for
Belgium: ]ANNE 149 nos. 46-48; for Brazil: BEVILAQUA r 66 no. 39· This means
that a purely ecclesiastical ceremony of Austrian Catholics in Italy was invalid in
Austria, despite canon marriage being the prescribed form in the Austrian Allg.
BGB.; see for instance OGH. (May 21, 1937) 66 J.Bl. (1937) 296, and
below, p. 233, n. 137·
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territory of the forum is invalid, unless the formalities prescribed by the matrimonial law of the forum are satisfied. The
forms of marriage which a state places at the disposition of the
parties are available to foreigners and citizens alike, but no
other forms are allowed. If the law of the place of celebration
leaves the parties free to choose between solemnization by a
minister of the gospel or a priest and solemnization by a civil
officer, a judge, or a civil commissioner, as is done in almost all
Anglo-American countries, Sweden, Italy, 63 and others, foreigners can easily satisfy both the local and the personal law
by choosing that ceremony which will be recognized by their
personal laws. Hardships may arise where civil marriage is
compulsory at the place of celebration.
The rule that the domestic formalities are exclusive is expressly contained in the following statutes, among others:
Germany, EG. art. I3 par. 3·
Hungary, Marriage Law of I894, §I I3.
Italy, C.C.(I865) art. I03; C.C.(I942) art. u6.
Poland, Law of I 926, art. I 3 par. I.
Sweden, Law of I904, c. I § 4 par. I.
Switzerland, NAG. art. 7c par. 2. 64
Brazil: Introductory Law of I942, art. 7 § I.
Soviet Union, Family laws of I926 of Russian Soviet Republic, art. I36; of Ukraine, art. !07 par. 2. 65
Ordinarily the rule is treated as unquestionable and justified as being required by elementary publit policy. 66 Every
63 The form of marriage ceremony provided for by the Italian Concordat with
the Holy See, viz., and ecclesiastical marriage recorded by the state civil registrar,
is available to foreigners, according to the general opinion, which is contested,
however, by BALLADORE-PALLIERI, Dir. Int. Eccles. 220.
64
To this effect BG. (Oct. 6, 1883) 9 BGE. 449, 453; Just. Dep. April 30,
I 924, BBl. I 924, II 2 5; BBl. I 940, 1462 no. 9 (no marriage by proxy for
foreigners prevented from entering Switzerland); HUBER-MUTZNER 434;
contra: STAUFFER, NAG. art. 7c no. 26.
65
FREUND in 4 Leske-Loewenfeid I 366; MAKARov, Precis 331ff.
66
Cf. 2 FIORE no. 54I; RoLIN, Principes 79:ff. nos. 576, 578, 581; TRiAs DE
BEs, 6 Repert. 2 52 no. I o 1 ; 1 RESTREPO HERNANDEZ I 09 no. 19 6.
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state is said to have decided, after careful deliberation, whether
marriages shall be solemnized in religious or temporal form,
or parties shall be permitted to marry without any formality
at all. From this point of view, it is understandable that states
should not wish to see exceptions made within their territories
in favor of aliens. Not quite so obvious, however, is the necessity of permitting foreigners to avail themselves of local ceremonies which are at variance with their personal laws. Doubtless, it is believed appropriate to render marriage possible for
alien residents.
An exception to the general rule requiring marriages ·celebrated within the country to comply with the prescribed
formalities is that of foreigners in Greece who are permitted,
according to an old doctrine, to avail themselves of all public
solemnizations provided for by their personal laws. This rule
permits all sorts of religious and consular marriages, excluding, however, simple consensual contracts of the common law
or Soviet type. 67

Illustrations:
(a) Validity of marriage in municipal form: In the English case of Papadopoulos v. Papadopoulos, P., domiciled in
Cyprus and belonging to the Greek Orthodox church, married
a woman of French nationality before a registrar in London
in compliance with the formalities of English law. His marriage was held valid in England, although it was not recognized in Cyprus because not celebrated in a church by a priest
of the Orthodox church. 68
There is abundant authority to the same effect in other
countries. 69
67
Cf. z STREIT-VALLINDAS 306, 3I5•
as [I93o] P. 55·
69

Belgium: Cass. (Jan. I9, I8p) Pasicrisie I85z. I. 85; Antwerp (July 3,
I939) 9 Rechtsk. Wkbl. 1939, 44·
France: In a series of decisions beginning with App. Douai (Nov. 1 8, I 903)
Clunet I904, 394, down to a particularly objectionable decision of the Trib. of
Metz (Oct. 30, 1929) StAZ. 1930, 198, the marriage has been held invalid if
the formalities of the personal law were not observed. More recently, however,
the trend favoring territoriality rather than the personal law has won the upper
hand, and it is now well established that a marriage celebrated in France in ac-
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(b) Invalidity of religious marriages not provided for by
the municipal law: Thus, in a German case, Jewish subjects
of Czarist Russia went through a religious ceremony in Germany before a rabbi. Although good in Russia, the marriage
was held nonexistent in Germany, as no ceremony was performed before a civil officer. 70 Similarly, a marriage was celebrated in Germany according to religious formalities by a
Greek and a Serbian subject. Although valid in both Greece
and Serbia, the marriage was held nonexistent in Germany. 71
(c) Invalidity of common law marriage: Two American
citizens from New York live together as husband and wife in
Belgium without a marriage ceremony. Belgian courts will
hold the marriage invalid. 72
Apparent exceptions. Obviously, it is not inconsistent with
the rule of compliance with local formalities for France and
Spain to authorize or compel 73 their nationals in their respective colonies to marry in compliance with the formalities
of the mother country.
Neither is it an exception, when a French court applies
Spanish law in deciding whether or not a French woman has
cordance with the French formalities is valid, while a marriage celebrated in
France in accordance with religious formalities is invalid. See Trib. civ. Seine
(Nov. 20, I9I2), aff'dCourParis (Dec. 22, I92I) inClunet, I922, I35; Trib.
civ. Seine (Jan. 7, I922), aff'd Cour Paris (Nov. I7, I922) Clunet I923, 85;
Trib. civ. Nice (June 26, I923) Clunet 1924, 670. All writers agree.
Germany: RG. (Dec. 17, 1908) 70 RGZ. 139; RG. (Nov. 16, 1922) I05
RGZ. 363; OLG. Dresden (March I3, I91I) 7 Sachs. Arch. (1912) 272 and
OLG. Dresden (Nov. 9, 1933) IPRspr. 1934, no. 46.
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 6, 1883) 9 BGE. 449, 453·
70
OLG. Miinchen (March 10, 192I) 42 ROLG. 98. To the same effect:
RG. (2d criminal section, Dec. 10, 1912) 18 DJZ. I913, 588; Bay. ObLG.
(March 22, 1924) 23 Bay. ObLGZ. 56.
Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Jan. 31, 1925) Pasicrisie 1925.3.129.
Switzerland: BEcK, NAG. art. 7c no. 86.
71
RG. (3d criminal section, Feb. 16, I914) Leipz. Z. 19I4, 869.
72
Belgium: PouLLET 469 no. 365.
73
In French Morocco, the Dahir of u-IJ of August, I 9 I 3, declared that
Frenchmen and foreigners are unable to marry except in accordance with the
formalities permitted by their, national law or those which will eventually be
determined for l' hat civil in the French Protectorate. The latter formalities
have been determined by the Dahirs of Sept. 4, I9I5, and Sept. IJ, 1922, to be
~dentical with those of the Civil Code. Since then, the French form of marri11ge
rs compulsory for French nationals, as the Court of Cassation held in two decisions
of March 3, 1937, Revue Crit 1938, 86, 88.
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acquired Spanish nationality by marrying a Spanish citizen
in France. The court may find that the marriage is invalid
under Spanish law because the religious ceremony was not observed and that therefore the wife has not become a Spanish
citizen, although it is certain that the marriage is valid in
France. 74
The Japanese Civil Code limits its own provision to the
marriage of nationals without mentioning the marriage of
foreigners. Probably, foreign parties may use any formalities
agreeing with their national law or laws. 75
Consular marriages performed within the forum. Where a
consular or diplomatic· agent is endowed by the state represented by him-the sending state-76 with the power of officiating at marriages, a marriage performed before him is
valid in the receiving state only if the latter state has agreed
to his acting in this capacity. Numerous marriages celebrated
in an embassy or consulate have been declared invalid by the
courts of the countries involved, because this function of the
diplomatic agent or a priest officiating in a legation was not
recognized. 77 Hence, for instance, a marriage celebrated by
two British subjects before a British consul in Germany is
74
Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. I9, I92o) Clunet I92o, I98; (Nov. I9, I92o) Clunet
I92I, I84; (March 29, I928) Clunet I929, 402. Comments expressing controversial opinions by PERROUD, Note, Clunet I929, 404, andJ. DoNNEDIEU DE
VABRES 455· See supra p. I37·
75 See BATY, "The Private International Law of Japan," in I Melanges
Streit (I939) I03 at Io6.
76 Where a marriage was celebrated before the consul of Guatemala in Paris
and it appeared that, according to the law of Guatemala, representatives of that
state had no authority to officiate at marriages, the act was declared null also
under French law. Trib. civ. Seine (March I5, I932) Revue Crit. I935> 436.
77 Austria (one party Austrian): OGH. (Aug. I7, I88o) I8 GlU. no. 8o66,
Clunet I88I, I7I.
Belgium (one party Belgian): Trib. Antwerp (Aug. 4, I 877) Clunet I 88I, 84.
France (one party French): Trib. civ. Seine (July 2, I872) S.I872.2.248,
Clunet I874, 7I; Trib. civ. Seine (Sept. 2, I920) Revue I92I, I65 n.2; (June
2I, I 873) Clunet I 874, 73; cf. infra n. 83, and Note AUDINET, S.I924.2.65. See
also the case of Hay v. Northcote [I9oo] z Ch. z6z, 69 L. J. (Ch.) 586, where
the English court, though referring to a French judgment which had declared
the marriage void, held it valid under English law.
Italy: App. Firenze (July 3Ij I877) Ann. Giur. Ital. I877, 3, 2.83 (an
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held nonexistent in Germany/ though it is considered good
in England. 79
Although some states are unwilling to consent to this function of diplomatic agents, numerous treaties embody agreements to recognize consular marriages performed within territory of the forum. 80 In some countries, consent is deemed to
be given even without any express declaration. This is the
case in Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Greece, Peru, Rumania, Spain, Turkey, and elsewhere, 81 particularly in France,
where by "traditional customary law" 82 foreigners belonging
to the same country are permitted to marry before their consul.
This liberal exception to the French system does not extend,
however, to religious marriages before a priest or chaplain attached to a diplomatic mission, sanctioned in former times by
the so-called freedom of the Chapel. Hence, French courts
American man and an Italian woman at an American consulate); see also Trib.
Roma (May 6, I936) Giur. Ital. I936, I, 2, 465.
Switzerland: Just. Dep. BBl. I 924, II 25, no. 5; Answer of Federal Council to
the British Legation, BBl. I9II, I 43I, no. 12, where it is added that the British
Legation in a note showed its willingness to make British consuls in Switzerland
conform to the Swiss conception.
Spain: Trib. Supr. (July u, I 899) 66 Sent. I 69 (Frenchman at the Anglican
Church of Puerto Rico, then a Spanish colony).
See, furthermore, Rb. Rotterdam (June 17, I935) W. I936, no. 633
(Egyptian consul). Decisions relating to Portuguese, Turkish, and Russian
consulates; cf. 3 FRANKENSTEIN I 70 n. I 76,
78
German EG. art. I.3 par. 3·
79
British Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, §I.
80
See infra p. 238; see also the Colombian Law, No. 266, of Dec. 2I, I9J8.
81
Belgium: Cour Bruxelles (May 29, I852) Pasicrisie I852.2.237; Note,
Clunet I 907, 335, 339; PouLLET 470 no. 366.
The Bolivian Law of December I5, I939; continues to recognize marriages
celebrated by diplomatic or consular agents of foreign powers, but requires
recording in the register of civil status.
Brazil: Lei de Introdul;iO (I 942) art. 7 § 2.
Bulgaria: GHE:Nov, 6 Repert. I9I no. 63.
Greece: z STREIT-VALLINDAS 3I5.
Peru: customary law for Catholics and Congressional Act of Dec. 23, I897,
art. 7 for non-Catholics (on the condition of subsequent registration).
Roumania: Trib.Ilfov (March 2I, I 89o); see PLASTARA, 7 Repert. 66 no. I 83.
Spain: Trib. Supr. (Feb. 2I, 1935) 217 Sent. 567 implicitly; see TRiAs DE BE&
85 no. II8.
Turkey: see SALEM, 7 Repert. 267 no. 2I8.
82
WEiss, 3 Traite 563.
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have invalidated a marriage celebrated before an Orthodox
priest of the Gre.ek legation in Paris and a marriage celebrated
before a Protestant minister authorized by the King of
Sweden. 83
The validity of consular marriages as determined by the
law of the sending state will be discussed in connection with
other foreign marriages. 84
4· The Law of the Place of Celebration as Applied to Foreign
Marriages

In general. All states, except those which require a religious
marriage for their nationals abroad and, to a certain extent,
Spain, recognize as valid a foreign marriage celebrated in
compliance with the formalities prescribed by the local law. 85
Such compliance is compulsory according to the English and
American conflicts rules ~ut optional under the laws of most
other countries.
83 France: Circulaire du Garde des Sceaux, Aug. 27, I879, Bull. Off. Min.
Just. I879, I46; Trib. civ. Seine (June 6, I893) Clunet I893, 88o; Trib. civ.
Angers (July 27, I896) and App. Angers (May 3I, I898) Clunet I898, 9II;
Cass. (civ.) (July 30, 19oo) S.I902.1.225, D.I90I.I.3I7, Clunet I9oo, 969;
App. Douai (Feb. 2, I899) Clunet I899, 825. The marriage of two Greeks,
celebrated according to their religious formalities at their legation, was held valid
by Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 20, I92o) Revue I92I, 226, but the judgment was
reversed, Cour Paris (March I, I922) S.I924.2.65; cf. ARMINJON, Revue I926,
I69; AUDINET, II Recueil I926 I 209.
Spain: Trib. Supr. (July 12, I 8 8 9) 66 Sent. I 69 (French parties in the
Anglican chapel of Puerto Rico).
84
/nfra pp. 236-240.
85 In most countries this rule is not questioned.
In Soviet Russia the statutes are interpreted to the same effect by FREUND in
4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 366, with some reservations, however.
In Spain the Supreme Court held on May I, I 9 I 9, I 46 Sent. I 7 6 and again on
April 26, I 929, I 88 Sent. 1286 concerning Spanish couples having married in
Argentina and Habana respectively, that non-Catholic Spaniards may marry
only in accordance with Spanish formalities before a Spanish consul or viceconsul; LASALA LLANAS I07 and TRiAS DEBEs, in 3I Recueil I9JO I 654, 673,
and in his Sistema espafiol de derecho civil internacional, nos. I I I, I I 2 state this
to be the actual law, but restrict the unwelcome rule to the cases where both
parties are of Spanish nationality, or the man is a Spaniard and the woman is not
a national of the country of celebration. Moreover, in a country prohibiting
consular marriage the parties are believed to be free to choose the local ceremony.
For Eastern Poland, see supra n. 56, and for Turkey, SALEM, 7 Repert. 268 no.
22I; but cf. GouLI~, Mariage, 8 Repert. nos. 4I, 288, and 382.
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The local form, including the proper officer and the
proper ceremony, must be observed in its entirety as determined by the law of the place of celebration. 87 In Morocco,
Egypt, and parts of China, religious ceremonies are customary
but dependent on certain conditions with which foreigners accordingly have to comply in order to satisfy their national
laws. On the other hand, Swiss authorities recognize a Japanese
temporary marriage (the famous Madame Butterfly marriage), entered into by a Swiss national, as valid without time
restriction, the Swiss law disapproving such restriction. 88
Under the Concordat of 1929 between Italy and the Holy
See, Italians may marry in Italy either in~accordance with the
Civil Code or in accordance with the ecclesiastical ("canonic")
formalities, provided, however, that the ecclesiastical marriage is recorded by an Italian civil officer. 89 Since this alternative does not exist outside of Italy, a marriage of Italian
nationa~s abroad before a Catholic priest is not valid, even
under the Italian conflicts law, unless it has been performed
in accordance with the formalities established by the forum. 90
Special problems: (a) CommonZaw marriage.s·. Since some
formal marriage ceremony is required in almost every
European country, 91 the question has been presented whether
the principle of locus re git act~tm could be extended to a common law marriage of nationals of a European country cele86 Wher!! a French Catholic woman married an orthodox Serb in a Catholic
church in Yugoslavia, the marriage was held invalid in France, because according
to the local law it should have been celebrated before an orthodox priest; see
Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 22, 1937) Revue Crit. 1937, 65o.
The American decision in In re Lando's Estate (1910) 112 Minn. 257, 127.
N.W.I125, is based upon the same principle. The court was mistaken, however,
when it interpreted EG. art. 13 par. 3, as permitting a marriage in Germany
before a minister of a religious community. Cf. KESSLER, 1 Z.ausl.PR. (1927)
865 n. x.
87 2 BEALE§ 121,4; § 122.1.
88
Just. Dep., BBl. 1925, II 143.
89
Hence, an unrecorded religious ceremony performed in Italy will not be
considered sufficient by a foreign court; cf. Austrian OGH. (May 21, 1937)
19 SZ. no. x66.
9ll See Bosco, 22 Rivista (1930) 469ff.; FEDOZZI 419ff.
91
Except in Soviet Russia and until recently in Scotland.
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brated in a jurisdiction where common law marriage has not
been abolished. Despite objections, the validity of common law
marriages celebrated in the United States has been upheld not
only by English courts 92 but also for their respective nationals
by the courts of Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy. 93
Gretna Green marriages, too, have been recognized in England 94 and other countries. 95
Furthermore, recorded marriages entered into by nonRussians in Soviet Russia have been recognized in other jurisdictions, 96 and even non-recorded marriages have been declared valid by the German Reichsgericht on the ground that
itwas often difficult for German parties resident in Russia
to reach a German consulate. 91 The court stated, however, that
92 Rooker v. Rooker (r863) 3 Sw. & Tr. sz6; In re Green, Noyes v. Pitkin
(I909) z5 T. L. R. zzz.I JoHNSON 299, however, has express doubts concerning
the validity of such marriages celebrated by domiciliaries of Quebec who go
·
abroad for this purpose.
03
Belgium: Trib. Antwerp (Jan. 13, I 886) J. d. Trib. I 886, col. 3 I r; App.
Bruxelles (July Z9, I909) Clunet I9IZ, 583; POULLET 46Z no. 360; WIGNY,
58 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I93r) 34I at 346.
France: Continually so held since Cass. (req.) (Dec. zo, r84I) S.I842.I.JZI;
see WEiss, 3 Traite 531; Cass. (req.) (Jan. I3, I857) S.I857.I.8I; Trib.
civ. Seine (Apri12o, I89I) Clunet I89I, 932; Trib. civ. Seine (Aug. 3, 1894)
Clunet I895> 374; Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. I7> I924) Revue I9z5, :u6; Cour
Paris (Nov. 2o, I928) Clunet I929, Io5o.
Germany: RG. (Oct. 26, I932) 138 RGZ. 2I4, 2I8, IPRspr. I9J2, no. 8 at
z5; LG. Tiibingen (July 25, I934) JW. I934> 28o2, IPRspr. I934, no. 57
at I30; RG. (April 7, I938) I 57 RGZ. 257 at 262, JW. I938, I7I6.
Italy: Trib. Ariano (Feb. 4, I898) and App. Napoli (March 3I, 1898)
cited by FEDOZZI at 426 n. I, who himself requires that the conclusion of the
marriage be proved by an act of consent, excluding inference from the subsequent conduct of the parties.
94
Compton v. Bearcroft (I769) 2 Hag. Con. 444; Bach v. Bach (1927)
43 T. L. R. 493 (by implication).
95 Prussian Obertribunal (Jan. I5, I855) 29 Entsch. Kgl. Ob. Trib. 380
no. 5I.
96
Czechoslovakia: S. Ct. (I93 I) no. V. 10.644, 6 Z.ausl.PR. (I932) 448.
France:Trib. civ. Seine (June I7, I927) Revue I928, 332 (Spanish man and
Russian woman.)
Germany: RG. (Oct. 22, I930) JW. I93I, I334> IPRspr. I93I, no. 57;
RG. (Oct. z6, I9JZ) I38 RGZ. 2I4 at 2I7, IPRspr. 1932, no. 8 at 25.
Switzerland: see BEcK, NAG. 222 no. 12.
97
RG. (April7, I938) I57 RGZ. 262 at 265.
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strict proof that the marriage was a true marriage and intended
to be permanent was necessary in each case. 98
(b) Tribal marriage. As a rule, marriages of white persons,
in accordance with the formalities of uncivilized native tribes,
are not recognized. 99 Colonial practice has, however, recognized various exceptions. 100
(c) Marriage by proxy. Marriage by proxy, where permitted by the law of the place where the proxy participates
in the marriage ceremony, has been recognized in the United
States. 101 A Turkish immigrant to the United States, for
instance, was allowed to marry by proxy a woman living in
his native country, thus enabling her to join him in this country.102 A similar case was that of a German prisoner of war in
Morocco who married by proxy an Austrian woman in
Austria. 103 Although section I 24 of the Restatement requires
only that the absent party consent to the marriage, Continental
courts seem to require also that this consent be expressed in
98

q8 RGZ. at 218; I57 RGZ. at 266.
In re Bethell, Bethell v. Hildyard (1888) 38 Ch.D. 220. Contra: Cour
Paris (April 24, I926) D.1927.2.9 held void a marriage of a French explorer
in Mongolia and an American girl before a Belgian Catholic missionary, as
Mongols do not use religious marriages. This was, however, an unusual case
due to the remote place, see EscARRA, ibid.; infra n. I79·
100 On French practice in Indo-China and Tunisia, cf. J. DoNNEDIEU DE
VABRES 447· On marriages of white persons and Indians in the United States
and Canada see GooDRICH 319; I JoHNSON 320-327· On the very precarious
position of a white woman marrying a native in the British Empire or even
a member of an Oriental religion or of a Hindu caste, cf. memorandum of the
British Foreign Office transmitted by the British Consul in Berlin, printed in
StAZ. 1923, 31; see also 2 BERGMANN, 75·
101
See Restatement§ 124. See LoRENZEN, "Marriage by Proxy and the Conflict of Laws," 32 Harv. L. Rev. (19I9) 473, 484;
102
Cf. GooDRICH 303; United States ex ret. Modianos v. Tuttle (1926) 12
F. (2d) 927; see also Clunet I929, 205. It is true that according to s. 28 (n.) of
the Immigration Act of May 26, I924, the terms "wife" and "husband" do not
refer to a proxy or picture marriage, but on the interpretation see HACKWORTH,
2 Digest of International Law (194I) 367 s. I64. On the contrary, Canadian
federal and province authorities do not recognize any marriage by proxy for
the purpose of immigration; see note of the Canadian Government to the
German Government, 2 BERGMANN 78.
103
Opinion of the Saxon Government of May 24, I 9 I 6, cited by LEWALD 86
no. II7.
99
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advance in an instrument in writing, stating the name of the
other party. Provisions to this effect are contained in some
codes, as for instance the Austrian and the Cuban 104 and, for
soldiers, in the new Italian Code. 105
If these precautions are taken, there is no room for the
objection that marriage by proxy does not fulfill the requirement of consent. The party for whom the proxy acts must observe the regular form of consent. The proxy himself is no
more than a messenger, and whether or not a party may
express his consent by messenger is clearly a matter of formality.106
Prevention of secret marriages. Elaborate precautions have
been taken in the municipal laws of Western and Central
Europe to prevent prohibited and secret marriages. Marriages
may not be celebrated without prior publication of banns, and
after celebration all marriages must be recorded by civil officers. These acts, both that preceding and that following the
main ceremony, are regarded as formalities 107 and, therefore,
as a general principle, are governed by the law of the state
of celebration. 108
(a) Provisions by the state of celebration. To prevent prohibited and secret marriages numerous countries endeavor to
make sure that the marriage is not prohibited by the personal
law of the parties. Thus, banns are required to be published
not only at the place of celebration but also in the country or
104

Allg. BGB. § 76, first sentence. Consent of government also required.
Cuba: C. C. art. 87.
In the Netherlands, BW. art. I 34 requires royal permission.
10"C. C. (I942) art. III.
See also the German war-time provisions of the period of I9I4-I9I 8.
106
Cj.RAAPE I76, 255; but also 3 FRANKENSTEIN I54·
107
It is not true, as often alleged, that banns are considered part of the
formalities only in Germany but not in France.
108
This principle is followed in Switzerland by the regulation of banns in the
case of a foreign marriage of Swiss nationals; no banns are required unless the
authorities at the place of celebration ask for a Swiss certificate showing no known
impediment to marry, in which event banns are published for the purpose of
granting the certificate. See BBl. I 8 99, I 3 6 I no. 4; id. I 9 I z, I 5 07 no. I 5; BEcK,
NAG. art. 7c no. 95·
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countries where the parties reside or have resided at some time
prior to their marriage. Foreigners are commonly not permitted to marry unless they can show a certificate of their own
country that no impediment to the marriage is known. 109
(b) Banns prescribed by the personal law. In addition, some
countries have established analogous provisions for their nationals abroad. Under the French Civil Code, which contains
the prototype of all such regulations, a French national who intends to marry in a foreign land must, under certain circumstances, have banns published in France, particularly if he has
resided in France in the six months preceding his marriage. 110
The Code itself imposes no sanction for the performance of
this duty. The courts, however, have pronounced null the marriages of parties who intended to keep their marriage a secret
in France or who intended to evad<? the prohibitions of French
law. 111
Although the provisions of the French Code have been
copied by Italy, the Netherlands, and other countries, few of
these countries 112 have followed the French decisions directed
109

See below, p. 2 84.
C. C. arts. 170 and 6 3·
!11 Cass. (req.) (March 28, 1854) S.1 854.1.295; Cass. (req.) (Nov. 20, 1866)
8.1866.1.442; Cass. (req.) (March 8, 1875) S.1875.1.171; Cass. (civ.) (June
15, 1887) S.189o.r.446; Cass. (req.) (July 5, 1905) Clunet 19o6, 1145,
8.1906.1.141, Revue 1905, 714; Cass (req.) (Jan. 3, 19o6) Clunet 19o6, 1149,
Revue 1907, 211; and particularly Cass. (civ.) (July 13, 1926) S.1926.r.263.
Cf. on this peculiar practice NIBOYET 725ff. no. 616.
112
To the, same effect as the French decisions:
Belgium: C. C. art. 170 as amended by law of July 12, 1931, art. 13. (Seems
clearly to require observance of the local foreign formalities only.)
Quebec: Durocher v. Degre (1901) 20 S.C. 456, criticized by Charbonneau,
J., in Hebert v. Clouatre (1912) 41 S.C. 249, 258ff.
Contra: Italy: C. C. (1865) art. 100 par. 2; C. C. (1942) art. II5; the
consequence of omission is not nullity but only a penalty, Cass. Napoli (June 26,
1883) Legge 1884.1.14; App. Messina (Nov. 9, 1927) cited by FEDOZZI 419 n.
2; Trib. Pesaro (June 14, 1928) 21 Rivista (1929) 420. Cass. (Aug. 2, 1935)
Rivista Dir. Pubbl. 1936, II 204.
The Netherlands: BW. art. 138 requiring banns is generally understood as
meaning banns in the Netherlands. Non-compliance was believed to result in a
nullity but not since the decision of the H. R. (May 31, 1872) W. 3484 and the
Law of July 7, 1906, S. no. 162, art. 6.
Hungary: Marriage Law of 1894, § I I 3 par. 2.
110
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against fraude a la loi, since the French courts have interpreted these provisions in their peculiar manner and have
assumed discretionary powers of doubtful validity.
In reconciling these variations, the Hague Convention on
Marriage provided that the requirements of the national
law concerning publication must be observed, with the proviso
that omission of publication does not invalidate the marriage
except in a state whose law has been violated. 113
(c) Recordation prescribed by the personal law. A French
national who has married abroad, moreover, must have his
marriage recorded at his French place of residence within
three months after his return to France. 114 This provision of
the French Code has likewise been widely imitated. 115 No
sanction is provided,116 except that the Portuguese provision
that a foreign marriage can be proved only if recorded in
compliance with law, 117 has had some following. 118
A steadily increasing number of states in this country require residents who go elsewhere to be married and who
113 Hague Convention on Marriage of I9o2, art. 5 par. 3, followed-by Sweden,
Law of I904, with subsequent amendments, c. I § 4 par. 2.
114
French C. C. art. I 7 I, no cause of nullity; App. Aix (Dec. 20, I 900)
Clunet I903, 639; Trib. civ. Seine (Oct. 27, I92I) Clunet I921, 940.
115
Belgi urn : C. C. art. r 7 I.
Haiti: C. C. art. I 56.
Italy: C. C. (I 865) -art. IOI.
Eritrea: C. C. art. I I 2.
Monaco: C. C. art. I39·
The Netherlands: BW. art. 139·
Neth. Indies: C. C. art. 84.
Nicaragua: C. C. arts. Io6, 525.
Venezuela: C. C. (I942) art. I03·
116
See for Belgium: App. Liege (April 8, I925) Clunet I926, 502; Italy:
Cass. Palermo (Aug. s, I905) Foro Ital. I905, I, I443; I Rivista (I9o6) s86;
App. Messina (Nov. 9, I 9 2 7) see supra n. I I 2.
117
Portugal: C. C. art. 2479 and Law of Dec. 25, I9Io, arts. 6o, 6I. CuNHA
GoN«;ALVEs, I Direito Civil 685 explains that the marriage is considered valid as
to effects in the country of celebration, and with respect to bigamy even in
Portugal.
118
The similar view of the former C. C. of Peru, art. I 59, has been abandoned
in the C. C. of I936; cf. APARICIO y GoMEZ, 2 Codigo Civil, Concordancias 324
and 356 (I4).
Mexico: C. C. art. I 6 I par. 2 is characteristic of laws declaring that the
civil effect of the marriage is retroactive to the time of the celebration only if it
is recorded within three months.
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return to reside within the state, to file a certificate of their
marriage with the proper officer. 119
In the Soviet Union, a circular of the Commissariat of
Justice of the U.S.S.R. required all Soviet nationals marrying
abroad to have their marriages recorded at the office of the
diplomatic or consular representative of the U.S.S.R. But
the code of only one Soviet Republic, the Ukraine, has expressly declared compliance with this provision essential for
recognition of the marriage. 120
Defective celebration. The law of the place of celebration
establishes the formalities and what constitutes failure to
comply with them. It is universally agreed that the same law
also determines the effect of such failure of compliance on the
validity or invalidity of the marriage.
It is interesting that this principle is more firmly settled
than two broader principles of which it would seem to be an
application.
First, it is fairly well established, although not without
some opposition, that the same law determines the causes as
well as the effects of the nullity of a marriage. 121 This broader
rule, which includes formal and substantive requirements for
marriage, has been adopted by the Restatement § I 36:
"The law governing the right to a decree of nullity is the
law which determined the validity of the marriage with respect
119
Maine Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 72 § 7, as amended by Laws of 1933, c. 24 § r;
New Hampshire Rev. Laws (1942) c. 337, § 7; id., c. 338, § 30; North Carolina Gen. Stats. (1943) § 51-2, as amended by Public Laws 1939, c. 375;
Vermont Pub. Laws (1933) § 4093; Virginia Code Ann. (r942) § 5077;
West Virginia Code Ann. (1937) c. 48 § 4692 [14].
12
Circular letter of July 6, 1923, no. 144, The Weekly for Soviet Justice
622; Ukrainian Family Law of 1926, art. 105; this provision seems not to
apply, however, unless both parties are Soviet citizens. Cf. FREUND, 4 Leske-'
Loewenfeld I 366-9. Dr. V. Gsovski states that the requirement is not in any
recent Soviet code and seems not to have been enforced.
121
Germany: RG. (June 22, 1931) 133 RGZ. r61, IPRspr. 1931, no. 231
OLG. Dusseldorf (Oct. 31 1 1922) JW. 1923, 191; KG. (Jan. 29, 1934) DJZ.
1934, 1158, IPRspr. 19341 no. 16.
France: Ch. civ. Douai (March 28 1 1928) Clunet 1929, 4001 Ch. civ.
Montpellier (June 21, 1928) Clunet 19291 10621 cited by GouLt, 9 Repert.
82 no. 423.
The Netherlands: see MuLDER 38, 109.
Switzerland: see GAUTSCHI1 27 SJZ. (19Jo-1931) 321. 325.
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to the matter on account of which the marriage is alleged to be
null."
In England these problems are ordinarily discussed under
the heading of jurisdiction. If, however, a marriage has been
celebrated abroad, English courts are prepared to respect the
jurisdiction of the forum loci actus, and therefore the result
now stated for the first time in modern form by Cheshire is
the same as that in other countries. 122
Second, the results of a formally defective transaction of
any kind are said to be determined by the law whose formalities have not been properly observed. 123
Although both general rules, and particularly the second,
"
have been opposed on the ground that either the law of the
forum or the lex causae should prevail, in the particular case
of a formally defective marriage the rule is virtually unchallenged.124 The forms of marriage vary too much, indeed,
for one jurisdiction to determine the sanctions for violating
the formal requirements of another.
Consequently, the law of the place of celebration determines
whether or not a defect is material to the validity of the marriage and, if so, whether it renders the marriage nonexistent,
void, voidable, or annullable (whatever may be meant by
these terms) ; whether an omission can be cured by some additional act, as for instance, recording or factual cohabitation;
and whether or not an annulment has retroactive effect. 125
122

See Salvesen v. Adm'r of Austrian Property [ 19z 7] A. C. 64 I ; CHESHIRE
J46, 347·
123
See GooDRICH § 1o6; 2 ARMINJON, no. 49·
124
NIEMEYER, Das IPR. des BGB. 115, RAAPE 183, I FRANKENSTEIN 56I,
3 FRANKENSTEIN 183, and MANNL, II Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 786, have advocated
the lex causae. RAAPE I 86, and MANNL, however, admit that this theory is
impracticable for marriages, and it has been formally rejected "at least with respect to the conclusion of marriage" by the Reichsgericht (June 22, I931) 133
RGZ. 161, I65. Likewise, J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 46I seems to agree that the
Court of Montpellier (supra n. 12 r) was right, although he defends the predominance of the personal law in determining sanctions for defects in marriages
in general. In still another opinion, it was thought that the law more favorable to the marriage should be followed, but no decision seems to have applied
this illogical thesis.
125
RG. (June u, 1931) 133 RGZ. I6I, 165,
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There are, of course, exceptions to the rule. The most significant exist in Switzerland. According to article I 3 I of the
Swiss Civil Code, no marriage may be annulled on the ground
of a formal defect, if it has been celebrated before a public
marriage officer. Nor may a Swiss court annul a marriage,
unless the ground of nullity is also recognized by Swiss municipal law. 126 Thus, a Swiss court will not annul a foreign
marriage of Swiss nationals celebrated before. a public officer,
although a formal defect invalidates the marriage under the
local law, nor will a foreign annulment in such case be
recognized in Switzerland. 127
Another exception exists in France. On the theory of "possession of status" (possession d'hat), article I96 of the Civil
Code prohibits an annulment on the ground of formal defect,
when the marriage is commonly reputed h> exist and the
record of celebration before a civil officer can be produced.
·while the Court of Cassation has refused to apply this provision to marriages celebrated abroad, 128 there is a tendency
to extend it to all marriages celebrated before a French civil
officer and to all marriages of French nationals. 129
Where the conflicts rule of the national law makes observance of the local ceremonies optional, a celebration, defective
under the Jaw of the place of celebration, may be considered
valid in the homeland.
Evasion of formalities. Apart from the requirements of
some -countries concerning publication and recording by their
nationals (see above at page 2 2 7), parties are generally free to
choose for an intended marriage a place anywhere in the world
and may thus avoid the formalities prescribed in their own
country:
126

NAG. art. 7f par. 2.
BECK, NAG. art. 7f no. I 72.
128
Cass. (req.) (May 9, I9o5) D.I905.1.367, Revue I9o5, 349; followed
by Cour Paris (May IS, I93r) Gaz.Pal.I93I.2.262; Trib. civ. Seine (March
rs, I932) Revue Crit. I935• 436.
129
PILLET, I Traite 563 no. 265; LEREBOURS-P!GEONNJ:ERE 3 sr n~ I.
127
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"No exception is made to the principle even where the sole
object of the parties in marrying in a foreign country has
been to evade some troublesome formal requirement of their
lex domicilii." 130
This is a rule well recognized in England and in all other
countries not prescribing compulsory religious marriage.
An occasional exception exists where, as in Arkansas, 131 a
marriage out of the state is not recognized, unless the parties
actually resided in the foreign state or country at the time of
the marriage.

5. Religious Ceremony Considered Essential by the Personal
Law
Point of view of the personal law: (a) Foreign civil marriage. Those countries which consider marriage essentially a
religious institution, such as Bulgaria, Greece, Liechtenstein,
et cetera1 132 treat as null and void a marriage celebrated abroad
by one of their own subjects in accordance with civil formalities. This rule has been expressed repeatedly by the highest
authorities of Czarist Russia 133 as well as by the attorney
general of Greece, 134 who in an opinion stated that such a
marriage is simply nonexistent, i.e., that anyone may invoke
its invalidity, no decree of nullity being necessary.
The Hague Convention on Marriage (art. 5 par. 2) expressly reserved to the states prescribing religious formalities
the right to treat marriages celebrated abroad by their nationals in disregard of such prescriptions as invalid.

°CHESHIRE 325.

13

131

Pope's Dig. Stat. (I937) § 9023.
See supra p. 2 I 3.
of the Cassation Departments, penal, I 889, no. 2; civil, I 899,
no. 39; of the first Plenary Meeting of the Senate, Aug. I 2, I 9 I I; Circular of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Russian Representatives in Germany of
February 25, I889, no. I384; Decree of the Consistorium of St. Petersburg,
May 20, I9 I I; cited according to MAKAROV, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 488 n. I os.
134
Opinion of Mr. GIDOPOULos, procurator at the Areopague, to the Ministry
of Justice, no. 54 (Dec. 28, I936) Clunet I937> 902; for the literature and cases
in point see 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 3 I 7 n. 32·
132

133 Decisions
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(b) Foreign religious marriage. Under Greek law a Greek
national may marry abroad in accordance with the formalities
of his church, no matter what the local law provides. 135 A
similar rule was in force for subjects of Czarist Russia. 136 In
other countries, such as Croatia, which is governed by the
older Austrian law, a foreign marriage of Catholic nationals
must comply with the formalities established by the Catholic
church at the place of celebration. 137
Point of view of the local law. Where a Bulgarian national
marries before a civil officer in Germany and does not go
through an additional religious ceremony, the marriage is
valid in Germany and invalid in Bulgaria. 138 This situation is
apt to give rise to puzzling problems under the law of the
country where the celebration took place, i.e., Germany. It
has been held that such a "limping marriage" (matrimonium
claudicans) can be dissolved by a German decree of divorce,
although generally divorce presupposes a marriage valid under
the personal law of the parties. 139 In this case, the grounds for
divorce are fixed exclusively by German law. But many related questions are open to discussion. What happens if one
of the parties marries another person in Bulgaria? Is he or she
punishable for bigamy in Germany? And shall it be held that
remarriage is allowed·even in Germany, since German law
provides that a person's capacity to marry is determined by his
national law? 140 Prevailing German opinion is to· the effect
that the marriage ought to be binding in Germany in every
135 2 STRErr-VALLINDAS 32 I: a Greek may marry a Bulgarian girl before an
Orthodox priest in Germany.
136
MAKAROV, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 48 8; MAKAROV, Precis 32 5.
137 See LOVRIC, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I IOJI, IOJ4·
This seems to be the rule in Colombia also, as art. 12 of Law 57 of April Is,
I887, declares that marriages celebrated according to the Catholic rites produce
all civil and legal effects. Cf. I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ I I I no. 202.
138 See supra n. 69.

139 Cf.
140

KG. (Dec. II, 1933) JW. I9J4, 619.

EG. art.

I

3 par.

I.

234

MARRIAGE

respect, the personal law notwithstanding. 141 Furthermore, if
the female party to the marriage was a German national, she
has, on account of the marriage, lost her German nationality,
though she has not acquired that of Bulgaria.
While the same basic principle with regard to an English
marriage was clearly adopted in English precedents such as
the Papadopoulos case, a strange modification was caused by
recognizing a marriage annulment pronounced at the husband's foreign domicil for the mere reason that the marriage
lacks the proper ecclesiastic form· Hence, after such foreign
annulment, the wife cannot obtain her rights as a spouse nor
can she sue for divorce. 142 This attitude of the English courts
has been influential in Canada and Scotland. 143
Another problem concerns the consequences of such a marriage, valid under the law of the place of celebration and invalid under the personal law. Are marital property rights and
other incidents of the marriage governed by the personal law
of the parties, 144 although this law treats the parties as not
married? The more reasonable answer seems to be in the
affirmative, 145 because this is just the normal consequence of
considering the parties married.
Point of view of third countries. What is the position of a
third country when a conflict arises between the state of celebration and the national or domiciliary state of the parties?
The answer is clear when the third state adopts locus regit
actum as the absolute binding rule, which is the case in Great
Britain and the United States. A marriage celebrated by a
141
See LEWALD 111 no. 158; NusSBAUM, DJPR. 162; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 214;
MASSFELLER, Das grossdeutsche Ehegesetz ( ed. z, Berlin, 19 3 9).
Contra: RAAPE 38'3, 400.
142
See KEITH, "Some Problems in the Conflict of Laws," 16 Bell Yard ( 19 3 5)

xs.

143

See infra p. 422.
Cf. EG. arts. 14ff.
145
SeeRAAPE I D.IPR.x8o, in conflict with KG. (May 3, 1937)
2523, and several writers.
144

JW.

1937,

MARRIAGE

235
146

Greek citizen before a city recorder in San Francisco
is
certain to be recognized in England. On the other hand, a
religious marriage of the same man celebrated in France
would be considered invalid in the United States, because it
is invalid in France.
Where, however, a COlJrt must follow the national law of
the parties, ascribing to the law of the place of celebration only
an optional role, it is doubtful which law is applicable when
they are in conflict. Prevailing opinion favors the solution
afforded by article 5 of the Hague Convention on Marriage
according to which a marriage formally valid at the place of
celebration is formally valid in all third countries, the national
country alone being entitled to consider it void because of the
lack of a religious ceremony. On the basis of this rule, the
Reichsgericht recognized as valid in Germany a marriage
celebrated before a civil officer in Brazil between a Turkish
national of Roman Catholic faith and a stateless woman who
had once been a national of Prussia, non-recognition of the
marriage under existing Turkish law notwithstanding. 147 It
also upheld a marriage entered into before a Norwegian civil
officer by a Greek national of Orthodox faith and a N orwegi<).n
woman. 148 The Swedish statute and the C6digo Bustamante
have adopted the same rule, 149 and French and Belgian decisions are to the same effect. 150
146
Case.ofOLG. Hamburg (Nov. IS, I926) Hans.GZ. I927, Beibl. 4, IPRspr.
1926-I927, no. 28.
147
RG. (April 6, 1916) 88 RGZ. I9I.
148
RG. (Oct. x, 192s) JW. 1926, 37S• IPRspr. 1926-1927, no. 27. See
also OLG. Karlsruhe (April 18, 19 I 7) 35 ROLG. 343; OLG. Hamburg (Nov.
IS, I926), supra n. 146.
Contra: RAAPE, 2S3, 172; 3 FRANKENSTEIN I6o.
149
Sweden: Law of 1904 with amel'\dments, c. I § 6.
Codigo Bustamante art. 41.
150
Belgium: Antwerp (April 20, I927) Clunet I928, 488; (Pole whose
national law required religious ceremony and Belgian woman marrying before
the registrar in London): Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Jan. 3I, I92S) Clunet I926, soo.
France: Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. IS, I922) Clunet I922 1 396; Trib. civ. Seine
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In the opposite case of a marriage invalid in form under the
law of the place of celebration, article 7 of the Hague Convention provides that it "may" be recognized by third countries, if the formalities of the national law or laws of both
parties are satisfied. A marriage celebrated in accordance with
the religious ceremony prescribed by the personal law, but not
in compliance with the civil formalities of the place of celebration, is regarded as valid in France, Germany, and the other
countries following the optional rule. 151
Except for this instance of reference to the personal law,
the few countries which require their subjects to follow a
religious ceremony even when marrying abroad find themselves isolated. Their requirements are observed neither by
the countries of celebration nor by third countries. The difficulties involved are illustrated by such cases as the recent sequel
to the famous Papadopoulos case, which revealed a first marriage in England and a second in Greece, the man being married to two women fo~ ten years. 15.2
6. Other Tests

Foreign consular marriage: (a) In general. We have had
occasion to deal with the position of the forum as concerns
marriages at which a consular or diplomatic agent of a foreign
power has officiated within the territory of the forum. 153 Con(June I7, I927) Revue I928, 332; Trib. civ. Seine (April 27, I933) Revue
Crit. I935, 759·
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7f, whereby marriages celebrated abroad are valid
if in accordance with the law of the place of celebration, is applied also to
foreigners by STAUFFER, NAG. art. 7 no. Io, and others, but interpreted otherwise by BEcK, NAG. 230 no. 48.
151
France: PILLET, I Traite 552 no. 259; BASDEVANT, Revue I9o8, 284 (On
occasion of an Austrian decision); AuDINET, I I Recueil I 926 I 202ff., LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 383 no. 325·
Germany: EG. art. I 3 par. I ; art. I I par. 1.
.
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Dec. 15, 19I3) Revue I9I4, 6II, approved by
PouLLET 472 no. 367.
152
Papadopoulos v. Papadopoulos (no. 2) (I935) [I936] P. Io8; cf. supra
n. 68 for the first Papadopoulos case [I93o] P. 55·
153 Supra pp. 220-222.
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sent by the receiving country to such official action of a foreign
representative is intiicated either by liberal custom, as for instance, in France or Greece, or by an express clause of an
international treaty. Now we are concerned with the status
of a "consular" (or "diplomatic") marriage in the sending
state.
Recently, the institution of consular marriage has been used
primarily by Europeans and Americans marrying in Oriental
countries, where marriage forms depend on the various religious denominations or national groups. Treaties allowing
representatives of Western powers to exercise non-litigious
jurisdictiori have partly superseded the old system of capitulations. The recent increase in provisions concerning consular
marriages, however, seems to indicate other needs. Switzerland, for instance, though generally prohibiting consular marriages, specially authorizes her representatives to officiate when
located in remote countries or when Swiss nationals are unable
to marry according to local formalities and the country of
celebration is not likely to object. 154 Thus, relief might be
given a Swiss couple who had obtained a divorce in Switzerland and wished to remarry each other in Spain, since Spain,
ignoring the divorce, could make no technical ceremony of
remarriage available to them, although a form of reconciliation is in such case provided. 155
A remarkable concession for the sake of international cooperation was made by the participant states in the Hague
Convention on Marriage. By article 6, paragraph I, second
sentence, the signatory powers bound themselves not to oppose a, diplomatic marriage, even though it would offend their
own laws on remarriage or religious impediments. Thus, if
154 C/. Swiss Rev. Consular Regulation of Oct. 26, I923, art. 63. This was,
indeed, the situation in Peru for non-Catholics until the Law of Dec. 23, 1897·
Cf. German RG. (June 9, 1883) 9 RGZ. 393 at 402.
And in Turkey for parties of different religions until the Civil Code of
I 926; see SALEM, 7 Repert. 268 no. 220.
155 BBl. I 9 I 9, IV. 3 I o, no. 2 I.
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both parties are aliens, the second marriage of a divorce or
even the marriage of an ordained Catholic priest is valid,
although it would otherwise be considered repugnant to local
policy. n;s In England, also, foreign marriages of aliens, celebrated before the consul of their common country, are regarded as valid, notwithstanding their invalidity according to
the law of the place of celebration. This concession to the law
of nationality is masked by the fiction that the parties have met
on extraterritorial territory. 157
(b) Authority granted by the sending state. As a condition
of consular marriage, the solemnizing official must be empowered by his· own state to officiate at marriages in general or
at specific marriages. Such authority is given either by law, as
in Great Britain, France, and Italy/;; 8 or by administrative
acts based on legislation, as in Germany. 159 A few states do
not allow their agents any such function. 16 ° Consular officers
of the United States are authorized to solemnize marriages if
the parties are domiciliaries of the District of Columbia, a
territory, Massachusetts, or Connecticut, or if they are United
States citizens domiciled abroad.un Other countries require
either that both parties be their subjects 162 or that at least
156 WALKER

656, and others very inappropriately call this concession strange.
See FosTER, 6 5 Receuil I 9 38 III 444, no. z 5.
158 Great Britain: Foreign Marriage Act, I 89z.
France: C. C. art. 48.
Italy: C. C. (I86s) art. 368.
159 Germany: Laws of May 4, I87o, §I; Feb. 6, I875, § 85; Law on Consular Jurisdiction of April 7, I9oo, § 36 par. z.
Switzerland: C. C. art. 4I par. 3; Rev. Consular Regulation (supra n. IS4).
16°Former Austria was in this group; see WALKER 647 (whose mention of
Sweden and Portugal, however, is wrong).
Argentina seems disinclined to allow diplomatic marriages; see ZEBALLos,
Bull. Argent. de Droit Int. Prive I9o5, szo. Likewise: Guatemala, cf. Trib.
civ. Seine (March I5, I93Z) Revue Crit. I935> 436; El Salvador, cf. IS Bull.
lnst, Int. (19z6) I6o. On Colombia see RESTREPO HERNANDEZ III, §zoo
n. I; on Peru, RoGER, 7 Repert. 30 no. 53·
161 Congressional Act of I86o, Rev. Stat. § 408z, zz U. S. C. 7z, Code of
Fed. Regulations, Title zz § 91. 4zo; Mass. Gen. Laws (I9JZ) II c. zo7 § 43;
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) c. z76, § 5150.
~62 The Netherlands: Consular Law of July zs, I87I, as redrafted on July
15, 1887; Spain: C. C. art, 100 par. 3; Portugal: Law of Dec. 25, 191o, art,
s8 § z, etc.
157
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one party belong to the sending state.
Still others permit
consular marriage even of foreign couples; Great Britain does
so when the country of celebration consents and both parties
are nationals of the same country. 164
Illustration: France, not having authorized a celebration
of marriage between a French party and a Bulgarian party before a French consul in Bulgaria, declares such marriage
invalid in France; 165 it is therefore invalid in Bulgaria too.
States should not be entirely free, however, and most
states do not feel free, to fix the permissibility of consular marriages. In case both parties are not nationals of the sending
state or, at least, where one party is a subject of the receiving
state, the consent of the latter state should be required. A
satisfactory rule has been laid down by the Hague Convention
on Marriage, article 6 paragraph I, first sentence:
"In respect of formalities the marriage is to be recognized
everywhere, if it is concluded before a diplomatic or consular
representative in conformance with the laws of his country,
provided that neither of-the spouses is a citizen of the state
where the marriage is celebrated and that this state does not
oppose the celebration." 166
Section I 2 6 of the Restatement requires more simply that
the marriage should be performed "in accordance with the
163
France: C. C. art. 170 pars. 2 and 3, as completed by the Decree of
March 8, 1937 (Clunet 1937, 649), listing remote non-Christian countries
only; Germany: (supra n. 159) including denizens; Great Britain: Foreign
Marriages Order in Council, 1913, arts 1, 2. Switzerland: Bundesrat requires
as to marriages in China that the husband be a national, BEcK, NAG. 223 no. 19.
The Belgian law of July 12, 1931, art. 7 par. 2 permits by exception marriages
between Belgian men and foreign women "in the countries where the local
legislation prevents the celebration of marriages of the kind." Perhaps the idea
is related to that prevailing in Switzerland (supra n. 154).
164 See Bailet v. Bailet (1901) 17 T. L. R. 317.
·
165
Cf. Trib. civ. Seine (May 7, 1937) with note in Clunet 1938,522,525:
Trib. civ. Seine (March 15, 1932) Revue Crit. 1935, 436 (marriage celebrated
before Guatemalan consul in Paris, who acted without authorization from
his government, declared void).
166
This provision is supplemented by arts. 6 and 7· Sweden: Law of 1904
with amendments, c.I § 7 adopted the same solution. Great Britain and Belgium, supra n. 163; and Italy: Consular Law of Jan. z8, 1866, art. 29, take into
consideration the consent of the receiving state.
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law of the country where it takes place or with a treaty to
which that country is a -party."
Unfortunately, many states are not so considerate. 167
A peculiar feature of a few laws is that a religious minister
may be authorized to officiate. 168
The treaties are as varied as the statutes or customs of the
sending states. Usually they require either that both parties
belong to the sending state 169 or that one be a national or
d<?miciliary of the sending state, the other belonging to a third
state. 170
(c) Law of third states. Except for article 6, paragraph 1,
of the Hague Convention, courts will, according to the principle of lex loci celebrationis1 follow closely the position taken by
the local law. 171 In this regard, section r 26 of the Restatement expresses a rule of universally settled law. But it must
be borne in mind that most countries are satisfied when the
marriage form agrees with their own municipal prescriptions.
Hence, if both parties belong to the same state, it suffices to
observe the regulations of this state and, if they are subjects of
different states, to comply with the formalities of both states.
(d). Ceremony. Respecting details of the ceremony, the
rules of the sending state are customarily followed in a
187 Particularly Great Britain (cf. Hay v. Northcote, supra n. n), although
Foreign Marriage Act, I89:z, s. I9, instructs the officer. to refuse to perform the
marriage if the celebration would be contrary to the rules of international private law or to the principles of international comity.
168
Connecticut, Gen. Stat. (I9Jo) c. :z76 § 5I5o.
Sweden: Law of I 904 with subsequent amendments, c. I, § 5 par. :z, § 8.
Norway: Law of June :z6, I9:z5.
·
169 See, for instance, the treaties of Germany with Italy (May 4, I 89I ),
Soviet Union (Oct. u, I9:z5), Panama (Nov. :zi, I9:z7), Lithuania (Oct. 30,
I9:z8), South Africa (Sept. I, I9:z8), Bulgaria (June 4, I929), Turkey (May
:z8, I929), and Haiti (March 10, I9Jo), the treaties with Bulgaria (art. I9)
and Turkey (art. I 8) containing marriage regulations and the others conferring the right of the most favored nation.
170 See for instance the three consular conventions between the three Baltic
States of July u, I9:ZI (II League of Nations Treaties (r9:z:z) 87, 99; zs
ibid. (I9:Z4) 299) art. I5.
171 This is the widely prevailing opinion; contra: 2 ZITELMANN 6IJ and
LEWALD in STRUPP, I Worterbuch des Volkerrechts und der Diplomatie 264.
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diplomatic marriage, 172 although Soviet law does not respect
this custom. 173
·
·
Marriage on the high seas. Insofar as the law of the place of
celebration is competent, marriages on board ship on the high
seas are governed by the law of the flag. 174 This rule seems
to be universally accepted. Most domestic laws, however, are
reluctant to authorize such marriages on their own vessels.
Great Britain allows captains of vessels to officiate, provided
the parties were unable to take advantage of a local law or
consular intervention. 175 In the United States, it is generally
held that the marriage is valid, if in conformance with the law
of the shipowner's domiciP 76 To be sure, the law of the flag
may permit marriage by mere consent. 177
Marriage in remote places. The validity of a marriage per
verba de praesenti has been admitted where there was no
means of solemnizing the marriage under some local law,
e.g., in the Far East, 178 although there is less doubt about its
validity if an ordained priest or ;minister is present. 179
Military marriages abroad. Soldiers serving abroad in time
of peace or war, if allowed to marry at all, usually enjoy special
privileges. There may be a special marriage officer, or soldiers
may be allowed to marry by proxy or even by their own written
declaration filed at the marriage office of the bride. 180
172 C6digo Bustamante art. 41..
173 See MAKARov, Precis 31.8.
174 Restatement §§ 11.7 and 45·
175 Foreign Marriage Act, I 89z, § I z; and .Foreign Marriages Order in Council, I9I3, art. zo(z); R. v. Anderson (I868) L.R. I C.C.R.I6I.
176
See GooDRICH 304.
177 Cf. Fisher v. Fisher (I9z9) 1.50 N.Y. 3I3, I65 N. E. 46o. See HAcKWORTH, z Digest of International Law (I941) 37I § 165.
178 See with respect to Japan: BATY, op. cit. supra n. 75 at 106-Io9.
179 England: Lord Campbell in R. v. Millis ( I843-1844) 10 Cl. & Fin.
534, 786; Catterall v. Catterall (1847) 1 Rob. Ecc.58o. Cf., on the ecclesiastical form, Culling v. Culling, Law Rep. [I896] P. II6.
Canada: Re Sheran (I899) 4 Terr. L. R. 83; cf. Connolly v. Woolrich &
Johnson ( I867) II L. C. J. I97> I R. L. (K. B.) 1.53 (involving the Indian
marriage of a white man with an Indian woman). See also I JoHNSON JZI •.
180 The method last mentioned was introduced by a recent German regulation
of Nov. 4, I939> RGBI.I ZI63,§§ 13, I4: marriage in the absence of the husband, which consists of separate declarations of the parties without proxy.
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In France it is provided that only French soldiers with
brides of French nationality may appear before a civil officer
of the army, while foreigners have to comply with the local
formalities. 181

IV.

CoNCLUSIONS

This subject has presented an excellent illustration of the
thesis that a uniform conflicts rule is easily obtainable despite
fundamental differences in municipal legal systems-provided
that these differences do not prevent mutual tolerance. The
only serious disturbance in this harmony is attributable to
the attachment of a few countries to the traditional claims of
certain religious denominations. In view of the general development in the last century and a half, such perseverance is
hardly justifiable, although it reflects deserved gratitude
for the civilizatory work of the churches during many centuries. Catholic countries such as Austria, Italy, Colombia, and
Ecuador which at present have or had a short while since marriage rules largely accommodated to the conceptions of the
Roman Church, nevertheless agree in the conviction that their
nationals should not be prevented from using the marriage
ceremonies that are legal in foreign countries. The Spanish
Supreme Court criticized by the literature requires Spanish
nationals to marry at the consulates, but not on the ground of
religious law.
It may be hoped that the period of readjustment following
the present war will stimulate reconsideration of these basic
problems of international relations.
181
C. C. art. 93 par. 3, as amended by Law of Dec. zo, 1922. The British
regulations do not apply to all parts of the army. E.g., the Foreign Marriages
(China) Order in Council, 1938, excludes the solemnization by a marriage
officer in China of marriages between parties either of whom is serving in
China in His Majesty's Naval or Military Forces or the Royal Air Force.
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Substantive Requirements for Marriage
I.

SuRVEY

r. Terminology

r

THE traditional language of the canon law and most
modern codifications, marriage requirements not concerned with formalities are labeled "impediments ( obstacles) to marriage." According to their effect upon the
validity of the marriage, they are divided into impediments
merely capable of postponing its celebration--impedimenta
impedientia, directory requirements-and those rendering the
marriage void or voidable--impedimenta dirimentia, mandatory requirements. This division is well known in every law.
(Cf. Restatement§§ 9, 122).
The term "requirements," which is frequently used today,
is more convenient and more correct, because it includes the
conditions of consent to marry, while "impediments" fails to
include defects of consent.
"Capacity" to marry far from covers the whole concept. It
denotes the general ability of a person to marry at all, for instance as defined by requirements of age and parental consent, but it does not refer clearly to an individual's being permitted to marry a specific person or a person of a determinate
class. Nor does the term, capacity, include the requirement of
sufficient consent of the parties; for this reason, in the text
of the Hague Convention on Marriage, article I, the words
"The capacity to contract marriage" were replaced by "The
right to contract marriage." 1 As short terms, however, both
terms are and may be used.
1 For this discussion see decision of the German RG. (Dec. xs, 1930) IPRspr.
1931, no. 58 at 119.
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2.

Two Rival Basic Principles

Not only are the municipal rules on intrinsic requirements ·
of marriage extremely different, but also the rules relating to
the conflict of municipal laws are confusingly varied. A few
observations may help us to find our way.
There are two main principles, both coming from the statutists:
(a) One principle, represented in its purest form by the
dominant conflicts law of the United States, points to the law
of the place of celebration; a marriage good where contracted
is good everywhere, and vice ver:sa. The practice of applying
this maxim/ which clearly originated in the ordinary contract theory, 3 to the substantive requirements of a contract
creating a status, was in defiance of the traditional doctrine of
status. The reason for this custom is perhaps that the machinery of marriage licensing has seemed inadequate to meet the
unknown laws of the respective domicils of the parties. And
an avowed purpose of the principle has always been to make
marriage possible for persons who could not marry under their
domiciliary laws.
(b) In the European systems, the personal law of the
parties controls the intrinsic requirements. Under this system
the personal law may be determined either by the domicil or
by the nationality of the parties, as the status rule may be.
Illustration: A sixteen-year-old girl of Serbo-Yugoslavian
nationality is married in Michigan. She has capacity to marry
under rule (a) and also accordit}.g to English law based on
domicil (under rule b) but is incapable according to her
national law applied under rule b.
By certain regulations, however, both these points of contact, and sometimes even that of the place of celebration as a
2
ULRICH HuBER, De conflictu legum in diversis imperiis, no. 8 (GuTHRIE,
translation of SAVIGNY 512.) "Si licitum est eo loco, ubi contractum et celebratum est, ubique validum erit effectumque habebit."
3 See JoHANN STEPHAN POTIER, 3 Auserlesene Rechtsfalle, part 1 (Gottin·
.
gen, 1777) §§ u-xs.
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third element, are combined with each other, with obscure
complexities resulting from the combination. Other serious
complications are bound to arise under this system when the
personal laws of the parties are different.
3· Influence of Public Policy
Both basic principles have proved one-sided, each being
closely limited by numerous exceptions. Whatever principle
a country may have adopted, there will be a marked tendency
not to apply a foreign marriage rule which conflicts with the
matrimonial law of the forum. Marriage is one of the favorite
objects of tenacious local custom and of more or less singular
enactments. Once almost every town in Central Europe had
its own law of marriage. Although centralizing states have
always succeeded in unifying multitude of matrimonial systems \Vith almost no resistance except for the claims of
churches, still each existing international private 'law is influenced (and if we except the United States, even greatly
influenced) by the idea that its domestic rules alone are
morally justified and form an indispensable gift to its own
subjects. If we observe how varied marriage laws are and how
antiquated or arbitrary many of them appear, we understand
the reluctance of states to recognize each other's laws.
The matter is further complicated because more than one
country may be involved, and in consequence different countries may apply their own public policies. There is the country
where the parties intend to marry, the country which considers
one or both of the spouses its subjects, the country where a
lawsuit for annulment is brought, the country where recognition of the marriage or recognition or execution of an annulment is sought, and there may be other countries interested in
the status of children.
The question of public policy depends on which of the two
basic principles mentioned is adopted.
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Under the main principle accepted in the United States, the
substantive requirements for marriage are determined by the
law of the state where the marriage is to be or has been celebrated. But apart from certain elementary exceptions, such
as the rejection of polygamous and incestuous bonds, there has
appeared a "substantial" and "growing" body of cases to protect the law of the domicil of the parties! Moreover, important legislative attempts have been initiated to curb
"evasions" of the domiciliary policy of marriage.
In various other countries on the American continent, where
the same basic principle prevails, the influence of the personal law has made itself felt even more pronouncedly.
Conversely, in a country allowing foreigners to marry only
if the marriage is not prohibited by their domiciliary or national laws, additional requirements are established to satisfy
local public policy (prohibitory public policy) and certain
foreign prohibitions are disregarded as offending the local
order (permissive public policy).
The phenomena mentioned above will be treated in the following pages. The situation arising when the validity of a
marriage is examined in a lawsuit or when a foreign judgment
on its validity or invalidity is presented for recognition, will
be dealt with separately, since the problem is essentially the
same for intrinsic and formal requirements.
4· Ecclesiastical Courts
A particular position is tak~n by ecclesiastical courts of all
faiths. As the churches claim universal efficacy for their
rulings, the tribunals constituted by them apply their own
laws exclusively, irrespective of whether the marriage is celebrated in one country or another. Conflicts rules are lacking,
'See Note, 26 Harv. L. Rev. (1913) 536 and GooDRICH 305; BEALE and
others, "Marriage and the Domicil," 44 Harv. L. Rev. (1931) 501, 527, n. 85,
notice "a growing c~msciousness of the power of the domicil."
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and in some parts of the world the resultant confusions are
considerable. 5

II.
I.

LAW OF THE PLACE OF CELEBRATION

The Principle

The United States. In the United States,O the law of the
place of celebration has greater influence on the substantive
requirements of marriage than in any other country. In this
country, this law is applied by the marriage officials and judges
of the state where the marriage is to be or has been celebrated,
by the courts of the state or states where the parties had their
domicils at the time of the marriage, and finally by the courts
of any other state. In other words, from the standpoint of the
domiciEary state or the standpoint of the state of celebration,
the rule is the same for domestic and foreign marriages and for
domiciliaries as well as for foreigners.
Argentina and otht?rs. The law of the place of celebration
has also been adopted in a group of Latin-American countries
but its application is greatly restricted, as each of these countries requires those persons whom it regards as its subjects (by
domicil or nationality, respectively) when marrying abroad
to observe all its prescriptions or a large number of them. This
group includes Argentina, 7 Guatemala, 8 Paraguay, Peru, and
Costa Rica. 9 In this spirit the Treaty of Montevideo of 1889
5 On Bulgaria, cf. DANEFF, 38 Bull. Inst. Int. (1938) 5; on Palestine,
GOADBY I4·3ff.
6 Restatement § 12 r.
Cf. BISHOP, 1 New Commentaries on Marriage
§§ 841ff.; 1 WHARTON§ 165a; MINOR§ 73; 2 BEALE·§§ 121.2 1 121.6 1 121.7;
KESSLER, I Z.ausl.PR. (1927) 858 n. 5·
7 Argentine Civil Marriage Law of 1888, art. 2, relating not merely to formalities as some wri.ters have suggested; see ALCORTA, 2 Der. Int. Priv. 99; 2
VICO no. 13; RoMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int. Priv. 277.
8 Guatemala: Law on Foreigners (1936) art. 36. See MATOS no. 228 at
342, 343·
9 Paraguay: Marriage Law (r898) art. 2;
Peru: C. C. Tit. Prel. art. V, par. 2;
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 9 (by implication).
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(art. II), recast in I 940 (art. I 3 par. I), formulates the
principle as follows:
The capacity of persons to contract marriage, the form and the
existence and the validity of the marriage act, are determined
by the law of the place where it is celebrated.
The article enumerates a number of essential defects on account of which annulment may be sought, provisions with
which we shall deal later. The main rule for substantive requirements seems, however, unqualified with respect to the
marriage of two foreigners. In this case, the rule is applied
regardless of whether the marriage takes place within or without the country. The same result was implicitly adopted by
the Civil Code of Mexico for the Federal District 10 but has
not been repeated in the Code of I 9 32.
Chile and others. In another group of Latin-American
countries, a formula has been adopted similar to that of
Chile, as follows:
Marriage celebrated in a foreign country in conformity with
the laws thereof, or with the Chilean laws, shall have in Chile
the same effects as if it had been celebrated on Chilean territory. (C.C. art. II9 par. 1.)
Apparently, an option is granted between local and national
law with respect to formalities as well as other requirements.
But the more recent Chilean Law on Civil Marriage, of January ro, I884 (art. I5 par. r), simply states:
Marriage celebrated in a foreign country in conformity with
the laws thereof, shall have in Chile the same effects as if it
had been celebrated on Chilean territory.
This text seems to indicate that requirements, both formal
and substantive, are controlled by the local law alone, whereas
Chilean subjects, according to an additional paragraph, must
in addition obey the "prescriptions" or (in a more recent
wording) the "prohibitions" of the Chilean marriage law.
1

°C. C. (x884) art. 1741 (1928) art. x6x.
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This group of countries/ 1 therefore, seems to join the
group discussed above.
Brazil's recent law (I 942), going over to the domiciliary
principle, contains two provisions: 12 In the case of any marriage celebrated in Brazil, Brazilian law is applicable to mandatory requirements (impedimentos dirimentes) and formalities. In case the parties have different domicils, the validity of
the marriage is governed by the law of the first marital domicil. In the light of the foregoing parallels the language suggests that marriages celebrated in Brazil are exclusively governed by Brazilian law-correspondingly with the rule in this
country-but that capacity to marry in foreign countries is
determined according to the common domicil of the parties
rather than to the place of celebration. The only available
comment by a Brazilian author, however, transfers from the
system of the Hague Convention to the new rules the consideration of the impediments established by the national
laws. 13
The obscurity of drafting in all these enactments is regrettable.
Denmark. In Denmark, likewise, the primary rule refers to
the law of the place of celebration. This rule is not exclusive,
however, sin~e a marriage official may not preside at the marriage of two nonresident foreigners, if some impediment established by one of the domiciliary laws is proved to him. 14
But where a person domiciled in Denmark enters upon a marriage in a foreign country, the Danish law does not claim any
11 Ecuador: C. C. art. I I 5 par. I is similar to the older Chilean text; it is
added, as it was formerly in the Argentine C. C. art. I 64, that any annulment
of a foreign marriage by an ecclesiastical authority must be respected.
Uruguay: C. C. (I868 as amended I893 and I9I4) art. Ioi, par. I and Act
of May :u, I 885, are certainly to the same effect, as Uruguay is a participant
in the Montevideo Treaty.
I2 Lei de IntrodU«;iio (I942) art. 7 §§ I and 3·
13
ESPINOLA, 8-B Tratado 820 no. 203.
14
BoRuM, Personalstatutet 424, 427, 440; see also HoEcK, Personalstatut
I 6; BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 2 I 8 nos. 34 and 3 7; MuNcH-PETERSEN,
4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 746. (These writers do not entirely agree with each
other.)
·
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influence, unless a strong public policy, such as that regarding
bigamy or incest, requires attention. 15
C6digo Bustamante. A singular application of the law of the
place of celebration is made by article 48 of the C6digo Bustamante. While this code invokes as a general principle the personal law of the parties, article 48 provides that coercion, fear,
and abduction as causes of nullity of marriage are governed by
the law of the place of celebration.
Switzerland. Whereas the American rule, as conceived by
the Restatement, refers exclusively to the municipal law of the
place of celebration, in Switzerland a parallel rule is established 16 for foreign marriages of Swiss nationals, with the
distinct implication that above all the conflict law of the place
of celebration shall decide what legal order applies to the
case. This rule, which indicates an unusually broad-minded
policy, has not always been correctly applied by non-Swiss
courts. Taking into account the diversity of conflict laws, Swiss
conflicts law gives way to any other conflicts rule of the foreign
domicil. As a matter of fact, the draftsmen realized that in the
statistical majority of cases the foreign conflicts rule would, on
the basis of the nationality principle, refer the case to Swiss
matrimonial law to govern the substantive requirements for
Swiss nationals. The decision, however, is left to the local law,
the intention being to rule out any conflict with the law applicable under the local conflicts rule. It follows that a marriage of Swiss nationals in the United States, if good at the
place of celebration, is good under Swiss law too. It is immaterial whether the parties are domiciled at the foreign place
of celebration. 17
There is much doubt, however, whether this rule applies
only where both parties are Swiss nationals or whether the
local law governs mixed marriages as well. Sometimes the
15 BoRuM, Personalstatut~ 45 7; 6 Repert.
18

17

NAG. art. 7f.
BECK, NAG. ~31 no.

so, ibid.

z 1 8 no. 3 7.

275 nos. x8-z3.
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18

courts have extended the rule to the latter case, but generally
it is argued that only where both spouses are Swiss can the
Swiss concession succeed in avoiding conflicts; where another
legal order is involved, the nationality principle is preferred. 19
Soviet Russia. Soviet Russia applies her marriage laws to all
persons, including foreigners, who marry within the
U.S.S.R. 20
2..

Exceptions: Prohibitive Public Policy

The United States: Policy of the forum. Exceptions to the
rule that a marriage validly contracted at the place of celebration is valid everywhere are made by common law practice
as well as by statute.
A marriage is held invalid when it is, in the opinion of the
forum, contrary to the general principles of Christendom. The
only applications concern polygamous and incestuous marriages, and both are dealt with discriminately. Practical cases
of polygamy are those of the so-called "progressive" .sort, viz.,
where a party has gone through a second marriage after a
divorce recognized at the place where granted but not recognized at the forum. 21 Incest is not a characteristic of every marriage between near relatives prohibited at the forum; but such
has been assumed in a few cases of marriage between nephew
and aunt 22 or even the widow of a nephew and an uncle. 23 ·
The decisions respecting marriages of first cousins are in conflict. 24
18 BG. (Dec. I8, I875) I BGE. IOI; BG. (March I8, I876) 2 BGE. 32;
BG. (Oct. 28, I881) 7 BGE. 658, 662.
· 19 BEcK, NAG. uo nos. IO and II; HUBER-MUTZNER 427 n. I7I·
20 See FREUND in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 366; MAKARov, Precis 327.
21 Restatement§ I32 comment a; 2 BEALE§ I32.I.
22
Restatement § I32 comment b; Campbell v. Crampton (C.C.N.D.N.Y.,
r88o) 2 Fed. 4I7; State v. Brown (189o) 47 Ohio St. 102, 23 N. E. 747;
Laughran v. Laughran (I934) 292 U.S. 216. England: (uncle and niece) De
Wilton v. Montefiore [I9oo] 69 L. J. (Ch.) 7I7, [I9oo] 2 Ch. 481.
23 Osoinach v. Watkins (1938) 235 Ala. 564, t8o So. 577·
24
For validity: In re Miller's Est. (I927) 239 Mich. 455, 2I4 N. W. 428;
Schofield v. Schofield (I912) 51 Pa. Super. Ct. 564. For voidness: Weinberg
v. Weinberg (I927) 242 Ill. App. 4I4; Johnson v. Johnson (I9Io) 57 Wash.
89, 106 Pac. 500.
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A further exception is made by common law on behalf of
"a distinctive national policy of the forum." On this ground,
miscegenation is considered a cause of invalidity in all
Southern and some Northern and Western states. 25
Policy of domicil. Though the subject of endless controversy, a few other requirements established by the law of the
domicil of a party have been enforced regardless of the local
law; thus the provisions of Oklahoma and New York about
nonage 26 and certain prohibitions against remarriage. 27 The
Restatement does not hesitate to generalize in this respect;
every time a state makes it clear that it regards a prohibition as
arising out of a "strong public policy"-what in Europe is
called extraterritorial or international public order-the prohibition limits the rule that the local law governs. If this extension of the force of the law of domicil were accepted unanimously, the situation would be somewhat clarified. Under
no theory, however, would the law of the place of celebration
be excluded in any jurisdiction by a domiciliary prohibition
that, though of mandatory character or of public interest, is
not held to be clearly of primary importance. 28
Under the common law, apart from the general function
of public policy, the fact that the parties attempt to elude their
domiciliary prohibitions is immaterial. The law of the place
of celebration is applicable, as Judge McSherry stated in Jack25 Restatement·§ I 3 z comment c; Dupre v. Boulard (I 855) I o La. Ann. 4 I 1 ;
State v. Bell (1872) 7 Tenn. (Baxt.) 9, 32 Am. Rep. 549; Kinney v. Commonwealth (1878) 30 Va. (Grat.) 858, 32 Am. Rep. 69o; Eggers v. Olson
(I924) 104 Okla. 297, 23I Pac. 483. Cf. Jackson v. Jackson (I895) 8z Md.
17, 33 Atl. 3 I 7· Denying extraterritorial effect: The Inhabitants of Medway
v. The Inhabitants of Needham (I 8 I 9) I 6 Mass. I 57, 8 Am. Dec. I 3 I.
26
Ross v. Bryant (I923) 90 Okla. 300, 217 Pac. 364, criticized in 23 Col.
L. Rev. (I923) 782; Cunningham v. Cunningham (I912) 206 N.Y. 341, 99
N. E. 845 (where, however, the parties had not cohabited). Contrary result
in Massachusetts: Levy v. Downing (I9I3) 2I3 Mass. 334, too N. E. 638.
27
Cf. Restatement§§ qo, 13I; z BEALE§ I30.1; STUMBERG z6o.
28
Cf. Restatement§ I32 comment a; Sturgis v. Sturgis (1908) SI Ore. 10,
93 Pac. 696, on marriage without parental consent. Fensterwald v. Burk
(I9I6) 129 Md. 131, 98 Atl. 358, on the prohibition in Maryland of marriage
between uncle and niece.
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son v. Jackson, "even when they have left their own State
to marry elsewhere for the purpose of avoiding the laws of
the domicil." 29 Thus, infants domiciled in Wisconsin, marrying validly in Minnesota, are considered validly married in
Iowa, although the marriage is invalid because of nonage i~
Wisconsin under its evasion clause. 30 In the same spirit, the
Civil Code of Argentina, article I 59, expressly establishes the
law of the place of celebration as governing, "even where the
marrying parties have left their domicil in order not to be subjected to the formalities and laws there in force."
By statute, however, specific provisions against evasion have
now been introduced in seventeen states. 31 Five of these
states 32 have adopted the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act of
1912, section I of which reads as follows:

"If any person residing and intending to continue to reside in
this state who is disabled or prohibited from contracting marriage under the laws of this state shall go into another state or
country and 'there contract marriage prohibited and declared
void by the laws of this state, such marriage shall be null and
void for all purposes in this state with the same effect as though
such prohibited marriage had been entered into in this state."
This provision presupposes prohibitions rendering the marriage void under the home law; if it be understood as referring
29
(r895) 82 Md. 17, 29; cf. Fensterwald v. Burk (1916) 129 Md. 131,
cited above in note z8. Danelli v. Danelli (r868) 4 Ky. (Bush) 51 (widow
and brother of late husband marrying in Switzerland contrary to their domiciliary Austrian law); Stevenson v. Gray (r856) 17 Ky. (B. Mon.) 193, and
BISHOP, r New Commentaries on Marriage § 843. A similar statement in
McDonald v. McDonald (1936) 6 Cal. (2d) 457, 58 Pac. (2d) 1-63, that the
intention of the parties to evade a requirement is entirely immaterial, has
shocked BATIFFOL, the distinguished French writer, in spite of his familiarity
with American conBicts law; see his spirited comment on this case in 32 Revue
Crit. 1937, r6o, 167ff. French law especially is accustomed to repression of
fraude a la loi.
30
Boehm v. Rohlfs (1937) 224 Iowa 226, 231, 276 N. W. 105, 108.
31
HARPER and T AINTOR, Cases 7 r 3, distinguish the statutes enacting a
subjective test of evasion, those enacting an objective test of evasion, including
the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, and those covering all ceremonies between
persons who intend to live in the state.
32
Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Vermont, ahd Wisconsin.
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solely to voidness ab initio, the provision may be criticized as
ineffectuaP 3 At least it is not confined to single enumerated
prohibitions as are some other evasion statutes; 34 hence, it
would not be impossible to bring child marriages under its protection, though no such decision is known. 35 Nor does the Uniform Act require, as three states' enactments do, 36 that the
parties intend to evade a prohibition.
The Uniform A-ct has extended its scope remarkably by
adding section 2, whereby an evasive marriage is prohibited
by the state of celebration itself. Further repression of evasive
marriages can obviously be accomplished by reciprocation
among the states sharing the policy of preventing evasion; in
fact, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has declared void a
marriage celebrated in Indiana in defiance of the marriage
prohibition and the evasion statute of Illinois, the parties being
domiciled in Illinois. And other cases seem to promote this
approach, 31 which has been properly construed as a r.envoi to
the conflicts rule of the domicil. 38
33 RICHMOND and HALL, Marriage and the State (1929) 196. As a matter
of fact, it seems that not every mandatory requirement is given extraterritorial
effect even in interpreting the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act; see Lyannes v.
Lyannes (1920) 171 Wis. 381, 177 N. W. 683; cf. KESSLER, 1 Z.ausl.PR.
(1927) 858, 861.
34 E.g., miscegenation (Montana), capacity (Connecticut), blood relationship (West Virginia).
35 Recently all jurisdictions have established statutory rules on age. Evasion
of such provisions was one of the principal purposes of marriage out of the
state; cf. the enumeration of motives for such marriages by GooDRICH 306,
There are still marked variances among the statutes.
36 Indiana Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 44-209.
Maine Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 72 § 9 (intention of returning).
West Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1937) c. 48 § 4695 [17].
37 Hall v. Industrial Commission (1917) 165 Wis. 364, 162 N. W. 312;
note that Wisconsin bas adopted the same Uniform Act as Illinois. In L.
Meisenhelder v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company (1927) 170
Minn. 317, 213 N. W. 32, a Kentucky marriage between first cousins, valid
where celebrated, invalid at the domicil in Illinois under the evasion statute in
force there, was held invalid in Minnesota. See also People v. Steere (1915)
I84 Mich. 556, 151 N. w. 6I7, criticized in 13 Mich. L. Rev. (1915) 592,
but cf. GooDRICH 313 n. 54· See for comment TAINTOR, "Effects of ExtraState Marriage Ceremonies," xo Miss. L. J. (1938) 105.
38 GRISWOLD, "Renvoi Revisited," 51 Harv. L. Rev. (1938) I 165 at I 199ff.
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Under common law principles also, bigamy, incest, and miscegenation, when subject to a "strong" domiciliary policy,
are sufficient cause for annulment in the courts of any third
state having the same distinctive public policy. The Restatement again achieves a broad generalization. According to ·
section 132, wherever a statute at the domicil makes a marriage void even though celebrated in another state, the marriage is void-not only at the domicil but also in all third states
and even in the state of celebration, for section 132 says
"everywhere." 39
The Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, section 3, provides
the following additional precaution: the li<;ensing official must
a~certain that a party residing in another state is not prohibited
from marrying by the laws of the jurisdiction where he resides. 40 Yet no independent verification of the allegations of
candidates is usual. 41
The Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, section r, prohibiting
the parties from going "into another state or country," was
probably intended to be applicable in any country as part of a
domiciliary law. Under this assumption, the marriage, celebrated in Florida, of an American or an Englishman d~miciled
in Illinois with his first cousin, is invalid under the laws not
only of Illinois but also of France, where the principle of
nationality requires the application of the law indicated by the
national law of the person. 42
It may be noted that, except for miscegenation, the notion
of evasion apparently is not extended to the case of parties
effectively changing their domicil, i.e., abandoning their old
39
It has been repeatedly stated that no support can be found in the cases for
this view, cf. e.g., VARTANIAN, Foreign Marriages-Recognition, I I 7 A. L. R.
(I938) I86, I88.
40
Improved in Wyoming Comp. Stat. (I9zo) § 496o, amended by L.
I9JI, c. 99 §I; Rev. Stat. Ann. I9JI, ch. 68 art. Io6 (68-Io6).
41
RICHMOND and HALL, Marriage and the State (I9Z9) I97> regretting
this and other deficiencies, advocate an efficient verification of assertions, state
supervision, and interstate exchange of records.
42
C/. KEsSLER, 1 Z.ausl.PR. (x9z7) 858, 863.
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place of residence and establishing themselves for the time
being at the foreign place where they have their wedding. If,
for instance, the parties are forbidden at their domicil to marry
within a certain time under the sanction of nullity, they may
transfer their domicil to another state and validly marry under
its law. 43 The marriage will be recognized even in the former
jurisdiction.44
Denmark. A foreign marriage of Danish domiciliaries is
annulled when it contravenes the prohibitions against bigamous or incestuous marriages. 45 Moreover, in case both parties
were domiciled in Denmark, the marriage may be annulled by
royal decree. 46
Latin-America?~ countries. Restrictions of much greater
significance are imposed on the principle lex loci celebrationis
in the Latin-American countries mentioned above (p. 24 7). In
some of these countries, the entire body of domestic prohibitions is declared compulsory on subjects marrying abroad. 47
In others, a broad catalogue of requirements is similarly prescribed. 48 The Treaty of Montevideo of I 8 89, article II, recast in I 940, article I 3, had the task of limiting the influence
of public policy in the mutual relations of. the participant
states. This convention, however, still reserved to every state
the right to consider void a marriage valid where celebrated,
in the event of any of the following defects:
(a) Defect of age in one of the parties, the minimum required being fourteen years completed by the man and
twelve by the woman;
43

Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald (I933) 2IO Wis. 543, 246 N. W. 68o.
State v. Fenn (I9o7) 47 Wash. 56I, 92 Pac. 4I7; Pierce v. Pierce (I9Io)
58, Wash. 622, I09 Pac. 45; GOODRICH 307 n. 29·
'
4S See BoRuM, Personalstatutet 45 I and 6 Repert. 2 I 8 no. 3 7.
46 Denmark: Crim. Code of Feb. 10, I 86.6, § 4; cf. HoECK, Personalstatut 24.
47
Chile: C. C. art. 1 I 9 par. 2.
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 9·
Ecuador: C. C. art. I 15 par. 2.
4 8 Argentina: Civil Marriage Law (I888) art. 2.
Mexico: C. C. (1884) art. 175. Cf. RoMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int. Priv. 280.
44
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(b) Relationship between the spouses in direct line by
blood or affinity, either legitimate or illegitimate;
(c) Relationship between the spouses of legitimate or illegitimate brother and sister;
(d) Having caused the death of one of the spouses of a
former marriage as perpetrator or accomplice in order
to marry the surviving spouse; 49
(e) A former marriage not legally dissolved.
Analogous reservations as made by some states, e.g., Argentina (C.C. art. 159), are evidently meant to apply only to
their own subjects. The reservations contained in the Convention of Montevideo, on the contrary, seem to be standard requirements, common to all participant states, which may be
raised by any participant state in any case of a foreign marriage. If this assumption is correct, the influence of public
policy has been correspondingly unified to a considerable extent.
In Ecuador (C.C. art. II5 par. r), a foreign marriage of
any person that is valid at the place of celebration is recognized,
although, however, invalidation by an ecclesiastical court
must be respected. 50
Switzerland. Swiss law is applicable in cases of evasion,
where the parties marry in a foreign place with evident intention to evade the grounds of nullity of Swiss law. 51 The
three premises for this rule are that only an artificial contact
with the foreign place of celebration existed, that mandatory
requirements have been evaded, and that both parties knew the
facts and manifestly intended to evade the Swiss prohibitions.
All these three conditions are seldom proved in a single case. 5 2
49 The case of a married person· causing the death of his or her own spouse,
must obviously be included.
60
No analogous consequence of the state's connection with the Catholic church
exists in Italy or Spain.
51 NAG. art. 7£ par. r.
62
In the practice of the Federal Tribunal there is just one decision, BG.
(Jan. 19, 1934) 6o BGE. II r, Clunet 19381 9841 where a lunatic and his bride
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A tacit fourth condition for the application of this rule seems
to be Swiss nationality or at least Swiss domicil of both
parties; 53 if the parties have in fact, and not merely fictitiously
transferred their domicil from Switzerland to a foreign place,
the provision is inoperative, just as the American evasion
rules.
Apart from the rule just mentioned on evasion, which may
or may not be included in the idea of international public
policy, Swiss courts reserve to themselves the discretionary
power to consider a marriage void on grounds of public policy.
The Federal Tribunal, emphasizing the necessity of such
stringent national policy, has recently denied recognition to a
foreign remarriage of a Swiss citizen who was still married
under Swiss law. 54 However, not all grounds for invalidity,
opposed to the marriage of foreigners in Switzerland, are applicable to the foreign marriage of a Swiss subject. 55 Particu-.
larly, the provisions preventing marriage between uncle and
niece and aunt and nephew do not have the effect of invalidating a marriage celebrated abroad, although in such cases
Swiss certificates that the candidates are capable of intermarrying are not issued. 56
3· Exceptions: Permissive Public Policy
The United States. In the United States, it is a fairly well
settled policy that foreign penal restrictions upon freedom are
not recognized. This principle applies to penal legislative prohibitions on remarriage; extraterritorial effect is denied to
traveled to Brighton, England, to marry there, and NAG. art. 7£. was invoked
ad abundantiam.
53
Cf. SCHNITZER 159, and BECK, NAG. 241 no. 88, having different opinions.
BEcK, NAG. 241 no. 85, and others suggest that the husband must be a Swiss
citizen; I havedisregarded this arbitrary opinion.
64
BG. (May 13, 1938) 64 BGE. II 74·
65 BEcK, NAG.. z3z no. 56 and ibid. z6z no. 154.
56
BEcK, NAG. 232 no. 57·
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such prohibitions everywhere, even when they are established
by the domiciliary state. 57 Disregard of racial prohibitions 118
falls in the same category.
Switzerland. Swiss law has established the following important general limitations on recognition of foreign marriage
prohibitions:
A marriage contracted abroad, which is invalid according to
the law of the place of its celebration; may be declared invalid
in Switzerland only if it also is invalid under Swiss law. 5 9
The idea is that the domestic legal order is not iNterested in
annulling a marriage that satisfies Swiss requirements. It is
doubtful, however, to what group of persons this provision is
intended to apply. 60

III.
I.

PERSONAL LAW

The Primary Principle

Law of the domicil. The law of t~e domicil of either party
governs marriage requirements in Great Britain, according to
prevailing opinion, and in the British Empire, Norway, and,
as has been mentioned, to some extent in Denmark. 61 The Scandinavian Convention on Family Law also has established
this as a primary rule.
·
The position of British law, it is true, is. not quite clear.
English courts are accustomed to think in terms of jurisdiction
rather than to distinguish competency of tribunal and applicable law. They are supposed to recognize, however, foreign
judgments affecting the status of Englishmen domiciled
57
Commonwealth v. Lane (1873) II3 Mass. 458; Van Voorhis v. Brintnall
(1881) 86 N.Y. 18; State v. Shattuck (1897) 69 Vt. 403 1 38 Atl. 81.
For further details see STUMBERG z6o.
58
State v. Tutty (C. C. S.D. Ga., 189o) 41 Fed. 753·
59
NAG. art. 7£ par. z.
60
See discussion by BEcK, NAG. z58 no. 143, and SCHNITZER 16o.
61
Cf. supra p. Z49; for Denmark, supra p. z56, ns. 45, 46.
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within the jurisdiction of the foreign court. Nevertheless, in
Wilton v. Montefiore (1900), 62 a marriage between a Jewish
maternal uncle and his niece domiciled in England was declared void, although it was alleged to be valid by both Jewish
custom and the law of the place of celebration. In Sottomayor
v. De Barros (1877)/ 3 it was held that a marriage of first
cousins domiciled in Portugal, prohibited from marrying
there, is to be deemed invalid also in the eyes of an English
court; a contrary result was reached in the second case of
Sottomayor v. De Barros in 18 79, 64 solely because it had then
been established that the bridegroom had his domicil in England when the parties married in England.
On the basis·of this latter case, many writers have believed
that English courts would always apply domestic law, if the
marriage is celebrated in England and one party, or at least
the bridegroom, is domiciled there, irrespective of any incapacity by which the other party may have been affected under
his own domiciliary law. 65 Thus, whereas a domiciled Englishman marrying abroad would remain subject to the English
rules on capacity, the foreign grounds of incapacity of a person domiciled abroad would be disregarded. This alleged rule
has acquired world-wide notoriety; it has been labelled a badge
of "insular pride and complacency." 66 In fact, apart from
the unclear grounds of the court in the second Sottomayor
decision and the entirely discredited case of 0 gden v. 0 gden, 61
there is no reasonable support for such a unilateral English
62

[19oo] 2 Ch. D. 481.
[1877] 3P.D.1.
64
[1879] 5 P. D. 94·
65
WESTLAKE §§2I, 25; DICEY, Rule 183 Exc. I; 6 HALSBURY 376; less
decidedly, FOOTE 125.
66
CHESHIRE 228; FOSTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict
of Laws," 16 Brit, Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84, 88. See e.g., BATY, "Capacity and Form of Marriage," 26 Yale L. J. ( 191 7) 444; GoODRICH 316 n.
66; and more recently GRAVESON, "Matrimonial Domicil and the Contract of
Marriage," 20 Jour. Camp. Leg. (1938) 55, 65; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 6o n. 17.
61
[19o8] P. 46; cf. infra p. 267 and n. 95·
63
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doctrine. 68 That the place of celebration has no importance 69
was expressly stated in the second Sottomayor case.
Cheshire criticizes the rule from another point of view,
suggesting that only the "matrimonial domicil" should be
decisive. We shall discuss the merits of this doctrine shortly.
At any rate, Cheshire himself believes that only the second
Sottomayor case is in his favor; he admits that Sir James Hannen did not base his decision upon the fact that England was
the matrimonial home and, further, that the grounds of decision are unsatisfactory. 70 In any event, a recent English
decision, 71 overlooking Cheshire's opinion, adopts with better
foundation the prevailing doctrine that the domicil of either
party determines the capacity to marry.
N ationallaw. In the rest of the world, 72 the national law of
either party governs intrinsic marriage requirements. The
Hague Convention on Marriage of I 902, article I, and the
68
In Chetti v. Chetti [I909] P. 67 the prohibition against intermarriage
between a Hindu Brahman and a foreigner was disregarded, but this disability
was one that the person affected could discard at will (CHESHIRE 22 8 n. I).
Moreover, it was considered inappropriate to assert such a prohibition against
an English marriage to an English partner, obviously because repugnant to
,
public policy to do so.
69
However, BECKE'IT, "The Question of Classification ('qualification') in
Private International Law," IS Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I934) 46 advocates the American principle.
7
°CHESHIRE 226; contra, see GRAVESON, 20 Journ. Camp. Leg. (I938) 55,
cited supra n. 66.
71
In re Paine, In re Williams, Griffith v. Waterhouse [I940] 1 Ch. D.
46, [I939] Io8 L. J. (Ch.) 427 per Bennett]., cf. Note, 56 Law Q. Rev.
(I 940) 22. BENTWICH, "Recent English Cases on Domicile in Matters of
Personal Status," 52 Juridical Review (I94o) 284, 288 (English prohibition
applied to marriage in Germany of a man domiciled in Germany and his late
first wife's sister, previously domiciled in England).
72
Austria: OGH. (I907) 44 GlU.NF. no. 38II; WALKER 597, 598.
Belgium: C. C. art. I 70 ter, as established by Law of July 12, I 93 I, art. I4•
Bulgaria: see I BERGMANN 6 5.
Finland: Law of Dec. s, I 929 on Family Relations of International Nature,
sec. I (Finns abroad); sec. 2 par. I (foreigners in Finland).
France: C. C. arts. 3 and I 70.
Germany: EG. art. I3 par. r.
Greece: C. C. (r8s6) art. 4 par. 3; C. C. (I940) art. I3·
Haiti: C. C. art. 155 (Haitiens abroad).
Honduras: C.~· arts. 137-139·
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C6digo Bustamante, article 36 (for states following the nationality principle), adopted this rule, while the Scandinavian
Convention on Family Law acknowledges it as a subsidiary
rule.
If, within a state, religious law determines the personal law,
the substantive requirements of marriage are usually included.73
Renvoi. In the conflict of domicil and nationality principles
or of either of them with the law of the place of celebration,
renvoi is accepted in most European countries. 74
Illustrations: (i) Two Swiss parties domiciled in Switzerland married in Brighton, England. Swiss law (NAG. art. 7f)
refers the validity of the marriage to the English conflicts law,
Hungary: Marriage Law of I894, §§ Io8, I09, IIO; cf. Clunet I924, 597;
6 Repert. 463 nos. 83 and 88.
Italy: C. C. (I865) art. Ioopar. q C. C. (I942) art. II5 (Italians abroad);
art. II6 (foreigners in Italy).
Luxemburg: C. C. art. 3 par. 3 and art. I 70.
Monaco: C. C. art. 3 par. 3 and art. I38.
The Netherlands: BW. art. I38; H. R. (Jan. 6, I91I) W. 9125.
Nicaragua: C. C. arts. I02 and I03·
Poland: Law of I926 on private international law, art. I2 par. 1.
Portugal: Code of Civil Register of February I8, I9II, arts. 40 and 245;
Regul. Consular, D. no. 6462 of March 7, I920, arts. 143, 144; see CUNHA
GoNc;:ALVES, I Direito Civil 678.
Spain: C. C. art. 9; Trib. Supr. (July 10, I9I6) I37 Sent. I05 (Spaniards
abroad). Spanish Morocco, Dahir de la condicion civil de los espaiioies y
extran j eros, art. I o.
Sweden: Law of July 8, I904 with amendments, c. I §§ I, 2.
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7c (for marriage within the state).
Turkey: 7 Repert. 264 no. 209.
China: Law of I9I8, art. 9·
Japan: Law of I 898, art. 13·
73 The rule that religious law governs the requirements for marriage is in
accordance not only with Catholic canon and Greek Orthodox law but also
"with Ottoman and Orieqtal tradition" in Palestine, as GoADBY, I 52, declares;
he cites, id., n. 8, Re Alison's Trusts (I874) 31 L. T. 638 (marriage in Persia of
an Armenian Christian woman held invalid under Armenian canon law) and
Moharem Benachi c. Salomon Sasson, infra p. 272, n. II 8.
74
France: Cour Paris (March 23, I888) Clunet I889, 638; cf. WEISS, 3
Traite 478 n. 2.
Germany: EG. art. 27; RG.(Feb. I 5, I9I2) 78 RGZ. 234, for further renvoi;
Bay. OLG. (Jan. I8, I9I8) JW. I9I8, 375; KG. (March 22, I9o6) 32
Jahrb. FG. A 28. On certain controversies see RAAPE 260.
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7£, based on art. 54 of the Swiss Con~titution.
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which, in turn, refers the question to the Swiss domestic law.
Hence, Swiss law ,was applied by the Swiss Federal TribunaF5
(ii) An American citizen domiciled in Germany married a
German woman, apparently in Germany. The German court
applied German law to the requirements for both parties, on
the erroneous basis that the American law referred the man's
capacity to marry to the law of his domicil; but the court could
have reached the same result through the application of the
American principle of lex loci celebrationis• 76
Contrary to its general attitude, the Hague Convention of
I 902, article I, in deference to the aforementioned Swiss rule,
allowed an "express" reference of the national law to another
law, thus affirming the Swiss rule while condemning renvoi in
general.
Problems Arising when Parties are Subject to Different
Personal Laws

2.

Each law applied separately. The general doctrine is that
each party must be free from prohibitions to marry the other
party, this to be decided, in a country following the domiciliary
principle, separately according to the law of the domicil of
each party and, in a country following the nationality principle, separately according to the national Ia.w of each party.
It must be noted, however, that this doctrine has had and
still has opponents.
Minority opinions. Savigny, 77 at the time when the domiciliary principle was unchallenged, pleaded for the law of the
first matrimonial domicil, which he identified with the domicil
of the future husband, unless the parties had in fact established
their domicil at another place or intended to do so. Savigny
was followed by many writers of the early and later nineteenth
75
78
77

BG. {Jan. I8, I934) 6o BGE. II I.
OLG. Dresden {Jan. IS, I9IZ) z6 ROLG. :u I.
SAVIGNY § 3 79, tr. by GUTHRIE Z9I•
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century/ 8 but his view has finally been abandoned, since long
ago objections were made that it is unfair and antiquated to
disregard the personal law of the bride. 79 It is also frequently
urged that the validity of the marriage cannot be tested by the
law of the place where the parties establish their domicil after
their marriage. Nevertheless, Cheshire explicitly invokes
Savigny's theory for his resurrection of the same opinion. 80
The Marriage Act of Hungary provides that in anycase
where a Hungarian man marries a foreign woman, either at
home or abroad, her personal law is to be considered only
with respect to her age and capacity to consent, while in all
other respects the validity of the marriage is to be tested
exclusively by Hungarian law. 81 The Civil Code of Honduras
even makes Honduran law obligatory on the capacity of both
parties to marry abroad, when one party is a citizen. 82 By such
laws, the influence of domestic public policy, described below,
is certainly exaggerated.
Another opinion, now discredited, urged the application of
the more severe of the two laws involved. 83 At present, the
only doctrine of importance is the general doctrine first stated.
Doctrine of unilateral prohibitions. To apply to either party
his or her personal law has proved delicate. Following the
canon law and Savigny, 84 a distinction has been drawn between
78 RoTH, 1 System 288; GIERKE, 1 Deutsches Privatrecht 236 these two
fascinated by old German law; WINDSCHEID, 1 Pandekten (ed. 9) § 35 no. 4·
The rule was partly accepted by 1 BAR§ 16o and is now advocated by BARTIN,
2 Principes 1 23.
79
WALKER 569.
8°CHESHIRE zzo, 221. Cf. also GRAVESON, 20 Journ. Comp. Leg. (1938) 55,.
68, supra ri. 66. Contra: GooDRICH 314.
81
Marriage Law of I 894, §§ 11o, 111.
82
Art. 138.
83
ARMINJON, 2 Precis 457 no. 214. Occasionally certain impediments usually
considered involving only one spouse, are given a broader interpretation affecting both spouses, see e.g. 2 ZITELMANN 6o9 n. 300 and KG. (Dec. 21, 1936)
JW. 1937, 2039 and see contra RAAPE, 2 D.IPR.144 n. 3·
84
SAVIGNY § 379, tr. by W. GUTHRIE 291.; "Denkschrift," 14 Z.int.R. (1904)
524, 525· KuRT STEINLE, Die zweiseitigen Ehehindernisse im internationalen
Privatrecht, Thesis (Munich, 1939).

SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR MARRIAGE 265
unilateral and bilateral prohibitions, although no settled definition of these terms exists nor even seems necessary. Roughly
speaking, some provisions of matrimonial law concern only
one person, while others apply to both parties or generally to
the conclusion of the marriage. In the first case, one of the
parties lacks capacity, and this party alone is prohibited from
marrying (unilateral); in the second case, the prohibition
resulting from the disqualification of one of the parties includes both ..
In consonance with the personal law, each requirement must
be observed just as it would have to be observed in the homeland. Illustration is provided by the following four important
unilateral prohibitions (a-d). A fifth example (e) leads to
the related question of the party who may bring suit for annulment, the determination of which also depends on the personal
law. 85
(a) Age required for marriage. 86 In all countries following
the system of nationality, an Italian girl may marry on attaining fourteen years of age, a German at sixteen, a Serbian at
seventeen, and a Greek, Spanish, or Northern Irish girl at
twelve. It is immaterial what the law of the other party prescribes.
(b) Consent in form but not in fact; defective intention.
Defects affecting consent to marriage, such as consent induced
by error, fraud, or duress, are exclusively determined by the
law of the spouse whose intention is alleged to be vitiated.
The law of the partner is immaterial. 87
85

For other cases in French practice, see J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 439ff.
Germany: RG. (Dec. 2I, I9I6) JW. I9I7, 364.
87
France: Cases of mistake: Trib. civ. Strassbourg (Dec. 21, I 920) Clunet
I92I, 933; App. Dijon (March 2o, I922) Clunet I922, 409; Trib. civ. Seine
(June It, I929) Revue I93o, 458. For duress see AUDINET, "Les Confiits
de lois en matiere de mariage et de divorce," II Recueil I926 I I75 at t8o.
Germany: RG. (May 3, I9I7) Warn. Jahrbuch I9I7, no. 2Io; RG. (Oct.
6, 1927) Revue I93o, 129; RG. (June 23, I93o) IPRspr. 1930, n. 65; RG.
(Feb. I6, I9JI) JW. I9JI, IJ40, and many decisions of lower courts collected
by 3 FRANKENSTEIN 82 n. 86. In the case RG. (Feb. 6, I9Jo) JW. 193o, I003,
86
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Illustration: A Belgian man married a German woman. He
was mistaken as to her virginity. The man is not allowed to
avail himself of the German provision that a marriage may be
attacked upon the ground of error concerning the personal
characteristics of the other spouse, but is limited to the Belgian
provision which regards only an error in physical identity of
the other spouse as relevant. 88
(c) Consent of parents or guardians. The consent of parents
or guardians required for a marriage of parties who have not
reached a certain age, such as twenty-one, 89 and, according to
some laws, the duty of the child to notify his parents of his
intended marriage ("acts of respect"), 90 all come under the
general rule regarding the capacity of the child or ward to
marry. This is one of the requirements called, according to the
French doctrine, "formes habilitantes," understood in France
to have nothing to do with formalities. These requirements
are governed by the same law that is competent to declare a
party incapable of marrying by his own will alone. Continental
opinion has it that these requirements are ruled by the national
law and not by the law of the place of celebration. 91 For
IPRspr. 1930, no. 64, the error of a Swiss husband was decided under the Swiss
Civil Code instead of the Swiss conflicts rule (NAG. art. 7£), calling for the
application of the German Civil Code; cf. 3 FRANKENSTEIN 59 n. r 3·
Italy: Cass. Torino {July 31, r883) Giur. Ital. 1883, I 6r7, Sirey 1886.4.1
Switzerland: OG. Bern {Oct. 27, 1927) 64 ZBJV. (1927) 185.
88
German Marriage Law of 1938, § 37 (even broader than BGB. § 1333);
Belgian C. C. art. r8o; cf. Cass. Belg. {July 17, 1925) Pasicrisie 1925.1.370,
emphasizing that not even "dol," fraudulent misrepresentation, justifies an
action for avoiding the marriage, the same as in France, see Chambres Reunies
(April24, 1862) D.1862.1.153.
89
E.g., France: c. c. arts. 148, 158, 159; Germany: BGB. §§ I303-1J08,
Marriage Law of I 9 3 8, §§ 3ff.; Quebec: C. C. art. I I 9·
9
France: c. c. art. I 51.
Belgium and Luxemburg: C. C. art. 151.
Spain: C. C. art. 4 7.
The Netherlands: BW. art. 99·
91
Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles {Jan. 3, 1913) Clunet 1914, 633.
France: Trib. civ. Seine (Aug. 4, 188o) Clunet 188o, 478; Trib. civ.
Seine (Dec. 21, 1885) Clunet 1886, 448; Trib. civ. Seine {July 28, 1905)
Clunet 1906, II52; Trib. civ. Seine {June 15, 1910) Clunet 1911, 212; Trib.
civ. Seine {Jan. Io, I917) Clunet 1918, I192; Trib. civ. Seine (March 8, 1920)
Clunet 1920, 206; Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 17, 1926) Clunet 1928, 404. Similarly,
on consent of council of family and tutor ad hoc for a natural child, Trib.

°
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example, the opposition of an American father to the
marriage of his daughter, likewise an American national, has
been rejected because of her nationallaw. 92
This conception also seemed accepted for a time in England.
English courts applied in accordance with their meaning foreign statutes requiring the consent of parents or similar acts,
that is, the statutes were construed as in the countries of their
enactment, either as postponing the marriage or as threatening
its validity. 93 At present, however, such permission is ordinarily regarded in England as a formal requirement and
governed, for this reason, by the law of the place where the
marriage is celebrated. 94 It is again primarily the decision of
Ogden v. Ogden which led to this change, a "very much discredited" authority indeed. 95 A better rule would perhaps have
superieur Papeete (] une 28, I 909) Clunet 191 o, r6 7; ratification of marriage
by parents, Cour Paris (May 15, I9I7) Clunet I9I7, I4I3; Trib. civ. Seine
(Jan. I8, I923) Clunet I924, II7·
Germany: RG. (Dec. 2I, I9I6) JW. I9I7, 364; somewhat confused KG.
(March 22, I9o6) 32 Jahrb. F.G. A 28.
Greece: Law of May 28-29, I887, see 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 291 n. 27.
Quebec: Agnew v. Gober (I907) 32 Que. S.C. 266, (19I9) 38 Que. S.C.
313 (judgment revised); cf. I JoHNSON 283, 287.
92
Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. 30, I923) Revue I922-I923, 494·
93
Postponing impediments: Simonin v. Mallac (I86o) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67;
Gretna Green cases: see Brook v. Brook ( 1 8 61) 9 H.L. I 93 ; prohibitory impediment: Sussex Peerage Case (I844) II Cl. & F. 85.
94
DICEY, Rule I82 at 736; WESTLAKE§§ I8, 25; FOOTE IOI; also FoSTER,
"Some Defects m the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," I6 Brit. Year Book
Int. Law (I935) 84, 90 (although sharply disapproving of this view); 3
FRANKENSTEIN 85, and many other Continental writers. More hopeful of future
better advised decisions: BECKETT, 15 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I936) 46,
77-80, supra n. 69, and CHESHIRE 2 3 I.
Recently, the problem has been, if possible, still more confused by the question
whether the matter pertains to "primary" or "secondary" characterization,
see CHESHIRE 34-36; RoBERTSON, Characterization 239-245, CoRMACK,
"Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Question in the Conflict of Laws," I4 So. Cal. L. Rev. 2ZI at 235; an unfortunate controversy, see
also FALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi and the Law of the Domicile," I9 Can. Bar Rev.
(I94I) 3II, 338.
95
·
[I9o8] P. 46, criticized by the Privy Council in Attorney General for
Alberta v. Cook [I 926] A. C. 444, 455; by the House of Lords in Salvesen v.
Adm'r of Austrian Property [I927] A. C. 64I, 646; by WESTLAKE § 25, CHESHIRE 338ff., BECKETT, 15 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I936) 46, 8off., supra n.
69; FALCONBRIDGE, 53 Law Q. Rev. 235, 247, RoBERTSON, Characterization 242,
and many others. Only I BEALE Sio, 2 BEALE 674, 679 n. 3, II03, approves
this decision.
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been found, were it not for the misleading habit of English
courts and writers, even such critics of current opinion as
Cheshire and Beckett, customarily contrasting mandatory requirements with formal instead of with directory requirements. Instead of saying that in English family law the want of
parental consent does not invalidate a marriage, every writer
asserts that consent is a formal requirement in English matrimonial law; 96 therefore, discussion continues whether it is such
also in English conflicts law.
Hence, it is not certain that (I) a marriage official 111
England is empowered to officiate at an attempted marriage of
foreigners that he knows is prohibited at their domicil because of lack of permission and that ( 2) a marriage celebrated
in England would be held valid in the absence of parental
permission, if this is an essential requisite under the domiciliary law for the validity of the marriage. These assumptions
would be necessary, if it were true that the power given parents
in Continental codes to interfere with their children's marriages "cannot be tolerated in England or the United States," ·
as Wharton once asserted. 97 But at present nobody seems to
envisage such a public p'olicy. Dean Falconbridge hopes that
English and Ontario c~mrts will recognize the nullity of
French and Quebec marriages in the absence of the requisite
parental consent. 98
Less radical, an unusual provision of the Civil Code of
Venezuela, article 134, declares, apparently on grounds of
public policy (and not because of wrong classification), that
lack of permission or lack of an "act of respect" does not invalidate a marriage, unless such permission or "act of respect"
is requir~d in the interests of ascendants or guardians.
,96 CHESHIRE 35, z3r; FoSTER, r6 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) at 90,
supra n. 94· This formulation is also to be found in the critical report of FALCON·
BRIDGE, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 89, on the basis of a particular theory of
classification against which CANSACCHI, ibid., protests.
97
I WHARTON § Z53 at 573•
98
Annotation [193z] 4 D.L.R. r at 35·
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The formality of notification, of course, is adjusted everywhere to the modes available locally. 99
Although form and substance need not be distinguished
in the United States, since the law of the place of celebration
governs both, on grounds of public policy the domiciliary law
is occasionally taken into consideration with respect to parental
consent. 100 No such attention would be given to a mere
formality.
(d) Prohibition against remarriage. A prohibition to contract a new marriage, not because of another existing marriage
but as an effect of a former dissolved marriage, is considered a
unilateral incapacity.

Illustrations: (i) An Italian married a widow, a citizen of
Fiume, where Hungarian law was in force, before the expiration of the ten months' period prescribed by Hungarian law,
the widow having obtained, however, a dispensation under
Hungarian law granted to her upon a finding that she was
not pregnant. The Italian Tribunal of Alba recognized the
marriage, 101 although Italian law did not admit such dispensation from its corresponding impediment.
(ii) A Belgian divorcee domiciled in Paris was held bound
by the three hundred days' delay of the Belgian Civil Code
(arts. 228, 296) and ineligible for dispensation under the
analogous French provision. 102 On the other hand, when the
French provision is more severe than that of the national law,
French courts are likely to insist upon the former. 103
(e) Impotence. Because of a personal characteristic of one
party, a statute may give to the other an exclusive right to
have marriage annulled. This is often assumed to be the case
99

CUNHA GoN<;ALVES, I Direito Civil 679.
Cf. the survey of cases given in Sturgis v. Sturgis (I9o8) 5I Ore. xo, 93
Pac. 696 and GOODRICH 3 I 2.
101
Trib. civ. Alba (Fe\!. 27, I9:u) Giur. Ital. I9:u, I, z, ISS·
102
Cour Paris (Nov. 301 1934) Revue Crit. 19351 486; cf. BATIFFOL,
ibid. 616,
103
See infra n. I 5 z.
100
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when a spouse is found to be impotent/ 04 although this is not
the only nor the most modern view. In consequence, it has
been contended105 that if, e.g., a Brazilian, married to a
woman of French nationality, was affected by this condition,
the wife could not avail herself of Brazilian law, and French
law would afford her no relief on this ground.
Doctrine of bilateral prohibitions. Many obstacles involve
both parties, even if founded on the qualities of one party.
In this event, each party may avail himself of the remedy
offered, irrespective of whether it is established by his own
personal law. In other words, the personal law of either spouse
decides whether a prohibition concerns one party or both;
if both, the ensuing conflicts rule gives full international
weight to the decision of the personal law.
(a) Social policy. Of such a bilateral nature are the enactments that forbid bigamy, 106 marriage between near relatives, 107 miscegenetic marriages, 108 marriages of lunatics,
syphilitics, epileptics, drunkards, persons afflicted with contagious diseases, and the like. 109 Insanity falls into this category only when treated from the viewpoint of eugenics, not
'
when considered a defect of consent. 110
(b) Adultery. Doubts have been expressed concerning the
scope of statutes under which, in the case of an adultery stated
· 104 This was the justified construction of Italian C. C. (r86$) art. 107, but
has been changed by C. C. (1938) art. 121, C. C. (1942) art. 123.
105
KAHN, 2 Abhandl. 63.
106
See RG. (April22, 1932) IJ6 RGZ. 142, 144-145 and RG. (June 8, 1936)
I5I RGZ. 313, 317·
107 E.g., under Swiss C. C. art. I oo no. I, uncle and niece are prohibited
from marrying if either one is a Swiss.
Swedish Marriage Law of I92o, c. 2 §§ 7, 8.
GreatBritain:Mettev. Mette (1859) I Sw.&Tr.416.
108
Twenty-eight states of the United States, Germany, Italy, etc.
109
Many states of the United States; Sweden, Denmark, Germany, and an
ever-increasing number of other countries.
IIO See RAAPE, 2 D.IPR. 144 n. 3, in opposition to KG. (Dec. 21, 1936) JW.
19 3 7> 2039·
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in a divorce decree, adulterer and paramour are forbidden to
marry each other. 111
The German prohibition was considered bilateral under the
Civil Code,112 and the official comment on the recent Marriage
Act has confirmed this interpretation. 113 This means that both
guilty persons are involved in the prohibition, and therefore
the marriage is forbidden if the unmarried accomplice is a
German, even though the adulterous spouse may be nonGerman.
Illustration: A German was divorced on the ground of
adultery, then became a Polish national and wished to marry
his paramour. The Prussian Ministry of Justice held that the
unmarried woman, who was still a German citizen, needed a
dispensation. 114
In the Netherlands, this question is unsettled, but the courts
treat the impediment as an obligatory policy of good morals,
precluding marriage within the state by any guilty party
mentioned in a divorce decree, 115 no matter whether the judgment be domestic or foreign and whether or not the personal
law so provides. 116 In both Germany and the Netherlands,
however, a marriage concluded in spite of the prohibition is
not annullable.
(c) Impediments connected with religion. The famous
Austrian religious impediments were intended to be bilatlll E.g., Belgium: Law of April r6, 1935 (limiting the period of prohibition
to three years) .
Germany: BGB. § 1312, Marriage Law of 1938, § 9·
The Netherlands: BW. art. 89.
112
RAAPE, 2 D.IPR. 144·
113
Ordinance of July 27, 1938, RGBl. I 923 § s(s); ANZ, JW. 1938, 2072.
114
StAZ. I 934> 292·
115
H.R. (April16, 1908) W. 87r8, KosTERs-BELLEMANS 135, Clunet 1912,
293 and H.R. (June z, 1936) W. 1936, no. 1013, criticized by ScHOLTEN,
N.J. 1936, 1013 and AssER-SCHOLTEN, Familierecht 64. This criticism probably
affects also the decision of Rb. Haag (Feb. 1, 1935) W. 12974, whereby the
prohibition does not concern a foreign woman who has received a dispensation
from an analogous impediment under her own law.
116
Rb. Amsterdam (Nov. 12, 1936) W.' 1937, no. 270.
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eral 117 and were so applied in the countries where they were in
force. The same is true for the impediment of difference of
faith as it still exists in Egypt 118 and elsewhere. 110
The Spanish provision, now again in force, whereby no one
is allowed to marry a divorced person, also is a bilateral prohibition directed against both parties to the intended marriage.
Thus, under Spanish law, a French divorced woman cannot
marry a Spanish bachelor. In France, however, not less than
three different opinions have been expressed: 120 that the
prohibition is unilateral but as such makes the marriage invalid; 121 that it is bilateral but the capacity of the woman
depends on French law alone; 122 and that Spanish law is
primarily applicable but eliminated by French public policy. 123
(d) Sham marriages. An obvious but notable example of a
twofold defect is presented by the case of parties who go
through a ceremony of marriage for some purpose other than
that of creating a true marriage. Legislation that regards marriage essentially as a contract, is inclined to deny validity to
simulated consent to marry;, thus canon law/ 24 as well as
117 See the explicit exposition by WALKER 6o2 ff.; it may be remembered that
these impediments were not applied if the parties married abroad and did not
intend to go to Austria. Similarly, Spain: Trib. Supr. (July 10, 1916) 137
Sent. 105.
118 Moharem Benachi c. Salomon Sasson, Mixed Trib. (June II, I9IJ)
3 Gaz. Trib. Mixtes no. 428 (Egyptian woman, forbidden under Moslem law to
marry foreign Christian; marriage internationally invalid),
119
Poland: Supr. Ct. (July 22, I924) Revue I925, 440; Supr. Ct. (Nov. II,
1933) Z.f. Ostrecht I934-1935, 444·
Czarist Russia and Lithuania: BucHLER in StAZ. 1929, I 92 to the effect that
Christians as well as Jews are prohibited by their respective religious laws
recognized by the state.
120
Special literature: CHAMPCOMMUNAL, in "Conflit de lois nouveau," Revue
1921, 4I, 47ff; SERIN, Les conflits des lois dans les rapports Franco-Espagnols
en matiere de mariage, de divorce et de separation de corps (Toulouse, 1929).
121
Trib. civ. Montpellier (March 18, I92o) S. I92I.2.1 1, Revue 1921, 79,
Clunet I920, 633.
122
App. Aix (Jan. 24, I924) Gaz.Pal.t924.I.507, Revue I924, 99, 277,
Clunet I 924, 670 (cumulating the various rationes decidendi).
123
Trib. civ. Seine (May 5, I9I9) S.I92I.2.9, Revue I9I9, 543· Recently
prevailing opinion has favored this interpretation. Cf. AUDINET, I I Recueil
I926 I I75> I82; J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 443·
1 4
2 Codex Juris Canonici c.Io86 § 2.
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French, Scotch, English,125 and probably American opinion/ 26
consider the marriage in such case void. Modern codifications
presume that a public formal declaration of marriage should
not be disavowed by revealing an intention to misuse the marriage institution. But recently in Germany, marriage for the
sole purpose· of procuring a name for the woman 127 or merely
to give her the nationality of the husband, 128 has been excepted
and considered void. In Switzerland similar rules were advocated 129 and have been adopted in a changed practice of the
Federal Court and the Swiss Government. 130 The United
States has reacted against sham marriages designed to facilitate immigration; the Federal Act of May 14, I 93 7, simply
orders deportation. In all these cases it is sufficient that one
personal law establish the invalidity.

Illustration: During World War I, a French girl married
an American in Turkey with the understanding that she should
escape internment in a camp and that the marriage should
serve no other purpose. The Tribunal of Grenoble declared
this marriage void according to French law, regardless of the
law of the domicil of the American husband. 131
Time element. It is well settled th~t the applicable personal
law is the personal law as of the time of the celebration of the
125
M'Innes v. More (H. L. I 7 8 5) 3 Craig. & St. 40; Taylor v. Kello (I 7 8 7)
3 Craig. & St. s6; also Dalrymple v. Dalrymple (I8II) 2 Hag. Con. 54, IOI,
I6I Eng. Rep. 665, 8o2.
126
Cf. BISHOP, I New Commentaries on Marriage §§ 328ff.
127
BGB. § I325a (Law of Nov. 23, I933).
128
Marriage Law of 1938, § 23 par. x; and RG. (April 7, I938) 92 Senff.
Arch. 3 I I no. I 29.
129
See EGGER in Festgabe fiir Fritz Fleiner (I937) 85; RICHARD, "Les
mariages fictifs," 66 Bull. Soc. Legisl. Comp. (I937) 337·
130
BG. (November 9, I939) 65 BGE. II 133 and (Oct. I8, I94o) 66 BGE.
II 225. In both cases a Swiss citizen had married a German woman threatened
by expulsion because of her behavior; the courts stated in both cases that the
woman had not intended permanent marital community. The Federal Council,
by Order of Dec, 20, 1940, article 2, par. 2 has even authorized the Just. Dep.
to annul nationality acquired by such marriages; see 38 SJZ. (194I) 173.
131
Trib. civ. Grenoble (July II, I923) cited by J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES
440 n. I, Cf. 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 29I n. 28; RG. (Dec. IS, I930) JW. 193I,
IJ40o
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marriage 132-not that to which a party is subject at a time
prior to or subsequent to the marriage.
Consequently, a defect inhering in a marriage at its inception
is not cured by the acquisition of a new domicil or a new
nationality; a void marriage remains void.
Exceptions have been made, however, in favor of validity.
Thus, the German Reichsgericht in a recent case 133 had to
deal with a marriage void under Austrian law on the ground of
disparity of cult (Christians and non-Christians), the
parties having changed their Austrian nationality for that of
Italy. The court saw no reason why it should invalidate a marriage considered valid in the new homeland because of public
policy contrary to the impediment. Likewise the Kammergericht in Berlin stated recently 134 that, if both husband
and wife voluntarily acquired a new citizenship, their marriage
could not be declared void on a ground not recognized as an
impediment under their new law. 13 ~
Conversely, a valid marriage is not affected by a change of
personal law; for instance, where a former French Catholic
priest married and afterwards became a citizen of Spain, the
132
Germany:RG. (Dec. I7, 1908) JW. 1909, 78; RG. (Feb. rs, 1926) II3
RGZ. 38; RG. (June 23, 1930) IPRspr. 1930, no. 65; RG. (Dec. 15, 1930)
JW. I9JI, 1340; 46 Z.int.R. (1932) 14; RG. (June 22, 1931) 133 RGZ.
16 r, and others.
France: App. Chambery (Feb. 7, r885) Gaz.Pal.r885.1.7o3, Clunet r888,
796.
133
RG. (May r6, 1931) 132 RGZ. 416, JW. 1932, 227. In this case the
Reichsgericht went so far as to reverse the principle, holding that the decisive
time should be that when the action for annulment is brought. But this can
hardly be taken literally in view of the general rule illustrated in the preceding
note.
134 KG. (Aug. s, 1937) JW. 1938, 855 (marriage celebrated in 1916 before
the German consulate in Adana, Chile, between a German woman and a Russian
who afterwards became a Chilean subject; error as to the personal qualities of
the husband entitled her to sue for nullity under German BGB. § 1333 but not
under Chilean Law of Jan. 10, r884, art. 33; she was held to be deprived of
the right under German law if she had become a Chilean national on her own
application; if only the husband had applied, her citizenship would depend on the
validity of the marriage. In a note MASSFELLER, without protesting, expresses
doubts).
135
BARTIN, 2 Principes 122 suggests that a defect that can be cured· according
to prior law should be eliminated by a new law not retaining the impediment but
that an "absolute" voidness cannot be cured.
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marriage would not b.e invalidated under French law and
probably not under Spanish law.
A far-reaching deviation from this principle is implied by
the C6digo Bustamante, article 40, whereby any country is entitled to deny recognition to a marriage, if the marriage is contrary to certain expressly enumerated prohibitions of the
forum. This provision, taken literally, would entitle Brazil to
declare void a marriage celebrated validly in Chile between an
uncle and his niece, 136 if the parties became citizens of Brazil
and perhaps even if they did not. Such an application of public
policy would be unreasonable, unless the court believed the
continuance of the marriage within the forum to be as shocking as did the Ohio Supreme Court in the famous case of State
v. Brown. 131
3·

Prohibitive Public Policy of the Country of Celebration

The Hague Convention. The Hague Convention on Marriage reduces the prohibitory effect of domestic marriage impediments to a few fundamental points. This was the main
achievement of the Hague treaty. It includes five prohibitions,
entitling the participant states to prevent the celebration of
marriages on grounds, not of the personal law of the parties,
but of its own local law:
·
(a) Absolute prohibition on account of relationship or affinity;
(b) Absolute prohibition between parties to adultery, provided the marriage of one of them has been dissolved on the ground of this adultery;
(c) Absolute prohibition between persons who have been
convicted of a joint attempt upon the life of the
spouse of one of them;
(d) Prohibitions concerning a former marriage;
(e) Religious prohibitions.
135 Argued

by M. WoLFF in 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 4.03.

137 {189o) 47 Ohio St. 1oz, 26 N. E. 74·
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The grounds for the first three prohibitions listed above are
contained in article 2, paragraph I ; the last two are implied in
article 2, paragraph 4·
An absolute prohibition is a prohibition which is not dispensable. In case of adultery, for instance, dispensation may be
granted in Germany; Swiss parties, their national law including no prohibition at all to marriage on account of adultery,
may therefore marry in Germany. The Dutch courts, however,
consider adultery an absolute obstacle both for nationals and
foreigners. 138
In the countries that have been or still are members of the
Convention, every prohibition of local law has been examined
in this way to meet the test of article 2. The Convention goes
still further in limiting the local prohibitory rules. If a marriage has been celebrated in violation of one of the prohibitions
listed above but is valid according to the personal law of the
parties, it is valid everywhere with the exception that it may
be considered invalid in the state of celebration (not in a third
state) in the cases mentioned in (d) and (e), not (a)-( c)
above. 139
Hungary, for instance, may forbid an ordained Catholic
priest of Belgian nationality to marry within Hungarian territory; if 'he succeeds in doing so, however, Hungary may consider the marriage void, but it is valid in Belgium and therefore in all other participant states.
No prohibition other than those mentioned above is proper
ground for preventing a marriage of nationals of another
member state. Hence, an Italian girl fourteen years old or a
Rumanian girl of fifteen may marry in Switzerland or Sweden,
. where the age limits are seventeen and eighteen respectively.
C6digo Bustamante. The C6digo Bus-tamante, article 38,
Settled doctrine, see H. R. (June 2, 1936) W. 1936, no. ror3, and cf.
Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 205.
The Polish Law on international private law of 1926, art. 12 par. 2, was
drafted less clearly; see Pol. Supr. Ct. (Jan. 7, 1931) 6 Giur. Camp. DIP.
(1940) no. 104, with a critical note by RENCKI.
138

II

139
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permits the local law to avail itself of (all) its prohibitions
which are not dispensable. Article 40 adds a rule for marriages
already celebrated, whereby "the contracting states," i.e., as
it seems. each of them, may refuse recognition to a marriage
conflicting:
With their provisions relative to the necessity of dissolution
of a former marriage, to the degree of consanguinity or affinity,
in respect to which there exists an absolute impediment, to the
prohibition of marriage established in respect to those guilty
of adultery by reason of which the marriage of one of them
has been dissolved, to the same prohibition in respect to one
guilty of an attempt against the life of one of the spouses for
the purpose of marrying the survivor, and to any other excusable grounds of annulment.
Trend. International literature, long critical of unlimited
local policy, has encouraged the trend towards restricting its
influence. This tendency is exhibited in the Polish Statute of
I 926 (art. I 2 par. 2) which confines the cases of overriding
local policy to four enumerated impediments. That the Italian
Civil Code of I 865 (art. I02 par. 2) reserved to the local law
every prohibition contained therein (arts. ss-69); was considered an "excessive and irrational" rule, 140 needing a restrictive interpretation,141 although hardly seeming to permit
it. 142 The new Code no longer tries to override the nationality
principle 143 to such an extent and enumerates the prohibitions
that are intended to apply to foreigners. 144 It is true that foreign Catholics desiring a canon law marriage with civil effect
must comply not only with civil requirements but with all those
established by the canon law and their national laws. 145 In
140 UDINA, 6 Repert. 513, no. 139; UorNA, Elementi I 77, no. I 27.
141

Cf. KuHN, Comp. Com.

128.

142 ANZILOTTl (1919) 236; UDINA, Elementi 178, no. 127 n. 2.
1
143

Relazione del Guardasigilli on. Solmi (Report of the Minister of Justice)
in C. C., book I, Progetto definitivo (1936) 54·
144 C. C. (1938) art. I 14 par. 2, C. C. (1942) art. I z6 par. 2. The Minister
of Justice declined to include Italian provisions on nonage in the list of
inderogable impediments, where the personal law does not infringe public policy,
See Relazione 1938 no. 78.
145

FEDOZZI 425.
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Spain, a similar position seems to be taken, all the Spanish
requirements for Catholic marriage being added to those of
the nationallaws. 146
Another example of increased understanding is that of a
recent Greek decision confining to Greek subjects the old prohibition of marriage between Christians and non-Christians. 147
The Scandinavian Convention on Family Relations 148 incorporates chiefly nondispensable prohibitions arising out of
relationship and affinity, and the Finnish law of 1929 149 enumerates only relationship, affinity, and existing marriage as
obstacles under local policy.
But exaggerated mandatory local requirements are still
frequent. The period of delay instituted for women after the
dissolution of a fo~mer marriage figures in the list of compulsory prescriptions of local policy in Switzerland/ 50 the
Netherlands/ 51 and France. 152 The most recent civil code,
146
Spanish Trib. Supr. (July Io, I9I6) 137 Sent. I05. Cf. TRiAs DEBEs, 3I
Recueil I930 I 674.
147 Court of Athens (I 93 7) no. 2462, Clunet I 9 3 8, 902, on the ground of Cod.
Just. L. I, 9, 6 of A. D. 388; Basilica L. I Tit. I, 38, and Rule 72 of the H.
Synod of Troullos.
148 Final Protocol no. I. According to no. 2 of the Final Protocol, persons who
have acquired full age by marriage under Finnish law or by dissolution of
marriage under Icelandic law, may be prevented from marrying unless they are
twenty-one years old.
149 Finland: Law of Dec. s, I929, on Family Relations of International Nature,
§ 2 par. 2, and§ 6 par. 3·
150
See Swiss C. C. art. 103 and BECK, NAG. I67 n. 53·
151
The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (Nov. II, I925) N.J. 1926, 391 (Russian bride); H. R. (June z, I936) W. I936, no. IOIJ (applying Hague Convention on Marriage of I 902, art. 2 par. 2). A convenient exception was made for a
Norwegian woman, first separated under the Norwegian Marriage Law of May
31, I9I8, § 43, and then divorced more than a year later: Rb. Rotterdam (Feb.
2, 1937) W. 1937, no. 482.
152
France: C. C. art. 228; Cour Paris (Feb. 13, I 872) S. r 873.2.I 12, D.r 873.
2.r6o, (public policy "of decency"); WEISS, 3 Traite 486; PouLLET 449 no. 350.
The same doubtful assertion was made even under the Hague Convention on
Marriage of 1902, art. 2 par. 3· Prevailing opinion contra in Switzerland, cf.
BEcK, NAG. 289 no. I7· In France this doctrine has been elaborated; the foreign law may be applied when it requires an even longer delay. Cass. (Nov.
27, I934) Nouv. Revue I934> 796 (Swiss delay for divorced women; no cur-
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that of Venezuela, has retained its long and exacting list. 153
Thus, the result is the same as when the law of the place of
celebration is taken as decisive, and therefore all requirements
of the local law as well as of the personal law impede the
marriage of foreigners. 154
Effect of treaties and conventions. Has the adherence of a
state to a treaty, such as the Hague or the Montevideo
treaties, or a state's participation in the Scandinavian Convention, any effect beyond the scope of the treaty, generally limiting the realm of unyielding public policy? Some Italian decisions155 and a few writers 156 have answered this question affirmatively with respect to the Hague Convention. They argue
that states, having once subscribed in a treaty, for example, to
the principle that the domestic age limit is alterable for
foreigners, can no longer allege the contrary with respect to
nationals of non-member states. Such a construction of an
international treaty is not only untenable but would indeed
endanger the conclusion of future treaties. Treaties are binding
upon states only within their limits.

4· Permissive Public Policy of the Country of Celebration
The Hague Convention. According to article 3 of the
Hague Convention, the law of the place of celebration may
permit the marriage of foreigners contrary to their national
laws, if these prohibitions are based exclusively on grounds of
a religious nature. The other states are entitled to deny to a
marriage contracted under such circumstances recognition as a
valid marriage.
tailment by dispensation); Cour Paris (Nov. 30, 1934) Nouv. Revue 1935, 49,
Clunet 1935, 927.
153
Venezuela: C. C. (1916) art. I32, C. C. (I942) art. I04 referring to all
mandatory requirements valid for nationals.
154
See supra n. 4 7.
155
See infra pp. 29 df.
IS6 WEiss, 3 Traite 478 n. 2; PoULLET 444ff.; AUDINET, II Recueil I926 I
174, 186; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 1I3 n. 202; ibid. I95·
Contra German RG. (Dec. 2I, I9I6) JW. 1917, 364; M. WOLFF, IPR. u9.
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Which impediments are of religious nature? The question
has been extensively discussed in the countries whose liberal
doctrine denies recognition to foreign discriminations on account of religion. In agreement with the dominant opinion
of these countries, the commentators on the Convention ascribe
religious character to prohibitions based on:
(a) Difference of religion ( disparitas cultus) / 57 such as
the canon law prohibition of marriages between
Christians and non-Christians in Austria, Spain,
Poland, Bulgaria, and Greece; the prohibition of
marriages between Christians and pagans in
Sweden; between Moslems and non-Moslems according to the laws of Islam; and between Jews and
non-Jews under Jewish law.
(b) The relation between godfather and godchild (co gnatio
spiritualis) under canon law 158 and in Rumania.
(c) The vows of priests or monks, endowed with civil effect
in former Austria, Spain, parts of Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary. 159
It is doubtful, however, whether article 3 applies to a former marriage still considered existent for religious reasons
157Not recognized: by enacted law in Venezuela, C. C. (1942.) art. I05i by
·
the courts in:
France: Cour Paris (Nov. 17, 192.2.) S.I924.2.65, Clunet I923, 85, Revue
1923, 437 (Serbian).
'
Switzerland: Kreisschreiben (June 30, 1928) n. 13, 25 SJZ. 183.
Italy: Trib. Livorno (May 5, 1894) Clunet 1898, 415 (Jewish law); Trib.
Torino (Oct. 18, I9Io) Clunet 1912, 288, and Corte di Venezia (Dec. 7,
1910) Clunet 191I, 1326 (Austrian); App. Trento (March 8, 1928) Foro
Ital. Rep. 1928, 1171, no. 27 (Austrian).
Germany: A much cited decision of the OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 6, 1908) 18
Z.int.R. (1908) 541 is to the same effect, but the prohibition was recognized by
the OLG. Karlsruhe (March 28, 1917) 35 ROLG. 358 (marriage celebrated in
London); and finally by the RG. (May 16, 1931) 132 RGZ. 416, 418 and RG.
(Oct. 1o, 1935) 148 RGZ. 383. Cf. RAAPE 2.39.
158
Cf. the controversy between SA'l"rER, 32. Z.int.R. (1924) 69 n. 88, and
3 FRANKENSTEIN 114 n. 204.
159
Not recognized in France (contra: AUDINET, II Recueil 1926 I 174,
184).
Great Britain, cf. DICEY, Rule 183 Exc. 2.
· Italy: Cass. Roma (July 31, 1924) Monitore 1924, 727.
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despite a divorce (Italy 160 and, for Catholics, former Austria,

Spain, and the Warsaw district).
No other prohibition established by the national law of a
party may be neglected, not even the politically inspired impediments which the Western tradition is accustomed to disregard.161 Thus, military deserters and conscientious objectors
from Austria and Germany, prevented fr:om producing a certificate of ability to marry, had to be refused the right to marry
in other member states. 162 To France this result seemed so intolerable with respect to the emigrants from Alsace and Lorraine, that France left the Hague Convention on May 3 I,
r 9 q, followed by Belgium on May 3 I, I 9 I 9· The Hague
Conferences of 1925 and I928 tried in vain to win these
countries back by permitting a member state to ignore prohibitions arising from military obligations or from the status of a
prince who needs the consent of the head of his house.
The Swiss authorities apply these prohibitions as well as
the provisions of an Italian law of I9J8 requiring governmental authorization for the marriage of an Italian to a person
of other nationality. 163 On the same ground; German writers
now claim that the German legislation on difference of race
must be recognized by all other participants in the Convention.164
It is, of course, left to the law of the place of the intended
celebration whether or not it will respect a religious prohibi160
Viewed as a religious impediment by WALKER 587, 588; SATTER, Note opposing App. Liege (Feb. 2, I937) 5 Giur. Comp. DIP. 13 n. I x. Many
writers think that art. 3, compared with art. 2 par. 3 and art. 6 par. I, excludes
the impediment of former marriage from the conception of religious impediments.
161
See supra pp. I o6, 2 58.
162
Cf. Swiss Fed. Dep. of Justice, BBl. I 9I7 1 III 57 5, no. I4: canton governments may grant license to marry {under NAG. art. 7e par. 2 to foreign objectors and desertors only if they are subjects of states having not adhered or
having left the Hague Convention).
1 3
£ Swiss Just. Dep., BBl. 1940, I463 no. I3, referring to art. 2 of the Italian
Law of Nov. 17, 1938.
164
Cf. the summary by RAAPE, 2 D.IPR. I 59 1 I 62.
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tion of the homelanCl. Switzerland, e.g., respects such prohibitions in the case of non-resident foreigners, while it ignores
them in the case of domiciliaries. 165 Third states are equally
free to determine their position.
In general. Outside of the Hague Convention and apart
from the religious prohibitions which have already been dealt
with, all political and penal prohibitions of a foreign country
are generally ignored. This liberal doctrine underlies the
Civil Code of Venezuela/ 66 which expressly rejects prohibitions of marriage founded on differences of race, class, or
religion. 167
In view of the American discussions of the effect of remarriage prohibitions, it may be noted that the situation in other
countries depends on analogous considerations. The first
problem is to determine whether the law forbidding remarriage is intended to be applied abroad and, if so, to what marriages.168 A prohibition meant to be applie~ extraterritorially
may not be applied by another country because it is regarded
165

BEcK, NAG. 293 no. 12.
Venezuela: C. C. (1916) art. 133, C. C. (1942) art. 105.
167
Hindu caste: Chetti v. Chetti [1909] P. 67. Racial prohibitions: Trib.
civ. Pontoise (Aug. 6, r&&4) Clunet r&85, 296. The Danish Minister of
Justice, by Circular of Oct. u, 1937, informed interested officials that the
German racial laws were applicable if no party was domiciled in Denmark.
This seemed to indicate that a contrary policy was expected in the case where
at least one party was a domiciliary; cf. RAAPE, 2 D.IPR. 16o n. 2, who also
notes the reaction of other countries to the German "law for the protection of
German blood" of Sept. 15, •935·
An interesting combination of considerations may be illustrated by a SouthAfrican decision. In the Roman-Dutch law, the old rule of lex loci contractus
still obtains. In addition, the facts that the bride was domiciled and the marriage was celebrated in the forum, Natal, formed grounds to disregard the inability of the man, under the common law of his domicil in Transvaal, to
marry his late wife's sister. Friedman v. Friedman's Executors (1922) 43
Natal Law Rep. 259, at 264, 266.
168 For instance, German courts have discussed at length whether by the
enigmatic provision of the Argentine Civil Marriage Law (r888) art. 82,
parties who have married in Argentina and have been divorced abroad are
prohibited from remarrying 9nly in Argentina or everywhere. See infra p.
432>n,I78•
166
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as penal. 169 Otherwise, it applies as part of the personallaw. 170
Relation to the forum. The subject under discussion furnishes significant applications of the general doctrine of public
policy. To enforce a domestic policy upon a case subject to
foreign law, a strong tie between the case and the forum should
be present. Thus, Swiss law quite appropriately entitles a
foreigner domiciled in Switzerland to invoke the Swiss
Federal Constitution, as opposed to his national law, in protection of his right to marry. Political or racial prohibitions, even
if not specifically eliminated by the Constitution, will be disregarded on behalf of a resident foreigner. A non-domiciled
alien has no such right; on the contrary, the cantonal authorities are required to prevent him from entering into a marriage
not recognized by his homeland. 171
Some codes, it may be remembered, 172 following the example of section 4 of the Austrian Civil Code, are restricted in
their external effect to transactions intended to have effect
within the territory of the personal law. The Austrian Supreme
Court declared valid, despite Austrian impediments, a marriage celebrated abroad by an Austrian citizen, in the absence
of intention to return to Austria immediately.This rule was
applied even to former Catholic priests and to marriages be169 England: Scott v. Att. Gen. ( 1 886) I 1. P.D. 128 declared inoperative the
South African restriction on remarriage by the guilty party..
France: Trib. civ. Marseilles (Nov. 2.5, I92.5) Clunet I92.6, 388 refused
recognition to a Serbian episcopal decree of divorce, because it contained a
clause making remarriage dependent on the bishop's consent, which the court
deemed inseparable, but the court should have recognized the divorce without
the remarriage clause, see Note in Gaz. Pal. I926. 1. 442..
Germany: KG. (May 30, I938) JW. I938, 2.75o.refused to apply the delay
for remarriage imposed by a Swiss court in accordance with arts. I 04 and I 50
of the Swiss C. C. because o£ its penal ("somewhat disgracing") character. i
Switzerland: Prohibition of remarriage declared in a divorce decree by a
Yugoslav bishop is not recognized, Just. Dep., BBl. 192.8, II 309.
170
England: Warter v. Warter (I89o) I5 P.D. I52. per Sir James Hannen,
Pres., recognizes a six months' delay after decree under the .Indian Divorce
Act, No. 4 of I 869. See also supra p. 2.69.
171
HuBER-MUTZNER 430, gives a clear picture; BEcK, NAG. 2.05 no. 49·
172
Supra p. I I 7, n. 55·
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tween Christians and Jews. 173 Thus, a foreign court had no
need to resort to its own public policy to allow such a marriage.
Consequences of tt state's acts. A permissive policy of the
country of celebration may be based upon reasons different
from those thus far mentioned. Shall the forum permit a
party locally divorced, which divorce is not recognized by his
personal law, to remarry? This problem arose in Germany out
of two apparently conflicting rules, viz., one determining according to the personal law whether a person is married or
unmarried (EG. art. 13 par. 1) and the other ascribing full
credit to a domestic divorce decree. 174 The second rule ought
to be enforced, if the authority of the state is to be maintained
consistently. A state is not supposed to dissolve a marriage and
yet deny the parties the advantages of the dissolution. In
Switzerland, however, the majority opinion has taken this very
position; 175 hence, a marriage between an Italian and a Swiss
woman may be dissolved in Switzerland, but the right of remarriage is enjoyed only by the woman. 176

5.

Sanctions for the Fulfillment of Intrinsic Requirements

Certificate of ability to marry. Officials issuing marriage
licenses or presiding at marriage ceremonies are in an unfavorable position to ascertain the impediments of a foreign candidate. A large number of countries, therefore, require foreign
173 0GH. (May 24, 1907) Spruch-Repertorium no. 198, 10 GlU.NF. no.
3787 and OGH. (July 17, 19o6) 9 GlU.NF. no. 3485 (Austrian Catholic
marrying an Austrian Jewess in New York). Singular distinctions were developed. For instance, the Austrian prohibitions upon marriage were maintained where an Austrian abroad had a job, the loss of which would force him
to return to Austria, OGH. (Oct. 28, 1936) 55 Zentralblatt (1937) 120 no.
so; See also OGH. (July 23, 1937) 56 Zentralblatt (1937) 889.
174
Two opinions correspond to these two rules. The first opinion, stressing
the conflicts rule of EG. art. 13, was advocated by LEWALD I I 8; RAAPE 404;
OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 3• 1923) 78 Seuff. Arch. 57· The second opinion: KG.
(March 13, 1911) 24 ROLG. 19; REICHEL, 124 Arch. Civ. Prax. zoo; MAssFELLER, StAZ. 1938, 112, 115; Dt. Justiz 1939, 1236ff.
175
BB1. 1922, II 582 no. 14 (Spaniard); BEcK, NAG. 464 no. 223.
176
See for fuller discussion infra pp. 517-519.
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nationals or domiciliaries to exhibit a certificate issued by a
competent officer in the country from which they come, to the
effect that to his best knowledge no impediment is known to
the prospective marriage. 177 Accordingly, in a great number of
states, measures have been taken, and offices have been designated/78 for the issuing of appropriate certificates to be used
abroad. 179 The Hague Convention on Marriage, article 4,
paragraph r, prescribed this precaution to the extent that the
Convention adopted the rule of national law. Some important
countries are unwilling to issue such certificates; 180 therefore,
either dispensation in the country of celebration is frequently
obtained, 181 or "certificates o"f custom" are produced. 182
The underlying idea of this institution is clearly demonstrated in Switzerland; foreign citizens intending to marry
177 E.g., Austria: Hofkanzleidekret of Dec. zz, 1814, Justizgesetzsammlung No.
11 8.
Finland: Gen. Ord. of Dec. 2 8, I 9 29, cf. SAJNIO in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I
68o n. s6.
Germany: BGB. § I3I5 par. 2, Marriage Law of I938, § I4 par. 1.
Cf. RAAPE 264, on the complicated case of a foreign annulment not recognized.
Hungary: Marriage Law of 1 894, § I I 3 par. 3·
Italy: C. C. (I86s) art. Io3, C. C. (1938) art. II4 par. I, C. C. (I942) art.
I I 6 par. I, not abolished as had been proposed.
Sweden: Royal Ord. of Dec. 3, I9I5.
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7e, BECK, NAG. I85, 200.
' 178 BosCHAN in 5 Z.ausl.PR. (I 9 3 I) 3 3 2 n. 2 gives a list of offices declared
competent in numerous states.
179 In some countries banns are issued before giving the certificates, as in
Hungary, Luxemburg, and Switzerland.
180 This is true particularly for Great Britain (excepting treaties concluded
on the basis of the Marriage with Foreigners Act, I9o6) and almost all the
states of the United States, except perhaps Wyoming, where a provision corresponding to§ 3 of the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act is in force. (L. I935>
ch. 3 §I, Suppl. 194I to Rev. St. Ann. I93I, 68-1o6). On the difficulties caused
by this attitude see HACKWORTH, 2 Digest of International Law (1941) 356
§ 16I.
In France a "certificat de non-opposition" may be issued, but it is not recognized as equivalent to a certificate of "no impediment."
181 E.g., Switzerland and in ·an cases of Americans, Federal Council, BBl.
1887, III 7oo; Just. Dep., BBl. 192.2, II 581 no. q, in view of the recognition, in
the United States, of Swiss marriages celebrated according to Swiss law.
Germany: Allg. Verfiigung des Reichsministers der Justiz, Feb. 4, 1936, Dt.
Justiz 1936, 208 and Durchfiihrungs VO. zum Ehegesetz of July 27, 1938, § 7•
152
Mostly through the diplomatic service of the country of celebration; see
Swiss Just. Dep., BBl. 1938, II 498 no. 7·
I
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within the country must apply to the government of the canton
for permission and, with the constitutional exception of domiciled foreigners/ 83 are not permitted to marry unless it is
shown that the marriage would be recognized in the homeland.184
Dispensation. Dispensation, likewise, is governed by the
personal law. Not the law of the place of celebra~ion but the
personal law determines what officials are competent to grant
dispensation from any prohibition to marry. 185
./'"" Effect of violation of personal law. Because of the broad
scope of the personal law, it is necessary to determine what
law governs the effects of a violation of its prescriptions. As we
have seen in connection with formal prescriptions, the domi-,
nant opinion is that the same internal law that establishes a
requirement determines the effect of failure to comply with
the requirement. 186 Covered by this rule are the problems
whether a prohibited marriage is valid in spite of the prohibition or whether, if not, it is absolutely null (nonexistent),
conditionally valid until annulment, or voidable at the instance
of certain persons; whether or not an annulment has retroactive
effect; by what persons action may be brought; whether an
annulment may be pronounced by persons other than judges;
by what events the right to annul is extinguishad, etc.
183 Swiss Federal Constitution art. 54 par. 3; NAG. art. 7e. Where the bridegroom is of Swiss nationality, authorization is unnecessary, Just. Dep., BBl. 1925,
II I43 no. I 2.

184 HUBER-MUTZNER 433·

In Germany, besides the certificate of ability, other documents are required,
such as a certificate that the husband's nationality will not be lost by marriage
under foreign law; another showing that the husband transfers his nationality
to the bride is probably obsolete. Moreover, it is remarkable that where
religious marriage is compulsory in the homeland of a party, Germany and
Switzerland require a priest to declare himself ready to marry the parties.
Cf. supra p. 214, n. 55·
185 KosTERS 3 66 states this principle and exceptions thereto granted by Royal
favor in the Netherlands.
Switzerland: Just. Dep., BBl. 1922, 11 581 no. II points out: a Swiss cannot
marry his late wife's sister who is of Italian 11ationality, unless she receives
dispensation under Italian C. C. (I86s) arts. 59, 68, and hence produces an
Italian certificate of nihil obstat.
186 See citations supra p. 229, n. 12 I.
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Where the parties have different personal laws, each of the
two laws must be consulted with respect to the consequences of
a violation. The law of the husband may give him an exclusive
right to avoid the marriage or may perhaps entitle the wife
alone to do so; sometimes both laws concur in the same or in
more or less similar effects. In addition to the illustrations implied in the cases discussed above, the following may be of
interest:
(i) Case decided by the Reichsgericht on January 20, 1928
(r2oRGZ. 35): In I9IOtwoSwisscitizens,A (male) andB
(female) married in Salt Lake City, Utah. Without having
obtained a divorce from A, the wife B married C, a German
citizen, in Indianapolis, Indiana, in I 9 I 6. Not until I 9 I 8 was
the marriage between A and B dissolved by divorce. In I 92 I
C, who had meanwhile returned to Germany, received knowledge of B's previous marriage to A, and thereupon B and C
separated. Upon inquiry, C was told by an American Military
Commission in Germany that his marriage with B was null
and void. Thereupon, in I924 C went through a German
ceremony of marriage with D. When the validity of this last
marriage came up for determination by a German court, this
court, according to the German choice of law rule, had to test
the validity of the marriage between B and C by the national
laws of these parties, i.e., simultaneously by German and Swiss
law. By article 7f of the Swiss Law on Conflicts, the court
would have been referred to the law of Indiana~. Under
Indiana law, the marriage was absolutely nonexistent, while
German law merely regarded it as destructible ex tunc by
decree of court. Following the general Continental approach
of applying to such cases the law establishing the more severe
sanction, the court should have found the second marriage
void without any legal process and the third marriage valid.
By inadvertence, the Reichsgericht overlooked the renvoi of
the Swiss statute on conflicts and, instead of Indiana law, applied as B's personal law the law of Switzerland, which it held
to be identical with that of Germany. 187 Hence, the court held
187 This finding was not entirely correct either.
Under German law an
annulment of a bigamous marriage destroys the marriage ex tunc; it is effective only ex nunc in Swiss law. The sanction of the German law is the more
severe and should have been applied.
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that C's marriage to B was valid when he married D, that the
marriage with D, objectively considered, was adultery and
that B would be entitled to a divorce.
(ii) Let us assume that in 1916 B had married in Iowa 188
instead of in Indiana; 189 then the infirmity of the marriage
would have been cured by the divorce of 1918. The same
would have resulted if they had married in Sweden. 190
(iii) The following situation is quite different. A German
girl, fifteen years old and domiciled in Switzerland, marries
somewhere, her age being concealed. Germany claims her as
a national, Switzerland as a domiciliary. The marriage would
be considered void ( annullable) in Germany and voidable in
Switzerland.
Evasion of directive requirements·. Since the effect of a violation of a requirement depends on the law establishing the requirement; it follows that the effect is the same whether the
marriage takes place abroad or at home. Thus, the Dutch
requirement of parental consent, being merely a directive
prescription, does not invalidate a foreign marriage, although
the wording of the Dutch conflicts rule could be understood
to entail invalidity .m In other words, evasion of directive requirements by a foreign marriage is of no consequence. This
result is certain. It is obscured only by the usual idea that, in
a well-ordered system of civil status, even non-mandatory
rules of domestic marriage laws are securely protected against
violation.

IV.

CoNCLUSIONS

The law of the place of celebration, which governs without
qualification the substantive requisites of marriage in the
188

Iowa Code (1939) § 10445 subsec. 4, § 10486 subsec. 3·
See Compton v. Benham (1909) 44 Ind. App. sr, 85 N. E. 365; Simms
v. Kirk (r924) 8r Ind. App. 515, 144 N. E. 146.
190 Swedish Marriage Law of June r r, 1920, c. 10 § r par. 2.
191
Dutch Supreme Court, H. R. (May 23, 1919) W.10436, N.J. 1919, 689,
in opposition to the questionable text of BW. art. 138.
Likewise, for instance, to avoid nullity Belgian citizens are bound to observe
only mandatory requirements abroad, i.e., the requirements of age, consent,
relationship and affinity. See PAGE, 1 Droit civil beige (1933) no. 692..
189
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United States and Argentina, contrasts with the personal law
observed as a matter of course everywhere else. The contrast
is striking enough to offer a legislative problem, a problem
aggravated by the limited knowledge we have of the exact
reasons at present for the American system. The historic background is obvious. Those of the statutists who advocated the
law of the place where the marriage is celebrated, did no more
than apply the rule they taught for contracts in general, and
their main impulse in establishing the rule sprang from selfsufficient territorialism. We may presume the same conception
to have prevailed in America, while it remained a country dependent on immigration and pioneering. Requirements of the
old countries were not to impede the marriages necessary to
new settlers. It was fair to replace them by the demands of an
honest Christian commonwealth. All this is understandable
without much research.
However, for a considerable period, neither immigrants nor
pioneers have typified the shifting population of this country.
Nevertheless, while in each of the forty-eight jurisdictions the
legislature occupies itself with enactments elaborately shaping
the requirements for marriage, marriages out of the state are
fairly numerous, and the conflicts rule permits citizens to
choose at pleasure any one of all these statutes, to which to
submit both the celebration and validity of their marriages.
This equation of intrinsic with formal requirements is no
longer appropriate. While the various forms of secular ceremonies solemnizing marriage are interchangeable, the very
different kinds of marriage impediments in the statutes are
not thought of as equivalent in any way in the mind of the
legislators. Yet, under the conflicts rule, they are all treated
in the same way.
The harm done by indiscriminate application of local law,
however, involves more than trespassing on the domain of
foreign state legislation. First, social progr.ess achieved in one
jurisdiction in the field of eugenics-as respects insanity,
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medical certificates, etc.-is freely frustrated in others. 192
Granted that some reformers of marriage welcome the unbounded multitude of marriage statutes as an immense laboratory for social experimentation-an attitude rather questionable-here freedom is converted into anarchy. Second, if the
state of the domicil reacts against foreign violation of its policy,
the great advantage of the principle that a marriage is good if
valid at the place of celebration, disappears. Nevertheless, the
implications of the legislative power and of specific marriage
policies are being more distinctly realized, and the cases where
a marriage is held void at the domicil of a party grow more
frequent.
Under these circumstances, the failure of the Uniform
Marriage Evasion Act to rally the states to the principle that
marriages concluded contrary to the domiciliary law should be
avoided is most regrettable. Could it be that its reforms were
not sufficiently clear and adequate to be considered worthwhile? Probably, they were regarded as inefficient in the absence of more effort than the Act dared to require. No machinery for enforcement was provided to prevent false allegations
by the parties and to effectuate interstate exchange of legal
requirements and personal records. Nor has the one state that
adopted the section in the Uniform Act requiring the license
issuer to ascertain whether the proposed marriage contravenes
the home statutes of the parties, been interested to prescribe
investigation of the alleged facts. It may have been premature
to expect more. Today in many jurisdictions, as a hundred
years ago, marriage licenses are granted with the greatest
facility and promptness. While a growing number of statutes
stress the necessity of proofs of age, parental consent, and
freedom from dangerous diseases, as well as banns or notice
192
The marriage of a fourteen-year-old girl from Wisconsin marrying in
Minnesota was declared in Iowa voidable only according to the Minnesota statute
of the time (cf. at present Mason's Minn. St. Suppl. 1940, § 858o) despite
the prohibition and the evasion statute of Wisconsin. See, in contrast, supra
p. z54, n. 37·
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of intention to marry, others have repealed the requirement,
formerly obtained by social students, of a few days' interval
between the advance notice and the celebration. 193 A new
species of state supervision may be needed to insure to marriage legislation due respect by the state's own officers as well
as by other states. The development in foreign countries seems
to suggest, however, that a better interstate understanding
would not require restrictions on the legislatures, whether
they perfer ultraradical or ultraconservative policies.
The chief rule of the civil law countries certainly is in extreme opposition to the American. While codes and treaties are
pathetically engaged in trying to conciliate clashing policies
of two or more jurisdictions, the American method of simply
ignoring the problem by exclusively depending on the law of
the place of celebration is so far from the European view that
Diena called it "absurd." But, if simplicity indicates a sound
law, the American rule is sound, and the European system
hopelessly "absurd." Still worse than the complications themselves is the variety of the attempts to harmonize contradictory
principles of the national and local laws. The system of applying the personal laws of two parties and the law of the celebration at the same time, if carried through as initiated by the
school of Mancini and embodied in innumerable codes, is impractical. A thoroughly informed representative of the Prussian Ministry of Justice told the legal committee of the Diet
in I 929 that the difficulties of ascertaining the capacity of
foreigners to marry had increased to a disturbing extent after
the first world war, strange results were occasioned by exotic
religious laws, and that the principle of nationality. was far
from furnishing the certainty it was supposed to guarantee. 194
A remarkable remedy, however, may be noted. By international conventions, the scope of the requirements that
should be observed abroad has been narrowed. Further aid in
193 See VERNIER, Suppl. I o § I
194 See supra p. 155, n. :u o.
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the same direction is supplied by modern enactments, such as
the new Italian Code, which spontaneously reduces the causes
of nullity of marriage when celebrated abroad. Indeed, if a
statute insists on prohibiting marriage between first cousins,
which is allowed in most jurisdictions, why should another
country yield to this problematic proposition? The state enacting such a statute would do better to limit the prohibition to
domestic ceremonies. The Hague Convention, the Treaty of
Montevideo, and the C6digo Bustamante agree in the division
of domestic marriage impediments into two categories, one of
international and the other of merely national applicability.
Only the gravest objections, shared by all participant states
or raised by one state and understood by the others, are considered sufficient to prevent or nullify a marriage contracted
outside of the home state. The lists of internationally relevant
impediments so far established coincide in some obvious inclusions-as for instance .consanguinity between ascendent and
descendent or between brother and sister, or an existing marriage of a party-and in other respects vary in a characteristic
manner. The religious impediments that had so great significance for the Hague Convention on Marriage are excluded
from consideration in the two Latin American treaties. Under
that of Habana (art. 40), any minimum age, including that
of eighteen years for male and sixteen years for female parties
prescribed in Brazil (C. c;. art. I 83, XII), must be observed
in the other states. The Montevideo Treaty (art. I I) does not
oblige a state to respect a lower limit than fourteen years for
men and twelve for women. Although this is unsatisfactorily
low, the idea of fixing an international age limit is excellent.
Finally, the existing contrasts suggest a compromise on
another basis. Suppose Italians visiting the United States. If
they are well informed, they may walk right from the pier
into a court house and be married at once. The permissibility
of their union will be judged exclusively under the law of the
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state where they happen to stay during a couple of hours. An
American may be domiciled for forty years in Italy, but his
capacity to marry at all, or to marry a certain person, will be determined by all Italian authorities concerned, by searching
the law of some forgotten home of his or of his father or
grandfather. One system is as abusive as the other. A state
should not want to join foreigners in marriage utterly disregarding their home laws. Nor should a state, using the
dubious test of nationality, exaggerate and perpetuate its
significance for the determination of civil status.
When is it reasonable to acknowledge the effect of a change
of circumstances upon the substantive requisites of marriage?
That the mere presence of parties ought not to suffice to change
the applicable law, is recognized, at least in theory. But also
the mere, though actual, change of domicil should not be regarded as enough. Evasion will not in practice be eliminated if
people who contemplate matrimony may choose their marriage law by simple transfer of their domicil. This is the
danger also in making the first matrimonial domicil govern
the substantive requisites.
All this leads to the proposition that the personal law of the
parties should continue to govern for a certain period after
the parties change their domicil. Marrying after this time,
they would be subject to the law of the place of celebration
alone, with effect also in their home countries. In such a simple
system, no additional precaution is needed. If it must be complicated by concessions to the actual conflicts law, the method
of shortened lists of international impediments is unavoidable.

CHAPTER

9

Personal Effects of Marriage
I.
I.

EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE tN GENERAL

The Internal Conceptions

"EFFECTS of marriage" is a modern legal concept corresponding to the comprehensive matrimonial legislation which was developed in the course of the
nineteenth century. Following the model of the German and
Swiss codes, all recent European codifications of private law
contain a chapter concerning the operation of marriage on the
relations between the spouses themselves and between the
spouses and third persons. The consequences of this arrangement are many and' significant; the European doctrine attributes much importance to the fact of marriage and considers
many, if not all, the pertinent provisions as a separate complex of rules within the system of law.
At present, the term "effects of marriage" refers both to the
personal relations and to the property of husband and wife. 1
The older codifications, compiled at the turn of the eighteenth
century, acknowledged certain personal rights and duties of
spouses but did not contain any extensive body of rules referring to the operation of marriage on property. They
customarily treated the problem of property interests between
spouses as it had been approached by the statutists, that is, by
discussing the effects of marriage settlements,. at that time
customary among propertied classes. Characteristically, today
the settlement is still called in France contrat de mariage and
in German, Ehevertrag, although it is not a contract of mar1 "Personal" and "property" relations, of course, as used above, do not
exactly correspond to their meanings in private law.
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riage but only a contract respecting property relations made
upon the occasion of a marriage.
Consequently, these codes and the literature of the period
treated the entire question of the effects of marriage on property as a question of contract. In the French Civil Code and
codes of other countries influenced by it, the subject is still
retained in the sections dealing with contracts. Not until very
recent times have some of these countries, particularly Italy,
Greece, and Peru, included in their new codes chapters on
patrimonial relations between the spouses, chapters placed
along with others dealing with the law of family relations.
Numerous topics pertaining to the effects of marriage, however, are still dispersed throughout the codes.
American law has not developed in this subject a body of
doctrine similar to that of the German Civil Code. The nearest
approach to it is a collection of scattered topics connected with
marriage, brought together under the heading of "husband
and wife" in the various treatises and casebooks on family relations. By analytical comparison, we find an important difference in that marriage in itself does not have so many
peculiar consequences in the present private law of this country
as it does in Europe. The emancipation of married women,
particularly as brought about by the equal rights statutes of
the common law states, has reduced the effects of marriage to
a comparatively small residuum.
Gradually, married women have been granted the power to
own and manage property in their own names and the capacity
to make valid contracts with and conveyances to third parties;
transactions between husband and wife have been rendered
possible; and the peculiar rules on liability for torts committed
by a married woman and on the husband's liability for the
wife's prenuptial debts abolished. Indeed, in a few states, the
old disabilities of married women have been swept away completely.
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On the other hand, legislatures and courts of numerous
states have deemed it unwise to empower a married woman to
bind her property as surety for the debts of her husband or to
become his business partner. A considerable number of states
have found it necessary to protect creditors by forbidding or
restricting property transfers between husband and wife. In
several states, the ancient institution of tenancy by the entireties has been preserved. In several states of the Middle West,
a contract of a married woman does not bind her assets, unless
she expressly states her intention to do so. With respect to
torts, the recent family car doctrine has resulted in a revival of
the husband's liability for certain torts of his wife. In the field
of property interests, statutory rights have been substituted
for the ancient rights of dower and curtesy in the majority of
states, in many cases with elaborated and strengthened provisions. The effects of marriage upon the property relations of
husband and wife, although no longer so vital as they were
at common law, are still numerous and important. The
changes from the old common law have been so recent, however, so unsystematic, and so different in the various states
that no general doctrine has thus far been worked out. Considering the undoctrinal or even anti-doctrinal climate C?f
American jurisprudence, we can hardly expect the elaboration
of any such doctrine in the near future.
2.

Reaction on Conflicts Laws

This is only one of the many differences of structure among
the municipal laws, having distinct reactions ·on the conflicts
law. Above all, in the Continental international private laws,
the national law has come to govern the whole complex of
relations growing out of marriage. Under the German Introductory Law, which has been followed by many other codes,
the non-patrimonial rights and duties of married persons are
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governed by the national law of the husband as of the time
when a particular relation is in question; effects on property
of the spouses are governed by the law of the country of which
the husband was a national at the time of the marriage.
The American law of conflicts, on the contrary, contains no
separate body of rules on effects of marriage. The Restatement
perfectly reflects the actual law, when it expresses the "effect"
of foreign marriage in one single sentence(§ 133), saying that
a state will give it the same effect as "a marriage created by its
own law." Duty to pay for necessaries, for goods bought, and
for alimony are treated together with all other alimentary
obligations (§§ 459, 460, 463). Effects on property of the
spouses are considered exclusively under the head of interests
of husband and wife created in each other's property, either
immovable or movable, and are treated along with property
in general (§§ 237-38, 248, 289-293). Moreover, the
capacity of married persons to enter into antenuptial contracts
(§ 238 comment b; § 289 comment c), separation agreements,
etcetera, is part of the law of contracts (§ 333); the capacity
to commit torts, the right of one spouse to sue the other in
tort, or the right of the husband to sue a wrongdoer for injury
to his wife, are regulat<:;d by the law governing torts (§§ 377
ff.). Finally, there are the rules on constructive trusts, living
trusts, and testamentary trusts, institutions affording the main
safeguards for the family interests of the wealthy.
As we must follow here the European division i.nto two
groups of effects, we encounter uncertainty about the borderline between them. Again, no substantial argument supports
the theory that the lex fori, the distinctions of internal law,
should decide directly the scope of a conflicts rule on personal
or property effects. 2 The more important points will have to
be discussed one by one.
2
' Still, this seems to be the prevailing opinion, also adopted in Latin America
by authoritative writers, such as z V1co, nos. sz, 6o.
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3. Personal Effects of Marriage
· The conflicts rules to be discussed here refer either to the
law of the forum, the law of the temporary residence of the
spouses, of their domicil, or of their nationality. In order to
understand why these rules differ more than those on status
in general, we must remember the nature of personal marital
relations. Every legislator is conscious of the fact that such
duties as those of mutual fidelity, cohabitation, and obedience
of the wife, have their foundation in morality or religion.
Nobody would think today of enforcing such duties through
specific performance or compulsory execution. All modern
laws agree that, so long as a marriage is normal, the law has
no importance in these respects. Modern codifiers, however,
have decided to lay down rules that give these duties a legal
character; they wish to emphasize the social importance of
sound marriages and to grant a spouse as much judicial help
as possible, short of separation and divorce. That it is insufficient to speak of "spiritual effects of marriage," as is done
sometimes in Latin America, probably for the sake of Catholic
doctrines, is demonstrated by the Codex Juris Canonici, which
defines the conjugal duties in terms of definite jural rules
(c. I I Io-I I IJ).
The more the legal nature of the mutual duties of a married couple is stressed, the more it is felt possible to resort to
a personal law determined either by nationality or marital
domicil. Where the personal effects of marriage are governed
simply by the law of the directing court, marriage is thought
to be ruled essentially by morals, which are naturally evaluated according to local written or unwritten rules. We shall
see how both ideas are confused in some countries, for instance,
in France.
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CoNTACTs

r. Law of the Residence

The Unit~d States. In the United States, it is not quite clear
whether purely personal marital relations are governed by the
law of the forum or by the law of the place where the spouses
"live," although the equation "place where they live, that is,
the law of their domicil" a has probably been abandoned. 4 As
a matter of fact, in case both parties reside temporarily at a
place, the court of that place apparently will take jurisdiction
and apply the locallaw. 5 Probably, the Restatement (§ 133,
Comment b) speaks of such a case, stating that "the incidents
which result from the existence of the status are determined by
the law of the place where they are sought to be exercised,"
and declares by way of illustration that the law of the place
where they presently live determines the question whether a
husband is guilty of battery when he uses force to control his
wife. Other cases may be too rare to be taken into account. In
British countries also, including Quebec, 6 the conception seems
to be that the husband's authority over the person of his wife
is of a disciplinary nature and to be decided entirely within
the limits of the lex fori, jurisdiction being predicated upon
residence, not domicil. This rule embraces the questions of
what amount of forcible control the husband may use, as well
as whether a resident foreigner may apply to the courts for
restitution of conjugal rights. 7
3

MINOR§ 79; DUDLEY FIELD art. 554·
KuHN, Comp. Com. 144. This point is settled implicitly by the Restatement§§ 54, 133.
Cf. 4 PHILLIMORE 359 cited with approval by I WHARTON 365 and KuHN,
Comp. Com. 144: "If the husband deserts his wife, refuses her maintenance,
or ill-treats her by violence, she has a right jure gentium to redress in the
tribunals of the place where they reside." Cf. also LORENZEN, 6 Repert. 343
no. 310.
8
I }OHNSON 327•
7
Connelly v. Connelly (1851) 7 Moore P. C. 438; O'Leary v. O'Leary
[Alberta, 1923] I D. L. R. 949•
4

°
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Argentina. In Argentina, the test of domicil adopted by the
Civil Code (art. I 6o) and by the Treaty of Montevideo of
I889 (art. I2) was suddenly changed by the Marriage Law
of November I 2, I 8 8 8 (art. 3), which referred to residence;
hence the courts have been stimulated to apply the law of the
forum. 8 The literature criticizes this solution as an unjustifiable infringement upon the domiciliary principle. 9
2.

Law of the Domicil

Domicil, as the test chosen for questions of status in general,
is decisive also in the personal relations of the spouses in Denmark, 10 Uruguay/ 1 if not in Argentina, more recently also
Peru 12 and Brazil 13 and under the Treaty of Montevideo. 14
Domicil in this connection is the marital domicil.
In Switzerland, lil<:ewise, in accordance with its general
rules, married persons domiciled within the country are governed by the municipal law; 15 Swiss nationals domiciled
abroad are subject to the law that is considered applicable
under the law of conflicts of their domicil. 16
French writers are increasingly inclined to propose legislation that marital domicil be taken as the test. 17
8 Even the former text, C. C. art. I 6o, was understood in the same sense by
DAIREAUX, Clunet I886, 293· ALCORTA, 2 Der. Int. Priv. I05 explains that
in almost every case the law of the place where the conjugal rights and duties
are exercised is deemed relevant.
9 2 WEISS-ZEBALLos, Manual de derecho internacional privado (ed. 5, I9I2)
I 59; 2 V1co no. 6o; RoMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int. Priv. 28I 1 285.
10 Danish Law on Effects of Marriage of March I8, I925, §53·
11 No discussion or problem exists as declares VALLADAO 6 5.
12 Peru: C. C. Tit. Prel. art. V, agreeing with precedents for which see 8
APARICIO y SANCHEZ, C6digo Civil 70.
13
Brazil: Lei de Introduo;ao (I 942) art. 7.
14
Text of 1889, art. I2, text of I94o, art. I4.
15
NAG. arts. 2, 32, as inte'rpreted by the Fed. Trib. (May 29, 1908) 34 BGE.
I 299, 3 I 6; cf. STAUFFER, NAG. 77 Vorbem. no. 7 to arts. I 9ff. The Swiss
domiciliary law has been emphatically re-emphasized in BG. (April I8, 1942)
68 BGE. II 9, IJ, adding that the rules concerning the protection of the marital union belong to public policy.
16 NAG. art. 28.
17
GouL:E, "Mariage," 9 Repert. 89 no. 477·

PERSONAL EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE

301

3· Law of Nationality

The problem. In juri~dictions adopting nationality as the
test of status in general, personal husband-wife relations h~tve
been controlled by the law of the state of which the husband
was a citizen. The simple reason for this rule originally was
that in the countries concerned the wife at marriage regularly
acquired the nationality of her husband. Yet, although this
effect of marriage upon the nationality of the wife has been
modified in an increasing number of countries, the conflicts
rule has been preserved and is the prevailing rule. This attitude may be explained partly by the force of tradition and J
partly by the fact that both the wife's acquisition of the hus- '
band's nationality and the application of the husband's personal law are founded on the marital power of the husband,
which in some rudim'entary form still exists under most
modern codes.
As a matter of fact, however, the cases where spouses have
different nationalities, either during the entire marriage or as
a result of later changes, have become frequent and this has
had to be taken into account.
In the United States, the law of nationality has been modified several times. Under the provisions in force since 1922, a
foreign wife no longer acquires American citizenship by marriage, and an American woman no longer losesher citizenship
by marrying a foreigner. These rules also exist in the Soviet
Union and in Brazil. French enactments after World War I
provided that a French bride retained her nationality unless
she filed a declaration to the contrary; an analogous provision
is now in force with respect to foreign women marrying
Frenchmen. Other countries have followed these models.
Along the same line, repatriation of wives who have lost citizenship by marriage is frequently facilitated by reduction of
the normal requirements. Another source of different nationalities of husband and wife is that, subsequent to the marriage,
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husband or wife may separately acquire new nationalities.
The cases of split nationality were considered by the Hague
Convention on Marriage Effects of 1905.
The rule that the national law of the husband governs the
personal relations between husband and wife, is expressly upheld in the case of divergent nationalities in the codes of Germany/8 Italy/ 9 the Netherlands/ 0 Spain 21 and lran, 22 by the
C6digo B,;,.stamante/8 and the Treaty of Montreux concerning the jurisdictions in Egypt. 24 In other countries, the same
view still obtains by interpretation. 25 Prominent French
authorities have also enunciated the rule. 26
The rule is unquestionably applied when both parties acquire a new. nationality by a common ·act. This mutability of the
applicable law is recognized everywhere (in contrast to the
immutability of the rules on marital property relations).
Where the national laws of the spouses are different, the
following efforts to modify the rule have been made:
Last common nationality. If the husband alone changes his
nationality, which until then has been common to both, it
seems inequitable that the wife should suffer a corresponding
change in her status. Therefore, the Hague Convention of
1905 (arts. I and 9 par. 2) provided that the law of the last
nationality common to the spouses should govern. This solu18 EG. art. 14 par. 1, as now usually construed; LEWALD 88; RAAPE 2.75;
WIERUSZOWSKI, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 6I n. 35 2., but see infra n. 2. 8; art. I4
par. z adds that German law applies also if the husband has lost his German
nationality but the wife has retained hers.
19 Italy: C. C. ( I8 6 5) Disp. PreL art. 6; C. C. (I 942) Disp. Prel. art. I8.
20
Hof Amsterdam (June 6, I9I9) W.I0444, N.J. Iop.
21
Spain: C. C. arts. I 5 and 22.
22
Iran: C. C. art. 963.
23
C6digo Bustamante art. 43·
24
Convention of Montreux of May 8, I 9 37 on Egpytian Mixed Tribunals,
Regulations of Judicial Organisation, art. 29 par. 3, U.S. Treaty Series No. 939·
25
See for instance for Austria: WALKER in I KLANG'S Kommentar 3 25 n.
I77 and Internationales Privatrecht 742 (doubtful); for Guatemala: MATos,
no. 2.30; for Portugal: VALLADAO 70.
:s AUDINET, 1 I Recueil I 926 I 2.I2., considers this rule obvious; BARTIN, 2
Principes 2I4 § 2.93, sees no room for hesitation.
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tion has been followed by Sweden, Poland, Italy, and Greece
and has been approved by some writers. 27
Illustration: In Germany (RG. [April 15, 1935] 147
RGZ. 385) a Dutch husband acquired German nationality,
his wife remaining a Dutch national. His action for restoration
of conjugal rights based on German law was denied because
this cause of action is unknown to Dutch law, which continued
to govern the duties of the parties according to the Hague
Convention.
The rule is understood as meaning that a change of nationality, in order to affect both spouses, must be voluntary on
the part of both, and not one which is voluntary on the part of
the husband alone and extended to the wife merely by operation of law.
But this solution is useful only in the case where there has
been at least one common nationality. The Hague Convention
is limited to this case; no uniform conflicts rule exists for
any other case.
Cumulative application of both national laws. To provide
a solution for every case of different nationality, .an influential
doctrine advocates the application of both national laws
cumulatively. Each party, it is argued, may have only those
rights and duties that are established by his or her own national
law. Hence, what right the hu;band or wife may exercise
depends on simultaneous approval by both marriage laws. 28
27
Sweden: Law of June I, I 9 u, § I subsec. 9; Poland: Law of I 92.6 on
international private law, art. I4; Italy: C. C. (I942.) Disp. Prel. art. 18;
Greece: C. C. (1940) art. 14 and previously decision of Epheteion Patron
(192.2) 33 Themis 92 (Italians, the husband later being naturalized in
Greece). OLG. Kiel (Jan. 24, 1931) JW. 1932,599 (in relation to England,
non-member state). Cf. CHAMPCOMMUNAL, Revue 1910, 59; NIBOYET 736
no. 626; 3 ARMINJON 17; PouLLET 479 no. 372. Resolution of the Sixth
Hague Conference, 1928; Rumanian Draft, art. 23.
28
Finland: Law of Dec. s, 1929 on family relations of international nature,
§ 14 par. r.
Germany: OLG. Braunschweig (Jan. I9, 1913) 26 ROLG. 232; KG. (May
2.7, 1927) JW. 1928, 73; KG. (Feb. 24, I936) ]W. I9J6, 2470; cf. OLG.
Stuttgart (March 31, 1905) II ROLG. 287. 2 ZITELMANN 67o; WALKER
742; M. WoLFF, 4 Rechtsvergl. H~ndworterb. 408, but apparently no longer
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It is rather generally felt, however, that such a cumulation
is difficult to determine and very undesirable. In every
country, the law regulating the effects of marriage is drafted
to achieve a certain balance; to take out a single part because
that part has not been acknowledged by another state's legislation, destroys the consistency of the marital law and reduces
its efficacy. 29
Emergency solutions. On the basis of the nationality principle, relatively the best solution seems that of resorting to the
last common nationality which the parties may have had, as
was done by the Hague Convention of r 90 5. Where the
parties never had any common nationality, the best approach
seems that of resorting to the law of the husband as of the
time of the marriage. This solution was suggested in a draft
issued by the Sixth Hague Conference of 1928. Every other
solution founded on nationality imposes excessive risks on
all third persons who deal with a married person. 30
Yet, would it not be preferable to abandon the principle
itself, at least in this particular field? A tendency toward the
domiciliary law seems strong; 31 it is of considerable weight
in his IPR. I 2 3 ; contra: I BAR § I 72 and most writers, see RAAPE 2 7 5 (deminutia matrimonii). MASSFELLER, }W. I936, 2472; ECKSTEIN, 7 Giur.
Comp. DIP. 7• The RG. (Feb. I5, I9o6) 62 RGZ. 4oo, has not yet taken
sides.
Italy: ANZILOTTI, Corso (I9I3) 250; cf. his arguments as to the parallel
problem of paternal relations, 2 Rivista (I907) II6; CAVAGLIERI 219; UDINA,
Elementi I8I; FEDOZZI 432; Bosco 229; contra: CANSACCHI, 3 Giur. Comp.
DIP. 275, with a good summary.
29
J. STRELITZ, Die Schltisselgewalt im internationalen Privatrecht, Thesis
( Giittingen, I 9 3 6) 42, tries, without success, to develop a more satisfactory
"cumulation." WENGLER, Book Review, I I Z.ausl.PR. ( 193 7) 973, calls attention to the rules in French Morocco, under which the status of each spouse
is governed by his personal law. 3 FRANKENSTEIN 246 n. 85, suggests applying the law of the defendant.
30
PouLLET 479·
31
CASSIN, 34 Recueil 1930 IV 757; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 269 no. 239;
FEDOZZI 238; cf. AUDINET, Clunet I9JO, p8. The problem was fully discussed with respect to the capacity of women to contract by AUDINET and others
in Travaux du Comite franr;ais de droit international prive, Annee 4, I 9 3 637> 89fi. The revised Czechoslovak draft (Revue I93I, I87) § I7 par. 2, refers,
in absence of a last common nationality, to the last common domicil of the parties.

PERSONAL EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE

305

in Latin America. 32 This development is closely connected
with that of resorting to public policy with respect to foreigners
domiciled in the forum, a trend which we shall consider in the
following section.
4· Public Policy of the Forum
Law of the wife. In a number of countries, the rule that the
governing law is the national law of the parties or of the husband, is reversed, and under certain circumstances the law
of the wife is applied, at least if it happens to be the law of
the forum.
In Germany (EG. art. 14 par. 2), German law is applied
when the German husband acquires a foreign nationality and
the wife remains a German national.
In France, the case of a French bride marrying a foreign
subject but retaining her French nationality has attracted a
great deal of attention. While some authors have interpreted
the amendment of the nationality laws, under which the
French woman's French nationality is preserved, 33 as designed
to preserve her French private law rights in all cases,S 4 others
limit the application of French law to couples living in
France. 35 A similar practice obtained in Brazil under the
nationality principle; Brazilian law was applied when one of
the parties to the marriage was a national of the country and
both, or even the husband alone, were living in BraziJ.3 6 The
like seems to be true of other Latin American countries as
welJ.3 7 An attempt to clarify the situation by an express statu32 VALLADAO has devoted his book, Conflicto das leis nacionaes dos con j uges
nas suas rela<;oes de ordam pessoal e economica e no desquite, to the defense of
this tendency. See particularly, I 78ff., on earlier views favorable to the law
of the domicil and conclusions, 205ff. The Brazilian Lei de Introduc;ao of
I 942 has followed his doctrine.
33 Law of Aug. Io, I927, art. 8.
34 LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 390 no. 333; cf. NIBOYET, Revue I929, I93,
I94> 209·
35
NIBOYET 734 no. 625.
36 VALLADAO 136,200.
37E.g., Guatemala, MATOS nos. 2u, 2I2.
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tory rule was made in France, in I 924, when the Chamber of
Deputies voted upon a bill providing for the application of
French law in all cases where either the husband is a Frenchman or where, the husband being a foreigner, the wife is a
French national and the parties are domiciled in France. ss
The requirement of French domicil was dropped in the draft
of the Societe d'etudes Ugislatives (I930) 89 : According to
this, French law should govern the non-property effects of
marriage as to both spouses, if one is French!
French courts. The courts in France go so far in applying
domestic law that it has been alleged that they would do so
every time a French party is concerned or any French interest is at stake. 40 However, this does not represent the dominant opinion. For some time, the French courts have been
wavering between the two poles of national law and public
policy, the former having been strongly advocated by Andre
Weiss and his school, the latter appearing as a goal of nationalistic post-war trends. At present, it seems that certain effects
of marriage are regarded as dependent on the national law
and others on the domestic law. The catalogue of the latter
group, as drawn up by Weiss himself 41 in I 9 I 2, has presumably been extended since. In I928, the following problems were enumerated by Niboyet 42 as governed by the
personal law: capacity or incapacity of the wife; mutual obligations of fidelity and assistance of husband and wife; wife's
duty to follow husband to his residence and the right to bear
his name; special capacity of the wife to dispose of her salary;
"putative marriage." 43
38 Revue 1924, 315 n. I.
39 Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg.

1930, 164, art. 19; cf. ibid. 76 • . Cf. NrBOYET,
Revue 1929, 193, 211; BARTIN, 2 Principes 201 § 288.
40
Trib. civ. Seine (April 8, 1930) Revue 1930, 461, AuBRY, L'incapacite
de la femme mariee en droit international prive franc;ais (Paris, 1933) 57;
LEREBOURS-PIGEONNLERE 389 no. 332, extending public policy to all moral
conceptions.
41
WErss, 3 Traite 584ff.
42 NIBOYET 736 nos. 627, 628.
43
See infra p. 545·
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The realm where public policy prescribes the exclusive application of French law, was defined as follows: penal provisions; implied authority of one spouse to contract for the
other; alimentary obligation; desertion of family.
The same general pattern exists in the other countries following the nationality principle. 44 So many variations in detail
exist, however, that we shall have to discuss every one of the
various effects of marriage separately.
Procedural law. It is a traditional proposition that domestic
law is exclusively applicable in matters of procedure and penal
law. Exclusive domination of the lex fori in matters of procedure is recognized oy the Hague Convention on Marriage
Relations of I 90 5. After stating as a general principle that the
rights and duties of the spouses in their personal relations to
each other are governed by their national law, article I adds
the following proviso:
However, these rights and duties cannot be enforced except by
the means permitted under the law of the country where their
enforcement is sought.
According to this provision, the forms of action, judgment,
and exe~ution are controlled by the local rules of the court,45
but the court of the forum does not permit any cause of action
that is not also recognized by the national law. 46 A German
husband, for example, is allowed under the German civil and
procedural codes to sue his wife for restoration of conjugal
rights, but he cannot bring such an action in Belgium. A Belgian husband, on the other hand, may not bring an action of
this kind in a German court, since he has no such right of action
under his nationallaw! 7
"Cf. for Spain: TRiAs DEBEs, 31 Recueil 1930 I 677 and 6 Repert. ~53
nos. 103, 104.
~ 5 See also 1 BAR 481 § 172 par. 3; 2 FIORE ro3ff. no. 598.
~ 6 The methods of enforcement must be analogous but not identical: see
Actes de la Quatrieme Conference de la Haye, 1904, 17 8; German Denkschrift
in 18 Z.int.R. (19o8) s8o.
47
Cf. infra n. so.
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This rule, forbidding a country to grant a foreigner a right
of action not recognized in his national law, is a strange limitation on local public policy, to which the signatories to the Convention voluntarily submitted. A national of a non-signatory
country may well be permitted to avail himself of a local
remedy that is not recognized by his national law, when the
forum considers the granting of such remedy required by its
own public policy. 48

III.

ScoPE oF THE RuLES

In this section, we shall note the matters that have been
claimed either generally or in some legal system as within the
scope of the conflicts rule on personal marital relations.
r. Duties of Conjugal Life
Where the personal law governs the relations between husband and wife, it has been applied to determine the spouses'
mutual duties of fidelity and personal assistance, the wife's
duties of obedience and rendering services in the household or
in the husband's business, and similar matters.
It depends on the personal law 49 whether the husband may
forcibly control his wife's conduct, whether he may open her
correspondence or rescind her contractual obligations of personal work, and whether one spouse may sue the other for restitution of conjugal rights. 50
48 See, for instance, for Italy: CAVAGLIERI 2I 8; UDINA, Elementi I 82 no.
I p. It has been contended, however, particularly by 3 FRANKENSTEIN 255,
that the public policy of the participant states was modified by the Hague Convention. See this contention in another connection, supra p. 279.
49
Cf. 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 350; NIBOYET 737 no. 627 (z).
50 Applying the personal law of the parties, German courts have accorded
this action (provided for in the German Code of Civ. Proc. § 6o6) to Czechoslovakian spouses (RG. (June u, I922) Leipz. Z. I922, 5I8) and denied it
to Belgians (LG. Giessen (Nov. I, I92o) 20 Jahrb. DR. 221), Swedes (LG.
Stuttgart (April 4, I924) 23 Jahrb. DR. 442), and Dutchmen (OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 23, I934) IPRspr. I934> no. 49; RG. (April I5, 1935) I47 RGZ.
385). A peculiar exception has been made by the RG. (Feb. I7, I936) I50
RGZ. 283 (an Italian wife domiciled in Germany was granted this action, unknown to Italian law, because she lacked the remedy she would have enjoyed
in Italy).
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As already mentioned, the local law is competent, however, 51 to bar an action that does not fit in with the local system
or to refuse a method of enforcement not permitted by its
procedure; it seems safe to assert also that no forcible control
by extrajudicial acts is granted unless permitted by the local
law. 52
Instead of resorting to the personal law, French courts have
sometimes simply applied the domestic law, especially when
the court was anxious to compel a husband to support his
wife. 53 French courts have also enforced the duty of obedience
to which a wife is bound under French law, irrespective of
whether such duty was incumbent on her under the national
law of the spouses. 54 The C6digo Bustamante seems to
abandon the personal law entirely, when it states that the
obligation of the spouses to live together, to observe mutual
fidelity, and to support each other, is subject to the local law
(art. 45).
Domicil by operation of law. A problem deserving special
discussion is that of determining the law by which the domicil
of a married woman is fixed. The conflicts rule on marital
relations determines, as a matter of course, whether a wife is
obliged to follow her husband to his place of abode; 55 but
does it also determine whether her domicil necessarily coin51
Supra p. 307. Thus, German courts would not assume the task of Swiss judges
of admonishing the parties and suspending their life in common, Swiss C. C.
arts. I 69, I 70.
52 Only occasionally, the action for restoration of conjugal rights has been
classified as of imperative public policy; thus RG. (Oct. 6, I927) IPRspr.,
1926-I927, no. 68 (Soviet Russians).
53 Trib. civ. Seine (May 3, I879) Clunet I879, 489; Cour Paris (April 20,
I88o) Clunet 188o, 300 (action for goods received at the domicil of the husband); Cour Paris (Jan. 7, I903) Clunet I9o5, 208.
54 Trib. civ. d'Evreux (Feb. 15, 1861) D. 1862.3.39 and Trib. civ. Seine
(April 8, I93o) Revue 1930, 46I. Concerning the latter, see infra n. 83.
55 Germany: OLG. Braunschweig (Jan. 19, 19I3) 26 ROLG. 232 (American
.wife held obliged to follow her husband from New Jersey to Germany, the
law of New Jersey being in accord).
·
·
France: Cass. (req.) (June 25, 1923) Clunet I924, 462 (in the application
of German BGB. § 1354 par. 2, it was held that a German wife in Alsace need
not follow her husband to an inconvenient dwelling place).
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cides with that of her husband? The municipal laws differ
widely in answering this question. 56 \Vhile England and Latin
America still insist upon the ancient rule that the husband's
domicil is necessarily that of his wife, other countries, for instance, Norway and the Soviet Union, do not recognize the
wife's domicil as dependent on her husband's at all. 57
In Germany, prevailing opinion applies the personal law
(i.e., the national law of the husband) also to the question
whether the wife necessarily shares her husband's domicil. 5 8
The United States courts, as well as the Treaty of Montevideo, resolve this question, like all other questions concerning domicil, by resorting to the forum's own rules on
domicil, unified throughout the country, instead of referring
the problem to the law declared applicable by the forum's
choice of law rules. Thus the Restatement says:

"§ 2 7 ... a wife has the same domicil as that of her husband."
"§ 28. If a wife lives apart from her husband without being
guilty of desertion according to the law of the state which
was their domicil at the time of separation, she can have a
separate domicil."
Except on the question of desertion, neither the municipal law
of the domicil nor that of the forum is decisive.
56 E.g., in America the older rule that a deserted wife is domiciled at the new
domicil of her husband, has not yet been abolished by the present Treaty of
Montevideo on international civil law, text of 1889, art. 8, but is abolished by
the new draft of 1940, art. 9· The Restatement § 28, moreover, permits the
wife leaving her husband to establish a new domicil if she is not guilty of desertion; statutory law permits the same even if she is guilty.
57 Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 570 no. 71.. Russia: FREUND, 4 LeskeLoewenfeld I 340.
58 Cf. BGB. § 10 and see RAAPE, 1. D. IPR. 191; cf. the recent decision of
the RG. (Jan. u, 1939) HRR. 1939, no. 376, 159 RGZ. 167, on the child's
domicil (infra p. 6os, n. 1.61).
Contra: 3 FRANKENSTEIN 1.31 1 503.
Similarly, Belgium: Cass. (March 19, 1925) Pasicrisie 1925.1.179; Trib.
Bruges (March 4, 1936) Pasicrisie 1937·3.81. Cf. infra Divorce, Chapter n,

n. 7I.
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A case decided by the Tribunal civil de la Seine 59 involved
a citizen of Czarist Russia who had married an American girl
from Rhode Island before a civil official in Cyprus. Some
time after the marriage, the husband went to Paris, while
the wife went to live in Capri, Italy, and never came to France
at all. The Tribunal, considering the question one of "qualification" and following Bartin's theory on this subject, declared
in conformance with the French law of the forum that the
domicil of a wife was necessarily that of her husband. 60
It may be observed, however, that this decision, like many
others, 61 was concerned with domicil as a condition of the
court's jurisdiction in a lawsuit brought against the wife at
the domicil of the husband. In this connection, the local concept of domicil clearly has a better claim than in the choice
of law.
In line with the general tendency toward the domiciliary
principle, it has even been advocated that the law of the husband's domicil should decide the legal domicil of the wife. 62
Capacity of Married Persons

2.

Classification. Under the system of personal law, the question has been raised whether a married woman's disabilities
are part of the status of the wife, and therefore governed by
her own personal law, or rather whether they are part of the
specific effects of marriage, and therefore subject to the law
governing these effects, which may be the law of the husband,
59

Trib. civ. Seine (April 27, 1933) Revue Crit. 1935, 759, with note by
Similar cases: Cass. (req.) (June 21, 1865) S.1865.1.313; Cass.
(civ.) (March 13, 1933) Revue Crit. 1934, 718, Clunet 1933, 639; Cass.
(civ.) (Dec. 4, 1935) Revue Crit. 1937, 189.
60
Cf. NIBOYET, Revue Crit. 1935, 762.
61
Cf. e.g., OLG. Stuttgart (May 8, 19o8) 17 ROLG. 81, r8 Z.int.R. (19o8)
453·
Uruguay: App. Montevideo (about 1938) Rev. Der. Juris. Adm. 1938, 210,
Clunet 1938, 841 (action for separation between American citizens, the husband
being domiciled in Uruguay, the wife living in the :United States),
82 NIBOYET, I Traite nos. 541 554 571.
.
1
1
NIBOYET.
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that of the common nationality, or some other law. All bias
aside, this problem of classification depends on the specific
nature of the wife's incapacity. The conflicts rule concerning
status in general envisages legal incapacities presumed to inhere in the female sex; the rule concerning personal effects of
marriage regards such disabilities as may be imposed in consequence of marriage. The principal illustration was the
former article 2 I 7 of the French Civil Code: A wife, even
when there is no community or in case of separation of property, cannot give, convey, mortgage, or acquire property,
either with or without consideration, without her husband's
joining in the instrument or his written consent. This rule,
imitated in many countries, was abolished in Italy in I 9 I 9,
in France itself in I 93 8, and in other countries/ 3 but is still in
force in some other places. The probable motivation of the
draftsmen of the Code, 64 emphasized by modern commentators, 65 was not a belief in the "frailty of the sex" but a desire
to strengthen the leadership of the husband, who was intended
to enjoy his powers not only in his own interest but in the interest of the family as a whole. Hence, the provision affects
not so much the status of the wife as the organization of the
family, i.e., the effects of marriage. An incapacity, such as was
imposed by the French Code, should be governed by the conflicts rules on personal effects of marriage rather than by those
dealing with personal incapacities. 66 All these observations
63Jtaly: Law no. 1176 of July 17, 1919.
France: Law of Feb. 18, 1938, J. OJI. Feb. 19, 1938, :ws8 no. 42, also in
39 Bull. Inst. Int. (1938) 145·
Belgium: C. C. arts. 212-226 bis, as amended by Law of July 20, 1932.
Rumania: Law of April 19, 1932.
64 See HERCHENRODER, "The Capacity of Married Women in French Law,"
20 Journ. Comp. Leg. (1938) 197 n. 1.
65 CoLIN et CAPITANT, 1 Cours elementaire de droit civil fran<;ais (ed. 3)
6r8; NIBOYET 736 no. 627, and prevailing theory.
66 Dominant doctrine, see RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 267; M. WoLFF, 4
Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 408; PILLET, 1 Traite 591 no. 277; FEDOZZI 454·
Contra: 3 FRANKENSTEIN 232, because of his theory, and some of the Swiss
decisions because of the confused Swiss legislation.
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seem equally true in regard to the common law disabilities of
married women. They were never designed for the protection
of the wife but were based upon the idea of the merger of personalities and thus flowed from the marriage relationship. 67
A different characterization of similar incapacities by the
municipal law of the forum is irrelevant. It is always possible, of course, that some statute, for instance, that of Florida,
although on its face similar to the provision of the French
Code, requires a different construction. 68
Suppose a woman, a citizen of the United States, is married
to a Belgian, both being domiciled in England, and she procures a loan in Nice, France, without her husband's consent.
A court following the nationality principle (German, Cuban,
etc.) will apply neither American law (as of her status) nor
the English (as of her domicil) nor the French (as lex loci
actus) but Belgian law (as governing marital relations).
Where the wife has retained a personal law of her own,
the only consistent solution is to disregard this law. 69
Finally, personal effects of marriage must be distinguished
from the effects of marriage on property interests. Numerous
disabilities of a spouse as regards freedom of contract or conveyance result from some matrimonial regimes, for instance,
from the community property system or the systems according to which the wife's general assets are managed by her husband. Prevailing opinion does not link with personal effects
of marriage the limitation of a married woman's capacity, unless it results from the marriage itself irrespective of any
matrimonial property regime. The Swiss Federal Tribunal
67
See the most recent writer, JosEPH GINSBURG, "Contractual Liability of
Married Women in Nebraska," zo Neb. L. Rev. (1941) 191, 19z.
63 In Florida and Texas, the common law disabilities of married women
have only partially been removed; cf. 3 VERNIER 36 § 15z; in Florida the
Circuit Court may grant the wife power "to take charge of and manage her own
estate and property," if the court is satisfied as to her capacity to do so, Fla.
Statutes Ann. (1943) §§ 6z.z8-6z.31,
69
PILLET, r Traite 591; LEWALD 95; doubts have been expressed by M.
WoLFF, IPR. u4, and RAAPE 2.89.
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formulated this rule once by acknowledging such effects on the
personal relations, if these effects take place even where the
wife has no property at all.7° Thus, the capacity to contract
and to acquire property 71 granted to married women by the
American equal rights statutes is a general capacity and ought
to be respected everywhere as an incident of the marriage law
involved insofar as that law is applied at all to the relations
between a husband and his wife. Analogous observations apply
with respect to limitations on married men.
Married woman's capacity to contract. (a) As a general
rule, the personal law is applied everywhere in Europe. This
principle has been stated expressly by a recent Finnish statute
and seems unchallenged throughout the civil law countries. 72
It was held in France, for instance, that, in accordance with
the foreign law of the time, an English wife was capable of
contracting without her husband's consent,73 that an Italian
70
BG. (Nov. :u, 1908) 34 BGE. II 738, 742. For an illustration of the
double task of examining first the personal capacity in general, then the possible restrictions by matrimonial property law, see the opinion by LYoN-CAEN,
advocate general, Cour Paris (July 71 1928) Revue 1929 1 8r (Norwegian
spouses).
71
Cf. KG. (Aug. 2, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 44·
72 Finland: Law of Dec. 5, 1929 on family relations of international nature,
§ 14 par. 3, capacity of a married woman to act determined by the law of the
state whose citizen she is, except for art. r 6, relating to third persons, and the
provisions concerning marital property.
France: Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 301 1854) S.1854.I.27o; Cass. (civ.) (July 29,
1901) Clunet 19or, 971; and a great many decisions of the lower courts; see
WEISS, 3 Traite 588.
Germany: OLG. Koln (Dec. 5, 1898) Clunet 1905, 396; RG. (Oct. rz,
1905) DJZ. 1905 1 II701 Revue 1907, 8oo (German wife contracting in
Luxemburg, liable under German law); RG. (March 201 1906) JW. 1907,
328, Clunet 1908 1 r87.
Italy: Cass. Roma (May 2, 1908) Giur. Ita!. 1908 1 1, 941, Clunet 1909 1 563.
Switzerland: The national law of the wife, not the domiciliary law, is decisive; see BG. (Nov. 21, 19o8) 34 BGE. II 741, applying Handlungsfahigkeitgesetz (r88r) art. 10 par. 21 instead of NAG. arts. 32 1 34; BG. (May 23,
1912) 38 BGE. II 3; capacity to contract is governed by the national law: BG.
(April 6, r894) 20 BGE. 648ft, 31 ZBJV. (1895) 173, 4 Z.int.R. (1894)
390 and 5 Z.int.R. (1895) 310; even if she is a former Swiss citizen: BG.
(Nov. 21, 1908) 34 BGE. II 738, 742.
73 Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. ro, r893) Clunet 1893, 530 obviously protecting
1
the French creditors, as the wife had made it clear that she contracted for
herself alone, not on behalf of her husband. The same is true for other decisions.
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wife could act upon the basis of a general power of attorney
from her husband (contrary to French law), 74 and that a wife
from Wallis, Switzerland, needed an authorization of the
court in case the husband was interested in the transaction. 75
The capacity of married women under age to contract depends on whether, under the marital law, any powers are reserved to her father or guardian. 76
(b) The law of the forum is seldom resorted to in this matter. 77
(c) The law of the place of contracting is applied nowhere
but in the United States and, perhaps as to mercantile contracts, in England. 78
Capacity to sue and be sued. A woman's capacity to be a
party to a lawsuit (persona standi in judicio, capacite d'ester en
justice) is generally held to depend upon the personallaw/ 9
except in the United States, where it is determined by the law
of the forum (Restatement§ 588).
The public policy of the forum has hardly ever been advanced to eliminate the personal law. 80
74 Trib. civ. Seine (Aug. 5, r88r) Clunet 1882, 617; conf'd Cour Paris (Dec.
17, 1883) Clunet 1884, 289; Trib. civ. Tunis (Jan. 29, 1908) Clunet 1909,
745·
75
Cour Cham\;>ery (Jan. 9, 1884) Clunet r885 1 r8o; Trib. comm. Seine
(May ro, r886) Clunet r887, 183; App. Chambery (Jan. 29, 1934) Revue
Crit. 1935, 133 (Swiss wife needed authorization under Swiss C. C. art. 177).
Correspondingly, Cour civ. Geneve (Nov. 171 1933) 56 Sem. Jud. (1934)
572 (French wife in Switzerland under French law).
76
RG. (Jan. 10, 1918) 91 RGZ. 403.
17
France: PILLET, I Traite 588 no. 276; LEREBOUR5-PIGEONNIERE 389
no. 332; contra: GouL:E, "Femme mariee," 8 Repert. 388 nos. r6, 17,
78
CHESHIRE 238, advocating the proper law; c/. supra pp. 190, 191.
79 France: WEISS, 3 Traite 589 n. 1, cites six French decisions and three of
Egyptian Mixed Tribunals.
Germany: never doubted.
The Netherlands: Rb. den Haag (June 24, 1919) W.10566 (Italian law);
Hof Amsterdam (July q, 1923) W.u163, N.J. 1924, 118 (Swiss law);
Rb. Amsterdam (March 17 1 1930) W.12151 and Rb. Arnhem (Jan. 23, 1933)
W.I271o, first point (German law) and others.
Spain: Trib. Supr. (Jan. q, 1885) 57 Sent. 45, Clunet r888, 138, cf.
Clunet 1889, 771 (wife, party to a lawsuit in Cuba, on the ground of her
capacity under the law of the United States).
80
0ne case is known: App. Gand (Dec. 24, 1902) Clunet 1903, 980, criticized by STOCQUART, ibid. 977•
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Right of the wife to carry on a business or engage ina profession. (a) Whether a wife needs the consent of her husband to
accept employment or to carry on an independent business of
her own, is decided according to the law that governs her
personal relations. For instance, an Italian wife who had engaged in a profession in French Tunisia, was held to have done
so with her husband's consent, which was presumed to exist
under article I 3 of the Italian Commercial Code, as worded
at that time. 81 The rule includes the conditions for a wife's
carrying on a business as a "sole trader." 82
The Tribunal civil de la Seine, however, consistently following its tendency to apply French law whenever possible,
awarded damages of so,ooo francs to an American husband,
domiciled in Chicago, Illinois, against the managers of a
theater in Paris who had employed his French wife, a former
music hall diva, against his prohibition. 83 It would be intolerable, the court said, if the wife could publicly challenge in
France the authority of her husband, even when he is a foreign
subject. The right of a French husband to forbid his wife to
engage in separate professional activity has been preserved by
the reform act of r938, which, however, subjects the exercise
of this right to the approval of the courts. 84
(b) The law of the forum simply is applied in the United
States.
Prohibition of certain transactions with third persons. In
former times, a married woman was often forbidden to become
a surety or to pledge or mortgage her separate property for her
husband or other persons; her power to do so is still limited
or denied in some states of the United States. 85 In the Swiss
81

Trib. civ. Tunis (March 28, 1908)-Revue 1909,227.
Cf. the American statutes collected by 3 VERNIER § r 8 7 and for Europe,
HARTENSTEIN, "Handelsfrau," in 4 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterb. rs6, on conflicts law ibid. 161.
83
Trib. civ. Seine (Aprils, 1930) Revue 1930,461.
84 Law of Feb. r8, 1938. See supra p. 312, n. 63.
85 Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania.
The New Hampshire statute was construed as protecting only married women
812
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Civil Code (art. 177 par. 3), the authorization of the court of
the domicil is required for any obligation to third persons
undertaken by a wife for her husband. This restriction would
be applied in a German court, 80 and it has been urged that a
German court should grant such authorization if the wife has
her domicil in Germany. 87
Another prohibition established in Portugal and Brazil 88
provides that a husband may not without the consent of his
wife ( outorga ux6ria) alienate immovables, sue or be sued
(sic) in regard to immovables, make gifts, or (by Brazilian
. law) become a surety. This prohibition is expressly stated to
apply irrespective of the property regime and thus comes
under the heading of personal relations in all courts applying
the personal law. The Brazilian courts, however, by their
broad extension of public policy, have applied the prohibition
also in the case of a foreigner married to a Brazilian wife 89
and will probably continue to do so under their new law, in the
case of Brazilian domicil of either party.
Protection of third persons. Restrictions of the kind described above are usually meant to apply also to relations between the spouses and third parties. If, however, foreign
restrictions are to be upheld, the conflicts rule may well make
an exception in the case of a third person dealing in good faith
domiciled in New Hampshire; see Proctor v. Frost (1938) 89 N.H. 304, 197
Atl. 813, and Note, 51 Harv. L. Rev. (1938) 1444. On Nebraska see 3 VERNIER
3 r 5 n. 9· The Roman-Dutch law imposing restrictions on a married woman
binding herself or her property, was considered a rule of capacity, governed
with respect to immovables by the lex situs, in Bank of Africa Ltd. v. Cohen
[1909] 2 Ch. 129, cf. CHESHIRE 541; also UNGER, "The Place of Classification
in Private International Law," 19 Bell Yard (1937) 3, 14.
86
For France see WEISS, 3 Traite 590, 591, but he admits two decisions of
18 31 and 18 3 3 applying the lex fori, ibid. n. 5·
87
RAAPE 287ff.
88
Portugal: C. C. arts. 1119, 1191, 14 71. Brazil: C. C. art. 2 3 s; cf. BEVILAQUA, 2 C6digo Civil ( ed. s, 19 3 7) 115. The husband's acting without the
wife's consent is prevailingly held to be annullable rather than void; see on
the controversy in Brazil GUIMARAES, Accordiios, 3 supplemento (1939) 476.
89
See Sup. Trib. Fed. (Nov. 30, 1932), not published, see VALLADAO 124,
reported by RoDRIGO OcTAVIO, Dicionario no. 986; Sup. Trib. Fed. (May 24,
192 9) 1o Rev. J ur. Bras. ( 19 3 1) 3 53 ; for decisions of Siio Paulo, see VALLADAO
132.
.
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with one of the spouses. The German Code, although containing two clauses for the protection of domestic commerce (EG.
arts. 7, par. 3 and r 6, par. 2), does not cover the prohibitions
discussed here, but analogous application of these clauses has
been advocated. 90 In France, Brazil, and other countries, the
vague and omnipresent force of public policy is invoked whenever domestic creditors are endangered by the application of
a foreign law.
3· Implied Authority: Legal Transactions Between Husband and Wife
Power to obligate the other spouse. By virtue of her "power
of the keys," so denominated in the German doctrine as a
power granted ex lege, the wife is authorized to bind her
husband by contracting within the sphere of household
activities (BGB. § 1357). The French courts have gradually
been reaching similar results on the basis of an alleged implied
authorization (mandat tacite) by the husband, the presumed
contractual basis thereof becoming more and more fictitious. 91
Most countries have rules of either the German or the French
type, which are sufficiently different from each other, however,
to cause problems in conflict of laws. The prevailing view holds
that all these regulations are concerned with the personal relations between husband and wife, rather than their property
relations. 92
Of the same character are the various rules concerning
liability for household expenses, such as the American family
expense statutes, 93 the corresponding provisions in Switzer90

See RAAPE, 2 D. IPR. 199 and citations.
KARL TH. KIPP, Rechtsvergleichende Studien zur Lehre von der Schliisselgewalt in den romanischen Rechten (Berlin, 1928). Nothing was changed
by the reforms of r 938; cf. Note by VIALLETON in Sirey r 938.x.r 76, 1 79·
92
See NIEMEYER, Das IPR. des BGB. 144 and the authors cited by RABEL,
5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 283; J. STRELITZ, Die Schliisselgewalt in internationalen
Privatrecht, Thesis (Gottingen, 1936). To the same effect in Switzerland,
STAUFFER, NAG. 79 no. 9·
93 3 VERNIER 102 § r6o.
91
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land, 94 Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Scandinavia, Guatemala, and
other countries, 95 which declare both husband and wife liable
for certain acts of the wife, and finally those occasional rules
which impose upon the wife liability for certain deeds of her
husband.
Not only in Germany is the personal law applied with
respect to all these rules, 96 but also in America the courts are
in agreement on this point. In Paquin Ltd. v. W esterfelt, 91 the
family expense statute of Connecticut was applied by the Connecticut court to spouses domiciled in that state, while in
Mandell Brothers v. Fogg/ 8 the Massachusetts court did not
apply the statute of Illinois, making the property of both
spouses jointly and severally liable for expenses of the family,
as against a wife whose husband had bought goods in Chicago,
both being citizens of Massachusetts. This latter case illustrates a disregard for the seller of the goods, typical of any
consistent resort to the principle of personal law.
,
German law is less rigorous. The German code has established an exception to the rule that the law of the husband
governs the relations between husband and wife; German law
applies if the spouses are domiciled in Germany and the
German law is "more favorable" to the third party with whom
a transaction has been made (EG., art. 16 par. 2). The awkward form of this sound exception has been properly criticized. 99
French courts, on the contrary, have been said simply to apply the law of the forum. 100 What they actually did in a series
94

Swiss C. C. arts. 207 par. 21 220 par. 2, 243 par. 3; cf. ibid. arts. 163, 206.
See KrPP, op. cit. supra n. 91, at 17; KADEN, 6 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb.
205 2 b(a).
96
Unanimous opinion. The application of the Hague Convention of 1905
is controversial; c/. WrERUSZOWSKI, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 63 n. 365 and
contra: 3 FRANKENSTEIW240.
97
Paquin, Ltd. v. Westerfelt (1919) 93 Conn. 513, ro6 Atl. 766.
98
Mandell Brothers v. Fogg (1903) 182 Mass. 582 1 66 N. E. 198.
99
See comment by RAAPE 359·
100
PILLET, r Traite 588 no. 276; BARTIN, 2 Principes 242 § 3oo, and others
with regret, as they advocated the national law; NrBOYET 739 no. 628 (2).
95
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of cases was to allow fashionable Paris dressmakers to sue the
husbands of lady customers on the theory that the debt was
within the rather modest scope of those household expenses
usually allowed on the ground of mandat tacite. 101 In no case
would the national law of the husband have been more advantageous to the plaintiff; ordinarily the spouses were found to
have been domiciled in France at the time of both the order
and the delivery of the goods. Since the allocation· of the debt
as between husband and wife was not in question, the result
seems not very different from the German rule.
The ·failure of the American conflicts rule to accept the
creditor's claim as defined under his own law, compels him,
before contracting, either to investigate where the spouses are
domiciled and what law is in effect there or to ask both spouses
expressly to consent. The elimination of that necessity is the
precise purpose of the family expense laws.
The best solution, so far not in force anywhere, would be
to hold either spouse liable or free from liability, according to
the personal law governing the non-patrimonial relations between the spouses and, further, to grant the plaintiff the possibility of availing himself of any more advantageous position
that he may have under the "proper law of the contract."
Prohibited transactions between husband and wiie. A few
vestiges of the ancient notion that marriage effects a merger of
the wife's personality with that of her husband and that husband and wife represent a single unity of body and soul, have
survived to the present day. In several states of the United
States,102 husband and wife either cannot contract with each
101 Worth c. Rimsky-Korsakoff, Trib. civ. Seine (March 30, r 893) Clunet
1893, 868; Cour Paris (June 17, 1899) Clunet 19oo, q8; Trib. civ. Seine
(June 9, 1905) Clunet 1905, 1040; Beer c. Prince Kotschoubey, Trib. civ.
Seine (April 10, 1907) conf'd Cour Paris (Nov. 5, 1907) Clunet 1908, 478;
Beer c. Prince Yourewsky, Trib. civ. Seine (June 17, r9o8) Clunet 1909, 476
(denying liability of husband); Redfern c. the same defendant, Trib. civ. Seine
(July 13, 1911) Revue 19rz, 385; Cour Paris (April r8, 1929) Revue Crit.
1935, 149 (English spouses living in France; the husband is not allowed to
entrench himself behind the English system of property separation).
102 3 VERNIER§§ 156, 173•
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other at all or are unable to make certain transactions with
each other, for instance, to form a partnership, to transfer immovables, ·or to make a sale to each other. 103 The French
courts, though they cannot carry the principle through, regard
partnerships between spouses as null. 104 In European conflict
of laws, the personal law clearly seems to govern the application of such provisions. 105
Widely discussed, however, are the choice of law problems
arising from the prohibition of gifts between husband and
wife. The controversy originated in the days of the postglossators, when Baldus and Bartolus disagreed on whether the
Roman prohibition of donationes inter virum et uxorem was a
statutum reale or a statutum personale. 106 Most codes have
abandoned such prohibitions, but, under some legislations,
gifts made during coverture are still invalid 107 or revocable. 108 According to prevailing opinion, these rules are
within the scope of the personal effects of marriage. 109 Hence
103
For sales, see also France: C. C. art. I 595·
The Netherlands: BW. art. I503, and others.
104
See LAGARDE, I Revue generale de droit commercial (I 93 8) I 75; since
the alleged prohibition is based on the matrimonial law, Cass. (civ.) (July 3,
I9I7) S.I92I.I.2or, it is applied to French spouses trading in Italy, App. Lyon
(April 24, I929) S.1931.2.25 (refusing in consequence enforcement to an
Italian decree treating the wife as a merchant and, hence, declaring her bankrupt) ..
105
France: Cass. (req.) (Jan. 25, 1938) D.H. 1938. I64 ff. (sale between
the spouses valid under Mohammedan law, despite French C. C. art. 1595).
The Netherlands: H.R, (May I], 1929) W.I2oo6, N.J. I929, 1279 (sale
between German spouses of Dutch immovables, subject to German marital law
rather than to Dutch BW. art. 1503). Similarly Louisiana: Rush et a!. v.
Landers (I902) 107 La. 549, 32 So. 95; Note, 57 L.R.A. 353 applies art.
2446 La. C. C., to an immovable, the spouses being domiciled in Indiana.
106
Cf. WEISS, 3 Traite 592 n. I; AUDINET, 5 Repert. 668 nos. :u6ff.
107
1taly: C. C. (r865) art. Io54; the Netherlands: BW. art. I715; Spain:
C. C. art. I 3 34·
108 France: C. C. art. r 09 6; Portugal: C. C. arts. I I 7 8, I I 8 I.
105
Belgium: PouLLET 6o9 no. 468 n. 2.
France: WEISS, 3 Traite 592; BARTIN, 2 Principes 213 § 292; App. Caen
(Jan. I5, I9I2) Revue I9I4, 147; Cass. (req.) (March 15, I933) S.I9J4.I.393·
Germany: RG. (March 2, 1894) 4 Z.int.R. (1894) 35r; RG. (Oct. u,
1907) I9 Z.int.R. (1909) 222, and the general opinion of writers.
Greece: STREIT-VALLINDAS 350 n. 36.
Spain: See DE CASTRO, "La cuesti6n de las califi.caciones en el Derecho internacional privado," 20 Revista Der. Priv. (1933) 265 at 278 n. 167, refuting.
the argumentation by RAAPE 34I II 3 as to Spanish law.
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the personal law applied is that of the lucrative transaction,
irrespective of the time element considered determinative in
marital property relations. 110 To resolve the uncertainties in
the case where the spouses have different nationalities, 111 the
Polish statute expressly invokes the national law of the husband at the time of the contract. 112
The French courts exclude immovables, at least immovables
situated in France, from the rule and apply French law as the
law of the situs.l1 3
Other classifications have been occasionally preferred. The
Dutch Supreme Court, 114 for instance, once held that the
Dutch prohibition, although affecting Dutch public policy, did
not apply to German spouses because the prohibition was said
to be inseparably connected with the prohibition of postnuptial
marriage settlements, established in the Dutch legislation
and Latin Codes, but unknown to the German Code.
As respects provisions excluding lawsuits between husband
and wife, the American rule that the law of the forum 115 or,
in the case of an action in tort, the law of the place of the
wrong 116 should be applied, is not shared by other countries;

°

11 KG. (March 20, 1939) Dt. Recht 1939, 938 (supposing that the husband
was of Greek nationality at the time of the marriage, a certain contract made
by him, in view of the Greek matrimonial system of separate property, constituted a donation;· since he ~ertainly was a Greek at the time of the contract, a
donation, if any, was void under Greek law, applicable as governing personal
relations. The court did not, as a Note by REU believes, characterize donation
under lex fori or lex causae, but simply applied the historic conceptions common
to all nations concerned).
111
See, besides the general discussion, supra p. 301, AuDINET, 5 Repert. 669
nos. 236, 242ff.
112 Poland: Law of 1926 on international private law, art. 15.
Germany: Erster Gebhardscher Entwurf (1881) § 19 par. 3.
113
Cass. (civ.) (April 21 1884) Clunet 1885, 77; Trib. civ. Seine (March
3> 1891) Clunet I89I, 508, modified by Cour Paris (May 27, 1892) Clunet
1&92 1 940, S.r896.2..73, conf'd Cass. (req.) (May&, 1&94) Clunet 1894, 562. 1
D.I894·1·355; Cour Paris (March 5, 1901) Clunet 1901 1 775; Cass. (req.)
(May 71 1924) Revue 1924, 407. BARTIN, 2. Principes 215, 216, hopes this
singular treatment of immovables is transitory.
114
H.R. (May 17, 1929) W. uoo6.
115
Restatement § I 33 implicitly.
116
Critical STUMBERG 1 &6.
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such prohibitions are regarded merely as means of regulating
the marriage relation and preserving domestic harmony. Recent American writers have urged a corresponding application
of the personallaw. 117
Of the same character are laws that do not permit a husband or wife to levy execution upon the property of the other
spouse. The Swiss law contains peculiar provisions of this
kind, which the Swiss Federal Tribunal has repeatedly declared to be no part of public policy and therefore not applicable to the case of a husband domiciled abroad. 118
Finally, the personal law governing marital effects extends
to the problem whether spouses during coverture may make
agreements on such matters as alimony (without or until
judicial separation), residence, or education of children. In
modern times, more and more freedom of arrangement has
been allowed, but the laws differ considerably. The French
courts, vigorously insisting on their domestic restrictions of
such agreements, are concerned almost exclusively with examining whether these restrictions have been observed. 119
Particular difficulties arise in the case of financial agreements preceding separation or divorce. 120
/

111
STUMBERG I 86; HANCOCK, Torts in the Conflict of Laws 235; cf. as to
vicarious liability of the husband, ibid. 255.
~ 18 BG. (March JI, I927) 53 BGE. III 33> 37; BG. (Oct. IO, 1930) 56
BGE. III I 73; contra: BG. (Sept. s, I 9 I 6) 42 BGE. III 342, 348.
119 Cour Paris (April 29, 1913) Revue 19I3, 879; Trib. civ. Seine {June
I8, I934) Clunet I935> 6I9, Revue Crit. 1935, 125, criticized by BATIFFOL,
Revue Crit. I937> 429, for not having inquired into the national (German)
law of the spouses; App. Lyon (March 26, I934) Revue 1935, 46I; Cass.
(civ.) {Jan. 26, I938) D.H. I938.I97, and Cour Dijon (March 28, 1939)
Clunet 1939, 634, neglect the analogous Italian marital law because the agreement was valid under French law.
120
E.g., a Swiss author, ADRIAN, (according to the review of his book in 38
SJZ. (I 942), 37I) admonishes Swiss lawyers to be aware in the case of English
parties, of the hostility of English law to agreements whereby a spouse promises
financial advantages to the other for obtaining divorce, while Swiss C. C. art.
I 58 allows agreements as to the consequences of divorce or separation with
allowance of the divorce court. See moreover, infra, pp. 525, 531.
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Support 121

4·

Application of the matrimonial law. The husband's duty to
support his wife or, more generally, one spouse's duty to support the other is considered in civil law countries as one of the
principal incidents of marriage, 122 rather than a quasicontractual obligation as conceived under an earlier doctrine.123
German courts and writers are in almost unanimous agreement that the national law of the husband, being the law
governing the marital relation, applies to all questions pertaining to the conditions and kind of support to be rendered,
either within the common household or during an extrajudicial
separation. The only exception to this principle, according to
German decisions, is that marital property rules govern the
determination of what property is liable to furnish the means
of support. 124
French courts have often been said to follow the law of the
forum, but they too start with the application of the national
law. 125 They think, however, that the French rules on alimony
present a minimum standard which must be applied on the
ground of public policy. 126 This modification has been rejected
121 On comparative law and international enforcement see International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, L'Execution a l'etranger des obligations alimentaires (Rome, 1938); "L'abandon de famille et ses sanctions,"
in Travaux de la semaine internationale de droit (Paris, I937).
122 RocuJN, Traite de droit civil compare, Le Mariage (I 904) 198 ff. nos.
147, 148; Swiss BG. (May 29, 1908) 34 BGE. I 299, 313; revised Czechoslovakian draft of Private International Law,§ I7 par. I, in Revue I931, 189.
123

1 BAR

§ 20J.

124

RG. (Feb. 15, 1906) 62 RGZ. 4oo, I6 Z.int.R. (I9o6) 298, 20 Z.int.R.
(1910) 404, Clunet I9I1 1 946; Bay. ObLG. (March 3, I9I3) 30 ROLG. I65;
3 FRANKENSTEIN 26o n. 135; KG. (Feb. 9, I929) IPRspr. I929, no. IS; KG.
I929, no. IS; KG. (March 9, I93I) IPRspr. I93I, no. 66.
125
Cour Paris (Oct. 30, I926) Gaz.Pal.I927.1.284; NrBOYET 739 no. 628

(J).
126
Cass. (req.) (July zz, I903) Clunet I904, 355; Cass. (req.) (March
27, I922) S.1923.I.27• Clunet I922, I 15, Revue I924, 401. For many other
decisions see WEiss, 3 Traite 597 n. 2. Spanish Trib. Supr. (July I, 1897) 8z
Sent. r8 declares that a foreign married woman is to be protected, if in Spain.
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127

by most German authorities, although it might well be advocated in cases where a foreign married person is left stranded
in the forum and has become a public charge, because his
personal law fails to grant him a right to support by his spouse
under the circumstances. The English and American rules on
alimony and support in particular are usually construed so as
to exclude their application by a foreign court; the lex fori is,
then, the only possible resort to secure support for an indigent
foreigner.
Switzerland applies the general rules on marital effects according to which foreigners domiciled in Switzerland are subject to Swiss law. 128
According to section 459 of the Restatement, the duty imposed by the state of the domicil to pay for necessaries furnished to a husband, wife, or minor child is enforced in every
state. To this extent the personal law of the parties has extraterritorial effect. The Restatement also recognizes an obligation imposed by the state where the necessaries have been furnished, but only if this state has jurisdiction over the debtor.
Lex fori. Simple application of the lex fori to the duty of
support has been adopted in the United States 129 as well as
by the C6digo Bustamante. 180
127
RG. (Feb. I 5, I 906) 62 RGZ. 4oo, cited supra n. I 24; I BAR § 203 n. 2:
"arbitrary." LEWALD 91 no. 126; RAAPE .284; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 261, emphasizing the force of the Hague Convention on effects of marriage. Contra:
KIPP-WoLFF, Familienrecht I44 § 39B; NussBAUM, D. IPR. r47, in the case
where both spouses reside permanently in Germany, or one spouse with the
consent of the other, in view of the administrative and criminal importance of
the duty.
128
BG. (May 29, 19o8) 34 BGE. I 299, 316ff; BG. (Feb. 22, 1934) 6o
BGE. II 77 (leaving undecided the case where only the defendant lives in
Switzerland); BG. (April I8, I942) 68 BGE. II 9, 13.
129
Restatement § 4 58.
13
C6digo Bustamante art. 45· It is recognized in community property states
that the obligation to pay for necessaries arises out of· the marriage and not out
of the wife's partnership in the community fund. See DAGGETT, Legal Essays
on Family Law (1935) n6 for California, 123 for Louisiana, 134 for Texas,
I44 for Washington.
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Law of the debtor. A theory presented by Pillet 131 and
adopted by the Japanese statute 132 subjects duties of support
to the law of the debtor, but it is doubtful whether this rule is
meant to apply to marital duties of support.
Provisional decrees. If the personal law governs, it does so
until the marriage is dissolved or some special rule applies.
The personal law is not supplanted even on the commencement of an action for annulment, for limited or full divorce, or
for judicial separation; however, the procedural situation may
give rise to particular needs. 133
J\. few German decisions have assumed that a court, taking
cognizance of an action for divorce or some similar action,
could by interlocutory decree grant the wife alimony pendente
lite, irrespective of the foreign personal law governing the
marital status of the parties. 134 More recent decisions, however, no longer resort to the German law of the forum even in
an interlocutory decree unless the personal law cannot be
readily ascertained; 135 sometimes it is presumed that the
foreign rule is identical with that of the forum. 136

5. Wife's lien 131
Article

2I2I

of the French Civil Code grants any married

131 PILLET, I Traite 599 and Droit international prive, resume du cours
(Paris 1904-1905).
132 Japan: Law of 1898, art. 21.
The similar Swiss provision, NAG. art. 9 par. 2, has no reference to foreigners;
cf. STAUFFER, NAG. art. 9 no. 7·
1 3
3 See also infra pp. 526-529.
134 0LG. Hamburg (Dec. 7, 1911) Hans. G. Z. 1912 Beibl. 56 no. 28 II;
OLG. Hamburg (April 28, 1921) 76 Seuff. Arch. 242 no. 149; OLG. Miinchen
(Nov. 4, 1921) JW. 1921, 1465; OLG. Koln (Dec. 14, 1928) JW. 1929, 449;
OLG. Hamm (Sept. 22, 1932) JW. 1932, 3824, IPRspr. 1932, no. 87. This
practice was approved by LEWALD 91 no. 126 (b); NussBAUM, D. IPR 147 n.
3; JONAS, JW. 1936, 3578. It does not refer to alimony between spouses in
general, as an American writer understood.
l:la The constant practice of the 13th Senate of the Kammergericht (March 9,
1931 and Oct. 22, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, nos. 66, 67; (Dec. 19, 1932) IPRspr.
1932, no. 88; (May 25, 1936) JW. 1936, 3577, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 33;
RAAPE 284; cf. also WIERUSZOWSKI, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 62 n. 359·
136
LG. Mainz (Sept. 2, 1925) JW. 1925, 2163; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 262.
137
CHARRON, "L'Hypotheque legale de Ia femme etrangere," Nouv. Revue
1937, 29; Note, ibid. 1938, 124.
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woman, irrespective of her property regime, a general lien on
all her husband's land for the protection of claims which she
may have against her husband, particularly claims arising from
his management of her property. Prevailing opinion in France
categorizes provisions of this sort despite their pecuniary
character among personal effects of marriage. 138 In recent
years, however, French courts have refused to recognize a
wife's lien on French immovables when the wife is neither a
French national nor enjoys treaty rights, even though her
national law imposes a lien on her husband's immovables. 139
The theory that the wife's lien is the counterpart of the disabilities of a married woman has been invoked to justify the
first theory. 140 This argument cannot be correct, as the wife's
lien was not abolished in France 141 when full legal capacity
was granted to married women by the law of February 18,
I 93 8. On the other hand, the courts transplant the problem
into the field of the rights of aliens where it does not belong.
The personal law should govern the problem simply as an
incident of the marriage relationship.
138
Trib. Havre (Dec. 29, 1928) Clunet 1929, 1048. WEISS, 3 Traite 649;
PILLET, I Traite 593ff. no. 278; NIBOYET 741 no. 630; LEREBOURSPIGEONNIERE 428 no. 354; on an earlier practice see infra p. 336, n. 15.
139 Cass. (req.) (Jan. 27, 1903) S.r904.r.81; Trib. civ. Seine (Dec. 31
1
1910) Revue 1911, 369, Clunet 191r, 901; App. Aix (Jan. 20, 1938) Clunet
1938, 488, Nouv. Revue 1938, 122.
140 See PILLET and NIBOYET, Zoe. cit. supra n. 138, CALEB, 4 Repert. 196 no.
176 and authors cited.
141 C. C. art. 2135, modified by Decret of June 14, 1938, allowing the
wife, however, to waive her hypotMque legale.
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Effects of Marriage on Property'
I.

BAsic

CoNCEPTIONS

ORRESPONDING to far-reaching differences in the
main conceptions of marital property systems, the conflicts rules on this subject are split into three groups,
two of which are illustrated by the American conflicts rules on
marital property rights in ( r) immovables and ( 2) movables,
and the third by the European rules on marital property rights.

C
1.

American Rules on Immovables

The old rule on immovables, 2 which is preserved in this
country, applies the lex situs. The underlying idea is that an
immovable is considered an isolated object of rights. This idea
can be traced back to ancient Germanic laws and was characteristic of the feudal system of landholding. If a woman owned
land at the time of marriage, the interest acquired by her
husband through the marriage was determined by the law of
1 On the American conflicts law see STUMBERG, "Marital Property an,d the
Conflict of Laws," I 1 Tex. L. Rev. (I 9 p) 53; LEFLAR, "Community Property
and Conflict of Laws," 2I Cal. L. Rev. (I933) 22I; HOROWITZ, "Conflict of
Law Problems in Community Property," II Wash. L. Rev. (I936) 121, :n2;
NEUNER, "Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws," 5 La. L. Rev. (I 943)
I67. For comparative conflicts law: JuLIA JoELSON, Giiterrechtliche Wirkungen der Ehe bei verschiedener Staatsangehorigkeit der Ehegatten im internationalen Privatrecht (Heidelberg, I 9 3 3).
2
/mmobilia reguntur lege loci. STORY§§ I58, I86, I88; 4 PHILLIMORE
no. 476; WHARTON 405 § 191. D'ARGENTRE originated this doctrine in
polemics ( Commentarii in Patrias Britonum Leges, art. 2 I 8, gl. 6, § 34)
opposing DUMOULIN's theory of domicil (consilium 53) in case no matrimonial
convention was made. The doctrine was advocated in the Netherlands and in
France by Paul Voet and Froland, from whom Story took inspiration. The
problem was called the "most .famous question" in a decision of the Court of
Dutch Brabant of November 3, r 693, "Decisio brabantina super famosissima
questione." See FROLAND, I Memoires concernans la nature et la qualite des
status (1729) 272, 309, 316; 1 LAINE 234, 334·
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the place where the land was situated. Therefore, under the
common law, if the spouses own real estate in ten different
countries, ten different matrimonial laws must be consulted,
each applying to its respective immovables only. The point of
contact is the immovable itself; the place where the spouses are
or where the assets are managed is irrelevant. This conception
implies that no problem arises other than that of determining
the interests of one spouse in the lands of the other. In fact,
section 237 of the Restatement contents itself with declaring:
"The effect of marriage upon interests in land owned by a
spouse at the time of marriage is determined by the law of the
state where the land is."
2.

American Rules on Movables

Movables, according to the old rule, follow the person,
mobilia ossibus inhaerent; rights in movables, created under
the law of the domicil, have extraterritorial effect. With respect to marital property, this rule is well settled in the United
States despite occasional inroads made by the law of the situs. 3
Accordingly, the mutual interests of husband and wife in each
other's movables are localized at the place of the interested
parties.
So far the rule is unassailable. Doubt is cast on the rule,
however, so soon as we ask whether all the movables belonging
to a married person are together thought to form a unit, an
entity, or whether each asset is a separate unit. The conception
of all the movables constituting one unit seems to obtain when
the prevailing rule is justified by the "desirability of applying
a single uniform regime to the entire estate of the parties," 4
3
It is remarkable, however, as a token of the strength· of the territorial
theory that the cases that actually or apparently preferred the lex situs are
continually emphasized by the writers; and this theory was adopted in the proposed Final Draft of the Restatement § 3 I I .
4
Note, 43 Harv. L.Rev. (r93o) 1287; STUMBERG, II Tex. L. Rev. (I9JZ)
63, supra n. r; LEFLAR, zi Cal. L. Rev. (I933) 233, supra n. r.
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or when it is stated more precisely in the words of Beale

5

to be

motivated by the consideration that
"These (movables) are brought together into an aggregate
unit, and from the time of acquisition become part of that unit,
and ... the entire unit is treated by third parties as well as the
spouses as a unit."
\Ve should like to think that this idea means that the law of
the marital domicil thus governs more problems than the
single problem mentioned above concerning the existence and
nature of the interests of husband and wife in each other's
property. But we are warned against any such supposition by
the language of the Restatement, which again speaks exclusively of "rights or other interests in movables"(§§ 289 ff.)
and when we find similar expressions used by the writers. We
shall see, in.deed, that many, although certainly not all, other
problems regarding the relationships between the spouses, as
well as between them and third persons, are treated in American common law as belonging to the fields of contract, tort, or
quasi-contract rather than to that of marital law. Apparently,
the formulation of conflicts rules in this country has been unduly influenced by the narrow scope of the matrimonial law
believed to remain after the passage of the Married Women's
Acts. Furthermore, insufficient attention has been paid to the
problems arising under the community property systems and
to the regulations of the rest of the world.

J. Continental Rules on Marital Property Relations
Quite a different picture is presented by the traditional
European marital laws, for which Central Europe has most
fully elaborated the general theories. The tangible and intangible assets of the parties ( activa) are conceived as forming
one part of a major whole, viz., the estate, while the debts of
the spouses form the other part. Therefore, inquiry is not
5 2 BEALE

§ 290.1.
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limited· to the determination of those interests which one
spouse may have in the assets of the other, but it is also directed
to the obligations that may arise between the spouses, the
liability of either to creditors, the enforcement and execution
of claims during coverture and after its termination, management of the wife's goods other than those pertaining to her
separate estate, presumptions as to ownership, and like questions. All these problems are regarded as forming one complex
unit, similar to an inheritance treated as an aggregate, to which
one conflicts rule applies.
Generally, such a system extends to every asset, but in
England and Argentina immovables are excepted and assigned
to the lex situs, just as they are in this country. But even in
these countries the system is not confined to the mutual interests of the spouses in each other's property.
The Continental systems, of course, are recognized in any
common law court in accordance with its conflicts rule; nobody
would think of refusing recognition because such a property
regime is "unknown in the lex fori." 6

4· Scope of the Marital Property Law
It is important to emphasize the comparatively broad scope
of marital property law in civil law countries.
In the American system also, the "effect of marriage upon
the interests of one spouse," to use the expression of section
237 of the Restatement, refers to all rules of the applicable
municipal law under which, by virtue of the marriage, property rights or interests are created, modified, or terminated.
In particular, both in the United States and in civil law
countries, these rules determine what powers of management
one spouse may exercise and what control the other may have;
to what extent freedom of alienation is affected; who is the
6
See BECKETT, "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private
International Law," 15 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1934) 46 at 57·
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proper party to sue and be sued with respect to the property of
either spouse; 7 and similar questions.
In civil law countries, marital property law also includes the
effects of such events as voluntary or judicial separation, divorce, postnuptial agreements, bankruptcy, and abuse by the
husband of his rights of management. In principle, this is true
in the United States too, but there are many variations and
exceptions.
Although article I9I of the C6digo Bustamante subjects the
wife's right to recover her dowry to her personal law, a rational
solution requires that either the matrimonial law of the spouses
or the general contracts law governs. 8 The former is the right
solution where the applicable matrimonial law includes special
rules on dowry, e.g., in Austria and Italy; in France the matrimonial law has been applied to a dowry constituted under the
law of Maryland. 9
In community property states everywhere, marital property
law determines what constitutes the community fund and what
the separate property of either spouse, and in addition the
questions of management, possession, and control by the wife
and the husband, respectively, the actions permissible during
the community, the termination and partition of the common
fund, et cetera.
An integral part of these systems is also the regulation of
liability of the different estates of the parties for debts either
of the community or of the husband or wife. Liability of the
community property for community debts only, as in Washington, or also for the debts of the husband as in Louisiana, or
for all debts of the husband and the prenuptial debts of the
7 See Williams v. Pope Manufacturing Co. (1900) 52 La. Ann. 1417, 27
So. 851 (married woman, domiciled in Mississippi, allowed according to the
(matrimonial) law of Mississippi to sue in tort in Louisiana, as the tort had been
suffered there). See also Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Humble (1901) 181
U.S. 57; Traglio v. Harris (C.C.A. 9th, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 439·
8
Cf. RAAPE 342·
9
App. Nimes (Dec. 10, 1912) D.1914.2.169.
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wife, as in California, is naturally considered by the lawyers of
those states as growing out of the marriage. The same approach
is used in Europe, not only with respect to a system of community but to any marital system, in classifying the problem of
the husband's liability for prenuptial or postnuptial debts of
his wife and vice versa. This does not seem to be the usual way ·
of thinking in this country but should be recognized as the
actually governing principle.·
As a matter of fact, if marriage property law is defined in
the conflict of laws as dealing with problems of title to property
only, its scope is much narrower than in European countries.
To visualize the difference and the attendant difficulties, let
us assume that German spouses are domiciled in Germany and
that the wife has been charged with a criminal offense but
acquitted. Under the German Civil Code (§ 1387, No. 2),
the husband is obliged to pay or to reimburse his wife for the
. expense of her defense, and as a co-debtor he is personally
liable to his wife's creditors, e.g., to her attorney. If her husband can be sued in an American common law court, what attitude should that court take? Should it classify the problem
according to the le.~ fori? It might find that no such claim is
granted to the wife or her attorney by the matrimonial law of
the forum although sonie claim under another theory may be
prosecuted. Obviously, the desirable solution is that German
matrimonial law as the law of the domicil should be applied in
its full bearing.
If we change the facts of the case slightly, there would probably be no doubt at all about an American court's reaching an
analogous solution where the husband, under the German
Civil Code (§ 1385), has to pay the taxes, interest on mortgages, and insurance premiums for those assets of his wife of
which he is possessed ex iure mariti during coverture. These
debts may be compared with the liabilities which are often
indicated as incidents of community property.
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Conversely, a German court, applying the essentially
narrower matrimonial law of a common law state, faces the
question of what to do about matters considered part of the
matrimonial law in Germany but not so considered by the governing foreign law. If, for instance, American parties are domiciled in a common law jurisdiction and the wife borrows money
with the consent of her husband, the latter would be liable to
the creditor only upon his assumption of a guaranty. Under
the German Code(§ 1386 par. 1), however, the husband is
liable for the interest on the loan, both wife and creditor being
able to enforce the liability (§ 1388), which extends to the
reserved property of the wife as well as to the husband's own
property. If the German court follows the characterization
appropriate to the civil law doctrine, it has to consider the
problem as one of matrimonial law and therefore governed by
the law of the American domicil. The most sensible consequence seems to be to adopt the conflicts rule applied in this
country to surety contracts. Or, instead of the law of the place
of contracting thereby indicated, should the German judges, as
in other contracts cases, apply the law of the place of performance, as required by the German conflicts rule? The result
would be that reached neither in Germany nor in the United
States.
An analogous question concerning torts was raised before a
French court. Article 1477 of the French Civil Code provides
as part of the matrimonial law that a spouse diverting or concealing any effects of the community property shall be deprived of his share of such effects. The judge considered
this provision inapplicable to an Italian couple and granted
the ordinary remedies common to both French and Italian
private laws. 10
In conclusion, it would seem that the broad concept of
marital property law, as developed in Europe, can conven10 Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 6, 1897) Clunet 1899,771, criticized by CLUNET in
Clunet 1899, 740; see also BARTIN, z Principes z84.
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iently be employed in the United States whenever reference
to the civil law in this field is to be made, and that, moreover,
the scope usually allocated to marital property law needs enlargement.

5· Relation Between the Marital Property Law and the Lex
Situs
As is well known, the law of the domicil or the national law
governing either movables or all property may clash with a
divergent law established at the situs. On the one hand, German writers have attempted to develop a theory of the rela,tion between general conflicts rules (such as the rules on
marital property or inheritance) and special rules (such as
those of property referring to the lex situs or of obligations referring to the lex loci solutionis) .11 On the other hand, fear
of friction has fostered the broad scope of the lex situs in the
United States.
Necessary role of the lex situs. What problems must be
governed in all systems by the law of the situs? The lex situs
determines quite naturally the kinds of property interests and
the modes of their creation, transfer, modification, and termination, and it decides to what extent, if at all, bona fide purchasers and attaching creditors are protected in their expectations. 12 In its application to problems of marital property
rights, the law of the situs may come into conflict with the
personal law. l;'he personal law may grant one spouse some
property interest in an immovable of the other, for instance, a
lien, which is unknown at the situs of the immovable, or the
personal law may provide that, immediately upon the marriage and without any conveyance, certain assets of the spouses
are transformed into a community fund, while no such transformation by immediate operation of law is known under the
law of the situs. In all such cases, the law of the situs prevails
I! Cf. MELCHIOR 398; M. WoLFF, IPR. sr, sz.
12 Note, 43 Harv. L. Rev. (1930) u86; cf. LEFLAR, 2~ Cal. L. Rev. (1933)
:u 1, 235, supra n. x.
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over the personal law insofar and only insofar as such immediate property questions are concerned.
Thus, the Montevideo Treaty 13 limits the matrimonial law
of the domicil insofar as its application is prohibited by the
law of the place where the property is situated, with the significant restriction in the I 940 draft to matters de estricto
caracter real, i.e., which pertain strictly to real rights.
Illustration: Before the unification of the German civil law,
a couple domiciled in Westphalia lived under the system of
community property, whereby the land owned by one spouse,
immediately upon marriage, fell into joint tenancy by both
parties. The wife owned land in Saxony, where, however, no
transfer of land ownership could take place without a conveyance. The Court of Appeals of Saxony held that the wife
continued to be the sole owner but that she was 'bound by
reasonable application of the personal law to execute an appropriate conveyance. 14
In the same sense, ·it has been held in France that restraints
upon the husband's alienation of his wife's dowry or liens to
secure claims of the wife against her husband, provided by the
personal law, are recognized as an interest in French immovables only to the extent and subject to the conditions
under which the analogous rights of French law are established.15 An express provision of the former Italian Code was
understood in the same way. 16 The maxim underlying all
these cases has been formulated by Zitelmann in the following
13 Treaty on international civil law, text of I889, arts. 40, 4t; text of 1940,
art. I 6.
14
0LG. Dresden (Dec. x, I896) I8 A~n. Sachs. OLG. SI3; cf. LEWALD
178, I79 no. z39; analogous decision of RG. (April zo, I903) JW. I903,
zso. An interest created under Maltese matrimonial law was dependent on
publication in Tunis for absolute effect against third persons. Trib. Tunis
(March IS, I9os) Clunet 19061 444·
15
Trib. civ. Seine (Aug. zo, I884) Clunet I88s, 76; Trib. civ. Seine {Jan.
u, I889) Clunet 1899, 346; cf. NIBOYET 635 no. 507 1 but also 3 ARMINJON
109 n. z. On a 'different recent practice see above, p. 3z7.
.
16
LEWALD, z9 Recue'il 19z9 IV 53z, n. 11 approved by FEDOZZI 64z, dis.
agreeing with other writers.
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sentence: CCDas Vermogensstatut lebt nur durch die Ancrkennung der Einz.elstatuten." 11 It has been decided in Canada
that marriage settlements concerning property situated in
another country are enforceable "so far as the lex situs does
not prevent their being carried into execution." 18
American conc,eption of the lex situs. In comparison with
the American law of situs, the European property law has a
very modest function. It does not determine the regime under
which the spouses shall live, with its innumerable ramifications, and of course not the requisites and construction of a
marriage settlement. It merely decides the technical execution
of the commands of the personal law.
Under the American system as in feudal times, however, the
law of the place where the immovable is located determines
every question relating to the extent and content of the effects
of marriage on property. Normally, foreign law is applied at
the situs, neither to determine the property interests which one
spouse may have in the assets of the other nor, if our assumption concerning the actual scope of American marital law is
right, to determine what liabilities, if any, exist with respect
to real property and whether the real property of one spouse
is liable to the creditors of the other spouse. In contrast to
movables, the law of the situs, and not the domiciliary law, is
considered competent to fix the economic purposes of the marriage institution and to formulate public policy concerning administration by the husband, control by the wife, and protection of the creditors. This means, furthermore, that there are
as many matrimonial laws as there are states where either of
the spouses has immovable property.
Even the capacity of married women with respect to all.
transactions connected with an immovable is governed by the
17 ZITELMANN in Festschrift fiir Otto Gierke (1911) :155 at 261; LEWALD 178

no. 239.
18

In re Jutras Estate (Saskachewan) [193:1] z W.W.R. 533, at 537·
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law of the state where the immovable is located and, in accordance with the ordinary rule of this country, not by the law
of the place of contracting.
An explanation sometimes offered for the broad rule on
immovables in the United States is that it is an essential function of a state to determine the title to interests in land. But
does it not suffice that the property interest as such be governed
by local law? Why should the locall~w also try to determine
the effects of marriage? Moreover, if this proposition were
correct, the law of the situs would also have to be applied
to movables. Some American writers have indeed claimed for
the situs "a sort of primary control over property within ...
its border," HI a claim quite unknown outside the United
States. The law of the situs is said to have the power to decide
what effect, if any, should be given to the law of the domicil,
and the latter is said to be applicable not on the basis of an
independent rule of conflict of laws but only indirectly by way
of reference by the law of the situs. Attempts have been made
to explain a few decisions 20 in this way, but these appear to
be inspired rather by considerations of public policy. 21 It
would be absurd to assume that the courts of the domicil itself
or the courts of a third state could not apply the law of the
domicil without the permission of the law of the situs. True
territorialism, furthermore, would require that the municipal
law of the situs be applied, not merely its conflicts rule. 22
There exists, however, an important restriction upon the application of the lex situs. In almost all American jurisdictions, 23 immovables acquired by assets pertaining to the sepa19
LEFLAR., 2I Cal. L. Rev. (I933) 22I, 225, 230, supra n. r. The Restate.
ment § 8 (I) seems to share this view.
20
Locke v. McPherson (I9oi) I63 Mo. 493, 63 S. W. 726; Smith v. McAtee
(I 867) 27 Md. 420, 92 Am. Dec. 64I; c/. Graham v. First National Bank
(I88I) 84 N.Y. 393, 38 Am. Rep. 528.
21
Cf. STUMBERG, II Tex. L. Rev. (I932) 53, 6I, supra n. I.
22 WIGNY and BROCKELBANK, Expose 33I n. I to art. 2·89.
23
jACOB, "The Law of Community Property in Idaho," I Idaho L. J. (I9Jl)
r, 36.
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rate property of one spouse, are his separate property, and
when acquired with community property are community
property-the so-called replacement or source doctrine. 24 As
a result, the impact of the lex situs to a considerable extent is
qualified by the operation of the lex domicilii influencing the
ownership of assets used for acquiring immovables in another
state. 25 This may be the law of the actual or of the former
domicil of the spouses. The lex situs, of course, retains its
power over acquisitions of immovables through earnings, gifts,
and succession or distribution on death. 26 The courts ordinarily
also apply the lex situs without hesitation in determining the
validity and construction of such contracts by the husband or
the wife as dispose of land, in adjudging the ownership of
profits and fruits, and in ascertaining the internal relations
between the spouses with respect to their interests in immovables. 27
Illustration. The husband bought land in Idaho with
money earned in Michigan, and acquires separate property
despite the community property system of the former state.
But, if he deeds the land to his married daughter domiciled in
New Y ark, there is a presumption, under Idaho law, that the
property is held in community by her and her husband.
The 'converse case has been singularly treated. If land is
sold in the state where it is situated and thus be converted into
money or a chose in action, the movables so acquired should
also, under the doctrine of replacement, to be consistent, be
substituted for the land and remain subject to the law of the
situs. But in a series of early cases, it was thought in the court
of the matrimonial domicil that, thanks to the conversion
effected at the situs, the time had come to apply the lex fori
24 So named by }ACOB (precedent note). See also In re Gulstine's Estate
(1932) 166 Wash. 325, 6 P. (2d) 628.
25 See NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (1943) 167, 169, supra n. I.
26 See for example the distinctions made in Newcomer v. Orem (I 8sz) z
Md. 297, 56 Am. Dec. 717.
27
See cases collected by NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. ( 194 3) I 7 2, 17 3, supra n. 1.
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of the domicil to the movables acquired. 28 In two other old
cases, temporary differences of policy with respect to. the
emancipation of married women caused one court at the domicil 29 and the other at the situs 30 each to apply its own domestic
law to the proceeds, in order to enforce in the interest of the
wife the progressive view of the forum against the old common law principle. Inferences as to the present rules can
scarcely be drawn from these decisions.
The lex situs in other countries. The system founded by the
postglossators, which places the effects of marriage on immovables under the law of the situs, has been adopted by
Great Britain, the United States, and Argentina, and the Austrian courts. 31 A similar situation exists with respect to Swiss
immovables belonging to Swiss nationals. 32
In France, Italy, and other Latin countries, this system
has been applied in a few decisions, 33 though by prevailing
opinion it has long been abandoned. 34 French public policy
28 Courts applying their own common law on marital property rather than
the community property rule of the lex situs: Kneeland v. Ensley (I 8 3 8) I 9
Tenn. 6:~.o; Newcomer v. Orem (xss:~.) 2 Md. 297, 56 Am. Dec. 717; Castleman v. Jeffries (I877) 6o Ala. 380. Court of community property system not
applying the lex situs of Georgia: Henderson v. Trousdale (Sup. Ct. I855) 10
La. Ann. 548.
29 Glenn v. Glenn (1872) 47 Ala. 204, refusing application of the old common law principle of South Carolina.
30 Smith v. McAtee (1861) :1.7 Md ••po, 9:1. Am. Dec. 641, rejecting pathetically the old common law principle of Illinois.
31 Argentine Civil Marriage Law (1888) art. 6. Austria: OGH. (Oct. :u,
1924) 6 SZ. 778 no. 337·
32
NAG. art. 28 no. 1. This reservation of the local law is understood to
cover capacity to contract and acquire by will, STAUFFER, NAG. art. :1.8 no. 14.
SCHNITZER z65, 133, 243 observes that before the Swiss Civil Code the law of
the canton of origin and not that of the situs was meant; thus the system was not
exactly that of the lex situs.
33
Cass, (civ.) (April 4, r88r) Clunet r88r, 4:1.6; see also OLG. Colmar
(Dec; 21, 1911), as a German court, DJZ. 1913, 174; CLUNET in Clunet 1907,
676. Outside of France, it is often not understood that this opinion is obsolete.
34
France: Principle of indivisibility, NIBOYET 6o1 no. 478; WEISS, 3
Traite 171, 4 ibid. 195; 2 ARMINJON 465; AUDINET, 40 Recueil 1932 II 289ff.
Belgium: POULLET 443ff.
Italy: DrENA, 2 Prine. 148.
Portugal: CUNHA GoN~ALVEs, 1 Direito Civil 689 (excepting only special
laws on immovables).
Spain: Trib. Supr. (Jan. z8 1 1896) 79 Sent. 125 at 133; Cf. TRiAS DEBES
no. rJS.
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even goes so far as to make equal treatment of movables and
immovables imperative, the nature of the conjugal association
being said to require that all its effects be regulated by one
single, immutable law. Hence, it has been repeatedly decided
in France that the American regime of separation of assets
applies to French immovables owned by Americans, the
American rule to the contrary notwithstanding. 35
In Austria, there was a split of authority on this point. 36
In the Scandinavian Convention on Family Law (art. 3,
par. 2), only the right to dispose of immovables is reserved to
the local law.
Louisiana rule. In Louisiana, statutes have expressly provided since I 852 that the community property system there
in force applies to all property, including movables, acquired in
Louisiana "by non-resident married persons." 37 The courts
have given effect to this provision in order to grant the outstanding benefits of the Louisiana community system to the
wife with respect to real property acquired in the state, 38 but
have declined to apply this provision to choses in action, 39 while
their position as regards tangible personal property does not
seem entirely settled. 40 How this strange rule can be fitted into
a well coordinated law of conflicts seems not to have been discussed so far.
The Civil Code of Latvia also subjects to the lex fori all
property of spouses not domiciled in the country. 41
35
Cass. (req.) (July I8, I9o5) Clunet I9o6, 446, Revue I9o6, zoo; Trib.
civ. Versailles (May IS, I924) Revue I925, 240, 252; Trib. Meaux (May 4,
I928) Clunet I928, 1223, 1228.
36
The courts were traditionally for the lex situs; cf. I EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ
Io6.
37
La. Rev. Civ. C. Ann. (I932) art. 2400.
It is doubtful whether art. I64 of the Cal. Civ. C. of I 8 7z, as amended in
I9I7 and I923, is to be understood in a similar sense. Cal. Civ. C. (Deering,
1941) 6SJff., § I64; cf. 10 Cal. L. Rev. (1921) 154; STUMBERG, 11 Tex. L.
Rev. (1932) 56, 58, supra n. r.
In Texas no such case has been found, STUMBERG, ibid. 65.
38
Succession of Dill (1923) 155 La. 47, 98 So. 752. ·
39
Williams v. Pope Manufacturing Co. (r9oo) 52 La. Ann. 141 7> 27 So. 851.
40 DAGGETT, The Community Property System of Louisiana (193 r) 109-II r,
41 C. C. ( 19 37) art. 13 sentence 2.
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Deference of Continental countries to the Anglo-American
mle of lex situs. The application of the law of the situs to
marital property interests in immovables in some countries,
particularly those following the Anglo-American system, has
been taken into consideration by several other countries, which
in such cases allow their own personal law to yield to the lex
situs to a greater extent than usual (see page 335). The out- ,.
standing provision of this kind, article 2 8 of the Introductory
Law to the German Civil Code, leaves the determination of
interests in or respecting foreign immovables or movables to
such particular local provisions as claim to govern at the situs.
Thus, all rules applied in Maine or California with respect
to immovables of a married person-at least insofar as these
rules are classified in America as rules of matrimonial character 42-are respected and applied in Germany as well. Article 28 of the German law has been followed with respect to
immovables by the Hague Convention of I 90 5 on Effects of
Marriage (art. 7) and other codifications. 43 The reservation
is applied, for instance, to homestead provisions. 44 French
courts, however, profess a radically contrary policy; in their
eyes unity of the matrimonial regime has the dignity of an
inevitable dogma. 45
Rationale. The American system of isolating interests in
immovables, although it has hardly ever been justified on
rational grounds, 46 is based on firm traditions and is undisputed in its reign. Its principal advantage lies in the simplicity
with which it enables a court to determine the interests of the
42
One of the many questions not hitherto discussed, because the fundamental
difference in scope between the matrimonial laws of this country and Europe
has been neglected.
43
Hague Convention on Marriage Effects, art. 7·
Poland: Law of I 926 on international private law, art. I 6.
Contra: Denmark: see BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 2I9 no. 44·
44 CuNHA GoN<;:ALVEs, I Direito Civil 689 with reference to the Portuguese
Decree no. 7033 of October I6, 1920.
45
See supra p. 341 and infra p. 359·
'"On the specious justifications by the ancient scholars, see I BAR § I 8 I.
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parties. This simplicity exists, however, only so long as the
court has to deal with isolated legal relationships regarding a
specific piece of land. Complications similar to those arising in
cases of succession or bankruptcy arise when assets are located
in different states and are to be treated as belonging. to a single
estate, either in the relation of the spouses to each other or in
their relations with third parties.
The European system of treating all problems of property
relations as one single comp_lex, subject to one single law,
avoids the difficulties that arise when different assets belonging
to the same persons are subjected to different laws. It creates
so many.complications of its own, however, that it is problematical which of the two systems should be preferred. The
greatest practical difficulties are caused by the coexistence of
two such fundamentally different approaches. International
cooperation of the type suggested by the Hague convention
and generous concessions such as those made to the AngloAmerican system by the Introductory Law of the German
Civil Code, might smooth over some of the friction between
the two systems.
II.

THEORY oF IMPLIED CoNTRACT

Another basic difference in views concerns the relationship
between the matrimonial law and the marriage settlement.
I.

French Practice

The French courts still follow the theory of Dumoulin,
who advocated in I 525 that the effects of marriage upon property should be determined primarily by the intention ~f the
parties. This theory is well known in this country too; in the
famous opinion in Saul v. His Creditors, 47 Porter, J., although
rejecting certain elaborations of Dumoulin's theory as de47 ( r 827) 5 Mart. N. S. (La.) 569. A mistake by Judge Porter in interpreting
the Spanish law has been noted by DE FUNIAK, r Principles of Community
Property (1943) 249.
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veloped in later French and Spanish practice, adopted the
principal ideas of the theory. In the opposite doctrine, marriage effects belonged to the domain of the various territorial
("real") statutes, which were in fact multiple and inconsistent
customs. To free the relations between husband and wife from
this entanglement, the parties were declared free to regulate
their rights and duties by marriage settlement once and for
all, the extraterritorial effect pertaining to the personal
"statute." Even in cases where the parties had made no settlement, they were said simply to have tacitly agreed to subject
themselves to a certain local custom, preferably to the custom
in force at the marital domicil, identical for practical purposes
with the domicil of the husband at the time of the marriage. 48
(a) Method and result of French cases. The full liberty
of the parties to make any settlement they choose is still recognized by the French courts, which continue to imply a tacit
contract in the absence of a settlement. 49
While once this method resulted in the general application
of the matrimonial law of the first domicil, it is now employed
more consistently with the original idea; in order to determine
the presumed intention of the parties, all facts of the individual
case are taken into consideration, including the conduct and
statements of the parties after the marriage. 5 ° Criticism of this
method of practical interpretation 51 has been answered by the
Tribunal de la Seine with the argument that manifestations
of the parties during marriage, though they cannot modify the
regime adopted at the time of the marriage, nevertheless give
48 Cf. CALEB, Essa.i sur le principe de l'autonomie de la volonte en droit
international prive (1927) 135; NrBOYET 792 no. 684; 3 ARMINJON 87ff. nos.

88H.
49
Cass. (civ.) (July u, 1855) S.i855.1.699; Cass. (req.) (July 15, 1885)
Clunet 1886, 93; Cass. (req.) (May 18, 1886) Clunet x886, 456. See other
decisions cited by WEISS, 3 Traite 639ff.
5
Constant practice, as the Repertoires attest; cf. particularly Cour Paris
(Dec. 71 1887) D.1888.z.z65; Cass. (req.) (June 4 1 1935) Clunet 1936, 898;
Cass. (req.) (April 6, 1938) S.1938.1.15I 1 Clunet 1938, 788.
61
NrBoYET 833 no. 716; PILLET, z Traite us.

°

EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE ON PROPERTY

34-5

2

significant support to the assumptions of the court. 5 By these
methods, it has been presumed that the parties have tacitly
agreed to adopt the law of the domicil of the husband or that
of their common nationality or that of an intended future
domicil. 53 But as an after-effect of the old domiciliary tradi. tion, the presumption of a tacit agreement to the law of the
real or intended marital domicil seems to be preferred,54 the
latter especially when it happens to result in the application
of French law. Some decisions have aroused amazement.
Thus, a Swiss married a French woman in New York, went
with her to Switzerland and many years after to France, but
French law was presumed intended. 55 The same result was
reached in cases where sixty years after the marriage the
bodies of the spouses were brought to France 56 and where
Swiss spouses had stayed in France no longer than three
weeks. 5 7
(b) Influence of the French doctrine on other countries.
The French system has been followed by some courts in other
countries 58 and hinted at in the statutes of Spain, Portugal,
52

Trib. civ. Seine (May II 1 I933) Revue Crit. I9341 129.
See the report of 'Brachet in Trib. civ. Versailles (May 15, 1924) Revue
1925, 241 1 245. See also ]oELSON1 op. cit. supra n. I 1 at 9I·
54
CALEB, 4 Repert. I8o no. 69ff.; cf. Cour Paris (Nov. I8, I937) Clunet
I938, 3IO'; Cour Paris (March z, I938) Clunet I938 1 544· In Switzerland this
was erroneously believed to be the French law; cf, SCHNITZER I97·
56
Trib. civ. Belfort (June 13, 191I) and Cour Besan~on (March I81 I912)
Clunet I913 1 I7I•
56
Trib. civ. Versailles {July I9 1 I927) Clunet I928, 429; 3 FRANKENSTEIN
296.
57
Cour Paris (June 2 8, I 9 3 7) Schardon c. Chavon, Clunet I 9 381 53 7; the
commentator, ibid. 540 is surprised, but the Cour of Cassation affirmed (May 5,
I938) Gaz.Pal.I938.2.232, cf. 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. uS.
58
To this effect Belgium: Trib. civ. Anvers (Dec. 26, I925) Pasicrisie
I9z6.3.24; Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Dec. 2, I925) Pasicrisie I926.3.II7; App.
Bruxelles (June q, 1931) 18 Bull. lnst. Beige (I932-I933) 53; Trib. civ.
Bruxelles (March 29 1 1933) Pasicrisie 1934·3·I9· Similarly PoULLET 478 no.
372, 573 no. 449· Other decisions, however, followed the national law. See
' infra p. 349, n. 82.
Brazil: with respect to marriages anterior to the Civil Code see VALLADAO I 53
and mor~ recently Sup. Trib. Fed. (June u, 1940) In re Wolner, 140 Revista
dir. civ. (1942) z81 (submission to the Brazilian general community property
system, assumed to have been effectuated by declaration in the marriage record,
53
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and in the original text of the Treaty of Montevideo. 59 The
Civil Code of Louisiana varies the French doctrine by declaring that "every marriage contracted in this S~ate, superinduces
of right partnership or community of acquest or gains, if there
be no stipulation to the contrary"; 60 of course, this is not an
interpretation of the parties' intention but a statement of the
legal regime.
In England, the contractual theory has exercised some influence. An express marriage settlement is construed according
to the law presumed to be intended by the parties; ordinarily,
the effect is that, by a rebuttable presumption, it is governed
by the law of the marital domicil. 61 Moreover, although no
longer popular, the doctrine of intended marital domicil has
not been forgotten. 62 Finally, the inference from a tacit marriage covenant to an immutable law of the first domicil, which
was rejected in Saul v. His Creditors, was proclaimed in De
Nicols v. Curlier as late as I 898. 63 The case, however, referred
to a marriage celebrated in France by parties domiciled in
France; a tacit marriage agreement was assumed, because the
French courts administering the law of the domicil would have
proceeded by this method. Neither in England, according to
the better view, 64 nor in Canada, according to the distinctly
without marriage settlement; per abundantiam the Austrian law, possibly national law of the parties is understood, with KJ,tASNOPOLSKI, Oesterreichisches
Familienrecht (Wien, 1911) § 17, as permitting autonomy of the parties (at
287)).
The Netherlands: A few older decisions overruled by H. R. (May 17, 1929)
W. 12006; on a later decision of Hof den Haag (Feb. 6, 1931) W. 12373 see
VANDER FLIER, Clunet 1933, 1110.
59 Spain: C. C. art. 1325; Portugal: C. C. art. 1107; Belgian Congo: C. C.
art. 12; but all these are rather harmless reminiscences, M. WoLFF, 4 Rechtsvergl.
Handworterb. 410; Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text of
1889, art. 41 (the marital domicil expressly agreed upon by the parties before
the marriage) •
60
La. Rev. Civ. C. Ann. (1932) art. 2399·
61
/n re Fitzgerald, Surman v. Fitzgerald [1904] 1 Ch. 573; In re Bankes,
Reynolds v. Ellis [1902] z Ch. 333, etc. CHESHIRE 495ff.
62
/nre Martin, Loustalan v. Loustalan [19oo] P. 211, 239; See WESTLAKE
72 § 36; DicEY 7 6 5 •
·
83
[1898] 1 Ch. 403; [19oo] 25 A. C. 21,
64
CHESHIRE 492, in contrast with 495·
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adopted opinion, is such construction imitated. In the absence
of an express settlement and a will, marital property is governed by the law of the husband's domicil. Hence, the community system of Quebec was applied in Ontario to spouses
who had their first domicil in Quebec, because the law of
Quebec like the French referred to the presumable intention
of the parties to choose the local regime rather than because
the Ontario court shared the theory of implied contract. 65
(c) Influence on America. In the United States, the old
French doctrine had some influence on Story. 66
The "intended domicil" appeared in a few decisions 67 but
has been rejected by prevailing opinion as well as by the Restatement. 68 A contemplated domicil which, because of a
change of mind, does not become a home in fact, may figure
as an important element in ascertaining the law tacitly chosen
by the parties in setting up a marriage contract, but it is no
veritable domicil at all and is therefore neglected in this country; domicil is the test for the determination of marital property rights in movables, independent of any intention of the
parties.
In Latin America, while the Montevideo Treaty of I 889
testifies to the widespread adoption of the theory of intended
marital domicil, the new text of I 940 evidences a disposition
to abandon the theory. 69
(d) Opposition to French practice. The literature, including the modern French writers, 70 unanimously rejects the old
65 See Beaudoin v. Trudel (Ont. Ct. App. I936) [I937] I D.L.R. :u6; In
re Parsons (Ont.) [1926] 1 D.L.R. I x6o.
·
66
STORY§§ I98, 199·
67
Ford's Curator v. Ford (x8z4) z Mart. N. S. (La.) 574, 578, q. Am. Dec.
20I; I WHARTON 402. § 190.
68
Restatement § 289; 2 BEALE § 289.1 n. 3; GOODRICH, "Matrimonial
Domicile," 27 Yale L. ]. (19I 7) 49 at so (against STORY); STUMBERG, I I Tex.
L. Rev. (I932) 53, 55 1 supra n. 1 and in his Principles of Conflict of Laws 285;
cj. CHESHIRE 492..
.
69
Art. I 6. Supra n. 59; see also I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ no. 2.2.4.
70
BARTIN, D.x 898.2.457, BARTIN, 2 Principes 247 no. 302; PILLET 2
Melanges 95; VALERY xu8 no. 7941 3 ARMINJoN xox no. 95 bis; NIBO;ET
833 no. 716; AuorNET, 40 Recueil I932 II 257-259, 265. As is known, Du-
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French practice. The presumed intention is called an excessively fictitious assumption, and the unpredictability of a
future court decision ori this intention is considered intolerable. 71 Of this system, it was recently said that the matrimonial
law, whose main reason to exist must be found in the security
of the spouses and of third persons, fails completely to serve
its purpose. 72
It is interesting that French writers advocating reform have
expressed a preference in certain cases for the domiciliary test
rather than the nationality principle. 73 The French private
draft of I 930 favors the first marital domicil. 74

Ill.
I.

CoNTACTS

Domicil

Domicil is the test of the effects of marriage on property in
the Anglo-American countries, Denmark, Norway, Argentina,
Paraguay, and Peru/ 5 recently joined by BraziF 6 in accordance with the general principles of these countries in matters of
status. Furthermore, domicil, rather than · nationality, has
been recognized by the courts in Austria, 77 whose marital
MOULIN's contemporary, D'ARGENTRE, fought against extraterritorial effect of
a tacit agreement, see WEISS, 3 Traite 29. In Italy, ANZILOTTI particularly
attacked the doctrine of presumed intention.
71 LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 407 no. 343, justifies the regard for manifestations
of the parties subsequent to the marriage as a means of avoiding surprises which
the courts would otherwise inflict on the parties.
72
SAVATIER, D.I936.I.7.
73 3 ARMINJON 104 no. 97; CosTE-FLoRET, Note, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 224
no. 126.
74 Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg. 193o, 82; cf. NIBOYET, ibid. 1928, 336.
75 Denmark: MUNCH-PETERSEN, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I
746; BoRUM,
Personalstatutet 4 55.
Latvia: C. C. (1937) § 13, extending however lex fori to all property situated in the country.
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 575 no. II6.
Argentina: Civil Marriage Law of r888, art. 5 par. r.
Paraguay: Civil Marriage Law of Dec. 2 1 1898, art. 5 par. r.
Peru: C. C. (1936) Tit. .Prel. art. V (for foreigners).
76
Brazil: Introductory Law of Sept. 4 1 1942, art. 7 § 4·
77 Austria: OGH. (Jan. 5, r864) 5 GlU. no. 2701; OGH. (Feb. 27, 189o)
28 GlU. no. 13176; dictum in OGH. (Oct. 22, 1924) 6 SZ. no. 337; contra:
most writers, see WALKER. 748.
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property law has apparently continued in force after 1938.
The particular system of the Swiss conflicts law extends to the
property effects of marriage. 78
The domicil in question has been generally and still is the
domicil of the husband at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. This principle, derived from the old ideas of coverture and merger, as in England, is preferred in the United
States as a simple and unequivocal test to indicate the matrimonial center, more reliable than the concept of first conjugal
domicil. Yet another view has been taken in Switzerland and
increasingly in Latin America, where the law of the first domicil actually established by the husband and wife in common is
declared applicable. 79 But as this doctrine needs to be supplemented when the parties, because of premature death or separation or continued migration, never establish a common
domicil, the husband's domicil at the marriage has to be
utilized as an inevitable emergency test. 80 The C6digo Bustamante (art. 1 8 7) adopts this method also in case the parties
have no common nationality. 81
These divergent concepts are obviously part of the marital
property laws, so as to make characterization of the domicil
dependent on the applicable law.
Nationality

2.

In other countries, 82 the nationality of the husband is the
test adopted and is preferred to the possibly different nationSwitzerland: NAG. arts. I 91 201 32; cf. HUBER-MUTZNER 472.
Switzerland: BG. (Sept. I9 1 I929) 55 BGE. II 2JI. Treaty of Montevideo
on international civilla w, text of I 940, art. 16.
Brazil: Introductory Law of 19421 art. 7·
80 Opinion adopted in Switzerland following TEICHMANN; see STAUFFER,
NAG. 87f no. 13; BG. (Sept. I9 1 1929) 55 BGE. II 230.
81
Similarly, e.g., Guatemala C. C. (I926) art. 174; Law on Foreigners
(I 936) art. 40; C. C. ( 1933) art. 116, if both parties are foreigners.
82
Germany: EG. art. I 5, followed by Hague Convention on Marriage
Effects, art. 2.
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (June I61 1926) Pasicrisie I927.2.77 1 Clunet 19:&8 1
IIo2; Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Jan. IS, I934) Clunet I935• 682.
Bulgaria: GHENOV, 6 Repert. 192 no. 68; GANEFF1 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 818.
78

'~ 9
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ality of the wife. In this field, unity and clarity of the regime
to govern the effects of marriage on property are considered
more important than attempts to satisfy both national laws.
This contrasts markedly with the controversial literature
respecting the effect of divided nationality on personal marital
relations. 83
Following the general trend from nationality to territoriality,84 however, the courts of some countries are inclined to
apply their own municipal law, if the wife was a national of
the forum before the marriage or at the time of suit or if the
first marital domicil was established at the forum. 85 In France,
China: Law of I 9I 8, art. IO par. 2.
Finland: Law of I929, art. I4 par. 2.
Guatemala: Law on Foreigners (I936) art. 40; C. C. (1933) art. II6 (in
cases of common nationality of the parties).
Greece: C. C. (I940) art. IS.
Hungary: 6 Repert. 463 nos. 83, 83 his, 88.
Iran: C. C. art. 963.
Italy: C. C. (I942) Disp. Prel. art. 19; as to the former law: Cass. (April
I6, I932) Foro Ital., 11 Massimario I932, 282 no. I376.
Japan: Law of I898, art. IS.
The Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (June 6, I919) W. 10444; VAN HASSELT
6 Repert. 6 3o no. I 70.
Poland: Law of I926 on private international law, art. I4 par. 3·
Portugal: C. C. art. I 107, cf. art. 16; CUNHA GoN.<;;ALVES, 1 Direito Civil 689.
,Rumania: Cass. (Feb. 23, I937) affaire Grigoriou, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP.
no. I 89.
Spain: C. C. arts. 9 and I325 as currently interpreted; see MANRESA, 9
Comentarios al C6digo Civil Espafiol (I9o8) I99·
Sweden: Law of June I, I912, §I no. 2.
83 In this field only isolated voices have protested the dominant doctrines such
as 2 ZITELMANN 749 who advocated a compulsory system of separate property
in nationally mixed marriages.
84
See supra pp. IS Iff., 348.
85 In Spain, Spanish law has been applied where the marriage is celebrated in
Spain and the wife is a national; see TRiAs DEBEs, 3I Recueil I93o I 658, 68o.
Regarding the Brazilian law previous to I 942 (C. C. of I 916, Introduction art.
8), decisions of the Sup. Trib. Fed., Recurso Extraord. no. 9I9, Weinberger
(Dec. 20, I9I6) 12 Revista Jur. (1918) 479, (Dec. 30, 1918) and (Dec. 2o,
1919) 19 Revista Sup. Trib. (1919) 48 (cf. VALLADAO 12.8, 129) modified the
principles essentially for the benefit of the Brazilian party. They deal with an
American from New York who married a Brazilian woman and established
domicil in Brazil. He went bankrupt under the law of New York, and the wife
claimed her Brazilian immovables under the common law system. The Supreme
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this trend has inspired a draft proposal of the S oci8te d' etudes
gislatives, basing the property regime on the law of the place
where the parties "fix" their domicil immediately after marriage, of which the last version significantly limits itself to
provide for the application of French law in the case of a
first French matrimonial domicil. 86
On the other hand, the far-reaching arm of the national
law is exhibited by the declaration of the Italian Supreme
Court that a regime of general community of property, under
which the sp~uses in Argentina believed they were living, was
inapplicable, because this regime was forbidden to them as
Italian nationals by article I 4-33 of the Civil Code (of I 86 5). 87
The disharmony between the Italian nationality principle and
the Argentine domiciliary principle has attracted attention, in
view of the millions of Italian immigrants living in Argentina,
and has resulted, if not in concessions to the domiciliary law,
at least in the suggestion that the parties should be induced to
declare a choice of law on their marriage. 88

ze

Illustration. 89 A German married woman domiciled in
ZUrich, Switzerland, contracted a loan with a Swiss bank. The
contract was, without doubt, governed by Swiss law. The question, however, whether she could, without her husband's consent, make her nonreserved property liable, was answered
in Germany under the German law of nationality, while a
Swiss court would have applied the Swiss law of domicil.
Court actually applied the law of New York and not the Brazilian general
community system. But the New York regime could not govern immovables in
Brazil. Moreover, under the principle of renvoi, Brazilian law was competent
in every respect. In the cases of Sao Paulo (VALLADAO 133) the law of the forum
was undisputed.
86
Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg. 1928, 339ff., art. 20; definitive text, ibid. I930,
175ff., art. 20. Cf. NIBOYET, ibid. I928, 3I9ff., 334, Revue I929, I93> 212.
87
Cass. Roma (April 16, 1932) Foro Ital., I1 Massimario I9J2> 282 no.
13 76; cf. UDINA, Elementi I 84 no. I 35; FEDOZZI 446.
88
FEDOZZI 45I; AUDINET, 40 Recueil I932 II 241 at 265. Cf. WEISS,
3 Traite 643, in view of the uncertain French practice.
89
Bay. ObLG. (May u, 1929) IPRspr. I929, no. 75·
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3· Law of the Place of Celebration
The law of the place of celebration has been invoked but
rarely. 90 Except within the strict confines of title questions, the
situs of movables is attributed no importance in any law.

4· Renvoi
Divergences between the law of the situs and the personal
law (for instance, in the case of immovables in the United
States), or between the proper law (French practice) and other
principles, make place for renvoi. If two French nationals
domiciled in the United States are married, under American
law their movables are governed by the law of the state of their
domicil; French courts would probably arrive at the same
result by construction of the parties' intention. 91 German
courts would follow the presumed French decision under the
statutory command of renvoi (EG. art. 27 ).
It is likewise by renvoi that, in Germany, the lex situs
governs the effects of marriage on immovables owned by
Americans. 92 German courts have interpreted this renvoi so
broadly that all questions determined in the United States
according to the lex situs of immovables are by them decided
in conformance with the German law applicable to immovables
located in Germany.
Illustration: An American wife in New York owned German immovables. The law of the matrimonial domicil, New
~Argentine Civil Marriage Law (I888) art. 5 par. I 1 probably presuming
that the marital domicil is at the place of celebration. Texas Ann. Rev. Civ.
Stat. (Vernon, I940) art. 4627 declares expressly that removal to Texas subjects
the marital rights of persons "married in other countries" to Texas law.
9 I See the decisions above, n. 54 and LEWALD, 29 Recueil1929 IV 567. When
1
renvoi was followed by OLG. Colmar (Feb. u, I90I) Clunet I903, 6661 .I I
Z.int.R (I902) 282, it was done under French law, but the court was German
at the time.
Spain: see MANRESA 1 op. cit. supra n. 82, at zos.
92
OLG. Colmar (Aug. 241 I9I I) 4 Rhein Z.f.Zivil-und Prozessrecht
295; cf. OLG. Miinchen (March Is, 1913) 30 ROLG. 45 (renvoi by Hungarian
law); OLG. Breslau (Oct. 31 1 1929) JW. 19301 IOII.
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York, did not require the husband's joinder for conveying the
land. Under German matrimonial law, however, the land was
a part of those assets of the wife of which she could not dispose
without her husband's consent. The German court held that
the American renvoi to the lex situs resulted in the application
of all the rules of German law on matrimonial property and
· that, therefore, the husband's consent was necessary. 93 Thus,
the ordinary German conflicts rule on capacity to contract was
not applied. Similar arguments have been made in Switzerland.94 ·
The French courts are in a different position, as their doctrine of renvoi yields to their doctrine that the matrimonial
property law must be supreme and unqualified. ua
The problem arising from the different scope of European
and American marital property laws in the application of
renvoi has not yet been properly explored. It seems obvious,
however, that renvoi must be applied when the two foreign
laws involved agree with 'each other in a certain result. Suppose that Italian spouses are domiciled first in Italy and then
in Switzerland; a Swiss court would apply the Italian system
of separate property so far as the mutual relations of the
spouses are concerned, and Swiss law of "property union"
with respect to their relations to third persons. In like case,
an English court would strictly follow the Swiss court, provided the parties retain their Swiss domicil. Would an American court, disregarding the Swiss partial recognition of Italian
law, also apply the Swiss principles of "property union" between the parties? Another question is still more delicate:
Would an American court introduce its own distinction between movables acquired before and after marriage?
93

0LG. Colmar (Aug. z4, 1911) 4 Rhein. Z. f. Zivil-und Prozessrecht z95;

3 FRANKENSTEIN 401 n. 57 approving.
84 HUBER-MUTZNER 476 n. 41 7·
95
See supra n. 35 and infra n. uz.
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IV.

THE PROBLEM oF

MuT~BILITY:

CHANGE oF

PERSONAL LAw DuRING CovERTURE

1.

Change in Legislation

If altered during the marriage, the governing municipal
law, according to principles generally recognized in Europe,
rules in its changed form. 96 The same law also determines
what retroactive effect changes have on the matrimonial relationship. 91
In the United States, the Fourteenth Amendment in some
measure limits retroactive state legislation. 98
2.

Change in Status

It is an old question whether alteration of the initial domicil
alters marital relations. The question now comprehends any
change in the personal law 99 and is of extraordinary importance in view of the enormous differences of matrimonial
property systems and the multiplied migrations of our time.
The former conception in Germanic countries seems to have
been that t~e legal incidents of property are only. an outgrowth of the personal relations between the spouses. The
personal regime being mutable, the property system was held
mutable too. This concept was followed in Switzerland, England, and, before the German Civil Code, in the northwestern
parts of Germany and in Baden.
Nevertheless, as early as 1265 A.D., the Spanish Partidas,
which have been so influential in the Americas, declared the
matrimonial regime immutable in the face of a change in per~
sonal status. 100
In France from the times of the postglossators, the prob96
· E.g., Cour d'Aix (April 28, 1910) Clunet 1911, 199 (change from Italian
to French law by the annexation of Nizza in r86o).
~ 7 HABICHT uS and the general opinion in Germany.
98
See the interesting Note, 1 6 Cal. L. Rev. ( r 9 2 7) 39 9.
99
TEICHMANN, Ober die Wandelbarkeit oder Unwandelbarkeit des gesetzlichen
ehelichen Giiterrechts, bei Wohnsitzwechsel (Basel, 1879); 2 ZITELMANN 725.
100
Partida IV, ley 24, tit. XI, a very clear and neat statement.
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lem was controversial; the victory of the theory construing
marital property law as a tacit contractual system naturally
brought with it the assumption of permanence. Moreover, in
French municipal law itself, the immutability of marital regulation of property was proclaimed so as to prohibit postnuptial
settlements of any kind, and finally also in the Civil Code
(arts. I 3 94, I 3 9 5), even in the case of divorce and remarriage
of the spouses (art. 2 95 par. 2), in the belief that, to secure
conjugal peace and to protect husband and wife against their
respective maneuvers as well as those of their creditors, the
system of marital property must be stable. Therefore, the
principle of immutability was considered imperative. 101
On the contrary, it is characteristic of modern codifications
to perll)it marriage settlements during marriage. 102
3· The Principles
(a) Full mutability. In England, the House of Lords
decided in the Hog case (I 804) 103 that parties, acquiring a
domicil in Scotland after fifteen years of marriage, thereby
became subject to the Scotch rule of community, and Lord
Eldon held that the rule applied to all movables which Hog
possessed. However, the communio bonorum of Scotch law
was not a true marital regime but only a mode of distribution,
and hence adequately governed by the law of the Scotch domicil of the deceased at the time of his death rather than at the
time when he acquired such domicil. 104
101 The entire Latin group followed this model.
102 The United States: see 3 VERNIER§ 156.
Denmark: Law on Effects of Marriage of 1925, c. 4 § 28.
Germany: BGB. § 1432.
Greece: C. C. ( 1 940) art. I 40 5 (for modification of settlements only) .
Guatemala: C. C. ( 1933) art. I 03.
Italy: the new C. C. (I 942) Disp. Prel. art. I 9 par. 2, maintains immutability.
Sweden: Marriage Law of I 920, c. 8 § 1.
Switzerland: C. C. art. I79 par. I.
103
Lashley v. Hog (I8o4) 4 Paton (Scotch Appeals Case) 581. DICEY 767
Rule I 86; CHESHIRE 493·
104 WESTLAKE 73ff.; FooTE 354 (both concluding for the system of full immutability),.
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In Switzerland, the principle of mutability, limited to the
relations of the spouses to third persons, applies to a married
couple transferring their domicil to Switzedand. 105
(b) Mutability of new acquisitions. In the United
States 106 and Argentina/ 07 the principle of mutability is established in the sense that only movables acquired after the
change of domicil are governed by the law of the new domicil. The same principle was adopted by the Scandinavian Convention on Family Law (art. 3) and is sometimes assumed to
be English law. 108 In the United States, the continuing effect
of law on property once acquired 109 is the more important
principle, since the interests in movables acquired under the
former domiciliary law continue in any objects that may replace these movables,110 so long as the proceeds of the original
goods can be traced. 111 (In the language of the civil law, a subrogation; pretium succedit in locum rei, and res succedit in
locum pretii.) Moreover, the authorities emphasize that transfer of movables from the state where they have been acquired
or from one domicil to another does not alter their condition,
either as separate or community property. 112 This doctrine
105

NAG. arts. rg, 20.
Matter of Majot (rgro) 199 N.Y. 29, 92 N. E. 402 rejected the doctrine
of the De Nicols case. The great majority of American courts have adopted the
law of the domicil at the time of acquisition. Cf. Succession of Packwood ( 1845)
9 Rob. (La.) 438,41 Am. Dec. 341; Pearl X· Hansborough (r848) 28 Tenn.
(9 Humph.) 426; Castro v. Illies (1858) u Tex. 479, 73 Am. Dec. 277;
Snyder v. Stringer (rgn) u6 Wash. qr, 198 Pac. 733· To the same effect the
statute of Louisiana Civ. Code (1932) art. 2401; Arizona Code Ann. (1939)
§§ 63-306; and Texas Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1940) art. 4627. Restatement§ 290; z BEALE§ 290.1; DEFUNIAK, 1 Principles of Community Property
(1943) 250·
.
107
Argentine Civil Marriage Law (r888) art. 5 par. z, followed by Paraguay: Civil Marriage Law (r8g8) art. 5 par. 2.
108
FALCONBRIDGE, "Conflict of Laws: Examples of Characterization," r 5 Can.
B. Rev. (1927) u6, arguments on De Nichols v. Curlier [rgoo] A. C. 21.
108
Brookman v. Durkee (1907) 46 Wash. 578, go Pac. 914; Restatement
§§ 291, 292·
10
~ SCHOULER, 1 Domestic Relations§ 592; 1 WHARTON 415ff. § 193a.
111
McAnally v. O'Neal ( r876) 56 Ala. 299, 302.
112
Restatement §§ 291-293· Brookman v. Durkee (1907) 46 Wash. 578, go
106
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is generally thought to be protected by the constitutional
guarantees against deprivation of property without due process
of law. 113 Only the technical nature of community property
may have to be construed, after a transfer, so as to agree with
the new lex situs. The debts contracted by the husband or wife
likewise retain their nature as enforceable on separate or community property respectively. 114
Under section 291 of the Restatement, however, control by
the former domiciliary law ends when "the interests are affected by some new dealings with the movables in the second
state." The exact meaning of this proposition is in doubt. 115
Beale, in another place in his treatise, 116 referring to Drake v.
Glover, where it was said that "The lex loci contractus governs,
'as to the nature, the obligation, and the interpretation of a
contract,'" 117 remarks only that dealings with movables
must be carried out in accordance with the law of the new
domicil.
How these rules work in practice has been illustrated during
a century in a few cases only, covering only a part of the situations imaginable and leaving incertitude in many respects. 118
(c) Immutability. In the field of the law of conflicts, immutability is proclaimed ordinarily by all systems following
Pac. 914 and many other decisions; see 12 L.R.A. (N. S.) 92I; 57 L.R.A. 353·
In Europe it goes without saying that these rules apply.
113
In re Drishaus' Estate (I926) I99 Cal. 369, 249 Pac. 515; In re Thornton's Estate (1934) I Cal. (2d) I, 33 P. (2d) r.
114
As to moving domicil from a separate property state to a community
property state: Hyman Lichtenstein & Co. v. Schlenker (I892) 44 La. Ann. Io8,
xo So. 623; Clark v. Eltinge (I9o2) 29 Wash. 2I5, 69 Pac. 736; Huyvaerts
v. Roedtz (1919) I05 Wash. 657, I78 Pac. 8oi. For the inverse situation no
case is illustrative; see also DE FUNIAK, 1 Principles of Community Property
(I943) 532. 533·
115
Note, 43 Harv. L. Rev. (1930) 1286, 1289.
116
2 BEALE§ 292.1; cf. Restatement § 29I.
117
(I 857) 30 Ala. 3 82 at 3 89 quoting STORY 219 § 263. This distinction is
universally recognized.
·
118
NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (I943) 176, I 78-I 82, supra n. r, makes an interesting attempt to coordinate the cases.
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the nationality principle 119 and in addition by some others. 120
Under this principle, the spouses continue under their former
matrimonial law.
Switzerland has adopted this conception, so far as the rights
of the parties between themselves are concerned. The Federal
Tribunal has observed that rights created under the first law
survive in such form as is consonant with a new statute. 121
119 Germany: EG. art. I 5· Following this model: Hague Convention on Marriage Effects, arts. 2 and 9·
China: Law of I9I8 1 art. IO par. 2.
Japan: Law of I898, art. I5 par. I.
Poland: Law of I926 on international private law, art. I4 par. 3·
See moreover:
Greece: C. C. (I94o) art. I5; formerly by interpretation of C. C. (I856)
art. 4 § 3; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 346 n. 2.2.
Guatemala: Law on Foreigners (1936) art. 40 last sentence.
French Morocco: Dahir of Aug. 30, I9IJ sur la condition civile des Fran~ais
et des etrangers dans le protectorat Fran,;ais du Maroc, arts. I4, I 5·
Spanish Morocco: Dahir de la condicion civil de los espafioles y extranjeros,
art. I3·
Decisions in the following countries:
Austria: 1 EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ (ed. I) I Io5.
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (June I6, I9z6) Pasicrisie I927.2.77, Clunet I928 1
I I02,
France: App. Alger (Dec. q, I 897) Clunet 1898, 723; Trib. civ. Seine (Dec.
28 1 I9oo) Clunet I90I 1 568; Trib. civ. Marseilles (July 12, I907) Clunet I9o8,
83I; Trib. civ. Marseilles (May 8, 19I3) Clunet I9I4 1 I27I.
Hungary: ScHWARTZ, 40 Z.int.R. (I929) I7o, I74·
The Netherlands: applied in the case of a Dutch husband by KG. (Feb. 261
I925) Z. des Deutschen Notarvereins I927, 58.
Spain: TRiAs DEBEs, 6 Repert. 253 nos. 103 1 109.
Sweden: Sup. C. (July 31, I9JI) Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv, 193I 1 403 1 7
Z.ausl.PR. (I933) 934 (Swedish spouses domiciled in the United States).
120 Quebec: Astill v. Hallee (•877) 4 Q.L.R. 120.
Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 219 no. 44; cf. 10 Z.ausl.PR.
(1936) 620 1 but see for another view MuNCH-PETERSEN, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld
I 746 no. 4·
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 575 no. n6; SYNNESTVEDT, DIP. Scandinavie 262. This rule was overlooked in Muus v. Muus (1882) 29 Minn.
II 51 12 N. W. 343 1 but probably would not have changed the decision.
Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text of I889, art. 43·
Rumania: Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 22 1 1937) 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1937) 318 no. 267
(interprovincial law).
121
See NAG. art. I 9 par. 1, as contrasted to par. 2 and art. 31 pars. 2 and 3;
BG. (Dec. 10, 19Io) 36 BGE. II 619; BG. (Dec. 5, I94o) 66 BGE. II 234
no. 48. (Swiss spouses having transferred their domicil to a foreign country
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Under the rigid French notions, this approach leads to
strange results. In the case of a married couple, first domiciled
in New Y ark and then in France, the separate property system of New York was applied in every respect, even to French
immovables of the husband acquired after the change of domicil. This was done, although the New York matrimonial law
does not extend to foreign immovables and, besides, would
not be applied by a New York court to objects acquired at a
new domicil. This result was based on the principles of unity
(assets regarded as an aggregate unit) and of immutability,
both of which go together: "L'immutabilite et l'unite vont de
pair; l'une ne peut se concevoir sans l' autre." 122
4· Exception: New Marriage Settlements
Assuming immutability as a principle of conflicts law, the
matrimonial law of the first domicil or first nationality decides
whether there is mutability in the field of private law, i.e., the
first personal law decides whether or not the parties may make
a settlement under a changed personal law.
General Continental customary law has admitted an important exception, however, 123 which is formulated by the
German Civil Code (Introductory Law art. 15, par. 2),
namely that if a foreign husband acquires German nationality
after the marriage or if foreign spouses establish their domicil
in Germany, they are allowed to contract a marriage settleretain their regime established in Switzerland, except when the foreign law
opposes it.)
122
Trib. civ. Versailles (May 15, 1924) with the conclusions of Counsellor
Brachet, affirmed by Cour Paris (Oct. 17, 1924) Revue 1925, 240, 254. Easier
to decide to the same effect was the case of Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. 17, 1924)
Revue 1925, 226 (incommutability and indivisibility of the property separation
of a naturalized American, former Frenchman, domiciled with his wife first in
New York and then in France).
123
RG. (March 9: 19oo) 10 Z.int.R. (19?o) 281; RG. (Sept. 25, 1903)
13 Z.int.R (1903) 587. ANZILOTTI, Sui mutamenti dei rapporti patrimoniali
f-ra coniugi nel diritto internazionale privato (Firenze, 1899) 12 r.
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ment, even if no such agreement would be permitted by their
former personallaw. 124
The Hague Convention on Marriage Effects accepts this
result in the case where both spouses acquire a new common
nationality, 125 but not where there is only a change of domicil126 nor where the husband alone changes his nationality.
The more sweeping German statute has aroused much criticism, 127 which is justified in the case where the husband alone
becomes a German national after marriage.
In the case where both parties change their status, it has
been argued that a former personal law that allows them to
modify their regime during coverture, invests them with a
right effective after the parties leave its orbit, whereas, if it
prohibits such modification, the prior law ceases to have a
legitimate role. 128 This last argument suffices to prove that the
solution of the question should be reserved to the new personal
law. Various writers have suggested that, in the event of a
change of personal law, the parties should be allowed to adapt
their property relations to their new legal surroundings, irrespective of the municipal law of the first state and the
124 Followed by Poland: Law of 1926 on international private law, art. 14
par. 2.
Italy: C. C. (I942) Disp. Prel. art. I9 par. 2.
Nicaragua: C. C. art. 105.
Swiss writers have inferred from NAG. art. 20 a similar right of French parties
to conclude a postnuptial settlement in Switzerland against the national law. See
STAUFFER, NAG. I02 n. 49·
125
Art. 9 par. I with art. 4par. I.
Sweden: Law of June I, I912, §I no. 9·
126
KG. (Feb. 26, I925) Z. des Deutschen Notarvereins I927, 58 (settlement
concluded by Dutchmen after having established themselves in Germany void).
This restriction by the Convention of the rule of EG. art. I5 par. 2 is·approved
by LEWALD, I03 no. 144, and others. Contra: under EG. art. I5 par. 2, the KG.
(June 23, I932) HRR. I933> no. 205, recognized a settlement by Swiss nationals
who had established their second domicil in Germany, whereby they agreed to a
system of separate property in accordance with the German Code but not in
accordance with Swiss C. C. art. I 79 par. 2.
127
2 ZITELMANN 74I n. 40r; NEUMEYER, IPR. (ed. I) 20; KoSTERS 468;.
LEWALD I03 no. I44; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 3Ioff. who overrates the nationality
principle.
128
KOSTER.S 454•
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general conflicts rule of the second state. 129 Louisiana has instituted such an exception to its otherwise rigid rule of immutability.130
The draft proposed by the French Societe d'hudes legislatives provides that if the marital property was not governed
by French law and if both parties are of French nationality,
either by naturalization or reintegration-viz., of both, or
of the party not a French national-they may adopt a settlement accepting a regime within a year. 131 Under the recent
Brazilian law, a party who is naturalized may require, with
the consent of the other, that the judicial decree of his
naturalization should state the acceptance of the Brazilian
regime of general community property saving (acquired?)
rights of third persons. 132

5· Classification
The classific~tion of the problem of mutability is theoretically easy; there can be no doubt that it belongs to the field
of effects of marriage on property. 133 Most French writers,
however, think that immutability in French law implies a
certain incapacity, characteristic of the French regime, which
therefore, concerns status and as such is dependent on the national law. 134 Nevertheless, the French courts 135 place the
129 Switzerland: NAG. arts. 20, 3 2, 3 6b.
Italy: ANZILOTTI, op. cit. supra n. ·123, at 65; DIENA, 2 Prine. 153ff.;
FEDOZZI 453·
.
130 La. Rev. Civ. C. Ann. (I932) art. 2329, as amended by Act No. 23.6 of
I910.
131 Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg. I930, I75ff., art. 2r; cf. ibid. I928, 3I9ff. at
339ff. According to art. 26 as proposed by the French regime replacing a foreign
system, has an effect retroactive to the day of marriage, this is, however without
prejudice to the rights acquired by third persons and the validity of ~egularly
performed acts of the spouses.
132 Brazil: Introductory Law (I 942) art. 7 § 5.
133 To this effect in France, BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. I934, 641.
134
2 ARMINJON 465 no. 2I8; BARTIN, 2 Principes I43 § 27I; NIBOYET no.
7Io; VALERY Io96 no. 768; AUDINET 474 no. 589; CALEB in 4 Repert. 199
no. I92ff.; SAVATIER, D. I936.1.7, IO. But LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 402 no.
340 advocates the lex loci actus.
135
Cour Montpellier (April 25, I 844) D.I845.2.36; Cass. (req.) (June 4,
I935) D.I936.r.7, Clunet 1936, 898, Revue Crit. 19361 755, annotated by
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problem in the category of the reg;ime matrimonial in a peculiar way. The Court of Cassation, in adopting the classification,
emphasized as decisive the unity of the marital property law
(regime legal)/ 86 meaning thereby that parties who have
once come to live under the French system of communaute
legale are bound by it irrevocably, regardless of whether they
are of French nationality. Parties, however, who have chosen
or who are subjected to a foreign regime, may change to the
French community system whenever such change is permitted
by their first personallaw. 137
Fortunately, no such queer controversy exists in any other
country.
6. Renvoi
The renvoi problem is resolved by including in the governing law the conflicts- rule respecting variability. For instance,
two Americans, who have not made a marriage settlement, establish their domicil first in the United States and then in
Germany. According to the American rule (Restatement
§ 290), on the one hand, newly acquired movables would be
considered subject to the German system of community of administration. Under the German conflicts rule, on the other
hand, the common law system of the first domicil would continue to apply to all property. The German matrimonial law
will be applied, however, because its application is induced
by the American rule of conflict of laws.
7. Rationale
Apart from the antiquated historical reasons that have influenced French developments, the invariabtlity of the governing law has been explained as being required by the theory of
BASDEVANT, ibid. 761; Trib. civ. Toulouse (June 8, 1938) Revue Crit. 1939,
105. Contra: Trib. civ. Strassburg (July 24, 1935) Clunet 1937, po.
136
Report of Counsellor Pilon, Cass. (req.) (June 4, 1935) D.r936.1.7,
cited supra, n. IJ5·
137
This is hailed by LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 402 no. 340.
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vested rights, by the alleged function of the law first applying to give a definitive solution,139 by the need of the wife to be
protected against arbitrary changes, 140 and by other arguments
equally weak. From a rational standpoint, there is only one
reason for avoiding a radical change in the regime, the danger
of confusion and unworkability in maintaining two heterogeneous systems at the same time, a danger illustrated under
the American rules pursuant to which a former regime partially survives with respect to movables acquired before the
change of domicil or replaced at any time, and makes itself felt
in other ways.
These difficulties, it is true, seem not to have attracted much
attention in this country. For some unknown reason, cases
dealing with the topic are relatively few.
On the other hand, the permanence of property relations,
more completely adopted in Europe than in this country,
raises problems in connection with other conflicts rules. While
the law governing marital property is fixed on the day of the
marriage or of acquisition, the law controlling succession to the
estate of a predeceasing spouse depends on his nationality or
domicil as of the day of his death, and the law governing the
personal relations between the spouses admittedly changes
with every change of domicil or nationality. In every municipal legislation, these three matters are to a certain degree coordinated. Their harmony may be greatly disturbed by combining in the applicable laws two or more divergent principles,
one for marital property, a second for personal relations, and
a third for succession upon death. Difficult problems of charac138
In connection with an assumed implied contract, a vested right (jus
adquisitum) was at the base of the Prussian Allgemeine Landrecht; see Prussian
Obertribunal (March u, 1873) 69 Entsch. kgl. Ob. Trib. 101. Among the
modern writers see PILLET, Principes szr no. z89; DrENA "La conception du
droit international prive d'apres la doctrine et la pratique en Italie," r 7 Recueil
1927 II 343, at 416: RAAPE 304; WIERUSZOWSKI, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld 1 64
n. 373·
39
1 1 BAR§ 184; KosTERS 453·
140
1 BAR, toe. cit.; WEiss, 3 Traite 647.
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terization, much discussed in recent literature, result. 141 Those
regarding the relation between marital property and inheritance law will be illustrated hereafter.
The position of third states is particularly delicate. In this
country, an acquisition by an Italian married couple, after emigration to the United States, will be treated according to the
law of the state where the parties establish themselves. Italian
courts, however, hold that Italian matrimonial law continues
to govern in every respect. What should be done by a court in \
Cuba or France r Under the nationality principle there in force,
these two countries generally agree with the Italian conception,
although such a decision seems ill-advised. 142
The circumstance, finally, that the German doctrine has
adopted the principle of mutability in the related field of
paterf\al rights in the property of a minor child, 143 further suggests that all existing rules are unsatisfactory and that entirely
new methods should be devised.

v.
I.

MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS

Characterization

What agreements are covered by the rules dealing with
marriage settlements, is in practice only to be ascertained by
comparative law. 144
2.

Permissibility

In the United States, the ordinary rule respecting contracts
is applied to antenuptial agreements. Hence, the Restatement
declares applicable the law of the place of contracting. 145 The
141 Doubt of the advisability of the principle on this ground has been considered
by NEUNER, Der Sinn 67, 68.
142
Cj. 3 FRANKENSTEIN 307.
143 See infra, pp. 55 8, 6o6-6o7.
144 RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 261 and 283; }OELSON, op. cit. supra n. x.
145
Restatement§ 238 comment b, § 289 comment c, should be read with a view
to the criticism by STUMBERG 288, 289 referring to Hutchison v. Ross (1933)
262 N.Y. 38x, 187 N. E. 65.
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Argentine Civil Code states the same rule. 146 This place, however, may easily coincide with that of the first marital domicil.ur
Generally, the conditions under which a marriage settlement is permitted are determined, in the absence of an antenuptial agreement, by the law governing the marital property.
This law decides questions such as are incident to the English
doctrine of freedom of contract, to the Italian provisions that
the parties may choose only between narrowly defined
regimes 148 (viz., the dowry system or the community of
gains), or to the German provision that the parties, unless the
husband is domiciled abroad, may not, merely by referring to
the foreign law and without expressly stating its rules, incorporate a foreign regime in thctir contract. 149 The same law also
controls the question whether the parties may insert clauses in
146
Argentine C. C. arts. I2.2.0 (new I2S4), 12os (new 1239); cf. 2 VICO
48 no. 69, ibid. so no. 72; Cam. civ. I Cap. (June 27, I94I) J. A. 1942. I
926, 937 (explains in a learned comment that the restrictions on community
property settlements do not apply to foreign-concluded contracts).
The Brazilian C. C. of I 9 I 6, Introduction art. 8 provided that the spouses
may choose the Brazilian law. On this unfortunate addition proposed by the
Senate and approved by the House of Representatives, which has been called
mysterious, see BEVILAQUA, 6 Repert. I68ff. no. so.
147
See, for instance, LeBreton v. Miles (N.Y. ~84o) 8 Paige 26r (intended
domicil in France); Spears v. Shropshire ( r Ss6) I I La. Ann. 559, 66 Am. Dec.
206; Davenport v. Karnes (I873) 70111. 46s; Mueller v. Mueller (I899) I27
Ala. 3S6, 28 So. 46s.
148
Italy: C. C. (I86s) art. I38I; C. C. (I942) art. I6I.
Spain: C. C. art. 13 I 7.
The Netherlands: BW. art. I98, contrary to French law, see PLANIOL, RIPER"l",
et NAST, r Reg. Matr. 47 no. 36.
1 9
" BGB. § I433> followed by Italian C. C. (1942) art. I6r. Germans in
Belgium may by virtue of § I433 choose the Belgian community of gains, RG.
(March I6, I938) 92 Senff. Arch. no. 96, JW. 1938, 1718. The Reichsgericht
even extended this benefit to Germans simultaneously citizens of another state,
beyond the limits of§ I433 par. 2, RG. (March IJ, I924) Leipz. Z. I924, 74I.
Contra: the Hooge Raad (June 24, 1898) W. 714I; H. R. (Jan. I4, 1926)
W. I I4S9, and KosTERS 447, have seen in a similar Dutch provision, BW. art.
I98, a rule on formalities not binding Dutch subjects abroad; bu.t see the criticism
by HIJMANS Io8; OFFERHAUS, Gedenkboek I838-I938, 707.
An old decision of Louisiana, Bourcier v. Lanusse (I8rs) 3 Mart. 0. S. S8I
held that the submission of the parties to the coutume of Paris was invalid, the
C. C. of Louisiana not permitting parties to choose a law other than of a state of
the union.
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favor of third persons or provisions looking to the death of one
of them.
The law meant here is, of course, the law of the husband's or
of the matrimonial domicil in certain countries and the national law of the parties in the great majority of civil law
countries.
In both systems, the validity of the settlement is suspended
until the celebration of the marriage. In England, the applicable law is considered to be that intended by the parties,
which, only by rebuttable presumption, is identified as that of
the matrimonial domicil.
The French courts again have developed a contrary view.
Where two Italians marrying in France stipulate universal
community of asset-s, the contract is prohibited and void in
Italy but has been held valid in France, either by application of
the law of the situs or nowadays generally under the doctrine
of implied contract.150
On principle, an antenuptial agreement made by foreign immigrants before coming to this country will be recognized in
the United States. 151 But they cannot be sure that a settlement
validly made here will be recognized in their homeland.
3· Formalities
The rule locus regit actum governs the formalities of marriage settlements. For this particular subject matter, it is recognized also in England that this rule as generally understood is optional, that is, it applies in case of noncompliance
with the formalities of the proper law. 152
150
See Cass. (req.) (May 71 I924) Revue I9241 406 and 2 ARMINJON1 ed. I 1
463, ed. 2, n. 2.
Cf. Italian C. C. (I86s) art. I433·
151
See, however, infra n. I 56.
152
Sir John Romilly in Van Grutten v. Digby (I862) 3I Beav. 561; In re
Bankes, Reynolds v. Ellis [I9o2] 2 Ch. 333 per Buckley, J.; In re Barnard,
Barnard v. White (I887) 56 L.T.R. 9 per Kay, J.; In re Fitzgerald, Surman v.
Fitzgerald [I904] I Ch. 573; cf. WRIGHT, "A Problem of Conflicting Marriage
Settlements," 44LawQ.Rev. (I928) 85, 93; CHESHIRE 498.
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The Hague Convention on the Effects of Marriage, article
6, has adopted some peculiar provisions; either the lex loci
actus or both national laws of the parties must be observed.

4-· Capacity
It is generally held outside the United States that capacity
to contract an antenuptial agreement is entirely distinguishable from capacity as envisaged under the personal or the
property law relations of husband and wife. In the common
assumption, it is not affected by the marriage but flows from the
general status rights of the party. Therefore, capacity to enter
into a marriage settlement before marriage is governed by the
law of the domicil or nationality of the party at the time when
the agreement is made, the same as the capacity of an unmarried person to make any other kind of contract.
However, in disagreement with this view, the Hague Convention on the Effects of Marriage (art. 3) has referred to the
national law at the time of the marriage rather than that of
the contract. By a remarkable coincidence, the English writer
Cheshire suggests that on principle the law of the matrimonial
domicil should prevail. 153 Although his main impulse derives
from his peculiar proposal to extend the marital law to capacity
to marry, it may be argued on another ground that the marital
law governing the objective permissibility of settlements
should likewise cover their subjective requirements.
Nevertheless, in recent times, the dominant opinion has
been well supported by the emphasis laid on the indep·endence
of married women. If the wife r.etains her own personal law
during the marriage, her status deserves to be respected in the
case of postnuptial settlements-in accordance with their basic
significance-and the more so in the case of contracts preceding the marriage.
153
CHESHIRE 235. Other suggestions are made by MoRRIS, "Capacity to Make
a Marriage Settlement Contract in English Private International Law," 54 Law

Q. Rev. (1938) 78, 86.
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5· Mutability
The right to alter the property regime during coverture is
determined in the same way as in the absence of a settlement.
The very origins of the doctrine of immutability in France
were connected with antenuptial agreements. Because the
property of spouses was supposed to be governed by such an
agreement for the whole duration of their union in all jurisdictions, tacit agreements were implied. The doctrine was applied
in England in the case of a French marriage 154 and is used in
Canada in the analogous case of a contract made or a marriage
celebrated without express settlement in Quebec. 155
Also, the American courts basically conside-r express marriage settlements to be valid and unaffected by any change of
status. But they have construed some agreements as intended
solely to cover property owned at the time of the marriage or
acquired while the parties resided at their first conjugal
domicil. 156 This was done particularly in the case of immigrants who had settled their matrimonial property in the old
country without contemplating emigration. A certain tendency
in favor of such a presumption may still be observed, 157 sometimes subject to question. According to the English and Continental point of view, a settlement applies to all assets of the
parties wherever and whenever acquired. This interpretation
is certainly convincing, where change by postnuptial agreement

r

154
De Nicols v. Curlier I 9001 A. c. 2 I regarding movables; ln -re De
Nicols, De Nicols v. Curlier [I9oo] 2 Ch. 4IO with regard to immovables (implied French contract was held enforceable against property in England).
155
See supra n. 6 5.
156
Long v. Hess (I895) I54 Ill. '482 1 40 N. E. 335 (the parties having immigrated many years ago; their settlement made in the grand duchy of Hesse
was declared not binding); Castro v. lilies (I8S8) zz Tex. 479 1 73 Am. Dec.
277; Fuss v. Fuss (I869) 24 Wis. 256. More recently: Hoefer v. Probasco
(I92I) 8o Okla. z6I, 196 Pac. 138 (avoiding by mere construction of the
intention of the parties for clear equitable reasons the interference of the agreement to a homestead acquired in a new domicil).
157
See the statement of the writers: 2 BEALE 1015; LEFLAR, "Community
Property and Conflict of Laws," 2.1 Cal. L. Rev. (1933) :ut, 224; GoODRICH
3.33 n. 40. Cf. NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (1943) 167, r85, supra n. x.
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after change of status is permitted and there is actually no new
settlement.
This contrast and the conflict of policy behind it are sharply
illustrated by the well-known case of Hutchison
Ross/ 58
where the higher New York courts applied the lex situs to give
effect to transactions between spouses who were continuously
domiciled in Quebec and lived under a marriage covenant ofproperty separation, immutable under the law of Quebec.
This leading case in conflict of laws on trusts has been considered a violation of the marital law of the domicil, and the
lawyers of Quebec resented the Appellate Division's 159 interpreting the covenant as not intended to bind the spouses
during their whole marriage or to subject them definitely to
the law of Quebec, a construction which has been called
fantastic. 160

v.

6. Settlements Concerning Immovables
The Restatement declares that settlements concerning immovables are to be construed in accordance with the law of the
situs, excepting the validity of the contract. 161 This statement
has been criticized as too broad, 162 but it is misleading as a
whole unless it is remembered that the Restatement recognizes
renvoi from the lex situs ( § 8, ( 1 ) ) • The "lex situs" in this case
simply consists of a conflicts rule common to all jurisdictions
of this country: First, the validity of the contract is ascertained
according to the law of the place of contracting or whatever
law is deemed to be applicable thereto. Second, under another
conflicts rule which is not more "lex situs" than the first, the
158
Hutchison v. Ross (1933) 262 N.Y. 38I, I87 N. E. 65, Annotation, 89
A.L.R. I023.
159
Ross v. Ross (I9JI) 233 App. Div. 626, 253 N.Y. Supp. 87I. The argument was not adopted by the Court of Appeals (see note I 58, supra).
160 1 JoHNSON 449, Appendix (devoted to the case).
161 Restatement §§ 237, 238 comment b; 2 BEALE§ 238.2.
162
NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (I943) 184, supra n. I, explains that the first part
of the rule is too broad.
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agreement is recognized as having full effect in the state of the
immovable, unless a particular public policy is offended, and
likewise is to be recognized in all third states. An antenuptial
contract concluded between residents of Nebraska in that state
is a.pplicable, beyond any doubt, "to real property situated in
Kansas owned by the husband at the. time of his death," in
accordance with "the general rule that antenuptial agreements,
equably and fairly made are valid and enforceable." 163
In the great majority of countries, this result is unchallenged, on the premise that immovables and movables are
parts of a unit.
7· Obligatory Settlements
An interesting experiment has been made in Guatemala,
where a marriage settlement in the form of a public instrument
must be executed when an alien or naturalized bridegroom intends to marry a Guatemalan woman. 164 European authors
have suggested similar measures for aliens marrying in the
country or foreign married couples acquiring citizenship.165
Many uncertainties would be avoided by some cautious pressure in this direction.

VI.

PROTECTION OF THIRD PARTIES

Opinion is strongly divided concerning the ~dvisability and
means of protecting third parties. While, according to the
older conception, the personal law could be invoked against
everyone, in recent times protection of third parties within the
jurisdiction results from the system of territoriality or from
exceptions to the rule of the personal law.
163

Sanger v. Sanger (1931) 132. Kan. 596, 2.96 Pac. 355> 356.
Guatemala: Law of Foreigners (1936) art. 41; C. C. (1933) art. too no.
4! cf. MATOS 356 no. 241.
165 See authors cited supra n. 88. See, in particular, the detailed requests that
marriage officers should address to the parties, as proposed by RoGUIN at the
Hague Conference of 19oo, Actes de la Troisieme Conference de la Haye
(1900) 2.31·
164
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No Exception to the Personal Law

No exception to the application of the personal law is
granted to third parties in France, Poland, and a few other
countries. French courts, when they actually recognize that
foreign law governs the property regime, consider it the duty
of anyone dealing with the husband or wife to inform himself
about the legal background. 166
2.

Exception with Respect to Third Persons

Conversely, in a system historically rooted, 167 Swiss law
distinguishes sharply between the relations of husband and wife
to each other and their relations with third persons. Irrespective of the law applying to the former, the latter are governed
by the matrimonial law of the conjugal domicil, which determines especially the legal position of the wife in relation to the
husband's creditors in the case of his bankruptcy or of an execution levied upon his property. 168 This proposition sounds attractive, but its application is complicated 169 and, as the
Swiss Federal Tribunal itself was compelled to admit, results
in certain curious consequences. 170 It was criticized by Meili
asearlyas 1902. 171
The C6digo Bustamante declares in article I 89 that the
forum's provisions on the effects of marriage as respects third
166
Trib. civ. Seine (May 29, I90I) Clunet I9o2, 36I. For Greece see
MARIDAKIS, II Z.ausl.Pr. (I937) 122.
167 See in particular Prussian Allg. Landrecht, II Tit. I §§ 3SI, 352 declaring
the law of the first domicil immutable except in relation to third persons. The
code referred only to the case where married persons, without a marriage
settlement, move from a country of separate property to another of community
property, but the courts extended the rule to the converse case; see Obertribunal
(March 28, I 846) I 3 Entsch. kgl. Ob. Trib. 297 no. 24 where it is stated that
the continuance of the original regime should not harm third parties acting in
·
good faith.
168
NAG. art. 19 par. 2.
169
ScHNITZER I94ff.; HuBER-MUTZNER 469ff.; BG. (July Io, I907) 33
BGE. I 6I7, 6221 BG. (July I4, I9o9) 35 BGE. II 463, 470; BG. (Dec. 10,
I9Io) 36 BGE. II 6I6, 6I8; BG. (Oct. I7, I9I8) 44 BGE. II 333·
170
BG. (July u, I929) 55 BGE. III 732; cf. also BG. (Dec. 17, 1908) 34
BGE. I 734, 737·
171 I MElLI§ 75; see JoELSON, op. cit. supra n. I, at 1o8-xx6.
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persons belong to the sphere of public policy of the forum, i.e.,
that they apply even where a foreign personal matrimonial
law otherwise governs.
3· Exception in Favor of Third Persons in Good Faith
Under the German provisions, a person may rely on the
results of German matrimonial law when he contracts with a
married foreigner domiciled in Germany, if he is ignorant of
the fact that the spouses are governed by some foreign regime
and this fact is not recorded in Germany in the proper public
register; likewise a married woman who carries on an independent business enterprise in Germany with the consent of
her husband is purported to have capacity as under German
law/ 72 although she may otherwise be governed by a foreign
regtme.
Illustration: Suppose an American married couple domiciled in Germany. Nothing has been entered in the public
record respecting matrimonial property rights. The husband
sold a crop of grain owned by his wife to a buyer who was
ignorant of the fact that the husband and wife were living
under the American system of separation of assets, under
which, contrary to the German law, the husband had no power
to sell and transfer his wife's crop. The German rule granting
the husband such power is to be applied.
Other countries also prescribe that a foreign regime must be
publicly recorded 173 and establish consequences for the parties' failure to do so.
In effect, the German system is not much different from
the Swiss, because parties living under a foreign system of
172 EG. art. 16, art. 36 par. 1. Also the German presumptions of ownership
of the husband ( praesumptio Muciana) and of the wife ('§ 1362 BGB.) are
declared applicable if they are more favorable to the third party, EG. art. 16
par. 2.
173
Switzerland: Justice Dept. Oct. 2 s, 19 3 3, see I I Z.ausl.PR. (I 9 3 7) 658.
Sweden: Law of June I, I912, § 2.
Denmark: see HoECK, Personalstatut 30.
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 75 par. 2, and Nicaragua: C. C. art. 154, which prescribe that changes of regime must be recorded in the appropriate registers to be
effective against third parties, may be applicable by analogy.
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matrimonial property law very rarely take the trouble to have
this fact recorded.
The international relation between these two systems has
been described by the Swiss Department of Justice, 174 to the
effect that a Swiss married couple living in Germany have to
observe the German prescriptions of registration to make their
marriage settlement effective, even in cases where otherwise
Swiss law would be applicable under the conflicts rule of the
court. Thus, a Swiss national domiciled in Switzerland, who
contracts with a Swiss husband or wife domiciled in Germany,
must inform himself concerning the property system valid in
Germany. In addition, Swiss legislation has given such spouses
opportunity to publish their property regime with the registrar
of their home canton, effective for transactions in Switzerland.
In the United States, no particular provisions exist for such
protection. Sometimes it has been assumed that the application of the lex situs to the marital property in immovables has
the purpose of giving third parties the legal position they are
likely to suppose/ 75 or that, for the benefit of a bona fide
purchaser or a creditor, movables are occasionally treated as if
they were not brought from a former domicil. 176 But the cases
do not seem to give such assumptions any considerable support.

VII.
I.

QuESTIONS OF CLASSIFICATION

Composition of Community Property

Two cases of the German Reichsgericht undertake to determine whether the community fund includes certain rights
which taken by themselves are governed by a law other than
that of the community property. In the first case, German
parties were married under a German ·contract of community of
174

See 29 SJZ. (I932-33) 25 no. I8.
See NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (I943) I7:z, supra n. I.
176 HARDING, "Matrimonial Domicil and Marital Rights in Movables," 30
Mich. L. Rev. (I932) 859; LEFLAR, 2I Cal. L. Rev. (I933) 235, supra n. I;
NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (I943) I8o and n. 49, supra n. I,
175
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acquests. The wife having acquired a tort claim under Belgian
law, the court properly applied German matrimonial law to
the problem whether the claim belonged to the community.
But the preliminary problem whether the claim was alienable,
so that it could fall into the community fund, should have been
decided under Belgian law. 177
In the second case, German spouses, living abroad, had
validly settled their community regime under Belgian law. In
the proceedings for partition of the community fund, the question arose whether the rights of the husband in a German partnership were a part of the community fund. The court correctly inquired into the alienability of the right, applying the
German law governing the partnership and deciding that the
right was not alienable in the precise sense in which alienability
is required in the Belgian and French law of community property.178
A comparable case in this country is where the husband buys
a chattel outside the domiciliary state. Thus, in Snyder v.
Stringer, 179 the husband, domiciled in Washington, acquired
an automobile in Iowa with earnings made in Montana and
Iowa. Under the laws of these two states, the earnings and
the automobile purchased therewith would have been acquired
as the husband's separate property, but they were deemed to
be community property by the law of the domiciliary state,
Washington.
2.

Marital Property and Inheritance

(a) Importance of defining limits of each field. To draw
the proper line of demarcation between marital property law
and the law of succession upon death is important in defining
177 RG. (May 30 r9r9) 96 RGZ. 96. Comments in various sense by MEL·
1
CHIOR I 87; RAAPE 309; 3' FRANKENSTEIN 400 n. 52.
178
RG. (March r6, 1938) JW. 1938, r7r8. For another interpretation
RoBERTSON, Characterization rsz n. 6o.
179
(r92r) rr6Wash. 131,198 Pac. 733; cf. LEFLAR, zr Cal. L.Rev. (1933)
232, supra n. r.
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180

the scope of conflicts rules.
In the United States, Great
Britain, and Argentina, the law governing movable marital
property is determined differently from that governing inh-eritance of movables; in most countries, the difference also
includes the rules on immovables.
It has been asked, for instance, in England whether the
English rule that a will is revoked by marriage is to be classified as a rule of matrimonial or testamentary law. As the rule
has been held to be essentially connected with the marriage
relationship, 181 its effect is measured by the law of the matrimonial domicil, "i.e. in most cases by the lex domicilii of the
husband at the time of marriage," 182 rather than by the lex domicilii of the testator at the time of his death. This reasoning is unsound, and the decision ought to be overruled.183
Many international treaties contain special clauses providing rules for the distribution of estates upon death. For
instance, one of the oldest bilateral treaties on jurisdiction, that
between France and Switzerland of I 869/ 84 provides that the
assets of a Frenchman or a Swiss dying within the territory of
the other country should be distributed by the court and under
the law of his last domicil in his home country. The Swiss
Federal Tribunal held in a recent case that the question
whether certain assets belonged to the wife's separate property
or to the acquisitions of marriage is a matter of marital law
and does not come within the treaty. 185
180
Cf. particularly, BARTIN, Etudes s, 68; SILBERSCHMIDT, 3 Z.int.R. ( 1893)~
132 at 143, 8 Z.int.R. (1898) 97 at 109,48 Z.int.R. (1933) 313; RABEL, 5'
Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 283; NEUNER, Der Sinn (1932) 6off. and in 5 La. L. Rev.
(1943) 167 at 186, supra n. 1; M. WOLFF, IPR. 37; BECKETT, "The Question
of Classification ('Qualification') in Private International Law," 15 Brit. Year
Book Int. Law (1934) 46; cf. also RoBERTSON, Characterization IS8-t68.
181
Vaughan Williams, L. J., in the case of In re Martin, Loustalan v.
Loustalan [1900] P. 2n, 240. Cf. CHESHIRE 523.
182
CHESHIRE 523.
183
FALCONBRIDGE, 15 Can. B. Rev. (1937) 227:-230, supra n. 108.
184
Treaty on the jurisdiction and execution of judgments in matters of private law of June 15, 1869, ;trt. 5 par. x.
185
BG. (Dec. 4, 1936) 62 BGE. I 235, Praxis 1937, 61,
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The two fields of marital property and inheritance are not
separated in the systems of municipal law by a uniform or invariably clear line. This fact has given rise to various useless
theories that have greatly overburdened the so-called problem
of characterization. The only acceptable method of treatment
has proved to be that based on general principles. Repeated
comparative research has revealed a basic criterion that more
or less obviously underlies all legislations, namely, that matrimonial law determines the interests of husband and wife during the marriage, including the specification of the assets of
either spouse on the dissolution of their conjugal life. In the
e~ent of one spouse's predeceasing the other, the law of inheritance regulates the distribution of those assets which belonged
to the deceased in accordance with the matrimonial law. This
distribution is particularly significant where the matrimonial
regime is a community property system. On the death of one
spouse, two partitions take place, either actually or at least for
the purposes of an accounting or a fictitious liquidation. First,
all property of husband and wife is examined to ascertain what
constitutes the community fund and which part of it continues
to be owned by the surviving spouse, while the other part, together with the predeceased spouse's separate. estate, forms
the inheritance. Second, administration and distribution of the
assets designated by the matrimonial law as the separate property and the part of the community fund belonging to the deceased, are governed by the law of inheritance according to the
will or the rules of intestacy, as the case may be. 186
This distinction is adequate to satisfy the theoretical needs
of all legislations and therefore to serve the needs of international application as required by the law of conflicts. Of
course, the distinction is so general that it leaves occasional
186 See RoGUIN, Droit civil compare, Regime matrimonial ( 1905) 9; KADEN,
"Eheliches Giiterrecht," z Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 705. Cf. also FALCONBRIDGE, "Characterization in the Conflict of Laws," 53 Law Q. Rev. (1937)
537> 54°·
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doubts as to classification. In fact, in determining which rule
of conflicts is applica:ble, uncertainty may arise fvom two
sources. On the one hand, some municipal systems have institutions of mixed or obscure character. On the other hand, marital
and inheritance regulations, forming integral parts of municipal legal systems, should logically be applied concurrently,
and not separately as necessitated by the dictates of two different conflicts rules. We must explain these two difficulties.
(b) Rights and expectancies· distinguished. Ordinarily, interests in assets of one spouse, which by marital law or marriage
settlement have been conferred upon the other, come into
being or, in the usual language, acquire the quality of vested
rights before the dissolution of the marriage. At common law,
for instance, a wife by virtue of the marriage has a dower interest in every parcel of real estate of which her husband has
been seised at any time during coverture. This interest can be
defeated neither by a conveyance of the husband nor by his
will. On the other hand, where testamentary or intestate succession entitles a surviving spouse to participate in the distribution of the predeceased spouse's estate, the surviving spouse
receives no more than a mere expectation, strengthened at the
most by provisions for forced shares; viventis hereditas non
datur.
It follows that where a legal system grants to a spouse a
genuine right to be acquired upon and during the marriage,
this right is always to be classified as matrimonial. Such a right
will therefore be acquired under the applicable matrimonial
law, irrespective of the inheritance law of the last domicil or
the last nationality. By a marriage settlement, in England,
"the law of the testator's domicil may be ousted from its regulation of a will." 187 In this country, much discussion has centered around the question whether, in all ten of the community
187 BENTWICH,

1911) 133ff.

The Law of Domicil in its Relation to Succession (London,
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property states, the wife has a present interest in the community fund during the marriage, sufficient for a separate income tax return. 188 There seems to be a growing tendency to
affirm the existence of an actual right for all purposes.189 In
France, Germany, Switzerland, as well as in the Latin American countries, all regimes, except that of complete property
separation, undoubtedly give actual rights during marriage.
Antenuptial or valid postnuptial settlements have a clear
precedence over intestate distribution also in this country. 190
Where, conversely, a right of a spouse is recognized as existent only at the time of the dissolution of marriage, the right
by no means necessarily originates in the law of inheritance.
Death of one spouse is ordinarily only one of several possible
causes of dissolution and the regimes that are usually called
systems of community upon death are in reality meant to confer some interest also in cases other than death. 191 For this
reason alone, such systems cannot be characterized as constituting successions on death. Moreover, although the nature of
the benefits granted to a surviving wife is uncertain in such
systems, analyses undertaken in recent years for the purpose of
applying conflicts rules have shown that in almost all such
institutions the widow is entitled to an interest upon marriage
rather than upon inheritance. 192
Still, some legislations contain veritable mixtures of elements which resist satisfactory classification. Thus, certain
188
See DAGGETT, "Wife's Interest in Community Property," Legal Essays
(I935) Iodf. For the construction of the law of Idaho see ]ACOB, "The Law
of Community Property in Idaho," I Idaho L. J. (I 9 3 I) I, z 5.
189
See STUMBERG, I I Tex. L. Rev. (I932) 53, 65 n. so, supra n. I; DAGGETT, "Division of Property upon Dissolution of Marriage," 6 Law and Cont.
Probl. (I939) 225, 233·
190
Ford's Curator v. Ford (1824) 2 Mart. N. S. (La.) 574; Estate of J. B.
Aubichon (1874) 49 Cal. I8.
191
KADEN, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. I.
192
The Austrian community on death is to be classified with matrimonial law;
see RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (I931) 26I; likewise the Danish community of goods,
see PAPPENHEIM, 6 Z.ausl.PR. (I9JZ) uo; and the Hungarian community of
gains, see ALMAS!, 1 Ungarisches Privatrecht (Berlin, 1922) I97ff., RAAPE 344•
An interesting example of a matrimonial institution clearly preserved from
ancient ideas is the continued community property of the German Code (§§ 1483
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American institutions of mixed character, such as the widow's
right of election between dower rights and testamentary bequests under the law of Pennsylvania,193 or between dower and
intestate share in Florida,194 or between statutory portion and
legacy under New York law, 195 have been objects of discussion
in the European conflict of laws.
The name that an institution bears in its legislative home
country cannot be decisive. Nor should the law of the forum
influence the analysis of foreign institutions. 196
(c) Coordination of the two fields in municipal legislation.
In some municipal laws, the connection between the matrimonial property law and the law of inheritance is particularly
strong. Recent authors ha~e drawn attention to the purposeful
balancing of provisions in th.e two fields, disregard of which has
caused unfortunate results.
-r 5 r 8), by which the community which existed between the spouses is continued
after the death of one spouse between the survivor and the children of thel
marriage. The children step into the place of the predeceasing parent through
the operation of marital law rather than the rules of inheritance. See RG.
(Oct. 25, r895) 36 RGZ. 331, 334· Hence, German courts and other courts
having a similar set of conflicts rules apply the said provisions whenever the
husband was a German national at the time of the marriage. 2 ZITELMANN
694; RAAPE 343; KADEN, 3 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 500; contra: 3
FRANKENSTEIN 391.
In Switzerland, an exactly analogous characteriza~ion of the existing continued community property system of the canton of Bern was made on the basis
of federal law, viz., general notions and the nature of things, by the BG. (June
30, 1905) 31 BGE. I 287, 294; cf. ScHOCH, "Conflict of Laws in a Federal
State: the Experience of Switzerland," 55 Harv. L. Rev. (r942) 738, 767ff.
193 Classified as part of the matrimonial law by Cour Paris (Jan. 6, r862)
S.r862.2.337, discussed by BARTIN, Etudes 70; NEUNER, Der Sinn 6o.
19-1 Cf. NEUNER, Der Sinn 64-66.
195
Classified as part of succession law by .French Cass. (civ.) (Aug. r6, r869)
S.r 869.1.41 7•
.
On the question whether or to what extent provisions of a marriage settlement
are offset by the provisions of distributing statutes establishing forced shares,
see BRESLAUER, "Conflict of Laws in Restrictions on Freedom of Testation,"
27 Iowa L. Rev. (1942) 425, 441; NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (1943) 187, supra
n. r.
196 This method has in fact been observed by the Reichsgericht since early
times; see its decision RG. (Dec. 19, 1887) 43 Seuff. Arch. 288 and (Nov. 25,
1895) 36 RGZ. 33 r, 334· The French courts have also followed it, as NEUNER,
Der Sinn 6o has demonstrated in opposition to HARTIN's thesis of classification
according to the lex fori.
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Thus, for instance, under the Massachusetts statute, a
widow has a dower interest in the property of her late husband,
while no community property is recognized. A husband, who
shortly before his death had transferred his domicil to California, would not leave any community property, nor would
the widow have any dower right. "That result would defeat the spirit of both of the dower laws of Massachusetts and
of the community property laws of the distributary estate; yet
it would be reached none the less." 197 If the husband had
gone to Louisiana, the widow would receive nothing if there
are "heirs." 198 Conversely, where the husband removes his
domicil from California to Massachusetts, the widow enjoys
simultaneously her community share acquired under California law and the dower interest under Massachusetts law.
Similarly, in Sweden the wife is granted a share in the community fund and for this reason is excluded from participation
in the inheritance,. if there are descendants of the husband.
Where a German married couple, not having concluded a marriage settlement, acquire Swedish nationality and the husband
dies, the widow has no claim under German matrimonial law,
which provides no benefits for the wife, nor under Swedish inheritance law;
Where, conversely, a wife is not given any matrimonial
right (except, of course, through an express marriage settlement), she may be granted under modern legislation a generous and indefeasible portion in her deceased husband's estate.
If, for instance, the spouses were of Swedish nationality at the
time of their marriage and later became German nationals, in
the courts of both countries the widow would receive, under
the Swedish matrimonial law, half the husband's property as
community part and, in addition, under the German law of succession on death, half or a quarter of the rest as heir.
187
198

LEFLAR, 2.1 Cal. L. Rev. (1933) 2.2.1 at z:z.6, 2.2.7, supra n. r.
La. C. C. (Dart, 1932.) art. 924; NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (1943) at 176,

supra n. r.
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Thus, coordinations carefully worked <?Ut within a domestic
statute are badly disturbed when different systems of law are
called into play by the choice of law rules on matrimonial property and inheritance. Ingenious remedies have been suggested, 199 but so far with little success. The problem is aggravated by the double fact that in most systems of private
law the relation between the two groups of provisions is hidden, and that the factual situations are far from suggesting
that radical change of the conflicts rules, or enlargement of the
scope of the law at the last domicil, is in equity required. We
may take for illustration the American cases in which the husband transfers his domicil from a separate property state to a
state where community property obtains. Apart from the hardship imposed by the former common law doctrine upon the
wife, which it was not the task of conflicts rules to remedy, it
seems not inequitable to apply the law of the first domicil.
Bruggemeyer/ 00 a lawyer, earned almost all his money in Illinois as his separate property and then stayed for years with his
wife in California where she died. There was no reason why
this change of domicil should have shifted half of his earnings
to the heirs of his wife. The spouses Latterner 201 lived three
years in Boston, Massachusetts, and fifteen in Los Angeles,
until they separated. No equitable argument challenged the
character as separate property of the husband's earnings as a
physician in Boston. 0'Connor 20 !l married in 1925 in Indiana,
but the spouses separated within "a few days"; there was no
ground why the husband's later moving to California should
give the widow half of the husband's premarital land in
Indiana.
The easiest practical way to assure that matrimonial and in. heritance statutes in the same legal system preserve their
199

See RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (I 9 3 I) z 83; NEUNER, Der Sinn 66 and 5 La.
L. Rev. (I943) I9o, supra n. I; 4 FRANKENSTEIN 3z6; RAAPE, z D. IPR. I97·
200
In re Bruggemeyer's Estate (I93I) II5 Cal. App. 5z5, z P. (zd) 534·
201
Latterner v. Latterner (1932) u1 Cal. App. z98, 8 P. (zd) 870.
202
In re O'Connor's Estate (1933) z18 Cal. 5I8, 23 P. (zd) 1031.
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natural balance, is simply more circumspect drafting of these
statutes. In this country, a federal Union where a part of the
population is inclined to change domicil, statutes of descent and
distribution should not blindly envisage only cases where both
the first and the last domicil happen to be in the state and,
moreover, no marriage settlement was established. In a community property state, the possibility that the surviving spouse
may fail, for any cause without his fault, to enjoy the regular
matrimonial share, should be considered. Vice versa, in a separate property state, there should be an appropriate provision to
adjust the ordinary distribution in the case where the surviving
spouse is amply provided with a matrimonial property interest.
True, theoretically the matter belongs to conflicts law, but conflicts rules suitable to all situations are scarcely available at this
time.

PART FOUR
DIVORCE AND

ANNULME~T

CHAPTER

11

Divorce
I.

THE PRoBLEM OF FoREIGN DrvoRCE

T

HE conflicts rules concerning divorce are generally
applicable not only to absolute divorce, i.e., dissolution of the bonds of marriage, but also to limited divorce, such as 'Separation from bed and board and similar types
of judicial separation, not merely temporary. Nevertheless,
we shall confine our discussion in general to absolute divorce.
Judicial separation has some particular features; for example,
there are special rules in the United States respecting the
recognition of foreign separation decrees. 1
r. Aspects of the Problem
Divorce is to be studied here in three aspects. We have to
consider first the connection that the parties to a divorce suit
(or corresponding proceedings of a non-contentious nature)
are required to have with the forum and, in the case where
persons, not subjects of the forum, are permitted to be parties,
the law applicable to the suit. In the second place, it will be
presupposed that a divorce decreed in one jurisdiction is being
examined for the purpose of recognition in another. Third, the
extraterritorial effects of non-recognized and of recognized
divorce decrees will be analyzed more precisely.
The subject to be discussed in this chapter has been somewhat neglected in comparative_ surveys and international discussions. Particularly in this country, endeavor to improve the
actual situation in case a marriage may be regarded as existent
in one state and dissolved in another, with all its tremendous
1 Restatement

§ 114 and comment.
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consequences for the parties and their issue and third persons,
has chiefly centered around the recognition of foreign decrees.
In the highly spirited debate under the headline of Haddock
v. Haddock, 2 or now of Williams and Hendrix v. North
Carolina,S it has been asked what position should be taken by
a state whose court is requested to recognize another state's
divorce decree, rather than what attitude might be suitable to
that state whose court is to take cognizance of the original application for divorce.
Every state of the Union has the unquestionable power to
·determine by itself all of its divorce policy; on the other hand,
by the impact of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as developed
by the Supreme Court of the United States, recognition of
divorce decrees is compulsory under certain conditions. Hence,
not unnaturally, scrutiny of the more or less anomalous decrees
rendered by the courts of about fifty jurisdictions and selection of those decrees that deserve recognition, has appeared the
chief problem. The complement of the problem is, what limits
every state ought to observe in opening its courts to divorce, so
as to facilitate reciprocal recognition. Perfect mutuality has
been reached by this method in such treaties as those of Montevideo and the Scandinavian states. The drafters of the successive uniform acts in this country 4 also distinctly perceived the
problem and found, in the writer's opinion, an adequate solution; yet these acts have encountered an amazingly unfriendly
reception. 5 The restaters of the law of conflicts, too, saw the
2 (I906) ZOI U.S. 56:1..
3 (I94Z) 3I7 U.S. z87.
4 Draft of a Uniform Divorce

Law, I4 Harv. L. Rev. (I9oi) szs; Resolutions, adopted by the National Congress on Uniform Divorce Laws in Washington, D. C., Feb. I 9-zz, I 906; Proposed Uniform Statute relating to Annulment of Marriage and Divorce submitted by the Subcommittee on Resolutions
to the Divorce Congress of Philadelphia, Nov. I3, I9o6. This statute was
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
in I907 and adopted in Delaware, New Jersey, and Wisconsin, but was replaced
by the Uniform Divorce Jurisdiction Act of I 930, 9 Uniform Laws Annotated
(I93Z) I33•
5 See especially VREELAND so. His own propositions were called politically
impossible by STUMBERG, Book Review, z La. L. Rev. (I939) zo7.
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goal when they started to define "jurisdiction for divorce," 6
apparently as an absolute notion, good for the use of all courts
concerned. But what they have stated can hardly be meant to
bind the courts granting divorce; it has useful reference only
to the problem of deciding in which cases the jurisdiction exercised by a divorce court should be recognized by a court of
another state, i.e., the problem of jurisdiction in the international sense.
2.

Diversity of Divorce Legislation

Comparative research in divorce legislation has revealed
staggering diversity. However, for writers to claim for this
reason alone that in cases of conflict of laws every state must
stick to its own policy without regarding the outside world, is
an overstatement. Certain contrasts are fundamental indeed;
others are not.
The doctrine of the Catholic Church that marriage cannot
be dissolved except by death, although having lost its force in
many countries, actually prevails in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Ireland, Italy, Paraguay, and Spain, and
with respect to Catholics in some parts of Eastern Europe and
the Middle East. 7 Absolute divorce is excluded also in South
Carolina. 8 Next to this group, we must place the laws of New
York and formerly of the District of Columbia, admitting
divorce only on the ground of adultery. 9
Looking to the opposite end of the line, we notic~ several
institutions of a very diverse nature. There are remainders
of the old patriarchical repudiation by which, for instance, an
Egyptian Moslem may divorce his wife without any alleged
cause. There is the ultramodern view of the Russian Soviet
Republics allowing each spouse to terminate the marriage by
6

Restatement§§ IIO-II3; cf. ibid. at§§ 43 1 77·
infra p. 430.
S. C. Constitution, Art. I 7 § 3.
9
D. C. Code (I929) tit. I4 § 641 was repealed by the Act of August 71 19351
49 Stat. 539> c. 453, §I.
Laws of New York (Cahill, I937) C.P.A.§ II47·
1 See
8
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unilateral declaration. Neither state nor church influences this
act. Again, we may add a few American and Mexican jurisdictions where the dissolution of marriages is offered, as the
current expression goes, 10 on a commercial basis; also, in addition to these open divorce markets, some states are disgraced
by abusive practices. The Old Testament right of a sovereign
head of a household, the Soviet emphasis on freedom of marriage, and the readiness of American courts to provide divorce,
are certainly heterogeneous phenomena, but in common they
result in permitting indiscriminately what the legislations of
the first group refuse indiscriminately. ,
We may well call both groups of legislations radical and set
them apart for the major purposes of conflicts law. In the rest
of the world, divorce regulations form a block of kindred
systems. To be sure, they are very far from being homogeneous. The old conception that divorce is a remedy given to an
innocent against a guilty party vanishes more or less slowly;
modern social aims are gaining acknowledgment here and
there; private interest and public welfare are differently
evaluated; many historical remainders and arbitrary predilections of local lawmakers increase the number of varieties.
Vernier lists eight major and thirty-one minor causes for divorce in this country alone, irregularly distributed over fifty
jurisdictions. 11 Defences, principles of procedure, authorities
empowered with granting divorce, are diverse. Nevertheless,
the basis'is a common one: marriage can be dissolved, if dissolution appears to be the minor evil, and whether it is must be
controlled by an agency of the state in appropriate proceedings. A really basic difference occurs respecting the question
whether a mutual agreement of the parties should be accepted
10
Hatton, J., of Tonopah, sitting during the vacation of a judge in Carson
City, Nevada, "asserted that the State Legislature, with commercial intent and
under pressure, had legislated the present divorce law," in the cause of Mrs. de
Forest Payne, N. Y. Times, Sept. 2.9, 1942., p. u.

11 :r. VERNIER

§ 6:r..
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as a self-sufficient ground for divorce decrees, but, strangely
enough, this point has not been much emphasized as a consideration of public policy in conflicts law. On the whole,
soberly examined, a modern statute on divorce is usually on
the middle road, a product of compromise with an increasing
admittance of social-hygienic ideas. There is little need for conjuring up the vision of bridgeless gulfs between conceptual
antitheses.
.
There 'is something more to tone down the contrasts. A
statute such as that of Nevada or of a Mexican state embodies
the normal terms and provisions, at the most indulging in
some clauses that promise secrecy or allow unnamed grounds
for divorce at the discretion of the judge, while the experiences
of other countries, we may discover, again and again reveal an
average practice laxer than the official language indicates.
Lawyers know this well, each with respect to his own state;
probably it is a universal tendency. A few illustrations: When
before the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937, adultery was the
only divorce ground in England, scandalous maneuvers were
in semi-official use to simulate evidence of adultery. The same
revolting practice is said to be frequent in New York. Courts
where desertion is not recognized as a cause, find a cause in
cruelty and vice versa; in the numerous countries following
the CodeNapoleon, "injures graves" is an elastic notion. German courts were never seriously embarrassed by the p'rovision
that the defendant spouse must have caused the breaking ~p of
the marriage by his reprehensible conduct. A reform of the
law was demanded and finally accomplished, with the effect of
legalizing the liberal practice and obviating the conventional
lies of the parties, rather than of introducing a new rule.
Why are these practices admitted? In large centers of population, courts are unable to examine the individual circumstances as they might wish to do. As has well been observed in .
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this country/ 2 collusion between the parties or abandonment
of the cause by the weaker party characterize the overwhelming majority of cases. A divorce judge in any such
country has the feeling of gliding down an inclined plane; no
stop anywhere is firmly assured, once divorce has been permitted. Of course, there will always be judges more conscientious, or conservative, or formalistic than the average. But it
is the geqeral trend that counts. And even the general prohibition of divorce does not work without exception.s. Courts
without absolute divorce at their disposal are inclined to grant
annulment of marriage where in other systems divorce would
be expected.
In addition, there are geographical limitations on legislative
control. Italian couples went to Fiume for divorce, Argentines
continue to go to Montevideo, citizens of South Carolina to
Georgia and North Carolina, and the answer to New York is
given in Reno. That only wealthy people are able to escape
their home laws aggravates the moral aspects of the situation.
Paradoxes reach a climax in the field of recognition. Foreign
decrees are irregularly recognized in this country and encounter prohibitive defences in Continental Europe, especially
in the country to which a party belongs as a national. However, if "invalid" divorces are not a simple "myth" within
the United States/ 3 the contention that they are to a large
extent in fact recognized is true with respect to all countries.
3· Pivergence in Method
In approaching the problem of the interstate and international treatment of divorce, we must be aware of a funda12
HARPER, "The Myth of the Void Divorce," 2 Law and Cont. Probl. (1935)
335; }ACOBS, "Attack on Decrees of Divorce," 34 Mich. L. Rev. (1936) 749,
959; SAYRE, "Divorce by Judicial Process," 18 Iowa L. Rev. (1933) 493, so8;
Note, 36 Col. L. Rev. ( 1936) I 121; cf. JACOBS, "The Enforcement of Foreign
Decrees for Alimony," 6 Law and Cont. Probl. (1939) 250, 251.
13
GoODRICH§ 128 n. 46.
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mental difference between the American method and that
followed in the principal civil law countries.
In this country, it is a matter of course that every state
grants jurisdiction for divorce without asking what extraterritorial effect the forthcoming decree will enjoy in other
states. Moreover, so soon as jurisdiction is assumed by a court,
there is no doubt that the case will be decided in exclusive accordance with the municipal statute of the forum (lex fori),
irrespective of any qualifications of the parties; no choice of
law therefore is involved.
The most representative legislations of the civil law, however, take into consideration the position of the law of the state
whose nationals the parties are, with regard to one or both of
the following points:
( i) Jurisdiction in the case of foreign nationals is not assumed unless the national law of the parties is willing to
recognize this jurisdiction.
(ii) Divorce is not granted, unless it is agreeable to the internal law of the national state of the parties.
In the heyday of the principle underlying these ideas (the
so-called principle of nation~lity ), many writers went further, applying the pure national law of the parties. 14 But with
the Introductory Law to the GermanCivil Code (1896) and
the Hague Convention on Divorce and Separation (I 902) as
models, it is now generally required that both the foreign and
the domestic laws must concur in permitting divorce in the
particular case. Hence, the law of the forum, although not exclusively governing, as in the common law c0untries and
others, has more to say than in almost any other field of conflicts law. Its importance is further increased where one party
is a subject of the forum and the other a foreign national.
1
' GIERKE, I

Deutsches Privatrecht 2 3 6; REGELSBERGER, I Pandekten I 7 8;
5 LAURENT 244, 276, 285, and others.
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4· Predominance of Lex Fori
Why in divorce involving foreign aspects, the law that a
court must apply _in purely domestic matters should have such
an abnormal influence is usually explained by a general reference to the nature of the institution. It is said that divorce is
permitted or refused in every state according to its tradition,
religion, ethics, logic (or what is believed to be logic), and
in conformity with hygienic and other considerations of population policy. This general reasoning is not adequate to the
subject. Consideration of the three groups of divorce legislations set out under (ii) above, taken as a basis to measure
affinity of divorce policies, suggests the following.
The standards of each of the three groups are basic. We may
be astonished indeed by the grouping of states in which the
Hague Convention of I 902 undertook to unify the rules for
granting divorce and for recognizing foreign divorce. There
were, on the one hand, the states which had normal modern
legislations and, on the other hand, Austria, Italy, Portugal,
and the Czarist Russian Empire, where at that time divorce
was either left to the ecclesiastical authorities of the various
denominations, or forbidden at least to Catholics. Italy has remained a member and retained its ban on divorce; the Convention has prevented Italian nationals from being divorced
in any participating state. This has been praised as a great
progress in international cooperation, 15 but it has resulted in
the final withdrawal from the Convention of France, Belgium,
Switzerland, Germany, and Sweden successively. It is quite as
prejudicial to combine legislations of contradictory character
for the purpose of reciprocal respect, as it is to exaggerate
minor varieties of policy. In federations that guarantee mutual
recognition of state acts between the single states, it should
be presupposed that the aims of the several legislations, varied
15 LEWALD, "Haager Konventionen
STRUPP, 1 Worterbuch des Volkerrechts

zum lnternationalen Privatrecht," in
und der Diplomatie 466.
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as they may be, are not fundamentally hostile to each other. In
a Union including legislations of New York and Nevada, the
Full Faith and Credit Clause cannot work smoothly. It is the
writer's conviction that it is not so much the multitude of
regulations in the United States as the extremes to which a
few of them go that creates difficulties in the mutual recognition of divorce decrees.
On the side of the majority group, no such prominent differences obstruct mutual understanding. All these systems
strive, through an institution controlled by the state, to assure
sound domestic relations within the limits to which the assistance that law and legal machinery provide is subject. To
apply the law of the forum among states of this group to
foreigners as well as to citizens presumes a claim to a stringent
public policy that cannot be obj.ectively justified by the accustomed standards of comparative law. Whether considerations pertaining to the field of conflicts rules better support
that claim, will be asked later.

5. "Migratory" Divorce
Our subject includes divorces described in the United States
as "migratory" and probably best defined as divorces obtained
in a state by persons who have just completed the minimum
time of residence required by the local statute for granting
jurisdiction over divorce. Technically, it is required that a
bona fide domicil be established and, in the prevailing opinion,
that the person must have had actual residence during this
time. Hence, it is presumed by the law "of the books" that the
newcomer has intended to transfer the center of his entire
life to the state for an indefinite time. In contrast, it is not
sufficient to take residence within the jurisdiction merely for
the purpose of obtaining divorce, although the circumstance
that the domicil is changed with the motive of securing a
divorce is not prejudicial. The minimum requirement of "resi-
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dence" is generally understood to evince the required mental
purpose, which, to put it simply, is that of establishing a real
and permanent domicil.
The actual picture looks so different from this legal structure
that migratory divorces are currently identified with those
obtained in evasion of the domiciliary statute, i.e., by a falsely
pretended domicil. The rate of migratory divorces in the first
sense, i.e., upon completion of minimum residence requirements, has been appraised for the year I 929 as constituting
only 3 per cent of the total number of divorces in this country,
a much smaller percentage rate than had been feared. 16 The
absolute numbers, however, are highY The total of divorces
was over 200,000 in I 929 and, after the drop caused by the
depression, reached 250,000 in I937 and about 264,000 in
I 940. In the two counties in Nevada, Clark and Washoe,
where Las Vegas and Reno are situated, divorces totaled I 7s6
in 1929, 4769 in I9JI, and 3629 in I9J5. 18 The rate of
divorce for IOo,ooo population has been estimated with
respect to the year 1940 as 200 in the United States, 90 in the
Middle Atlantic states, and 4 71 o in Nevada. More serviceable
than many arguments used to moderate the apprehensions that
must be aroused by the rapid increase in these rates is comparison. Although in Europe, excluding Soviet Russia, no
country reaches even half of the American percentage, the
highest percentage of divorces occurs in Switzerland,19 despite
16
CAHEN, Statistical Analysis of American Divorce (I932.) 78. The apparently optimistic views of this writer have influenced most sociological observers.
17
U. S. Bureau of the Census, Vital Statistics, Special Reports, U. S. Dept.
of Commerce, Vol. IS, No. I8, p. I93 (March zo, I942.). Estimated number
of divorces by states, United States I 9 3 7-I 940.
18
According to a newspaper correspondence in I 943, there were 59 I o divorces
in Washoe County and 2.72.0 cases in Clark County, an "all time high" rendering
$2.oo,ooo in fees in these counties. The total of seventeen county courts in
Nevada is given with II,399 divorces against 8,6I6 in I942., the fees amounting
to more than $soo,ooo.
19
This fact has been observed by Swiss authors. GMUR, 2. Familienrecht I so,
with respect to the decade of I 900 to 1909. It is confirmed by the following
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the repugnance to divorce in the Catholic inner cantons and
the conservative character of the population in the entire country. In I 93 I the rate of divorce for IOo,ooo population was 70
in Switzerland as against I4 7 in the United States. \Ve may
conjecture that the spirit of advanced democracy and industrial
enterprise has some influence on the frequency of divorce. Yet,
obviously, every divorce marks a regrettable failure even for
a childless couple, and lawyers cannot fail to be moved by the
inadequacy of their machinery. The divorce mills complete
the evils of familial maladjustments; not only do they work
against the intentions of sister state legislatures, in itself a sign
of unsound relations, but they also enable legislatures, courts
and attorneys to destroy homes for the sake of local profits.
6. Ex Parte Proceedings
The many cases in which, under modern statutes, a spouse
can sue for divorce while the other party is resident in another
state, need particular care by legislatures and courts. Not only
do almost all legislations of the world allow in such cases subsidiary use of service by publication and the grant of divorce
despite the absence of the defendant, but often the procedural
guarantees are handled unsatisfactorily. 2 ° Facts alleged by the
plaintiff are not sufficiently verified. Even fraudulent maneuvers-for instance false indication of the defendant's address
designed to prevent due notice of the trial-are not efficiently
figures regarding the year 19 27: divorce rate per IOo,ooo population: England
and Wales, 7.3; Belgium, 31; France, 45; Germany, 57.6; Denmark, 55;
Switzerland, 62; Japan, 79; United States, 16o; Leningrad, 983; Moscow, 959·
REUTER and RUNNER, The Family (193I) 2Io; HANKINS, "Divorce," 5 Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (I 9 35) 1 7 7. Higher figures in similar proportion have been indicated for I 9 35, omitting Switzerland, see JACOBS, Cases
on Domestic Relations (ed. 2, 1939) 352. The relation to "married persons" or
"existing marriages" would be more instructive, but this is not available.
20
Very conveniently, SAYRE, "Recognition by Other States of Decrees for
Judicial Separation and Decrees for Alimony," 28 Iowa L. Rev. (I9 4 3) 321
3 3 9 suggests "more effective substituted service than is required now" as pa~
of the process.
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counteracted, whatever the law of procedure may be. 21 No
wonder that the international attitude is simple mistrust.
Easily gained divorces may be attacked in the courts of other
states, if enforcement is sought or, alternatively, annulment is
asked. And this, despite the fact that everywhere, by customary
law or statute or express clause of international treaty, proper
service and a decent opportunity for defence are made primary
conditions to the recognition of foreign divorces. Any observer
will note that all those states whose courts indulge in routine
service by publication, are among the severe censurers of the
same act by foreign courts.
We have, however, to limit our survey to the two main
questions of jurisdiction and choice of law.

II.

JuRISDICTION

A divorce suit is considered to belong to a court either by
virtue of some domiciliary connection or the nationality of
both, or possibly one, of the parties.
Other grounds for assuming divorce jurisdiction have
sometimes been deemed to include the place where the marriage has been celebrated or the place where an offence against
the marriage has been committed. The first conception is
derived from regarding marriage as a contract and dissolution
of marriage as a rescission thereof; the second reflects the idea
that divorce is of a penal nature and therefore govemed by the
law of the place of the wrong. These conceptions no longer retain roots in the present legislations; their after-effects may
be discerned in certain rules of choice of law and, in this country, in some additional provisions relative to jurisdiction over
divorce, rather than in the main principles.
21
Among the endeavors to help the victims of divorce, the activities of the
International Migration Service are particularly deserving. See WAINHOUSE,
"Protecting the Absent Spouse in International Divorce," 2 Law and Cont.
.
Probl. (1935) 360.
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The existence of a third ground for jurisdiction is quite uncertain. Generally, it is emphatically denied that in matrimonial causes the parties may agree on a_ court. 22 Nevertheless,
sometimes openly, courts are induced to take jurisdiction without close scrutiny, when the defendant consents to the suit. 23
In any event, jurisdiction is quite frequently assumed everywhere on undisputed false allegations of domicil, without
any inquiry by the court, which is equivalent to making the
parties domini litis as to jurisdiction, and-more legitimately
-a separate domicil of the wife is recognized when the husband consents.
I.

Nationality as Basis

The faculty offered by .most civil law countries to their
nationals to bring suit for ~ivorce even when the plaintiff is
domiciled in another country may be briefly mentioned. 24
A few countries go so far as to reserve all matrimonial suits
involving a national to their own courts exclusively, even if
the parties are domiciled abroad and in the most distant
22
There are exceptions such as the permission by Mexican state laws to grant
jurisdiction in divorce when both parties submit to the court. The Federal Supreme Court holds recognition due in the Federal District and Territories in
the case of express submission as contrasted with tacit agreement, on the basis of
art. 602 of the Cod. Fed. de Proc. Civ. See decisions (April 2, 1935) 44 Seman.
Jud. 72 as to the state Chihuahua, and (Dec. 7, 1934) 42 Seman. Jud. 3596 as
to the state Morelos.
23
Submission to divorce jurisdiction is treated as actually effectiye in Greece
by 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 379·
It has been considered but rejected in Argentina, see LAZCANO, 57 ].A.(1937)
463ff. n. 128.
The Brazilian Supreme Court, however, seems to have construed arts. 3 I 8323 of the Codigo Bustamante, allowing submission to a court, so as to include
jurisdiction in divorce; Fed. Sup. Ct. (July 17, 1940) 58 Arch. Jud. 83.
In the English case of Hussein v. Hussein (1938) 54 T.L.R. 632, marriage was
celebrated in England but the husband was not even a resident. The court took
jurisdiction on the undefended suit by the wife, a decision presented as model
to Scotch courts in so Jurid. Rev. 195.
24
For details see French Cass. (req.) (April 29, 1931) S.1931.I.247·
German Code of Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. 2.
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7g.
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regions. Once the Czarist Russian and the Austrian Empires
were in this group. Today the list includes-after many doubts
are discounted 25 and leaving Austria aside 26-Czechoslovakia,27 Hungary/ 8 the former Austrian and Hungarian parts of
Rumania, 29 Poland, 30 and Turkey. 31 On the other hand, such
25 In Greece exclusive jurisdiction is no longer claimed by the courts except
for Greeks domiciled in Greece. See STREIT, 20 Recueil I927 VI 5 I; FRAGISTAS,
7 Z.ausl.PR. (I93J) 297; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 382; cf. Trib. Athens I933,
no. I676, Clunet I934, I04I; Trib. Athens (Ist inst.) I935 no. 8250, 47 Themis
582, Clunet 1937. 597· TENEKIDES, Clunet 1937. 598.
Portugal: 1 BERGMANN 551.
26 Austria: § 81 no. 3 of the "Jurisdiction Law" (Exekutionsordnung) was
understood as reserving divorce jurisdiction over nationals to the Austrian courts,
see WALKER 724. It was (or isf) controversial whether this rule survived the
annexation of Austria in 19 3 8 ; two Swiss decisions applied it to Austrian emigres: Kantongericht St. Gallen (Jan. zo, 1939) 37 SJZ. 73 no. 15, and App.
Bern (March 12, 1940) 37 SJZ. 32 no. 6; also BECK, "Zur Frage der Scheidung von Oesterreichern in der Schweiz," 38 SJZ. (I941-1942) 57·
27 § 81 no. 3 of the Austrian Jurisdiction Law was maintained in Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, the exclusiveness of jurisdiction was in controversy between the Supreme Court and the government and was finally settled tentatively.
See for details German RG. (Oct.z6, 1933) 143 RGZ. 130; R.MAYR, 1 Z.osteurop.R. ( 19 34) 1 7 7. In the later period, most German courts refused to exercise
jurisdiction over nationals of Czechoslovakia; see KG. (Oct. 17, 1930) IPRspr.
19 31, no. 62, and the decisions ibid. nos. I 34-I 41 ; RG. (Feb. 1 8, 19 3 7) I 54
RGZ. 92. Contra: OLG. Jena (May 11, 1934) JW. 1934, 2795, IPRspr. 1934,
no. 124. Similar result in Switzerland: App. Zurich (April 21, 1937) 34 SJZ.
(1937-1938) 282 no. 51, Bl.f. Ziirch. Rspr. 1937, 353, 12 Z.ausl.PR. (1938)
587.
28
Hungarian Marriage Law of 18941 § II4; cf. 11 Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 187.
29 See 1 BERGMANN 590.
80 A contrary liberal doctrine was clearly adopted by the Polish Law of I926
on private international law, art. 1 7 par. 3, on which a great many German
decisions were based, see RAAPE 397· It was the declared intention of the judicial commission of the Polish Sejm, as the Polish Ministry of Justice recognized, to facilitate the divorce of Polish emigrants before foreign courts. See
documentation of the decision of App. Danzig (Oct. 21, 19 3 7) 4 Z.osteurop.R.
(I937) 304. Yet, the tendencies were reversed, and by a rather surprising interpretation of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure of 1932 1 § 528, recognition
of any foreign divorce decree was refused except for the reciprocity provided
by treaty. See ZoLL, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (I934) 716; Polish Supreme Court (Feb.
51 1931) Z.f.Ostrecht 1932, 383i Polish Supreme Court (April 23 1 I936) Clunet 1937, 6I7; and Polish Supreme Court in Plenary Civil Chambers (May 29,
1937) published in Dt. Justiz 1938, 251; cf. RABEL, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (I 934) 7I 8;
9 ihiJ. (1935) 290. MASSFELLER, "Einzelfragen aus dem deutschen internationalen Ehescheidungsrecht," JW. I935> 2465. Correspondingly, jurisdiction
was denied by RG. (Feb. 24, 1936) 150 RGZ. 293; RG. (July 31 I939) 160
RGZ. 396, 3991 OLG. Stettin (Sept. 23, 1938) JW. 1939 1 249.
31 Turkey: Art. IJ no. 6 of the Law of April u, 1924 amending§ 18 of the
1
Code of Civ. Proc., see 1 BERGMANN 768.
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exclusive jurisdiction is not claimed by the vast majority of
states, and, although at one time nationality of the husband
was considered the only generally sufficient condition for divorce jurisdiction, 32 in some countries nationality alone, without domicil or at least residence, of one party in the state is
considered insufficient for suing ~r being sued. 33 Even so,
many conditions attach to recognition of foreign divorce
decrees by the national states, including such powers of reexamination as approximate exclusive jurisdiction. 34
The conflicts between the claims of the national and the
domiciliary jurisdictions have attracted a great deal of attention. Generally, the only remedy envisaged has been in concessions by the states of domicil to those states to which the
parties involved belong. Not only has the Hague Convention
sanctioned this trend, but, more moderately, even an English
authority has suggested that divorces rendered at the competent court of the national state should be recognized in England the same as decrees of the matrimonial domicil. 35
Domicil as Basis

2.

By common law, coverture effects a merger of the personalities of husband and wife. The wife necessarily shares the
domicil of the husband. This "matrimonial domicil" is, if any,
the most suitable place for the dissolution of the marriage or,
in the terminology of the common law, to locate the "re,;" that
constitutes the object of the action in rem, as the action for
divorce is commonly regarded. It happens that under common law the private relations of individuals are generally
governed by the law of their domicil, and this, of course, is
32

See Gebhardsche Materialien 1 84.
E.G., Czechoslovakia: see S. Ct. nos. 1449, I 5 34, 2 746; The German Law
on Divorce of January 24, 193'5> § 1; Swiss NAG. art. 7g par. 1 also involves
restrictions; see BG. (Oct. to, 1930) 56 BGE. II 335, at 341.
34
See infra pp. 474, 478-480.
35
GurrERIDGE, "Les confiits de competence jurisdictionnelle en matiere de
divorce et de separation de corps," Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1938) I, 7>
33

16, 28.
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interrelated with the domiciliary principle of jurisdiction. But
the idea that the domicil of the parties, even of one party, in
a state suffices to give that state jurisdiction for divorce, because divorce is a matter of "status"-this "generally accepted
doctrine," in the words of Beale 36-may be questioned after
a glance at the rules of the civil law countries. In most of these,
status and capacity of an individual are governed not by the
law of his domicil but by that of the country whose national he
is (principle of nationality). Nevertheless, also in these countries, jurisdiction for granting divorce is ordinarily assumed at
the matrimonial domicil or at the domicil of one party. Certainly, divorce alters the family status of a person, and, therefore, the states following the nationality principle have partly
opened their courts to non-domiciled nationals also. But the
reasons why jurisdiction is given at the "domicil" and the
more precise determination of domicil for this purpose are not
to be found in any doctrine. They are policy considerations
that we shall subsequently try to analyze.
(a) Common domicil. Where, under the conception of the
court applied to for a divorce, both spouses are domiciled, in
the full sense of this word, within the forum, jurisdiction is
granted in all states acknowledging the dissolution of marriage
inter vivos. There are two groups.
The matrimonial domicil is sufficient everywhere for assuming jurisdiction. However, in Great Britain since the subject was clarified in 1895/ 7 in the British dominions,38 and
under the present Treaty of Montevideo, 39 the matrimonial
domicil has remained the sole test of jurisdiction for the pur36 I
37

BEALE§ I 10.1.
Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier [1895] A. C. 517·
38
An exception for a wife living separately is made in the New Zealand Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Amendment Act, New Zealand Statutes, zi Geo.
V, Session III (I 930) No. 43, p. 2.48 sec. 3, in consequence of the English cases
in misericordia, see below, n. 1 2 8. For particulars, see READ, Recognition and
Enforcement zoo, zor, zz3.
39
Treaty of Montevideo, text of 1889, art. 62; text of I94o, art. 59·
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pose of divorce. The wife has her domicil with that of the
husband by operation of law. It is the most certainly recognized case of divorce jurisdiction also in this country. 40
This simple system of conferring jurisdiction also provides
an appropriate test to determine the applicable law, since the
· statutes of the state where the marriage is located work in the
double function of lex fori and lex domicilii, and moreover,
among the states adopting this system, mutual recognition of
divorce decrees is easy.
In countries acknowledging a separate domicil of the wife
or ignoring the institution of legal domicil, the principle has
to be modified. Jurisdiction is exercised when both spouses
have their domicil within the state, either together or separately. 41 Naturally, this rule obtains in the United States. 42
The reasons supporting these rules and underlying the
"res" theory are obvious. A community in which the spouses
have centered their lives may feel competent to adjudicate
the continuation of their marriage. Insofar as the conduct of
private persons may deserve consideration in determining
jurisdiction, an element of submission to the state activity may
be implied. On the other hand, it appears a superfluous hardship to send the parties away to their distant homelands; this
would sometimes mean their ruin.
(b) Presumption of common domicil. If in the eyes of the
forum the parties have their domicils in different states, an
attempt has been made to maintain the original system in one
of two ways.
One way is this: The last matrimonial domicil of the parties
is held competent for the purpose of divorce, even though it
40
Haddock v. Haddock (1906) 20I U.S. 562; Atherton v. Atherton (1900)
181 U.S. 155; Restatement§§ uo, II4.
41
Hague Convention on Divorce of I902, art. 5 no. 2 §I: "· •• before the

competent authority of the place where the parties have their domicil."
Under the Scandinavian Convention, art. 7 par. I, this is the main ground for
jurisdiction.
42
Restatement § I I o.
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has been deserted by the husband. Thus, the ancient construction is superseded, whereby the husband would transfer the
matrimonial domicil to his new place. This progress was made
in the United States as the earliest step to improve the situation of married women as against offending husbands. 43 The
same step has been made in British countries 44 and, as late as
1937, in England. 45 The draftsmen of the recent revision
(I 940) of the Montevideo Treaty added a similar clause to
their text, 46 after the Argentine practices had taken a kindred
view. 41 Analogous clauses in the Hague Convention and the
Swedish law permit divorce at the former common domicil in
case the defendant has deserted his spouse or has left the
country after a cause for divorce arose, 48 and, more generally,
the Scandinavian Convention gives jurisdiction to the state
where both spouses "had their last common domicil and one
of them is still domiciled." 49 Traces of this stage of the
development are frequent in this country. 5°
The other way has been demonstrated by the German procedural code. Where both parties are of foreign nationality,
the actual domicil of the husband within the state is sufficient
See I BEALE § z8.z.
Canada: Divorce Jurisdiction Act (I93o) zo-z1 Geo. V, c. 15 § z. Australia and New Zealand: see the detailed statements by READ, Recognition and
Enforcement zz4.
45
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937, 1 Edw. VIII & 1 Geo. VI, c. 57,§ 13·
46 Treaty of Montevideo, text of r 940, art. 59 par. z.
47
Cam. civ. z Buenos Aires (March 24, 1933) 41 J. A. 4zo; the law of the
matrimonial domicil determines also the question whether the husband has deserted his wife, Cam. civ. z (Oct. 7, 1935) 5z J. A. 144.
48
Hague Convention on Divorce of 1902, art. 5 no. z par. I sentence 3;
Sweden: Int. Fam. Law of 1904 with subsequent amendments, c. 3 §I par. I
sentence z.
49
Scandinavian Convention art. 7 par. I.
60
In particular, venue exists in the county where the parties lived as husband
and wife, if the defendant still lives there, cf. Mass. Gen. Laws (I93z) c. zo8
§ 6, or if the plaintiff lives there, cf. Miss. Code Ann. (1930) § I417>. or without such conditions, cf, Ala. Code Ann. (I94o) tit. 34 § z8; Va. Code Ann.
(Michie & Sublett, I936) § 5I05; W.Va. Code Ann. (Michie & Sublett, 1937)
§ 4709·
43
44
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and necessary for suits of either party, without regard to the
domicil of the wife, 51 whether or not it be r~cognized elsewhere or for other purposes.
(c) Admission of separate domicil for married women.
During the second third of the nineteenth century, the courts
in the United States successively began to acknowledge the
capacity of a married woman to acquire a separate domicil in
a steadily increasing number of situations. Ultimately, even the
most conservative courts acceded to this for the purpose of
bringing a suit or being sued, for divorce. 52 Consequently,
American courts and statutes no longer distinguish, for this
purpose, between husband and wife but treat them equally
as parties. Despite the diversity of the clauses-there are
seventeen different kinds 53-in all jurisdictions, suit for
divorce can be brought by the plaintiff at his own domicil. 5 ~
Optionally, it can be instituted in most states also at the domicil of the defendant by a non-resident plaintiff.
The theoretical basis of all this is traditionally attributed to
the conception that every state has an eminent interest in the
status of its domiciliaries and is thereby entitled to alter the
married status of a person domiciled in the state, even though
the other party may be domiciled in another. 55 Thus, the marriage status of one spouse is treated in the same manner as
the marriage of a married couple was under the older doctrine.
In the words of a New Jersey decision of 1934, the husband's
or the wife's domicil "carries with it the complete (marital)
51
Germany: Code of Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. I; cf. the Netherlands: BW.
art. 262 par. I.
52
I BEALE § 28.2.
53 2 VERNIER§ 8I.
M Haddock v. Haddock (I9o6) 20I u.s. s6z; Stevens v. Allen (I9I6) I39
La. 658, 7I So. 936; Perkins v. Perkins (I9I6) 225 Mass. 82, I 13 N. E. 84I;
Re Ellis (r 893) 55 Minn. 4oi, 56 N. W. ws6; Jones v. Jones (I889) 67 Miss.
I95> 6 So. 712; Blakeslee v. Blakeslee (1917) 41 Nev. 235, 168 Pac. 950; ·
Hubbell v. Hubbell ( 18 54) 3 Wis. 662.
55
See 1 BEALE at§ Io.8, 110.1.
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res or a part of it," so as to give the state court jurisdiction. 56
How can this be? Vreeland may well ask:
"Since the status is that of two persons, and not one, does the
wife upon acquiring a new domicil take half of the res with
her and leave half with the husband, or does it all stay where
it last was, or do they both have a sort of tenancy by entirety in
the res ... ?" 57
On the practical side, we are made aware by Goodrich that,
merely as a matter of logic, the out-of-state spouse would not
be affected, but consistency compels the courts to assume
further that the divorce destroys also the married status of the
non-domiciled party. 58 In counterpoise to this convincing
reasoning, we may remark that the Michigan statute allows
its courts to divorce, in their discretion, any party who is a
resident of the state and whose husband or wife has obtained
a divorce in another state, whether the foreign divorce is valid
or not. 59 The explanation given by the Michigan Supreme
Court is that the courts of both domicils possess jurisdiction
to grant divorces only "so far as the party resident within its
own limits is concerned; if one proceeds first, there is no legal
impediment to the other's taking like steps afterwards." 60
The fact is that the American divorce law has outgrown the
doctrine of jurisdiction in rem. From the time that the wife
acquired the power to assume a domicil of her own, duality of
domicil as a basis for divorce jurisdiction has been possible, and
all conceptions born of the ancient idea of marital unity have
lost their sense. Domicil has remained an essential prerequisite
of jurisdiction only insofar that, according to the best settled
56 Webb v. Webb (1934) 13
67 VREELAND 28.
5S GOODRICH §§ 124, 125.

N.J. Misc. 439, 178 Atl. 282.

59 Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) § 12?28 [Mich. Stat. Ann. § 25.86]. Related
but perhaps not identical statutes are in force in Florida, cf. Fla. Statutes
(1941) § 65.04 and Ohio, cf. Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) § 11979.
60 Wright v. Wright (1871) 24 Mich. 179; cf. Van Inwagen v. Van Inwagen
(1891) 86 Mich. 333,49 N. W. 154.
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rule of this unstable field, no· jurisdiction is granted when
neither of the spouses is domiciled within the state. The entire
question depends upon the extent to which a state chooses to
shoulder the responsibility of entertaining divorce suits, or to
leave them to other states. Individual legislatures have tried to
solve the problem in such a variety of ways as to indicate that
there is no logical necessity to follow any of them.
Indeed, no exact analogy to the American doctrine exists
elsewhere, and very few foreign regulations approach it. Even
these cannot be compared with it without understanding that
they deal with parties of foreign nationality, while in this
country the law has been developed with American citizens
in view and is applied to aliens with very few qualifications.
The nearest parallel is afforded by the Swiss law. In Switzerland, jurisdiction is assumed at the instance of a plaintiff of
foreign nationality if he is domiciled within the country, irrespective of whether husband or wife is suing and whether
the defendant is a Swiss national or domiciliary. 61 In France
and other countries, the defendant spouse must be a domiciliary, but the husband's domicil determines that of the wife, except where she has been judicially separated. 62 The Hague
Convention allows an option for the domicil of the defendant
where the parties have not the same domicil. 63 The general
rule of reference to the defendant's domiciliary law is also resorted to by the Federal Supreme Court of Mexico in interstate divorces, in case the laws of the Mexican states determine
jurisdiction for divorce differently (domicil of the husband,
marital domicil, domicil of the deserted wife). 64
61

See BECK 404 no. 37, comment to NAG. art. 7h par. I.
.
France: GLASSON et TISSIER, 5 Traite de Procedure Civile (ed. 3, I936)
no. I6o9.
'
Belgium: Novelles Belges, 2. D. Civ. I44 no. 471.
63
Hague Convention on Divorce of I902, art. 5 no. z par. I sentence z. The
provision has prevailingly been understood so as to characterize the domicil of
a party generally under his national law. See German RG. (April 5, 192.1)
102. RGZ. 8z, 84; LEWALD in 1 Strupp's Worterbuch des Volkerrechts und der
Diplomatie 469.
64
Mexico: S. Ct. (Oct. 14, 1940) Seman. Jud. 194I.I.403·
62
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Hence.., we find the American law rather isolated. But the
French practice sheds some light on one motive that is of
universal validity. The French courts have proclaimed the
doctrine that they must refuse to entertain jurisdiction over
parties who are both of foreign nationality, at least if they
have not their common domicil in France. 65 However, in
practice jurisdiction is exercised when the defendant does not
prove that he has maintained a foreign domicil at which he can
be actually sued 66 or, in another version, when there is no
foreign jurisdiction in which the suit can be prosecuted without hardship. 67 The desire to avoid what would look like a
denial of justice, is a legitimate one among the many impulses
for entertaining causes presented.
The reverse side of this obliging attitude was well known
in this country from the wave of divorces of Americans in Paris
until the decline of the I 9 2o's. 68
The wider such "hospitality," the more conflicts are likely
to appear. Conflicts are not even confined to that diversity of
national and domiciliary divorce laws that has been receiving
paramount attention in Europe. The different views, for instance, regarding the wife's domicil have the result that a court
of Uruguay, predicating jurisdiction upon the matrimonial
domicil, will divorce an American citizen domiciled in Montevideo from his wife who lives in the United States, 69 while a
New York court, if the wife lived there, would probably consider her domiciled in the state and protected by certain special
rules against the Uruguayan decree. A series of Canadian
65
French Cass. (req.) (June 25, 1918) S.I9I8-19.1.2o6; Cass. (civ.) (Nov.
to, 1920) S.I923.1.129; Cass. (civ.) (April 30, 1927) S.1927.I.2o8.
66
GLASSON ET TJSSIER, supra n. 62.
67
See French Cass. (civ.) (July 29, 1912) S.t913.1.425; Cass. (civ.) (Nov.
xo, 1920) and Trib. civ. Nice (Dec. 6, 1920) Clunet 1923, 72ff.; Cass. (Dec.
30, 1930) Revue 1932, III; cf. KUHN, Comp. Com. 170.
68
See BATES, "The Divorce of Americans in France," 2 Law and Cont. Probl.
(1935) 324; see also JACOB, "Problems of Divorce in France Incident to the
Statutes of 1941," 28 Iowa L. Rev. (1943) at 309.
69
Trib. Ap. Montevideo (Sept. 13, 1935) 36 Rev. Der. Juris. Adm. (1938)
210, Clunet 1938, 841.
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decisions has invalidated decrees rendered in this country because the finding of domicil was in contradiction to the
Canadian doctrines. 70 Where a Swiss court, assuming jurisdiction because of her separate Swiss domicil, had divorced a
woman of Belgian nationality, a Belgian court denied recognition to the decree; not even for the purpose of jurisdiction
could a Belgian wife have a domicil separate· from her husband. 71 Well known is the number of divorces unrecognized
within the United States despite the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the Constitution.
Residence is sometimes taken as a substitute for domicil,
particularly for the purpose of jurisdiction for limited divorce; 72 as such it may suffice.
We have now to investigate the additional rules that restrict
the assumption of jurisdiction.

3· Restrictions on the Assumption of Jurisdiction
It is a comforting experience that modern legislatures have
felt the need to limit their own domiciliary jurisdiction over
divorce, partly for the express purpose of avoiding at least
certain conflicts with other jurisdictions, partly with less distinct intentions to the same effect. However, these additional
requirements are of a very different nature in this country
from those on the European Continent.
(a) Additional requirements. In the United States, the
prerequisite that one party or the plaintiff be domiciled in the
state at the time of the commencement of the action, is usually
accompanied by further qualifications. The statutes have
varied and mixed the requirements so "as to defy classification," Vernier attests. 73 The author must confess that he has
not succeeded so far in completely understanding the meaning
70

See infra p. 493, n. 143·
Cass. (March 19, 19z5) Pasicrisie 19z5.1.179; Trib. civ. Bruges (March
4, 1936) Pasicrisie 1937·3.81.
72
With respect to the United States see 1 BEALE § I o.8, § I I o.s.
73 z VERNIER§ 81 and p. 107.
71
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of several such combined versions and would most welcome a
thorough discussion of all these clauses by a more competent
writer. It seems that there are three main statutory clauses:
Sometimes it is required that the parties have, at some time
before suit, both lived in the state. This is obviously derived
from the idea of the matrimonial domicil, upon return to
which either spouse is entitled to sue the other.
A considerable number of various clauses emphasize the
importance of the place and the time where the cause of action
accrued. Of this group, certain are important as direct measures to reject petitions evasive of foreign divorce law and will
be considered separately.
In their vast majority, the statutory clauses require a
definite period of "residence" of that party whose domicil is
decisive, previous to the filing of the action; almost always it
is provided or understood that this period should immediately
precede the suit. The period is from six weeks to two years in
particular states and varies also in different cases. It may make
a difference what the cause for divorce is. In linking the ideas
just mentioned with the minimum residence requirement, the
length of time is declared unnecessary or reduced, if the party,
or both parties, lived in the state before, or lived there at the
time when the cause of action arose, or if the cause occurred in
the state, etc. A typical formula is presented in the Unifor~
Annulment of Marriage and Divorce Act of I 906, whose first
provision gave jurisdiction:
"When, at the time the cause of action arose, either party
was a bona fide resident of the state, and has continued so to
be down to the time of the commencement of the action;
except that no action for absolute divorce shall be commenced
for any cause other than adultery or bigamy, unless one of the
parties has been for the two years next preceding the commencement of the action a bona fide resident of this state." 74
14
Proceedings of the Seventeenth Anitual Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, Draft of an Act to Make Uniform the Law Regulating
Annulment of Marriage and Divorce (1907) § S(a).
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As this wording shows, no exception is made in the case of
both parties being domiciled in the state at the time of suit. 75
Similarly, in the great majority of the statutes no particular exception seems to be intended to that effect, although the requirement of residence may be released in related situations,
such as where the defendant is personally served. 76 There are,
however, a few statutes which state that actual domicil is
sufficient, if both parties are domiciled in the state. 77
Disregarding the labyrinth of the statutory details, we may
take it that the restrictions of the last type counter-balance the
ruthlessness of divorce jurisdiction at the domicil of one party
by qualifying this domicil in a possibly very effective manner.
The requirement of residence previous to the suit is generally
understood as meaning domicil and, in most jurisdictions,
actual presence in the state as well, although a temporary absence is innocuous. 78 The lapse of time guarantees that the
individual has become a participant in the life of the state and ,
serves as evidence that the change of abode includes a serious
change of domicil. If applied to the case where both parties
have come to the state, the requirement is intended to foil
evasive demands as well as to protect one spouse against the
other's arbitrary choice of the forum. In both applications, the
requirement is usually held to be mandatory. 79 .
Unfortunately, the great purpose of this restriction has
often been forgotten. It is buried under the maze of confusing
details accumulated in the various statutory experiments.
Moreover, two defects are rightly much criticized. While
some states formerly demanded a residence of five years,
76

Statutes formed after this model speak expressly of both parties.
See, for instance, Iowa Code ( 19 39) § 104 70 (defendant resident and personally served).
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 5181.
77
See especially Ala. Code Ann. ( 1940) tit. 34 § 29.
N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 339 § 4·
In this sense, see also the Uniform Divorce Jurisdiction Act of 1930, § 1 (a)
(ed. 1932).
78 1 BEALE § 10.8.
19
Hetherington v. Hetherington (1928) 2oo Ind. 561 t6o N. E. 345·
76
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an unjustifiably long period, others are content with three
months, or, since the famous competition of Nevada with
Idaho and Florida, with six weeks. It has become the only purpose of such a requirement to benefit the local hotels and shops.
The other evil is lax enforcement of the normal residence
period; strange stories have been told in the literature in this
respect. 80
Could these faults be corrected, this dependence of jurisdiction on a residence period would be calculated greatly to
inspire legislation in other countries where thus far a minimum
period of residence has only occasionally been provided. 81
(b) Conformity to National Law. In Europe, while as a
rule jurisdiction over foreigners is taken at the matrimonial
domicil or in some countries at the domicil of one party,
measures are taken to avoid collision with the national law.
The Hague Convention. The Hague Convention, 82 followed by the statutes of Sweden and Poland, 83 has recognized,
in special clauses, the claim for exclusive jurisdiction of divorce,
which today is asserted by such countries as Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Poland. 84 If the jurisdiction of a state over petitions for divorce or judicial separation is exclusive for its
nationals, such jurisdiction is recognized by the other states as
the only one competent. The Belgian courts observe the same
restraint in the absence of an enacted rule and without being
bound any longer by the ;Hague Convention. 8 ;;
80 BREARLEY, "A Note Upon Migratory Divorce of South Carolinians," 2
Law and Cont. Probl. (1935) 32-9, 332.
81 Poland: Law of 1926 on interlocal private law, art. 2 (one year for change
of personal law).
Sweden: Law of March 23, 1934, Svensk Forfattningssamling 19341 no. so, 8
Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 639 (one year in the case of a Swedish plaintiff).
France: the decree of Nov. u, 1938 1 requiring a police permit for at least
a year's residence for recognizing the domicil of a foreigner (supra p. 141) evi·
dently is applicable to divorce.
82 Hague Convention on Divorce of 1902, art. 5 no. 2 par. 2.
83
Sweden: Int. Fam. Law of 1904 with amendments, c. 3 § I par. 2.
Poland: Law of 1926 on international private law,§ 17 par. 4•
84
See supra p. 398.
85
Cour Bruxelles (March 15, 1922) Belg. Jud. 1923, col. 103; Rb. Antwerp
(Nov. 191 1937) 8 Rechtsk. Wkbl. (1938-1939) col. 547 no. 1u and (March
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Germany. The German law goes even further. German
courts may not exercise jurisdiction in divorce cases where the
national country of the husband would not recognize the resulting judgment because of lack of jurisdiction of the German
forum. The German provision prescribes that, if both spouses
are foreigners, action for divorce may be brought at the forum,
provided that the domestic court has jurisdiction also according to the laws of the state of which the husband is a national.
According to one opinion, this text requires that the national
country should recognize also the specific court where the suit
is brought as having jurisdiction. 86 Better authorities, however, declare it sufficient that any German court, this or
another, be considered endowed with jurisdiction in the eyes
of the national law, that is, that German courts have jurisdiction in the international sense. 87
The prohibition does not extend to the case where the resulting decree of divorce would not be recognized on another
ground, for instance, because of lack of reciprocity or because
of service of the defendant by publication. 88
This prohibition, however, covers many more cases than
just those of exclusive jurisdiction mentioned above. It extends
to all situations where one or both of the foreign spouses are
domiciled in a country that does not recognize the effectiveness of the German decree within its borders. Similarly, exclusive jurisdiction has been claimed by many American cases
for the courts of the domicil, and likewise by Switzerland,
which does not recognize a foreign divorce of two Swiss citi29, 1939) 9 ibid. (1939-1940) col. 1373 no. 28x; App. Bruxelles (May 20,
1939) 9 ibid. (1939-1940) col. 42 no. 7 (Hungarians).
86
STEIN-}ONAS-POHLE, 2 ZPO. (ed. 16, 1939) § 6o6 VI; RG. (Nov. 21,
1929) 126 RGZ. 353, ]W. 1930, 1309; KG. (Oct. 25, 1937) JW. 1937, 3249,
but cf. MASSFELLER, }W. 1936, 3579·
87
SCHONDORF, 75 Jherings }ahrb. 66; ~UHL, }W. 1930, 1310; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 505; PAGENSTECHER, I I Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 480.
88
RG. (Nov. 21, 1935) 149 RGZ. 232; cf. KG. (Dec. 19, 1932) IPRspr.
1932, no. 76. On the application of the provisions to religious divorce forms,
see below, p. 413· On the case of subjects of a country where divorce cannot take
place except by bill of parliament, see NIBOYET 506 no. 417; ibid. 744 no. 636; z
BERGMANN 79i RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 262.
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zens, one of whom is domiciled in Switzerland. 89 Befo~e assuming jurisdiction to divorce an American husband, a German court must therefore ascertain, among other points: 90
(I) where the husband is domiciled, under the American
definition of domicil, requiring in particular the animus
manendi in the American sense; ( 2) if he thus is found to be
domiciled in Germany, whether the American conflicts rule
recognizes the jurisdiction of the domicil, and as of what time.
This subject needs more discussion m connection with
renvm.
Switzerland. Still broader is the scope of the former
Swiss 91 and the Hungarian 92 provisions that require not only
the jurisdiction but also the decree to be recognized by the national law, insofar as the acting court is able to predict. 93 Also,
the Court of Appeals in Zurich was denied jurisdiction, because personal service on the defendant was impossible and
German courts, under the German-Swiss treaty on mutual
recognition and execution of judgments, 94 therefore, would
not have recognized the decree.
89

78;
90

BG. (Oct.

10,

1930) 56 BGE. II 335; BG. (May 13, 1938) 64 BGE. II 74,

cf. for more difficult situations, BEcK, NAG. 363 nos. 112-115.
Cf. in particular RG. (Nov. 21, 1929) 126 RGZ. 353, IPRspr.

1930, no.

136.
91

NAG. art. 7h par. r.
Hungarian Marriage Law of 1894, § II6: ... if the judgment has force
in the state whose citizens the spouses are.
93 App. Zurich (Jan. II, 1936) Bl. f. Zurch. Rspr. (1936) 359; the treaty
is that of Nov. 2, 1929. App. Zurich (1937) 38 Bl. f. Zurch. Rspr. (1939) 78
no. 36 denies jurisdiction to the wife, because, under the applicable Polish law,
she shared the domicil of her husband who lived in Antwerp, Belgium. Similarly,
in the case of a wife suing her British husband domiciled in Canada, 37 SJZ.
(1940-1941) 31 no. 5·
94
Examples regarding American citizens: Bez. Ger. Zurich (June r8, 1930)
27 SJZ. (193o-1931) 87, no. 14 (wife under medical treatment in Zurich, intending to stay "permanently" in order to study there). Jurisdiction was granted
in view of the husband's submission to the court and the certainty that the decree
would be recognized in Minnesota). Same court (Nov. 3, 1931) 28 SJZ. (193 11932) 250 no. 217 (the wife paid taxes and attended classes at the University.
The husband in Boston consented to the separate domicil. The divorce ground
would also be recognized in Massachusetts). In both cases the assumption of
domicil was questionable, but the husband's consent to its establishment would be
termed decisive. The same observations are true for a case of British subjects,
Bez. Ger. Zurich (Oct. 25, 1935) j2 SJZ. (1936) zoz, no. 41.
92
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There is some uncertainty in applying either of these selfimposed restrictions, due to the difficulties of knowing exactly
the position of the foreign law. The possibility that the national
court in reviewing the decree will even re-examine the jurisdictional facts further aggravates the problem. The Swiss law
was therefore significantly changed in the wording of its provision. Former article 56 of the Swiss Law on Civil Status
required proof that the future judgment would be recognized
in the homeland. As this was found to be an impossible task,
the actual text (NAG. art. 7h par. I) demands proof only
that the Swiss jurisdiction would be recognized. But it is not
clear whether by this change the evidence has been made easier
to produce. Once, a Swiss court tried to consult the Supreme
Court of the United States on the "American" divorce law but
was informed that neither courts nor administrative agencies
in this country are prepared to give advice. 95 At any rate, the
court can only guess at the chances of recognition, if it does
not want to refuse to assume jurisdiction in virtually every
case, and experience shows that no court wants that.
In some cases, it may be suspected that Continental courts
have too lightly presumed American and especially English
willingness to recognize a domicil at and, therefore, jurisdiction of, the forum.
4· Religious Divorce
When a court applying the rule of nationality finds that
under the national law of a party divorce can be pronounced
only by an ecclesiastical authority (as in the countries influenced by the Greek Orthodox Church and by Islam), the
court faces the problem whether it may exercise jurisdiction
or must refrain from it. The German courts feel prohibited
from assuming jurisdiction by the provision that jurisdiction
must be in accordance with the national law of the husband,
95 BuRCKHARDT, 4 Schweizerisches Bundesrecht 142 no. 1674 II.
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for a national law giving exclusive po~ers to the churches is
deemed to exclude any judicial activity of temporal tribunals, 96 even abroad.
In France, jurisdiction was likewise denied, especially by
the Supreme Court in the famous case of Levin~ on, 97 a Russian Jew. Since the Russian law at the time left divorce proceedings to the religious authorities, a French court was held
unable to apply the national law of the party in its true form
without injury to the religious feelings of the parties. This
example was followed by many other French decisions, most
of which had to deal with subjects of the former Russian parts
of Poland and Lithuania. 98
In France, however, some courts and writers have expressed
contrary opinions, mainly because of the hardship imposed on
the parties but also because of two legal arguments. First,
public policy is invoked on the ground of the declared neutrality of the French state toward the churches and the impropriety of granting more prerogatives to foreign churches
than to its own. 99 Second, religious divorce rules are analyzed
as composed of substantive rules, concerned with the permissibility and the causes of divorce, and procedural rules giving
way in a French tribunal to the French rules of procedure. 100
96 KG. (Dec. 19, 1905) 14 ROLG. 241, aff'd RG. (Oct. 4, 1.9o6) 19 Z.int.R.
(1909) 263; RG. (Feb. 21, 1925) Clunet 1925, 1055. This is also the meaning
of the Hague Convention on Divorce, and Actes de la Troisieme Conference de
la Haye ( 1900) 21 1. An analogous position was taken in Switzerland by the
Trib. Zurich (Sept. 22, 1936) 34 SJZ. (1937-1938) 313 no. 591, although in
the instant case jurisdiction was assumed because the marriage was void under
the national (Palestine) law.
97 Cass. (civ.) (May 29, 1905) D.1905.1.353, S.19o6.1.16x, Clunet 1905,
1oo6, Revue 1905, 518.
98 Cass. (civ.) (Oct. 30, 1905) S.1911.1.581; Cass. (req.) (July zo, 1911)
S.1912.1.132; about ten decisions from 1920 to 1927 cited by J. DoNNEDIEU DE
VABRES 485; Trib. civ. Seine (Oct. I5, 1936) Nouv. Revue 1936, 541· Similarly
in Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (June 25, 1930) Pasicrisie 1931·3·36; see
also POULLET 489 no. 378; Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Dec. 6, 1939) J.d.Tr. 1940,
col. 120 (Spanish Catholics).
99 Trib. civ. Seine (June 11, 1921) Clunet 1921, 525 (Greek Orthodox Russians); Trib. civ. Seine (Dec. 24, 1921) Clunet 1922, 117 (Russian Jews).
1oo See in this sense BARTIN's note to the decision of Cour Paris (March r 7,
1902) D.r9o3.2.49 and (implicitly) Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 25, 1937) Clunet
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A recent Belgian critic of the dominant doctrine remarks that
neither the consistories of the Orthodox Church nor the rabbinate tribunals use any formule sacree, prayers or deprecations; they exercise purely judicial functions. 101 Courts of other
countries, too, are divided on the question. 102
The role of the religious element under the national law,
however, may be less important. The Austrian Civil Code,
still in force in some countries, prescribes that Jews are to be
divorced in c.aurt but that in the case of a mutual divorce agreement a preliminary attempt at conciliation must be made by
the priest or teacher. 103 The Marriage Law of 1836 of the
Warsaw District requires as a preliminary to court proceedings
a certificate of a rabbi on the ecclesiastical aspect of the case. 104
French and German courts have considered such regulations
no obstacle to litigation at the forum. 105 They find it more dif1937 1 523 (Lithuanian Jews); PILLET, 2 Melanges 359 1 373; NIBOYET 867
no. 7 52· App. Alger (March 7 1 1898) Clunet 1898 1 1102 (separation of Spanish
Catholics); Trib. civ. Toulouse (June 8, 1938) Revue Crit. 1939, 105 (RussianPolish Jews).
.
101 JOFE, n Revue Inst. Beige ( 19 3 6) 140.
102 Belgium: for exercising jurisdiction under application of substantive Belgian law: Trib. civ. d'Anvers (May 30, 1936); cf. 65 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles)
(r938) 295, and Cour Bruxelles (June 22, 1938) J.d.Tr. 1938, no. 3550
col. 646 (Polish Jews); JoFE 1 "Divorce de Polonais en Belgique," 45 Pand.
Per. (Jan. 1938) 5·
'
For denying jurisdiction: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (June 25, 1930) Pasicrisie
19 3 1.3 ·3 6 (Spanish Canon marriage-no divorce possible) ; App. Bruxelles
(July 9, 1932) Revue 1933, srr; Trib. civ. Bruxelles (June 25, 1930) Clunet
1932, 487, 489; Trib. civ. d'Anvers (March r, 1939) Pasicrisie I939·3·76;
also PoULLET 489 no. j78; VAN HILLE, 65 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I938)
295·

Italy: for exercising jurisdiction: Trib. Roma (June 22 1 1898) Giur. Ital.
1898, I, 2, 647 (separation of Spanish Catholics married according to canonic
formalities); for denying jurisdiction: App. Roma (June 6, I899) La Legge
I 899.2.45•
103
Allg. BGB. §§ I3 3. I 34·
104 Marriage Law, Kingdom of Poland, art. I 89, as generally interpreted. Although art. I 9 6 of the Code requires ecclesiastical jurisdiction also for Catholics
and Protestants, the German LG. Bremen (May 8, I934) JW. I934, 2353,
IPRspr. I 934, no. 55 1 concluded from the Polish international private law of
I 926 that jurisdiction should be assumed, and tried to apply the rules of both
these churches to a mixed Catholic--Protestant marriage.
105
France: Trib. civ. Strasbourg {Oct. :u, 1930) Clunet I9JI 1 x661 Revue
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ficult to adjust their own procedure to the singular presuppositions of the foreign laws. But some courts have even agreed
to recognize the activities of local religious authorities corresponding to the foreign customs. 106
The sacrifices involved in such concessions to foreign claims
are admirable instances in the development of international
cooperation. But they originated from such a superstitious
belief in the legitimacy of the nationality principle, that the
most unreasonable of all its claims, that for exclusive jurisdiction over emigrated married couples, was not questioned.
Foreign law must not be recognized, unless it is fit for international use.

III.

CoMMON ScoPE OF THE

Lex Fori

To evaluate the domain of choice of law in the countries
observing the personal law, it is necessary to go beyond the
question of jurisdiction and to realize that important questions
are everywhere governed exclusively by the law of the forum.
I.

Procedure

Procedure, of course, is the concern exclusively of local
rules. The law of the forum determines the necessity of conCrit. 1935, 753; Trib. civ. Metz (May 20, 1931) Clunet 1932, 16s, 644,
Revue Crit. 1935, 754 (Russian-Polish Jews).
Germany: RG. (Feb. 15, 1926) 113 RGZ. 38; RG. (May 20, 1935) 147
RGZ. 399; KG. (Dec. 11, 1933) JW. 1934, 619, IPRspr. 1934, no. so
(Russian-Polish Jews), overruled see infra n. 106.
Of Greek Jews, the Greek laws do not speak; cf. CARABIBER, 6 Repert. 430
nos. 95, 96; but in view of the entirely judicial and temporal procedure in Greek
legislation following Law no. 3222 of August 2&-30, 1924, the Cour Paris
(Dec. 29, 1925) Revue 1929, 25& has granted jurisdiction.
106
France: Cour Paris (Jan. 15, 1925) Revue 1925, 358; Trib. civ. Metz
(May zo, 1931) Clunet 1932, 165, 644, Revue Crit. 1935, 754· Contra: Cass.
(req.) (July zo, 1911) 8.1912.1.132; App. Rabat (May 9> 1933) Revue Crit.
1934, 125 (whether a French Algerian Jew has to give a religious bill of
divorce); AuDINET, Revue Crit. 1935, .756.
Belgium: App. Liege (June 26, 1934) Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ., Divorce 371
no. 1715 (certificate of the Grand Rabbi of Belgium accepted).
Germany: OLG. Koln (Jan. 20, 1932) JW. 1932, 2304, IPRspr. 1932, no.
78; KG. (Dec. u, 1933) JW. 1934, 619, IPRspr. 19341 no. so. Contra, overruling this practice, RG. (May zo, 1935) 147 RGZ. 399·
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tested and the permissibility of uncontested proceedings, as
well as the acts constituting procedure. 107 Provisional decrees
for separate residence or maintenance rendered during a
divorce suit also follow the procedural rules. 108
2.

Decrees

The law of the forum controls the form in which a divorce
is granted, if at all, including the choice of the persons or
authorities entrusted with granting divorces.
In certain countries, divorce is granted by the king or an
administrative authority/ 09 in others by the parliament,110
often by ecclesiastical tribunals, 111 or it. is a private agreement
between the parties either with or without some religious 112
or public control. 113 Whatever form divorce has in a country
for its own subjects, is also permitted between foreigners.
Divorce, conversely, if allowed at all, must not be granted to
foreigners according to formalities nor by persons, other than
those prescribed for subjects of the forum. Hence, religious
107 Deviating from this principle, the Appeal Court of Paris in Affaire Chiger,
Cour Paris (April 30, I926) Clunet I926, 943, Revue I927, 243 declared that
a French court could appropriate the power to determine causes for divorce in its
discretion, a power provided for by the Soviet Russian law of the time, with
respect to a controversial divorce between Soviet Russian nationals. This decision
was much criticized; cf. BARTIN, 2 Principes 302, 303.
108 Hague Convention on Divorce, art. 6; Poland: Law of I926 on international private law, art. I 7 par. 4 sentence 2; for comment, see KAHN, 2
Abhandl. 36o ff.
109 Denmark, Norway, Czechoslovakia in limited cases, police judge in
England.
1!0 Only way for the inhabitants of Newfoundland: also those of Eire and Quebec, but divorce is known to be unobtainable in both these countries. Judicial
decrees replaced Parliament bills in Ontario by the Divorce Act (Ontario) 1930,
20-21 Geo. V, c. 14 of the Statutes of Canada, I930; Northern Ireland by
Matrimonial Causes Act (Northern Ireland), I939> 2 & 3 Geo. VI, Publ. Gen.
Acts of I939, c. I 3; and in the Isle of Man by Act of I93 8.
lll Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece {since Law no. 3222 of 1924 for
Mohammedans only and perhaps Jews), Lithuania. With respect to limited
divorce: Italy, Spain, and Colombia.
112 Jewish law as mostly in use in Palestine and some eastern European countries. The rabbis assist in varying degrees, but under the provisions of the Austrian
Allg. BGB. of r8rr, § I 34, and the Marriage Law of the Kingdom of Poland
of I836, art. I89, the final decrees are rendered by the courts.
113
Soviet Russian and Mussulman countries excluding Turkey.
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and private divorces are out of the question in the United
States, 114 as well as in Western and Central Europe. French
and German courts annulled scores of divorce decrees
rendered in their territories by religious authorities, especially
in cases of Czarist Russians of various denominations, Polish
Jews, members of the Orthodox Church, and others. 115 For
instance, a divorce of a Yugoslav and a Russian of Greek
Orthodox faith by the Orthodox diocesan council in Paris was
annulled by the Tribunal de la Seine in I 930. 116
This, of course, is a purely negative proposition, leaving
unsolved the dilemma whether such persons should be granted
divorce according to the formalities of the forum or denied
divorce on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction because their
personal law requires religious proceedings. 117
114
Chertok v. Chertok (I924) 208 App. Div. I6I, 203 N.Y.S. 163 (divorce
decree by the rabbi of Brooklyn granted to a husband in New York against his
wife living in Russia, held invalid despite recognition by the Russian Government); In re Spiegel (S.D.N.Y. I928) 24 F. (zd) 6o5.
115
Belgium: Trib. Liege (March 21, 1929) Belg. Jud. I929, col. 428 (decree
by rabbi in Louvain).
France: Circular of the Garde des Sceaux of April, I 909, prohibiting the
recording of divorces granted in France by any judge without civil powers,
an abuse then often committed; Cour Paris (June 21, 19Io) Revue I91o, 837;
Cour Paris (Oct. 31, 19ro) Revue I9II, 82; Cour Paris (Dec. 26, 1912)
Revue 1913, 424; Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 20, 1920) Revue 1921, 226 at 236;
Cour Paris (March 23, 1922) and (May ro, 1922) Revue 1923, 425; Cour
Paris (Jan. xs, 1925) Revue 1925, 358; Cour App. Nancy (June 17, 1922)
Revue 1922-23, 435; Cour Colmar (May z3, I93I) Clunet 1933, 97·
Germany: Law of Jurisdiction of r S77 ( Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz) RGBl.
r 877, 4I, § r s par. 3 declares that the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in
temporal matters is without civil effect. This applies especially to marriage and
divorce. RG. (April 2I, 1921) 102 RGZ. 118; RG. (Feb. I5, I926) 113 RGZ.
4I; KG. (Dec. 16, I92o) Warn. Rspr. 192I, no. 35; RG. (Feb. 2I, 1925)
Warn. Rspr. I925, no. 133; KG. (Dec. 21, 1931) IPRspr. '93'• no. 143; KG.
(March 21, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, no. 77 (privilegium Paulinum recognized by
the Marriage Law of Warsaw (Kongresspolen) of 1836, art. 207); OLG. Kiel
(Nov. 30, I926) 91 Schlesw. Holst. Anz., N.F. (1927) 145 (repudiation under
the law of Russian Jews); LG. Berlin (Oct. 19, I 93 7) JW. I 938, 2402 (sending
of divorce bill by a Russian Jew from Germany to Russia ineffectual under
German law).
Switzerland: Justice Dept., BBl. 1937, III 141 no. 9 (divorce by the Council
of the Russian Orthodox Church in France, invalid in France and Switzerland).
116
Trib. civ. Seine (June 2, 1930) Clunet 1931, 1078.
117 See supra pp. 413-416.
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Exceptions to the principle of exclusive municipal formalities are very rare. 118 Even a consulate of a foreign power is
not usually allowed to grant divorces; apparerttly, the only
exception is contained in the German-Russian Treaty of
October 12, 1925, which permitted Russians married before
a Russian consulate in Germany to divorce by mutual agreement in accordance with Soviet lack of formalities but with
recordation thereof at the same or another Russian consulate
in Germany. 119
Domestic law also defines the wording of a divorce decree.
German courts have often considered, however, whether they
should insert in a decree divorcing foreign parties the statement required by the German Civil Code declaring which
party is in fault. The Reichsgericht finally decided that the
judgment should omit this statement only when it is either
prohibited by or would be of no significance under the personal
law.12o
3· Validity of the Marriage Prerequisite
Apart from some confusion between divorce and annulment/21 a universal prerequisite for divorce is that the marriage be considered valid at the forum or, if voidable, at least
provisionally valid. When, in the eyes of the court, the marus For Russian subjects of Armenian origin and faith, the Rumanian Cassation
Court recognized a divorce rendered by the Bishop of the Gregorian Church in
Bucharest, Cass. (May 13, 1935) Pand. Romane 1936.!.57; contra: PossA, 5
Giur. Comp. DIP. 359 no. 134, in view of the secularization of divorce by the
Rumanian constitutional laws.
ug See Final Protocol of the German Russian Treaty of Oct. u, 192.5, German
RGBI. 1926, II 6o at 8z.
120
RG. (April 18, 1918) Warn. Rspr. 1918, no. 189; RG. (Feb. 2.41 192.8)
Warn. Rspr. 1928, no. 64. KG. (March 13 1 1931) IPRspr. 1931 1 no. 8q KG.
(June 2.7 1 1932) IPRspr. 1932. 1 no. 86, etc., confirmed as steady practice, KG.
(May 30, 1938) JW. 1938, 2750; and after the Matrimonial Law of 1938
went into effect, see KG. (Aug. u, 1938) referred to in JW. 1938 1 2750 n. 1.
Cf. for Dutchmen, KG. (April 91 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 47, but also OLG.
Dusseldorf (Nov. 2.1, 1933) JW. 1934,'4371 IPRspr. 19341 no. 48. Correspondingly, Switzerland: BG. (June 13, 1912) 38 BGE. II 43 advised Swiss courts
to state culpability in the case of German spouses.
121
See infra p. 5 35.
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riage never existed or has already been dissolved, there is no
subject matter for the proceeding to dissolve the marriage
tie. On the other hand, if the marriage is recognized in the
forum, it is immaterial whether it is recognized in the country
to which the parties belong.
A significant application of this principle is the case of a
so-called matrimonium claudicans (limping marriage) celebrated either at the forum or abroad under circumstances warranting its recognition as valid at the forum, which is considered invalid under the personal law because of formal or
intrinsic defects. If, for instance, without a religious ceremony
a Bulgarian married a French woman in Paris before a civil
official, the marriage, valid and dissoluble in France, would
be null and therefore indissoluble in Bulgaria. 122 In such case,
the countries that ordinarily take the personal law into consideration disregard it. When the parties marry within the
forum, consistency and dignity of the jurisdiction require that
the forum stand upon the validity of the marriage. 123
Thus, a marriage annullable in the home country of the
party involved may be dissolved in the country of its celebration, each court taking the only way available for the
termination of the marriage ties.
The German courts have made it clear that in these cases
the law of the forum alone is to be applied and the personal
122 Cf. J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 450.
123 Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (May 2 1923) Pasicrisie 1923.3.133, Clunet
1
1924, 1098 (Russian-Polish Catholic).
France: Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 19, 1920) Clunet 1921, 184, Revue 19221923, 306; cf. also 6 Repert. 431 no. 97 (civil marriage of an Orthodox Greek);
Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. rs, 1922) Clunet 1922, 396' (Polish Jew married to

Catholic French woman before registrar in Brussels).
Germany: RG. (Dec. 17, 1908) 70 RGZ. 139 1 143; RG. (Nov. 16, 1922)
I05 RGZ. 363 (Czarist Russians married in conformance with temporal formalities in Germany); RG. (Oct. I, 1925) JW. I926, 375, Warn. Rspr. 1926,
no. 15 (Orthodox Greek married to, a Norwegian girl in Norway, the marriage
being recognized in Germany under the law of the place of celebration, EG.
art. II par. I sentence 2); OLG. Dresden (Nov. 9> 1933) JW. 1934, 1740,
IPRspr. 1934, no. 46; RG. (Nov. 7, 1935) Warn. Rspr. 1935, no. 192; KG.
(Jan. 14, 1937) JW. 1937, 961; LG. Berlin (Nov. z, 1937) JW. 1938, 395>
Clunet I938, 824; and other decisions, see infra n. 124.
Switzerland: App. Bern (May 301 1923) 6o ZBJV. (I924) 40.

DIVORCE

421

124

law entirely ignored.
It is not feasible, for instance, to
apply to the divorce by analogy foreign rules of separation.
The cases also have required adjustment of the ordinary jurisdictional rules 125 to meet the needs of the party interested
in dissolution rather than annulment of the marriage.
In this latter respect, an analogous doctrine developed in
England in cases ex misericordia. In Stathatos v. Stathato~, 126
a Greek, having married an Englishwoman at a registry office
in London and taken her to Athens, sent her back to England;
at his instance, the marriage was declared null in Athens, while
it was undoubtedly valid in England. In this and another
case, 127 English courts affirmed their divorce jurisdiction
despite the lack of an English marital domicil. This doctrine
of an exceptional domicil of the wife for the purpose of
divorce was embodied in a st~tute of New Zealand 128 but is
now deemed overruled in England. 129 The main remedy to
124
RG. (Dec. 17, 1908) 70 RGZ. 144, cited supra n. 123; RG. (May 41 1933)
JW. 1933, 2582 (the decisive passage was published by LEWALD, Revue Crit.
1934, 663); KG. (Dec. 11, 1933) JW. 1934, 6r9, IPRspr. 1934, no. so; KG.
(April2o, 1936) JW. 1936, 2464; LG. Berlin (Nov. 2, 1937) JW. 1938, 395;
LG. Berlin (Feb. 3, 1938) JW. 1938, 1273; OLG. Konigsberg (Feb. r, 1937)
Recht 1938, 22 no. 194. This theory was advocated by LEWALD 111 no. 158,
and Revue Crit. 1934, 661; SCHONDORF, 7 5 Jherings Jahrb. 53, 74; 1 FRANKENSTEIN 233 n. 189 1 3 ibid. 425. Contra: RAAPE 401; also Hans. OLG. (Oct. 25,
1933) JW. 1934, 242, r6 Hans. RGZ. (1933) B. col. 683, Revue Crit. 1934,
661, and the French Cass. (civ.) (Oct. 30, 1905) Revue 19o6, 730. See on the
broader problem of "limping marriages," supra p. 233.
125
According to the Hague Convention on Divorce, art. 5 no. 2 in fine, the
foreign jurisdiction exists (even in the case of an exclusive jurisdiction claimed
by the national courts) over a marriage with respect to which action for divorce
or separation cannot be brought before the competent court of the national state.
Sweden: Int. Fam. Law of 1904 with subsequent amendments, c. 3 § 1 par. 2
final words. German OLG. Karlsruhe (June 13, 1933) JW. 1933, 1669.
126 [r9IJ] P. 46.
127
Montaiguv. Montaigu [1913] P. 154.
128
New Zealand: Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Amendment Act, New
Zealand Statutes, 21 Geo. V, Session III (1930) No. 43 p. 248 sec. 3; cf. Worth
v. Worth [1931] N. Z. L. R. 1109. ,
129
H. v. H. [1928] P. 2o6; Herd v. Herd [1936] P. 205, 105 L. J.P.
D. & A. 108 (the husband abandoned his English domicil of origin and lived in
the United States; divorce denied the wife on ground of lack of jurisdiction of
English court); cf. CHESHIRE 357; for Canada: Hocc, "Domicile of a Married
Woman in Relation to Divorce," 6 Can. Bar Rev. (1928) 655, 666; FALCONBRIDGE, Annotation [1932] 4 D. L. R. 37·
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free the parties from a marriage void in the homeland is now
usually found in the recognition extended by English courts
to any annulment decree that may be granted by the competent
authority of the husband's domicil. 130 The same attitude has
been recommended to the courts of Canada, 131 and a similar
position was taken in a recent Scotch case, in which a marriage
with a Hindu was held valid in Scotland, though invalid in
India. The Scotch court denied the application of the wife,
who was living in Scotland, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, although the court knew that she would be unable to prosecute litigation in India. 132 The entire proposition seems very
unsatisfactory. At the instance of the foreign- party, a foreign
annulment is recognized to the disadvantage of the wife, while
the bond of marriage created by the law of the forum is disowned and the wife is denied on a purely formal ground the
right to divorce. 133

IV.
I.

CHOICE OF LAW

Lex Fori

United States. The principle in the United States is that a
divorce court applies the law of the forum to determine
whether divorce is admissible, as well as whether the party's
conduct or other event complained of constitutes a ground for
divorce. 134
This system was shared, a century ago, by general European
theory and practice. Savigny 135 supported the system by the
belief that divorce law is imperative in nature, because it
expresses moral conceptions purporting to be of absolute value.
130

Unanimous opinion following the Salveson case, infra p. 543·

lal
132

2. JoHNSON 36-40.

Watson-Mangrulkar v. Mangulkar [I939] S.C. 2.39 (Session Case). Cf.
Thomson v. Thomson (I9JS) Sc. L. T. 2.4 (Outer House of Ct. of Sess.).
133 See KEITH, "Some Problems in the Conflict of Laws," I 6 Bell Yard (I 9 35)
I 5 and supra p. 2. 34, n. I 42..
134
Stewart v. Stewart (I 9 I 9) 3 2 Idaho I So, I So Pac. I 6 5; Restatement § I 35·
135 SAVIGNY § 379 no. 6.
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Many writers and courts advocated the same idea. 136 This
doctrine slowly disappeared, however, until, at the Hague
Conference, it was found to have almost no proponents. 137
In this country, application of the lex fori seems to have
been justified by the merely statutory nature of divorce, the
effect of statutes being believed to be necessarily territoriala theory going clearly back to such fathers of territorialism as
D'Argentre and Ulricus Huber. It has also been advanced
that divorce remedies are special or equitable and therefore
cannot be exercised except by the courts of the state establishing the remedy. Sometimes there is invoked the general
motivation for territorialism that, the "res" being located
within the state, the state's interest prevails. It may be hoped
that nowadays nobody cares seriously for all these artificial
and worn-out assertions.
Neither are we any better served, when it is argued, especially in the Restatement, that "the law of the forum governs the right to divorce not because it is the place where
the action is brought but because it is the domicil of one or
both of the parties." 138 Story 139 and his contemporaries could
properly propose such a theory with respect to the matrimonial
domicil, whereby they had simply the husband's domicil in
mind. To identify the law of the forum with that of the
domicil is correct when divorce is rendered exclusively at the
136 BuRGE (ed. 2), 3 Colonial and Foreign Law 923; LAURENT, 5 Principes
no. x8·s; I BReCHER 297; OLJVI, Revue I885, 55; AssER-coHN 67, French tr.
by RIVIER (x884) II6; UNGER, I System I93 § 23 n. 126. This was the prevailing opinion in Germany before the Civil Code, see RG. (June I9, I883)
9 RGZ. I 9 I ; NIEMEYER, Positives Intern. Privatrecht §§ 99, 10o, and in I
Z.int.R. (I89x) J6I, 2 Z.int.R. (I892) 473> 5 Z.int.R. (I895) I67, I68 n. J;
in former Austria, see OGH. (March 27, I935) 8 Jahrb. Hiichst. Entsch. nos.
I564, I565; OGH. (May 27, I935) 8 Jahrb. Hiichst. Entsch. no. I04I; WALKER
722, 728, and I KLANG'S Kommentar 324; in Czarist Russia, see MANDELSTAM,
Clunet I902, 490; in former Turkey, see Clunet I9o3, 86, 96.
137 The learned Norwegian delegate Beichmann, Actes de la Deuxieme Conference de la Haye (I894) 73, was the main advocate of the lex fori, but
presented it as identical with the law of the domicil. Likewise, I BAR § I 73·
138 Restatement § I35 comment a.
139 STORY § 229 a.
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matrimonial domicil. The predication is manifestly wrong so
soon as there are two domicils of the parties.
The reasonableness of the rule appears never to have been
questioned. This alone, the unvarying application of the local
statute in every American court, makes it clear that the principle of territorialism with its strong roots in the past common
law has in fact here found one more expression. The spirit of
independence and the need to sever an immigrant or settler
from his former associations may have contributed to perpetuate this indifference to the outside world. As the story
goes, 140 it was almost half a century before the potentialities
of the N ev:ada statute of I 86 I, with six months' residence, for
affording easy divorces on a large scale was grasped by a
former New York attorney. Those early legislations were
simple documents of pioneers. If so, we may wonder why
under changed circumstances the application of foreign divorce
law never has been taken into consideration, while the choice
of law problem is so prominent in Europe and while also in
this country the main purpose of conflicts law is perfectly
acknowlydged as being the achievement of uniformity in establishing the solution of a legal question irrespective of the
forum. 141 There may be, indeed, no positive reason at all
but only a negative explanation for this result. At any rate, we
cannot overlook the fact that the actual doctrine has no clear
conceptual basis and that this lack of foundation has greatly
contributed to the much deplored confusion and anarchy in
this field.
Other countries. The law of the forum is openly applied to
any person in Soviet Russia 142 and in some Latin American
countries,143 upon the basis of the territorial principle. Also
140

INGRAM and BALLARD, "The Business of Migratory Divorce in Nevada,"

2 Law and Cont. Probl. (r935) 302, 305.
141

See supra p. 8 7.
MAKARov, Precis 396 attests a uniform doctrine.
143
E.g., see the declaration of the Colombian delegation in signing the Codigo
Bustamante, 86 League of Nations Treaty Series (1929) 374; Venezuela: Cass.
(June rs, 1914) Memoria 1915, 17I, 172; Cass. (Feb. u, 1921) Memoria
142
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in Denmark, Norway, and Iceland, traditionally the law of
the forum is applied, although the writers doubt whether it
is not rather the law of the domicil that is applied, because
usually divorce is not granted unless both parties are domiciled
within the forum or both parties had their last domicil and
one continues to live, within the country. 144 It might be advisable to construe soberly all these rules on the basis of
territorialism and lex fori rather than in terms of the principle
of domicil. 145 The manner in which specific problems are
solved by prevailing practice is more in accordance with the
lex fori principle. Also, the application of the American rule
by Continental courts, resulting from the nationality principle
and renvoi, is much simplified, if we understand it as based
on the law of the forum. 146
Latin American treaties. On the other hand, the Treaty of
Montevideo has unequivocally declared domiciliary law to
determine not only jurisdiction for divorce 147 but also, in a
provision correctly separated, 148 the right to divorce. The
problem, it is true, appeared in its simplest form, since jurisdiction is exClusive for the court of the present or last matrimonial domicil.
I922, I62, I63. The recent law of Brazil (I942) does not mention separation
in Brazil, but includes it in the "domiciliary" law applicable according to Lei de
Introdu~ao art. 7· EsPINOLA, 8-B Tratado I o66 asserts that in the case of different domicils, both laws must be attended concerning permissibility and causes
of separation.
144
Denmark: BoRUM, Personalstatutet 490 n. 5; BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 2 I 4 no. 8; ibid. at 220 nos. 48ff.; MuNCH-PETERSEN, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld
I 747·
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 57 5 no. I I 8.
Iceland: EYJOLFSSON, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 762; LONING in 9 Z.ausl.PR.
(I935) 407; see also German RG. (April 6, I936) I5I RGZ. Io3.
The Scandinavian Convention arts. 7, 9 starts from a primary rule that divorce
is rendered at the matrimonial domicil, but states exceptions, and finally declares
the law of the forum applicable.
145
FALCONBRIDGE, Annotation [I932] 4 D. L. R. 36 prefers the domiciliary
angle but concedes doubts on this point.
146
Infra pp. 446ff.
147
Treaty on international civil law, text of I 889, art. 62; text of I 940, art.
59· On restrictions of the principle, see supra n. 46.
148
Treatfof Montevideo, text of I 889, art. 13b; text of I 940, art. I sb.
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In the same way, the C6digo Bustamante clearly isolates
the choice of law question and with one exception subjects the
right to divorce to the law of the marital domicil. 149 This
is a remarkable victory for the domiciliary principle, as usually
the Havana Code does not decide which is the personal law.
2.

Diverse Contacts

As an aftereffect of former conceptions,150 divorce sometimes has been assimilated to the dissolution of ordinary contracts; as a matter of fact, all requisites of marriage in this
country are considered governed by the law of the place of
celebration, indicated by the historic rule for contracts. This
idea has also played a role in determining the dissolution of
marriage 151 and continues to do so in a few countries. In
particular, the Marriage Law of Argentina provides, in a
section known for the incessant complications and doubts it
has provoked in the world, that a foreign divorce of a marriage celebrated in the Argentine Republic does not entitle
either of the spouses to remarry, if the divorce is inconsistent
with the Code. 152 This means, in the prevailing though con149

Codigo Bustamante art. 52 {for the exception of art. 54, see infra p. 430).
See supra p. 396.
PuTTER, 3 Rechtsfalle, part I, So, 85, quoted by 1 BAR 486 §I 73 n. 6, tr. by
GILLESPIE 384 § I73 n. 10; Austrian Imperial Decree of Oct. z3,. I8ot,
Justizgesetzsammlung no. 542; cf. WALKER 727 n. 14; D'OLIVECRONA in Clunet
I883, 343 at 359· For criticism of this theory, see STORY § 23oa, and WEISS,
3 Traite 6 82. But it is the basis on which BARTIN, 2 Principes 3 23 § 3 I 8 advocates
application of the national law of the husband at the time of the marriage.
Peru: The Supreme Court of Peru, in a series of decisions declared that a
foreign marriage could not be dissolved for causes not recognized in the country
of celebration. See Ej. (July 2, 1929) 25 Anales Jud. (1929) 78 (Japanese
marriage) and cases cited by APARICIO y SANCHEZ, 8 Codigo Civil, Concordancias 70. Contra Ej. (June 20, I936) 32 Anales Jud. (1936) Ioo (consent
divorce.) The C. C. of Aug. 30, 1936 seems to eliminate this practice.
152
Argentine Civil Marriage Law of x888, art. 7, cf. art. 82. Divorces of
Argentine marriages and foreign marriages must be distinguished, apart from
the ordinary distinction of domestic and foreign divorces. Cf. the clear survey by
ROMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int. Priv. 3 I 3-320. A related provision of the Chilean
C. C. art. 120 was adopted also by Ecuador: C. C. art. I I 6; El Salvador: C. C.
art. 170; Uruguay: C. C. art. 103; and refers to all divorces granted abroad
which the municipal law would not permit.
1
See infra n. 178.
150
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tested opinion, that a foreign, e.g., Uruguayan, divorce of a
marriage celebrated in Argentina is invalid in Argentina.
The Treaty of Montevideo of 1889 implying this interpretation 153 invalidates such a divorce in all member states/ 54
although Uruguay departs from this rule on the ground of
public policy. 155 It is a fortunate concession to international
needs that, in the new I 940 draft of Montevideo, Argentina
acquiesced in the elimination of this extraterritorial effect of
the law of the place of celebration; the proviso was changed
into a mere rbervation allowing the state of celebration to
deny recognition to foreign divorces. 156
The Polish Supreme Court resorted to the law of the place
of celebration to solve the problem arising from interprovincial conflicts, 157 while the Rumanian Supreme Court rejected this test. 158 The Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia
seems to .have returned to the idea. 159
Any reference to the place where the offence to marital
duties was committed has long been abandoned in all
countries. 160 But reference to the law of the place where the
cause for divorce accrued is found in America in sporadic attempts to limit jurisdiction for divorce. 161
3· National Law Cumulatively Applied with the Lex Fori
In most civil law countries, the two questions of jurisdiction
and applicable law are distinguished as a matter of course, and,
with respect to the latter, consideration is given to the lex fori
in conjunction with the lex patriae. However, the approach
vartes.
53
1
154

2 VICO nos. 107, 108,
Treaty on international civil law, art. 13b.
155
See infra p. 480,
156
Art. I5b.
157
Polish S. Ct., Plenary decision (Oct. 9-1 6, 19 37) 5 Z.osteurop.R. ( 19 3 81939) 459·
158
Rumania: S. Ct. (March 3, 1937) 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1937-1938) 320,
159
See Sup. Ct. (Feb, 28, 1929) no. 8745 and (March 1, 1934) no. 13328,
·
10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 171; 1 BERGMANN 746.
160
STORY § 230a; I BAR 487 § 173 n, 9a, tr, by GILLESPIE 385 § 173 n. 16.
181
See infra p. 454·
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France and others. In France and the majority of other
countries following the French Code, 162 grant of divorce must
accord with the national law of the parties and not contravene
the forum's public policy understood in its broadest sense.
The observance of the national law is the rule, and public
policy intervenes as a basis for exceptions, the determination
of which is left to the discretion of the courts and which therefore remain measurably uncertain. 163 In fact, they cover many,
if not most, cases. 164
The Dutch courts, which started with this basis, seem now to
apply exclusively Dutch divorce law, disregarding the personal law where they are not bound by the Hague Convention
to consider it. 165 For the Netherlands, this is extraordinary.
In the German legislation, and those following its lead,
viz., those of Sweden, China, and Japan, and by the unwritten
law of Greece, divorce depends directly and concurrently upon
conformity with the national law and the law of the forum. 166
162 France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Rumania, Portugal; and with respect to
separation from bed and board, Brazil (until I 942), Italy and Spain and the
more recent enactments of French and Spanish Morocco. See subsequent footnotes
for cases. This system has been adopted by numerous Latin American writers,
e.g., MATOS no. 258, cf. also no. 264.
163 See NIBOYET 746; PouLLET 49Iff. no. 379; KoLLEWIJN, Het beginsel der
openbare or de (I 9 I 7) 90.
164 NI'BOYET, Notions Sommaires (I937) I87 no. 3IO bis, even formulates a
simple principle of cumulative application of the personal and the French laws,
parallel to the German system.
165
The decision ofthe Hooge Raad (Dec. q, 1907) W. 8636, Clunet I9It,
I 3 34 had attracted attention, as it applied Dutch law to American citizens
domiciled in the Netherlands, not by renvoi but as the lex fori. Cf., for instance,
the criticism by KoLLEWIJN, Het beginsel dcr openbare orde 87. See the later
decisions Rb. Amsterdam (Jan. II, I924) Clunet 1925, II2o; Rb. den Haag
(April 7, 1932) W. 1266I; Hof den Haag (June 22, I933) W. I27I5; Hof
Amsterdam (June 27, 1935) W. I2956; Rb. Almelo (Jan. 22, 1936) W. I937,
no. 54 (Lithuanians); Hof den Haag (June 5, 1936) W. I936, no. I052 (Germans, after Germany had left the Hague Convention).
166
Germany: EG. art. t 7 par. 4· Divorce cannot be pronounced in this
country upon the ground of a foreign law, unless it is permissible according to
both the foreign law and the German laws.
Sweden: Int. Fam. Law of 1904 with amendments, c. 3, § 2.
China: Law of I9t8, art. II.
Japan: Law of I898, art. I6.
Greece: App. Patras (I936) no. I7I, clunet I937> 369; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS
372·
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This system of cumulation was adopted by the Hague Convention.167 Although in this group the domestic divorce law
does not operate merely by way of exception, the rule refers,
here too, to the national law in the first place, with the internal
law controlling permissibility and causes for divorce. Hence,
also under these statutes, the divorce decree is founded on the
foreign law.
Under the Swiss statute, however, the roles are reversed;
if both laws consent, divorce is "pronounced according to
Swiss law." 168 The courts have concluded from this provision
that Swiss law must be applied to all legal effects of divorce,
such as ali.mentary obligations and guardianship over children.169

v.
I.

APPLICATION OF THE NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE

Permissibility of Divorce and Grounds for Divorce Distinguished

The disposition of the Hague Convention relating to Divorce and Separation, that the granting of divorce or separation
must conform with the national law of the parties as well as
with the law of the forum, is in two parts:
"Art. I. Married persons may apply for a divorce provided
the law of the state to which they belong (national law) and
the law of the place where the application is made both permit
divorce.
"The same applies to separation from bed and board.
"Art. 2. Divorce may be granted only if obtainable in the
particular case under both the national law of the spouses
167
Hague Convention on Divorce of I902, art: I:" .•. provided their national
law and the law of the place where the application is made both admit divorce."
168
Swiss NAG. art. 7h last paragraph. Similarly, Belgian Congo: C. C. book 1
art. I 3 par. 2.
169
BG. (June I3, 1912) 38 BGE. II 43, 49; BG. (May 28, 1914) 40 BGE. II
305, 308; BG. {Nov. 27, 1918) 44 BGE. II 453, 454; BG. (Feb. 2, 1921) 47
BGE. II 6; BG. (Dec. 1o, 1936) 62 BGE. II 26.5.
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and the law of the place where the application is made, though
on different grounds.
"The same applies to separation from bed and board."
There is nothing in the Convention to justify such a division of the rules, but this division had been established by
the discussions of the Institute of International Law 170 and
during the Hague Conference 171 for the purpose of a differentiated regulation. The distinction has regained significance in the C6digo Bustamante; under article 52, the right to
separation or divorce is governed by the law of the matrimonial domicil, while under article 54 the causes for divorce
or separation are subject to the hw of the place of suit, provided that the parties are domiciled in the forum. It is difficult
to understand this provision.
Generally, such distinctions are me1:de for the purpose of
analytical discussion but without any intended contrast. 172
2.

Permissibility of Divorce

(a) Under the law of the forum. Complete dissolution of
the marriage bond is at present prohibited in South Carolina,
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ireland, Italy,
Paraguay, and since 1938 again in Spain; also for Catholics
in the countries observing the Austrian Civil Code-Liechtenstein, parts of Poland and Yugoslavia-and for Catholics
under Czarist Russian law in other parts of Poland; and under
canon law in Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria,
and parts of Lithuania.
170 Annuaire I887-I888, 125, the national law should govern the question
whether or not divorce is allowed at all, and the law of the forum decides the
grounds for divorce.
171 See Actes de la Troisieme Conference de la Haye, I9oo, I93; KAHN, z
Abhandl. 3z I.
172
In the Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text of I889, art.
13 b, it is required that "the alleged cause" be agreeable to the law of the place
of celebration. This is too narrow an expression, as it must have been intended to
include permissibility of divorce in the first place. This mistake was not corrected
in the I 940 draft.
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Although legislators generally do not envisage persons other
than subjects of the forum, a divorce not granted to domiciliaries or nationals is not granted to foreigners. Religious
and ethical reasons, as well as respect for the judicial institutions of the forum, motivate this rule. The rule, which was
observed in France until divorce was reintroduced in r 8 84,173
is in force in Spain, 174 Italy (with short interruption, however, much noticed during the preparation for the Hague
Convention) / 75 Brazil,176 Argentina (though with considerable opposition), 177 and probably everywhere in the countries
mentioned in the previous paragraph.
By an analogous rule, foreigners cannot obtain any form of
limited divorce unknown to the forum. Whatever type of
judicial separation short of complete dissolution of the marriage ties may be prescribed by the national law, no form of
separation not provided by the law of the forum is granted.
Where, for instance, no divorce other than absolute divorce
is allowed, it is not possible to obtain any limited kind of
separation. These principles, not so natural as they sound, as
173
174

WEiss, 3 Traite 689ff.
TRiAs DE BEs, 6 Repert. z55 no. II x.
175 Following the contemporary trend toward permitting divorce of foreigners
whose national law did not oppose it, divorces were granted to foreigners by
App. Ancona (March zz, 1884) Monitore 1884, 365, Giur. Ital. 1884, II, Z471
App. Genova (June 7, 1894) Monitore 1894, 784, Giur. Ital. 1894, I, z, 554,
Clunet 1898, 4IZ; Trib. Milano {June z, 1897) Monitore 1897, 514 and
{June 30, 1898) Giur. Ital. 1898, I, 2, 765, aff'd App. Milano {Nov. 24, 1898)
Monitore 18 99, 64. But the last-mentioned decision was reversed by Cass.
Torino (Nov. zt, 1900) Monitore 19oo, 981; similarly, Cass. Firenze (Dec. 6,
19oz) Clunet 1903, 91o, and all later decisions, applauded by the writers; see
Bosco, z2 Rivista (1930) 461, soo; FEDOZZI 466 n. 3· On the sensation caused
at the Hague meetings by this temporary liberalism, see KAHN, z Abhandl. 31 3ff.
Among the other literature see z FIORE no. 689, generally followed in Latin
America; see e.g., MATOS, no. 564.
176
Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. {Sept. 18, 1920) App. civ. no. z, 755, z3 Revista
Jur. (1921) 496; Distr. Fed. {Sept. 1, 193z) per EDMUNDO DE OLIVEIRA
FIGUEIREDO in 23 Arch. Jud. 478, cf. 0CTAVIO, Dicionario, Divorcio absoluto 88
no. 4o8ff.; 2 PoNTES DE MIRANDA 8o and 6 Repert. 166 no. 44·
177
Argentine Civil Marriage Law of 1888, arts. 81, 82. There is opposition
now to the rigidity of excluding divorce for foreigners; cf, ROMERO DEL PRADO,
Der. Int. Priv. 314.
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we shall see, may create real hardship. Nevertheless, the
maxim is universal and fully adopted by the Hague Convention·on Divorce (art. I).
(b) Undet the national law. By virtue of the nationality
principle, divorce a vinculo is denied if the national law does
not permit dissolution of a marriage during the lifetime
of both spouses. If, for instance, an Italian subject were married to an Argentine bride in Argentina, 178 divorce cannot .be
obtained in Germany, because the husband's national law
forbids it, 179 nor in France because neither national law allows
it.180
The question has been raised, however, whether, in a
country having the institution of divorce, the public policy
that regards the institution as based on, morality and social
sanity is so strong that it must oppose foreign prohibitions.
When the temporary Spanish Republic had solemnly introduced dissolution of marriage, it seemed unbearable to refuse
its benefits to any category of persons, even foreigners. 181
178 Case of Trib. civ. Seine (May I I, I 9 3 3) Revue Crit. I 9 34, 129. It is
disputed in Argentine literature whether under the Argentine Civil Marriage
Law of I888, art. 82, a marriage celebrated in Argentina can be dissolved in a
foreign country that has not signed the Montevideo Treaty, so that remarriage
abroad is legal. The negative answer, presented by the decision in I oo Gac.
del Foro (I932) 78 col. 2, and RoMERO DEL PRADO, Der Int. Priv. 3I9 (with
CALANDRELLI, WE!SS-ZEBALLOS, LLERENA) has been approved also by the
Camara civil de Apelaciones de la Capital (March 14, I 9 3 5) 49 ].A. so s, Clunet
I937> I24; see also SCHLEGELBERGER, 4 Z.ausl.PR. (I930) 756. The opposite
view (GoNZALEZ, MACHADO, LAFA!LLE, ALCORTA, Vrco, REBORA) has been
said to be the prevailing opinion by a mistaken German author GoTTSCH!CK in
JW. I930, I827, who has been followed by numerous German decisions, such
as those enumerated by 2 BERGMANN 8 n. I and KG. Berlin (Feb. 9, I 9 3 I)
IPRspr. I93 I, .no. 68.
179
EG. art. I 7 par. 4· It makes no difference whether the marriage was
celebrated in Germany, OLG. Hamburg (Sept. 2, I936) Hans.RGZ. I936, B
486 no. I 71.
180
Trib. civ. Seine (May 2, I9 I 8) Clunet I 9 I 8, I I 82; Cour Paris (April 30,
I926) S.1926.2.89, D.1927.2.1. Correspondingly, in Trib. civ. Seine (May u,
1933) Revue Crit. 1934, 129 (see supra n. 178) a divorce granted to the parties
in Uruguay was not recognized in France, Czechoslovakia: S. Ct. civ., nos. 6787,
9079; but cf. S. Ct. (March I, 1934) no. 13328.
181
Republican Spain: Trib. Supr. {Jan. z7, I933) 207 Sent. 56; cf. Revue
I933, 533, '1.4 Rivista (I9JZ) 567.
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Analogous decisions have occasionally occurred elsewhere. 182
But prevailing opinions have preferred strict application of
divorce prohibitions imposed on the parties by their national
law. 183 It must be admitted that by this strict application the
policy of permitting the dissolution of marriage appears
weaker than its counterpart, the policy of inseparability of
spouses.
(c) Separation. A further consequence of the nationality
principle is that separation from bed and board, or judicial
or administrative separation of any other kind, except provisional measures, depends upon the approval of such an
institution by the national law of the parties. 184 Since, according to present general opinion,185 the kind of separation
granted must also conform with the law of the forum, doubts
arise when each law has a form of limited divorce, but the
forms are not identical. The varieties are numerous indeed. 186
But, apart from the very complicated problems caused in
Germany by the creation of a particular type of "dissolution
of the marital union" in the Civil Code of 1896/ 87 problems
which disappeared in 1938 with the abolition of this un182
Rumania: PLASTARA, 7 Repert. 68 no. I92 notes decisions both ways.
Belgium: Divorce to two Catholic Austrians was granted by App. Liege
(Nov. 2, I937) J.d. Tr. I937> col. 672 no. J5I2, 23 Bull. lnst. Beige (I937)
7 6; 24 ibid. ( 1 9 3 8) 52; this decision joins several other Belgian manifestations
of a liberal policy stronger than the usual; cf. infra. ns. 217-219, 222.
183
See, for instance, German RG. (Jan. IJ, 1936) 150 RGZ. 61, Nouv. Revue
I937, 109; Belgium: Cass. (March 9, 1882) Pasicrisie 1882.1.62; cf. POULLET
487 no. 377 and the foregoing notes 179 and I 8o.
184 See for the late law of Brazil: Jos:E F. MANSUR GUERIOS, "Desquite por
mutuo consentimento," 53 Rev. Jur. Bras. (1941) ItJ, 114.
185 Under the former pure theory of national law, the Trib. civ. Bruxelles
(May 8, I9o8) Pand. Per. I9o8.6o4 granted a separation on the mutual agreement of the parties according to the foreign law unsupported by the Belgian law.
186
See for comparative legislation, ROGUIN, I Traite de droit civil compare,
le Mariage (I9o4) 237; BERGMANN, 2 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 723.
187
Cf. RAAPE 381; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 474; cf. also 3 FRANKENSTEIN
468. See LEWALD, 57 Recueil 1936 III JI3 on the decisions of the highest
Dutch and Swiss courts.
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fortunate institution, few difficulties seem to have been encountered.188
A much deplored result 189 of the double legal requirements concerning separation occurs in the numerous international situations where one of the legislations involved provides only for absolute divorce and the other only for separation, or where the spouses loyal to their faith or to their
nationallegislati~n do not want the absolute divorce available
at the forum. In these cases, neither form of relief can be
conferred under the system of nationality. 190 The consequences are apt to include special inconveniences, especially
when the parties, faced with barred doors at their domicil,
are refused jurisdiction even in their homeland. 191 A court
having only absolute divorce, besides merely provisional
orders, at its disposal, such as the Rumanian or the German
tribunals, 192 is unable to give any relief to parties for whom
Italian, 193 Brazilian/ 91 etc., law is considered applicable, al188 Italians are separated in Switzerland; see decisions in 6 Z.ausl.PR. (I932)
836; 7 ibid. (I933) 644; II ibid. (I937) 656. In France, it was decided that
the effect of a French separation of Italians should be determined by Italian law
rather than French; see Cour Dijon (March 28, I939) Clunet I939, 634.
Portuguese nationals before I9 3 I could be separated but not divorced in France;
see Trib. civ. Seine (June I2, I8 8 8) Gaz. Pal. I8 88.1.902. Nationals of countries
recognizing judicial separation may likewise obtain separation in Portugal; see
CuNHA GoN<;ALVES, Direito Civil 696 (where also conversion of separation
into divorce is treated).
189
Cf. especially KAHN, 2 Abhandl. 330, 339, 342 (more violently than is
justified by his strong position against the law of the forum) and WALKER 702.
190 OLG. Kiel (May r6, I934) JW. I934, 2349, IPRspr. I934, no. 59
(Danish law) ; RG. (Nov. 4, I9 3 7) I 56 RGZ. I o6. Austrian separations from
bed and board have been transformed, according to the Law of July 6, I938,
§ I I 5 by a simple procedure and without instituting a new suit, into full German
divorces between persons who have become German subjects, RG. (Dec. 15,
I938) 159 RGZ. 76.
191
Compare, for instance, Rumanian C. C. art. 2 I 6, and KAHN, 2 Abhandl.
339· But see WALKER 703.
192
Since I 9 3 8, no limited divorce has existed in Germany, but the situation
was materially the same before, according to the opinion prevailing in the court
decisions. See OLG. Breslau (Sept. 8, 1933) JW. I933> 24oo, IPRspr. 1933,
no. 33·
193
Compare PLASTARA, 7 Repert. 68 no. 195, and FEDOZZI 461.
194
Just. Fed. Nictheroy (Oct. 3I, 1922) 66 Revista Dir. Civ. (I922) 314;
cf. OcTAVIO, Dicionario no. 319ff.
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though these legislations allow separation from bed and board.
Inversely, Italian courts deny such separation to Rumanian or
German nationals, because the parties' national law does not
provide separation. For the latter case, it was suggested that
this hardship should be alleviated on the ground that the
larger remedy is agreeable to the personal law, and some
Brazilian courts have proceeded in consequence,19.5 while
others have been opposed. 196 Yet at the Hague Conference,
it was answered that limited divorce is not a "minus" which
may be subtracted from absolute divorce, but a different
thing. 197
The Brazilian practice, previous to the law of I 942, was
interesting. The courts in principle required agreement of
the national laws of both parties for granting separation by
mutual consent (desquite amigavel) but granted it also in
three exceptional cases, viz., the case just mentioned of the
national law allowing absolute divorce, the case of renvoi, 198
and the case where one party is of Brazilian nationality. 199
These decisions seem to retain authority in cases where foreigners are not domiciled in Brazil.
19 5 The cases of this note and notes 196 and 198 have been kindly pointed out
by Miss Magdalene Schoch, Harvard Law School. Rumanian spouses or husband:
Ap. Pernambuco (1938) ll5 Rev. dos Trib. 745; Ap. civ. Sao Paulo ( 1938) u6
ibid. 157; 126 ibid. 171; German spouses: Ap. civ. Sao Paulo (1941) 131 ibid.
243; Ap. civ. Rio de Janeiro no. 8260 (Jan. 13, 1942) 61 Arch. Jud. (1942)
314; Japanese husband: Trib. Sao Paulo (Dec. 4, 1931) cited by 2 PoNTES DE

MIRANDA 83.
196

-

The Appellate Court of Parana in Plenary Meeting of its chambers (June 6,
1941) 34 Parana Jud. (1941) 59 adopting the nationality principle denied
separation by consent to German parties. Sao Paulo (1941) 133 Rev. dos Trib.
152 (German husband, Russian wife; no desquite in Brazil, as both German
and Russian law, in case she should have retained Russian nationality, do not
provide separation).
197 See documentation in OLG. Kiel (May r6, 1934) JW. 1934, 2349, IPRspr.
1934, no. 59·
198 Sup. Fed. Ct. (1937) 112 Rev. dos Trib. 334 (obiter dictum); Ap. civ.
Sao Paulo (1938) u8 ibid. 715; Ap. civ. Sao Paulo (1939) 123 Rev. dos
Trib. 597 (Czechoslovakian law of husband applied as the German law of the
wife refers also to that law) .
199
See infra n. 2 36.
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3· Grounds for Divorce
Under the principle of lex fori or lex domicilii as well as
Utider that of nationality, applied exclusively, the right to
divorce is governed by one law. The English courts demonstrate how seriously they accept this doctrine by applying, on
the one hand, only English law in any divorce suit in England
and, on the other hand, by recognizing foreign divorce decrees
of the matrimonial domicil without inquiring into what law
was applied in the qse. Similarly, when French courts adhered
to the pure nationality rule, they granted divorce for reasons
found in the national law but not in French law. 200 This point
of view still exists in some countries. 201 Of course, causes repugnant to the public policy of the forum are always excepted.
At present, however, courts in France and many other
countries are disinclined to apply a foreign ground for divorce,
unless it corresponds with a ground acknowledged in the
forum. 202 Absolute identity, it is true, is no~ demanded. For
instance, in the relations among the countries following the
Code Napoleon, divorce for injures graves is granted without
regard to the varying meanings of this term, which term is
also held to correspond to gross insults, cruelty, or desertion,
200

See SuRVILLE 440.
The Polish Law of I 926 on private international law, art. I 7 par. I
declares the national law applicable without any qualifications.
Greece: Court of Athens (I 9 3 7) no. I 9 p, 49 Them is 4 7 3, Cl unet 1 9 3 9, 46 3
granting separation from bed and board to Italian nationals according to Italian
law on a ground unknown in Greek law.
In Portugal: CUNHA GoN<;ALVES, I Direito Civil 692 thinks that outside of
the Hague Convention a cause of the national law unknown to the Portuguese
law suffices in principle.
202
Belgium: Trib. civ. Verviers (March 7, 1932) I9 Bull. Inst. Beige (I933)
74 (Swiss parties; grave injury required by Belgian law must be proved, as well
as disruption of the marriage by a lesser injury, ground for divorce under Swiss
law).
France: Trib. civ. Seine (April 27, 1933) Clunet 1934, 900, Revue Crit. 1935,
7 59 requires identity of grounds in both laws, while LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE
394ff. no. 336 suggests that equivalence should suffice.
The Netherlands: Cf. VAN DER FLIER, Grotius 1937, 155.
201
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constituting grounds for divorce under American statutes, 203
and even covers adultery as a foreign requisite. 204
The result of this system is, of course, that divorce is denied,
if the personal law includes no ground to support the action.
Englishmen (except where renvoi was applied) were refused
divorce in most cases because of the narrow limits of the right
to divorce in the English matrimonial law before the reforms. 205 The same is still true of citizens of New York,
domiciled in New York. ~oa But the internal conceptions of
what are sufficient grounds for divorce also play a large role,
although a certain elasticity in their application rests in the
discretion of the court. 207
A more definite position is taken by the German Code, the
Hague Convention, and the codifications following them. 208
Divorce must be supported in this system by the lex fori as
well as by the national law.
This group, however, divides on the following point. In
some of the texts involved, it has been made clear that, al203
'
E.g., Trib. civ. Seine (April 6, I922) Clunet I922, 674 (equation with
gross insults under California law); Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. I9, I926) Clunet
I926, 663 (equation with desertion under the Indiana statute).
204
PoULLET, no. 3 79; NIBOYET 746. Adultery may be defined very differently
(cf. SATTER, 5 Giur. Comp. DIP. I I), but the differences are not considered
material.
205
Cour Paris (March I, I933) Gaz.Pal.t933·1.884; App. d'Aix (March 23,
I936) Rec. Somm. I936, no. I736; Cass. (req.) (April 20, I937) Gaz. Trib.
I937.1.87: "injures graves" no cause for divorce under English law. Switzerland:
BG. (Feb. 2I, I935) 58 Sem. Jud. (I936) 209, II Z.ausl.PR. (I937) 656
no. 2 (facts insufficient to constitute "injures graves" under French law, C. C.
art. 2 3 I).
206
Trib. civ. Havre (Nov. I7, I923) Clunet I924, Iooo.
207
A Dutch observer, KoLLEWIJN, Het beginsel der openbare orde 90, thinks
Belgian courts are more inclined than French judges to recognize foreign divorce
grounds unknown to the lex fori; the most authoritative writer on Belgian
conflicts law, POULLET, no. 3 79 makes no such distinction, but he seems to favor
a liberal interpretation of the similar ground theory.
208
Hague Convention on Divorce, art. z.
Germany: EG. art. I7 par. 4·
Sweden: Law of July 8, I904, with subsequent amendments, c. 3, § 2.
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7h par. 1.
Japan: Law of 1898, art. 16.
China: Law of I9I8, art. I I .
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though divorce must be justified by some ground under each
of the two laws, the ground need not be the same in both. 209
Hence, the Swiss Federal Tribunal declared it sufficient if
the facts of a case supported, at the same time, disruption of
the marriage according to Swiss law and injures graves within
the French meaning 210 or disruption in the Swiss sense and
violation of the marital duties under the then unmodified
German Code. 211 And if the national law of Polish Jews allowed divorce by mutual agreement, German courts granted
it, provided that, in addition to satisfying the lex fori, a valid
reason, such as adultery or fault in disrupting the marriage
existed. 212 The case of mutual agreement. of Soviet Russian
nationals has been treated in the same way. 213 The statutes of
Japan and China 214 by their wording seem to exclude such
interpretation and hence to require in fact that the same or
a similar ground exist in both laws. ·
Cumulative application of two laws of any sort results in
dismissal of a divorce suit when, according to only one of the
two legislations, such events as condonation, recrimination
209 Hague Convention on Divorce, German and Swedish statutes (see supra
n. 208). The Swiss statute is interpreted the same way. Cf. German RG. (April
s, 19ZI) 102 RGZ. 82; OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 21, 1914) Hans. GZ. 1915, BBl.
no. 45; OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 5, 1915) ibid. no. 46; OLG. Rostock (Dec. 16,
1921) 77 Seuff. Arch. 174; OLG. Frankfurt (July 11, 1929) JW. 1929, 3507;
OLG. Koln (Jan. 20, 1932) JW. 1932> 2304. The Netherlands: Rb. Haarlem
(Oct. 29, 1935) W. 1936, no. 756 (under the Hague Convention).
210
Swiss BG. (May 26, 1932) 58 BGE. II 183, 188.
211
Swiss BG. (June IJ, 1912) 38 BGE. II 43, Erw. 3, 4·
212 OLG. Frankfurt (July 11, I929) JW. 1929, 3507 (supra n. 209) and
constant practice, despite some controversy in the literature whether divorce by
agreement is opposed to German public policy and, if so, whether it may be taken
as a basis for a German divorce decree; the dominant opinion interprets EG. art.
I 7 par. 4, which is less well drafted than art. 2 of the Hague Convention on
Divorce, as satisfying all the exigencies of German public policy, irrespective of
logical relation to par. 1 of art. I 7· Cf. PRETZEL in JW. 1928, 3030; LuTTERLOH, JW. I929, 4I9; HoLLANDER, JW. I929, 1863.
213
KG. CSept. I4, 1936) JW. 1936, 3579; cf. RG. (April 4, I928) 121
RGZ. 24.
21
4 China and Japan, supra n. 208.
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(compensation of causes)/ 15 or lapse of time negates the
right to divorce.
Moreover, the double requirement opens a strange gap
when divorce cannot be granted according to the national law,
because the forum would grant another type of relief. Laws
that leave the right to divorce without any limitation, like the
Soviet Russian law, or which broaden the right, like the
Belgian law, may eliminate or closely limit, respectively, the
right to sue for annulment of the marriage. For instance, a
marriage may be annulled under German law, because the
husband was ignorant of an incurable serious illness of the
wife at the time of the marriage, but it would not be voidable
under Russian or Belgian law, as divorce takes the place of
annulment there. Couples of these n~tionalities married in
their respective countries and coming to live in Germany
would not obtain either relief at their new domicil. 216
Perm;ysive policy. Divorce laws are sometimes quaint, even
if they do not equal the Chinese rules before I 9 3 I, under
which the husband could divorce his wife because of her garrulity and the wife had no right of divorce. The tribunal of
Brussels, in fact, reacted against the latter provision 217 and
recently also reacted against barring divorce to Catholics of
the former Polish kingdom/ 18 as well as against the religious
distinctions of the law of lran. 219 The basis for its opposition
is that it is contrary to the Belgian public order to investigate
215 Cour Paris {July 71 19zo) Clunet 19z1, 518 states that evidence is l:icking
for compensation of grounds according to the American law; cf. BARTIN, z
Principes 3o 5 § 3 14.
2 16 Annulment was denied where the national law of the party who was in
error does not regard the mistake as an impediment by RG. (Oct. 6, I 9 z 7)
Warn. Rspr. 19z8, no. I3 1 IPRspr. 19z6-19z7, no. 68, Revue I930 1 u9; the
prevailing opinion is in accord. See however, RAAPE 1 z D. IPR. I 79 and
infra p. 54z.
217 Trib. civ. Bruxelles {Jan. 3 I9Z3) 9 Bull. Inst. Belge (19z3) I46. See
1
also App. Liege (Nov. z, 1937) J.d. Tr. I937 1 col. 67z no. 35u, supra n. I8:z.
218 Trib. civ. Bruxelles (June :u, I938) J.d.Tr. I938 col. 646 no. 3550.
1
219 Trib. civ. Bruxelles (March 30 1938) 53 J.d.Tr. I938, col. 3z9 no. 3534•
1
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the religious denomination of the parties. In all these cases,
Belgian divorce law was substituted.
But German courts have not considered the wife's definitely
inferior position in suing for divorce under the legislation ot
Austria and Italy as contrary to public policy. 220 Nor has the
former English law, allowing only the husband to sue on the
ground of adultery, ever been repudiated on the Continent.
More doubt has been expressed about the Jewish laws prohibiting the wife from suing even on the ground of adultery
or attempt on her life, but they have been applied; the wife
of a Mohammedan Persian was similarly treated. 221 Again,
the·court of Brussels once granted divorce in such a case. 222
According to the prevailing opinion, it is considered undesirable to increase the number of unfortunate cases where marriage exists with geographically limited force. 223 So even
bizarre foreign institutions are admitted.
4· Different National Laws

National law of the husband. Upon the same historical
basis of coverture as in England, the national law of the husband alone is applicable, without regard to that of the wife,
in Germany, Portugal, China, and Japan; 224 according to
part of the French doctrine, the national law of the husband
is said to govern the causes for divorce. 225 Independently of
the historical background, this system has been appraised as
220 OLG. Dusseldorf (July 6, I9 I I) I I o Rhein. Archiv I 58; OLG. Kiel (Feb.
28, I923) 78 Seuff. Arch. 267, Clunet I925, I053·
221 Germany: RG. (May 26, I930) 43 Z.int.R (I930-:-3I) 39I; RG. (Sept.
29, I9JO) JW. I93I, I48; LG. Niirnberg (Jan. 22, I932.) IPRspr. I932., no.
8I; KG. (May I I, I9JI) IPRspr. I93I, no. I42..
France: Cass. (civ.) (Oct. 30, I905) Clunet I9o6, 4IO.
232 App. Bruxelles (June 8, I899) Clunet I899, 859·
223
RAAPE 435·
224 German EG. art. I7 par. I; followed by Japan: Law of I898, art. I6
and China: Law of I 9 I 8, art. I I. This is also the rule adopted in the Treaty
of Montreux, Egyptian Mixed Tribunals, Regulations of Judicial Organisation, art. 2.9 par. 3, publ. in U. S. Treaty Series, No. 939·
225 BARTIN, 2. Principes 3 2 3 § 3 I 8 states that this rule in the French system is
not doubtful, but the decisions are not homogeneous; cf. infra pp. 44Iff.
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the simplest and most convenient in practice. 226 In the last
decades, however, such preference for the husband has found
less and less favor, in conformity with the increasing tendency
to allow a married woman to retain or resume her original
citizenship. 227
Last common nationality. In the Hague Convention on
Divorce, the law of the last common nationality of both
parties was adopted. 228 The Sixth Conference added in its
non-ratified drafts that where the parties never had a common nationality or where they changed from one common to
two different new nationalities, divorce and separation depend
on both laws cumulatively. The recent Greek Code more conveniently calls in such cases for the application of the national
law of the husband as of the time of the marriage celebration. 229
Both laws cumulatively. According to another theory, the
granting of divorce must be permitted by the laws of both
spouses. 230
The law of the plaintiff. 'In contrast, the French courts
usually pronounce divorce at the instance of a party whose
226

RoLIN, 2 Principes no. 591.
There is no advocate in France any longer,]. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 474
n. 2 asserts, in ignoring Bartin's recent book supra n. 225.
228
Hague Convention on Divorce, arts. I, 2, 8; followed by Poland: Law on
international private law, art. I 7 par. I ; Rumanian Preliminary Draft of C. C.
art. XXIV.
229
Greek C. C. (I 940) art. I 6.
23
°Finland: Law of Dec. 5, I929, art. IO.
Belgium: App. Liege (July 7, I938) Pasicrisie I938.2.I29 (particularly
exacting, as the wife had resumed Belgian citizenship); Rb. Antwerp (May II,
I939) 8 Rechtsk. Wkbl. I938-I939> IS52 no. "JI2.
Italy: UDINA, Elementi no. IJ6; SALVIOLI, I9 Rivista (I927) 354 (admits
difficulties); and some decisions in France. Only Trib. civ. Seine (April 27,
I 9 3 3) Revue Crit. I 9 3 5, 7 59 states that the grounds for divorce must agree
with the foreign laws of both parties as well as with the French law. NIBOYET,
Note ibid. 762 declares regard for the defendant's law unnecessary.
Portugal: Sup. Trib. de Just. (Jan. 5, I9I8) 50 Direito 250, cited by CUNHA
GoN<;ALVES, I Direito Civil 693.
Switzerland: BG. (June 23, I933) 59 BGE. II IIJ; App. Zurich (June 23,
1934) 34 Bl. f. Zurch. Rspr. (I9JS) 72 no. 27; and App. Zurich (June I2,
1937) 37 Bl. f. Zurch. Rspr. (1938) 304 no. 151.
227
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national law as such permits it. Although occasionally under
this system foreign law has been applied, 231 the usual result
is a resort to French law.
This conforms to a general trend. Suppose that the applicable conflicts rule calls for the municipal law of the husband, he a foreigner and the wife a national; or suppose that
the last common nationality law should be applied, the wife
alone having acquired the nationality of the forum during
marriage,-courts are tempted to abandon the conflicts rule
for the sake of the wife. The same development that has
fostered favor for the wife's separate nationality induces the
courts to permit the wife such rights of divorce as the law of
the forum, which is also her national law, permits. Hence,
early examples of exceptions made for nationals in some
European and particularly in Latin American jurisdictions,
have been multiplied in recent times.
From about I 906, French courts have granted divorce according to French law to the French wife of a mixed marriage.232 If the husband were of Italian nationality, however,
they were bound by article 8 of the Hague Convention on
Divorce to observe the last common national law of the parties.
But precisely for this reason, France renounced her participation in the Convention in 1913, and in 1927 a French
woman ,marrying a foreigner was allowed to retain her French
nationality. These two events reinforced the trend of the
French tribunals. In the outstanding case of the Marquis .de
Ferrari, a French woman who, by marrying an Italian, had
become an Italian national and had been judicially separated
from her husband in Italy, recovered French citizenship. She
was granted a divorce a vinculo in spite of the prohibition of
Italian law which had controlled her marriage and was still
the law of the Marquis. The basis was surprisingly simple:
231 Cour Paris (March I I933) Gaz. Pal. I933· I. 884, Revue I933 629
1
1
(English law applied against English husband in favor of his French wife).
2 32 Trib. civ. Seine (Oct. z6, I9o6) Revue I907 590; Cour Paris (Oct. 3I
1
1
I91o) Revue 1911, 82; etc.
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the Court of Cassation declared that French law Is an Indispensable attribute of French nationality. 233 This decision
attracted world-wide attention; its exact scope remains obscure, except where the application of the French law is in
issue. 234 Much criticism has been aroused by the inconsistency
with which the foreign prohibition has been discarded in cases
analogous to those in which, before dissolution of marriage
was allowed in I 884, the French courts refused to recognize
foreign divorces of a French national married to an alien, and
the further inconsistency with the theory of fraud, which
the French courts were fostering at the very time of the Ferrari suit. 235 Nevertheless, the precedent of the Ferrari case
has been followed.
In addition to France, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany,
and Sweden successively left the Hague Convention to avoid
the divorce prohibition of the member state, Italy; in all these
countries, migratory Italian workers had married and deserted native women. Except for the little influence the Convention has preserved, it has become a habit in most of the
European countries to allow divorce to a national party of a
mixed marriage according to the lex fori. 236 In Germany,
233 Affaire Ferrari no. t, Cass. (civ.) (July 6, 1922) D.t922.1.137> S.t923.t.5,
Clunet 1922, 714, Revue 192.2.-1923, 444; no. 2, Cass. (civ.) (March 14,
1928) S.t929.1.92, Clunet 1928,383.
234 BARTIN, 2 Principes 308 concludes that these are purely French solutions,
of mere French interest, which we have no reason whatsoever to apply to foreign
couples; he does not even want to suggest recognition of an analogous decree of
a foreign--say, a Brazilian-tribunal.
235 See PILLET, Revue 1922-1923, 464 frankly regretting the decisions as a
break with international private law; AUDINET, 11 Recueil 1926 I 230; DEGAND, 5 Repert. 555 no. 83; SALVIOLI, "Confl.itto di leggi personali in materia
di divorzio," Rivista 1927, 354· NIBOYET, NoteS. 1929.1·9· As to the theory
of fraud, J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 480 has answered that fraud is relevant
only if committed against the law of the forum.
236 Brazil: (Before the law of 1942) Sup. Trib. Fed. (Nov. 6, 1918) Recurso
Extraordinario no. 587, 20 Revista Sup. Trib. (1919) 246; Ap. civ. Rio de
Janeiro (Jan. t6, 1942) no. 8oo, 62 Arch. Jud. 58. Cf. Ap. civ. Rio de Janeiro
(Oct. 25, 1934) no. 4.332, 121 Revista Dir. Civ. (1936) 322 (the constitutional
provision that Brazilian law is to be applied to the dissolution of a marriag'e
even if only one of the spouses is of Brazilian nationality applies also in cases of .
judicial separation if nationality is acquired by naturalization).
France: Cass. (civ.) (May 7, 1928) S. 1929.1·9> Revue 1928, 653 (conversion of separation into divorce after naturalization); Cass. (civ.) (Feb. s,
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the enacted law was adjusted to this end. 237
In Belgium, however, the courts have been thus far in disagreement. Their decisions are significant. In a series of cases,
divorce was denied to a woman who had married an Italian
and later recovered Belgian nationality, and to wives of
Austrian origin and Catholic faith who had acquired Belgian
nationality, on the unmodified rule that divorce must agree
with the national laws of both spouses and on the consideration
that at the time of the marriage both parties knew that their
bond would be indissoluble. 238 It has been argued, furthermore, that, logically, to free the party who belongs to the
forum by application of his or her national law, would leave
192.9) Clunet 192.9, 12.58; Cass. (req.) (Feb. 4, 1931) Clunet 1932, 451;
Cour Colmar (Feb. 13, 1937) Nouv. Revue 1937, 2.40; Cour Paris (Dec. 2.1,
1937) Revue Crit. 1938, 2.51, and decisions of lower courts; cf. PERROUD, Clunet 192.6, 2.4 n. 19; J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 475; Note, Trib. civ. Seine
(Jan. 19, 192.6) Clunet 1926, 663 (through renvoi, applying French law as the
personal law of an American woman domiciled in France); Trib. civ. Seine (Dec.
zo, 193 7) Nouv. Revue 1938, 324 (granted divorce to the wife who had resumed
French nationality, while under the husband's Dutch law adultery would have
been required); Cour Colmar (Jan. 7, 1938) Clunet 1938, 797, Nouv. Revue
1938, 326 (French wife granted divorce without regard to the German law of
the husband).
Rumania: Cass. (Sept. q, 1876); Trib. Ilfov (April 8, 1935) Clunet 1937,
625. The contrary rule obtains because of the Hague Convention in the case of
an Italian wife naturalized in Rumania: Cass. Bucarest (Oct. 2.5, 1928) Revue
1930, 517·

Spain: (during republican times) Trib. Supr. (July 10, 1934) 214 Sent.
642., Clunet 1936, 2.10 (Spanish wife, Italian husband).
Switzerland: BG. (June 5, 1901) 2.7 BGE. I 180 proclaimed that a Swiss
spouse could apply for divorce notwithstanding the prohibition of divorce by
the national law of the other spouse; BG. (June q, 1907) 33 BGE. I 355 (one
spouse a naturalized Swiss former Austrian Catholic); BG. (July 9, 1914) 40
BGE. I 418, 428; BG. (March z, 1922.) Clunet 1922., 752. (one party a naturalized Swiss, former Orthodox Russian); BG. (May 3, 1932.) 58 BGE. Il93,
Clunet 1932, II 51, Revue 1932, 710 (Swiss nationality resumed by wife of an
Italian after Switzerland had left the Hague Convention).
237 German Law on Divorce of Jan. 2.4, 1935, RGBI. 1935, I 48.
238 App. Bruxelles (July 9, 19 3 z) Revue Crit. 19 3 3, 5 II (sees the ideas of
·the Hague Convention transferred to the Belgian common law) ; App. Gand
(July II, 1935) 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. 302. no. 136; App. Liege (July 7, 1938)
Pasicrisie 1938.2.12.9, Belg. Jud. 1939, 303 (the more severe of the two national
laws must be applied); App. Liege (Jan. 12, 1939) Belg. Jud. 1939, 401
(the wife "submitted" to the indissolubility of the union).
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239

the other party married.
As a matter of fact, this is the
Swiss practice and the prevailing opinion in Germany, 240 so
far as remarriage is concerned. The Belgian authorities 241
to the contrary, who admit divorce, have replied that if the
non-Belgian spouse remains married under his or her national
law (not by Belgian law), it should be realized that this undesirable result is due to the fact that the unity of the law
governing the marriage has been broken by allowing the wife
a separate nationality. 242 This consequence is not strong
enough "to prevail over the absolute and unconditional right
that the wife derives from her national status and entitles her
to break up a union the continuation of which might damage
her." A Belgian writer has added that attitudes of high indifference to the misery of others are repugnant to the
basic tendency of public life in Belgium. 243
The analogy to the granting of divorce by the courts of
the domicil of one party in the 1United States is the more
striking, as in these Continental cases the plaintiff is generally domiciled at the forum. Niboyet suggests, however,
that a wife should not be allowed to sue for divorce under her
separate national law, unless the matrimonial domicil was established in France by both parties at the marriage or later. 244
Th1s means a step toward the exclusive dominance of the
domiciliary jur_isdiction, desirable in all respects.
239 Thus, LABBE, Note in S.I878.1.195· Cf. also DEGAND, 5 Repert. 553
no. 76, with earlier French decisions rejecting divorce; Trib. civ. Mons (April
8, I 927) Bel g. Jud. I 927, 508 (applying exclusively the foreign husband's law
"to avoid inextricable complications and eminently wrong situations").
240 See infra p. 5 I 8.
241 Trib. civ. Bruxelles (June 27, I928) Belg. Jud. I928, 635 (despite the
"bizarre and absurd" consequence that one party is not allowed to remarry) ;
Trib. civ. Mons (May 8, 1930) and Trib. Bruxelles (May 20, I93I) J.d.Tr.
I9Jl> cols. 462, '673 cited by JoF.E, 22 Bull. Inst. Belg. (I936) I32; App.
Liege (Feb. 2, I 931) Clunet 1932, 489.
242
Trib. Arion (April 23, 1937) Pand. Per. I9J8, JI no. 8.
243 }OFE, 22 Bull. lnst. Belg. (I9J6) IJJ.
244
NIBOYET 749 no. 641.
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VI.

RENVOI

The problem of renvoi is presented when, according to the
principle of nationality, the divorce law of the state to which
a party belongs should be applied, while, according to the conflicts rule of the foreign state, this law is not to be applied.
The Hague Convention on Divorce 245 denied renvoi between
member states, all of which followed the nationality principle,
but renvoi is observed, as usual, in most countries following
the principle, particularly by the French/ 46 German/ 47 and
Swiss 248 courts. 249 The situation in German and Swiss divorce
245
See RG. (Nov. 8, 1922) 105 RGZ. 340; KG. (Nov. 27, 1933) IPRspr.
1934, no. II6 and KG. (April 9, 1934) IPRspr. I934, no. 47·
246
France: Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. I9, I926) Clunet I926, 663 (American
wife); Trib. civ. Fontainebleau (June 24, I932) Clunet I933, 666; Cour Paris
(Dec. 24, I935) Nouv. Revue I936, Io8; Cour Paris (July 24, I937) Nouv.
Revue I937, 772 (two English parties; the English law even declares itself
incompetent); and finally Cass. (req.) (May 10, I939) Gaz.Pal.x939·1.962,
Nouv. Revue 1939, I53, Revue Crit. I939, 472 with a note by NIBOYET declaring that now he renounces his opposition to renvoi, although he construes it
merely as a theory of national interest in cases not regulated by the national
law. Among the four decisions against renvoi listed by J. DoNNEDIEU DE
VABRES 472 n. 3, and now overruled, the fourth, Cour Paris (March I, 1933)
Gaz.Pal.I933.I.884, Revue I933, 629, Clunet I935, 99, decided against the
English husband, plaintiff, in favor of the French wife, defendant; the third,
mentioned by KuHN, Comp. Com. I72 n. 66, Trib. Basses-Pyrenees (May 28,
1930) Clunet I93I, I092, was a curious mistake.
247 Germany: as to American citizens: RG. (March 2I, I904) 48 Gruchot's
Beitrage (I904) 8oi; OLG. Frankfurt (June 20, I9Io) cited by LEWALD IIo
no. IS6; LG. Miinchen (July I, 192I) JW. 192I, I47I; LG. Berlin (April 24,
I928) JW. I928, 3128; OLG. Stuttgart (Dec. 4, 193o) JW. I932, 6oi; RG.
(Nov. 21, I929) JW. I93o, I309. As to British subjects: KG. (Sept. zo, 190I)
3 ROLG. 365; OLG. Darmstadt (May I8, I9o6) DJZ.· I9o7, 1327; RG.
(Jan. 7, I907) JW. I907, 127; OLG. Hamburg (Nov. 6, I9I2) Hans. GZ.
I9I3, Beibl. 84 no. 52; OLG. Hamburg (March 3I, I927) Hans. GZ. I927,
Beibl. 139 no. 99; KG. (March 30, I936) JW. I936, 3572; OLG. Hamburg
(April22, I937) Hans. RGZ. I937, B 222 no. IOI; LG. Berlin (May 2I, 1938)
JW. I938, 1916. Argentine nationals: (where marriage is celebrated outside of
Argentina) OLG. Hamburg (Feb. 2, I929) and (May I6, I930) IPRspr. I93o,
nos. 75, 76; KG. (Feb. 28, I938) JW. 1938, 2748. Danish nationals: dictum
in RG. (April 6, I936) I5I RGZ. Io3, 106, correcting RG. (Feb. 24, I928)
Warn. Rspr. I928, no. 64.
Iceland: RG. (April 6, 1936) IS I RGZ. I03.
Norway: OLG. Celie (Oct. IS, I925) JW. I926, 388.
Nicaragua: KG. (March 30, 193I) IPRspr. 193I, no. 70.
248
Switzerland: BG. (June I5, I928) 54 BGE. II 225, 231; cf. ScHNITZER I 74•
249 Belgian courts have refused to accept renvoi by English conflicts law because the laws of both parties must agree with the law of the forum in permitting
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courts, however, is further complicated by the provisions forbidding them, as we have seen above/ 50 to assume jurisdiction
unless recognition of their jurisdiction appears fairly certain
in the national country of the parties. Generally, it seems,
these courts have not been aware of all the intrinsic difficulties
in this matter; however, most of their decisions can probably
be justified. We must here distinguish the questions of choice
of law and of jurisdiction.
The problem of the law of conflicts is rather simpler in this
case than in status questions generally. 251 It,is quite easily settled, if we understand the position of English, American,
Danish, and Norwegian lawyers in the sense that they recognize the jurisdiction of the domicil under certain conditions
and that, as they themselves apply the law of the forum at
home, they are not interested in what substantive private law
would be applied by a foreign divorce court. 252 Hence, a
French or German divorce cout"t is permitted (though not
directed, as was so often believed in Europe) by the national
law of a British subject to apply the law of the forum. It does
not matter that by another mistake 253 European courts have
often referred to the common law country where a British or
American national was last domiciled instead of to the general
principles of British or American law. Recently, German
courts have realized that they are applying German law as the
lex fori 254 (and not qua lex domicilii) with the blessing of
that national law. This was a new realization, as observers in
Germany had thought that there never is a renvoi referring to
divorce. See Rb. Antwerp (May u, 1939) 8 Rechtsk. Wkbl. 1938-1939, col.
1552 no. 312.
250
Supra,;pp. 411-413.
251
Cj. supra n. 146.
11 52 This seems to agree with KuHN, Comp. Com. 171 ; it is true that KuHN
concludes just contrary to the text that renvoi is particulary unsound with repect to common law countries:
253
For instance, OLG. Stuttgart (Dec. 4, 1930) ]W. 1932, 6o1, and BERG•
MANN in the note ibid. assume a renvoi from the California law because the
• party had formerly been domiciled in California. See supra p. 134.
254
See e.g., KG. (March 30, 1936) JW. 1936, 3570 in fine.
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the law of the forum. 255 With national laws such as that of
Argentina, the situation is theoretically different; the law
govet:"ning at the domicil of the husband is applicable. 25 fl
The entire problem, otherwise almost desperate, is reduced
in this manner to the question of determining in which cases a
Continental court may assume jurisdiction for divorce with
the expectation that the decree will be recognized in the national country. As a matter of fact, the answer must be different with respect to the individual jurisdictions where recognition is sought.
It is easy to answer the question when the husband is a
national of a country such as England or Argentina, where the
domicil of the husband is the matrimonial domicil and the law
of this domicil governs the right to divorce (possibly also after
one party has deserted the matrimonial domicil). German
courts have scrupulously investigated whether a Brit~sh husband was domiciled within their territory, making certain that
domicil at the forum exists not only in the German sense but
also in the British sense. 257
If one or both of the parties are of American nationality, the
solution is simple where both have their effective domicil,
common or separate, in the country of divorce. But if not,
which of the approximately fifty individual American territorial laws should be considered? It is incorrect to assume
that the last domicil within the United States, now abandoned,
should control, and the Continental court would scarcely be
justified in speculating before which court in the United
States the matter could probably be brought on the grounds
of the situs of property, the residence of children, etc.
255
256

MELCHIOR 215

§ 143·

This was overlooked by LEWALD, 29 Recueil 1929 IV 565, who uses the
Argentine law as an argument against renvoi.
257 See the detailed instructions about what a German court ought to ascertain
concerning the American requirements for recognition of divorce decrees in RG.
{Nov. 21, 1929) JW. 1930, 1309, and the careful statements as to the domicil
under English law in KG. {March 30, 1936) JW. 1936, 3570.
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The requirements of full faith and credit to divorce decrees
under the Constitution as developed by the Supreme Court
of the United States would not be directly decisive, since they
do not include foreign nations. Recognition seems to be
granted in virtually all American jurisdictions to alien decrees
of divorce, however, if no party is domiciled within the forum
to which such a decree is presented for recognition and one
party was domiciled at the divorce forum, while the other was
personally served with process or appeared and litigated on
the merits. Hence, it would be safe to assume jurisdiction in
such a case in Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Hungary et
cetera. Although not certain, it is probable that these conditions have been fulfilled in most, if not all, cases of admitted
renvoi. And there is no necessity of allowing more divorces to
foreigners.

VII.

CHANGE OF DoMICIL oR NATIONALITY

"
Conditions on which the granting of divorce
depends may
change in different respects, viz., ( 1) domicil or nationality
as the foundation of the court's jurisdiction may be altered
while the lawsuit is pending; ( 2) domicil or nationality as
determining the applicable law may be modified during the
proceedings; and (3) the status may have been changed after
the occurrence of the circumstances on which the divorce
action is based.
1.

Change of Factor Determining Jurisdiction

As the three questions just mentioned have sometimes been
confused, it has not always been clear that the first is dependent simply on the definition and the effects which the
rules of civil procedure give to the commencement of an action
for divorce. Generally, so soon as the action is considered
instituted according to the conception of the forum, the jurisdiction established at this moment remains fixed for the dura-
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tion of the suit-forum perpetuatur-jurisdiction continues.258 That, conversely, the ground for jurisdiction can be
supplemented later, is not universally affirmed.
2.

Change of Factor Determining the Choice of Law After
Beginning of Litigation

The second question may be illustrated by three German
cases, which result in the following paradigm. An American
citizen, at the time domiciled in Germany but formerly of
California, instituted a divorce suit in the German court of his
domicil but afterwards during the proceedings moved to
Copenhagen, Denmark. There was no doubt that by American principles (or, as it was construed, by the law of California) German family law was to be applied by way of renvoi,
so long as the domicil of the husband was in Germany. But
did American law, after the change of domicil, refer to German or to Danish law, and was this reference still decisive for
the German court? The Court of Appeals of Stuttgart thought
the question solved by the principle of perpetuation of the
forum mentioned above. 259 But, although this reasoning may
seem consonant with the conception, prevalent in this country,
that the lex fori governs divorce, in Germany the matter is
undoubtedly part of the choice of law problem and cannot
be answered by procedural rules. The Reichsgericht, in another case also, in inquiring whether reference should be
made to the new domicil, refused to consult the national law
but based its solution on the deliberate wording of the German
conflicts rule/ 60 invoking the law of the state to which the husband belonged at the time of the commencement of the ac258

See, for instance, Restatement § 76; German C. of Civ. Prov. § 263 par.z.
OLG. Stuttgart (Dec. 4, 1930) JW. 1932, 6o1. Contra: RG. (April 6,
1936) 151 RGZ. IOJ.
260
EG. art. 17 par. 1; RG. (March 19, 1936) 150 RGZ. 374; RG. (April
6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103, 108 (husband of Icelandic nationality served with
process in Germany returned to Iceland; in this case the Icelandic law, investigated as to its position on the question, revealed that it did not contain any rule
concerning the effect of a change of domicil upon the law applicable).
259
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tion. The same rule seems to prevail in France
and
262
as a matter of course. As the question is not identiBelgium
cal with the procedural problem, the German courts permit
the choice of law to be that of the time when the defendant is
served in the action 263 or when the ground for divorce is
pleaded in court; 264 a subsequent unilateral change of status
by the husband is disregarded. 265
The Polish statute (art. I 7 par. I) also declares applicable
the law of the state to which the spouses belong at the time of
the action; the Polish Supreme Court has understood this
to mean, however, the country to which the parties belong
when judgment is rendered. 266 In fact, the danger of arbitrary
changes made by one party is eliminated by this statute, since
it refers to the law of the common domicil.
3· Changes of Factor Determining Choice of Law Before the
Divorce Suit Is Brought
To understand the problem in question, suppose that the
domicil of the husband is the test in two states, X andY, and
that adultery is the only ground for divorce in X (e.g., New
York), while desertion is a sufficient ground in Y (e.g., New
Jersey), and suppose that:
(i) The husband changes'his domicil from X to Y, suing
his wife in Y on the ground that she deserted him when he
resided in X; or
(ii) The husband leaves his domicil in Y, suing his wife
in X, alleging that she deserted him in Y.
~ 61 LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 3 19ff. no. 2.80 and 393 no. 335·
262 However, Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Dec. 6, 1939) J.d.Tr. 1940, 12.0 rejects

the action for divorce of Spaniards, divorce having been prohibited by the government of Franco during the pendency of the trial.
263 RG. (April6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103, 108; cf. HABICHT 135; WALKER 685.
264
RG. (April 21, 1902) 46 Gruchot's Beitrage (1902) 959; RG. (April
6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103; cf. KG. (Dec. 17, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 58.
265
RG. (April 6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103, 1o8; against RAAPE 378 and 3
FRANKENSTEIN 438.
266
Polish Sup. Ct. (Dec. 9> 1935) 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1938) 742..
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Three solutions have been advanced:
(a) The court should consider the ground for divorce exclusively under the law ordinarily applicable, irrespective of
whether the facts occurred before or after the acquisition of
the new personal law.
Hence, desertion in X in case (i) is sufficient for divorce in
Y; desertion in Y in case ( ii) is insufficient in X.
(b) Conversely, the facts which happened when the personal law was not yet changed should be evaluated by the
personal law of the party at that time.
Hence, desertion in X is no ground; desertion in Y is a
sufficient ground for both courts in both cases (i) and (ii).
(c) Divorce should be granted only if the facts warrant
divorce under both laws, the former personal law of the time
when the facts occurred and the present personal law.
Hence, action is dismissed in both cases (i) and (ii).
The first'view-(a)-is naturally taken by courts applying
the lex fori. Under this theory, decisions were formerly
rendered by the German courts, as by the great majority of
American cases. 267 It is also applied by the French courts in determining grounds for divorce according to the lex fori when
the applicant is a French national; in the leading case, the
Ferrari case, the Court of Cassation justified the granting of
divorce under French law by events preceding the renaturalization of the plaintiff wife by declaring that the action
was to be based not so much on the material events as upon
the harm done by them to the conjugal life. 268 It is remark.able that this view was accepted by the Swiss Federal Tribunal
in a case analogous to the Ferrari case, so that the court applied
267 Germany: RG. (June 19, 1883) 9 RGZ. I9I, 193.
England, see WESTLAKE § 52•
United States: MINOR§ 84; I BEALE§ IIo.s.
~ 68 Cass. (civ.) (March I4, I928) Clunet I928, 383; see particularly App.
Limoges (Feb. 26, I929) and App. Nimes (April IS, I929) Clunet I93o, 368.
Contra: AUDINET, Note to Cass. (civ.) (Feb. s, I929) S.1930.1.8di., criticizing the retroactive effect given to a naturalization; but see LEREBOURs-PIGEONNIERE 40I no. 339·
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only Swiss law, although for this purpose a strictly contrary
statutory provision had to be daringly interpreted as referring
to foreign plaintiffs only. 269 French courts, however, seem
to extend the retroactive force of the lex fori to divorce actions
of foreigners. 270
The second view-(b )-agrees with a literal construction
of the Japanese statute providing that divorce is governed by
the national law of the husband at the time when the facts
causing divorce occurred. ~ 71 This method avoids in a radical
way any attempt at evasion by the husband but is highly impractical.
.
The third opinion-( c)-goes far back and was strongly
advocated by an editor of Story's work, Judge Redfield, claiming that:
"It would be an intolerable perversion that an act which by
the law of the State where committed was no cause of divorce
should, by the removal of the parties to another State where
the law was different, become sufiicient to produce a dissolution
of the married relation." 272
In this assertion, the words "State where committed" are
evidently a mistake. That the state where the act was committed should be of any importance was sharply denied by
Story. 273 Redfield plainly meant the state where the party
was formerly domiciled; an act or conduct should not warrant
divorce, if insufficient in the state where the party was domiciled at the time when it occurred. 274 The rule as formulated,
however, was adopted by many statutes and even by the American Uniform Draft of 1900 and 1907, that of 1900 running
as follows:
269

BG. (May 3, 1932) 58 BGE. II 93·
LAURENT, 3 Principes 53 7ff. no. 306, and many decisions, particularly,
Cass. (civ.) (May 7, 1928) S.1929.1·9·
271 Japan, Law of 1898, art. 16.
272
REDFIELD in STORY (ed. 6) § 2JOC.
273
STORY§ 23oa.
274
REDFIELD in STORY (ed. 6) § 23oc speaks of the transfer of the domicil.
§ 23od, however, sounds again perplexing.
270
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"No divorce shall be granted for any cause arising prior to
the residence of the complainant or the defendant in this state
which was not a ground for divorce in the state where the
cause arose." 275
This confusion of the time when, and the place where, the
offence occurred, makes the interpretation of the various
American statutes difficult.
The sanction that Story himself would have had in mind
was certainly the refusal of jurisdiction. 276 Correspondingly,
the actual statutes possess two kinds of clauses. On the one
hand, jurisdiction for divorce is often denied, with or without
statutory provision, when the cause of action occurred outside
of the state and the spouses were domiciled at the time out
of the state. On the other hand, in many statutes the required
time of residence preliminary to the action is prolonged, if
the cause took place outside of the state. Whatever the exact
sense of these clauses may be, their tendency is to prevent or
to render it difficult for a fact to be appreciated by a court
under a law other than would be relevant if the party in question had stayed at his domicil. Apparently the draftsmen of
the statutes have felt bound to the law of the forum, if once
jurisdiction is assumed, and therefore have thought that the
only remedy is to deny jurisdiction. A connected provision
of the Uniform Act of I 906 277 seems to follow this conception. The wording of the draft that had preceded in I 900, 278
however, reproduced in the preceding paragraph, may possibly be understood as involving a choice of law, meaning
that the divorce ground is governed by the law of the domicil
275

Draft printed in 14 Harv. L. Rev. (x9ox) 525, sec. x. The explanation at

52.6 is rather confused.
276 See STORY's own quotation § 2.3oa of Gibson, C. J., in Dorsey v. Dorsey
(1838) 7 Watts (Pa.) 349; and see WHARTON § 2.31 on the later events in
Pennsylvania.
277 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, supra n.
4, at§§ 8(b), xo(b) adopted in Del. Rev. Code (1935) §§ 3505(b), 3506
(b); N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) vol. 1 §§ 2..5o-xo(b), 2..5o-II(b).
278 Draft of Uniform Divorce Law, loc. cit. supra n. 4, cf. Ky. Civil Code
of Pract. (Carroll, 1938) § 42.3(2.).
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as of the time when the facts complained of happened. A consequence would be, that where the alleged cause fails to agree
with such foreign law, the suit ought to be dismissed as to the
merits, and not only quoad instantiam.
The same idea was to be found in Europe in the early
nineteenth century and is now frequent. 279 The German
statute, after providing that (EG. art. 17, par. 1) divorce
is governed by the law of the husband as of the time of the
commencement of the action, prescribes that (ibid., par. 2) a
fact that has occurred while the husband belonged to another
state cannot be claimed as a ground for divorce, unless the
fact is ground for divorce or separation also according to the
laws of that other state.
Correspondingly, the law of a former common nationality
of the parties is to be consulted according to the Hague Convention and the Polish, Swedish, Swiss, and Hungarian statutes, 280 and the law of the former domicil is influential in
the Scandinavian countries 281 and under the C6digo Bustamante. 282
A special problem arises, if permanent conditions, such as
mental deficiency, venereal disease, or habits of drunkenness,
279
App. Liege (April 24, I 826) Pasicrisie I 826. us, 127; for the practice
of the Prussian courts, compare Gebhardsche Materialien 188.
280
Hague Convention on Divorce, art. 4·
Poland: Law of I926 on international private law, art. I7 par. 2.
Sweden: Law of I9o4 with subsequent amendments, c. 3 § 2 par. 2.
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7h par. 2; cf. BG. (May 3, I932) 58 BGE. II 9H
ScHNITZER I 7 5·
Hungary: Marriage Law of I 894, § I I 5 par. I.
Moreover, the treaties of Czechoslovakia with Yugoslavia (March 17, I923,
art. 34 par. 2), Poland (March 6, 1925, art. 7), and Rumania (May 7, I925,
art. I9 par. 2); cf. SVOBODA, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 3I3 n. 186.
In Republican Spain LASALA LLANAS I40 advocates the same principle.
281 Denmark: prevailing opinion, see MuNCH-PETERSEN, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld
I 747; BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. z2I no. so; HoECK, Personalstatut 33·
Norway: see CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 57 5 no. II9·
Iceland: see EYJOLFSSON, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 762.
282
Art. 52; cf. art. 54 and BusTAMANTE, La commission des jurisconsultes
de Rio 12 I, no. I 24.
Cf. Guatemala: former C. C. art. 209.
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are recognized reasons for divorce under the new but not under
the old statute; can desertion be said to begin only after the acquisition of the new status? The American cases are divided. 283
Suppose a married couple was domiciled in New York, where
insanity is not a cause for divorce, and later transferred their
domicil to Norway, where it is, if continued through three
years. Should a time of lunacy spent in New York be counted?
This question ought to be affirmed, to avoid an unreasonable
rule. 284
The choice of law rule just contemplated, although systematically better justified than the refusal of jurisdiction, makes
the task of the judge delicate. Under the European formulas,
several legislations must be simultaneously applied; if the
parties have changed from a foreign nationality to two other
foreign ones, this makes three, and with the law of the forum,
four. No judge will like so much complication. All these
rules may be questioned. Some of them seem practically superfluous. The German provision was designed to prevent
the husband, whose national law alone is decisive, from changing his nationality so as to force his new law on his wife, if
the new law were more favorable for obtaining divorce. 285
Similar are the purposes of enactments preserving the divorce
law of a former domicil. But there is no sufficient reason to
complicate things where the last common nationality or
domicil of the parties is chosen to govern, just for the reason
that it renders a change of status of one party harmless.
As a whole, the contrast of opinions concerns the basic
theory. Where the law of the domicil dominates ideas, it is
283 r BEALE 473 § rro.5. The courts of New Jersey are consistent in requiring that the two year period for desertion must have run after the deserting
party became a resident of the state; see Berger v. Berger (1918) 89 N.J. Eq.
430, 105 Atl. 496, and citations at 497· The other view was taken by two old
decisions of New Hampshire, see r BEALE 474 n. 2; Batchelder v. Batchelder
(1843) 14 N.H. 38o; Hopkins v. Hopkins (1857) 35 N. H. 474·
284
Contra, RAAPE 38 8.
285
Conversely, it seems that the husband is able to avoid a threatened divorce
by changing to a more rigid law; LETZGUS, 145 Arch. Civ. Prax. 299·
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likely that this law will be regarded as determining the judicial value of the facts occurring during its reign. The European rules descr~bed above are derived in an analogous way
from the personal national law. On the contrary, the majority
view in this country is manifestly conce!ved within the sphere
of territorialism.
While American courts, at least, are consistent ~n following
the idea of a territorial law of the forum, some important
European courts inaugurating a similar theory have rebelled
against the current respect for the national law. We have
mentioned above the leading case of Ferrari; the French
Court of Cassation granted divorce to the wife who was Italian
by marriage but had recovered French nationality. No new
facts had arisen since the separation of the parties from bed
and board, rendered before the wife's re-naturalization. If
the French Court of Cassation granted the divorce upon the
anterior facts because the action was based, not so much upon
the material facts as upon the harm done by them to the conjugallife/86 the reasoning certainly is untenable; the different
legislations determine precisely what kind of facts should be
regarded as essentially disturbing the marital community. 281
However, in view of the fact that one of the most reliable
courts in the world, the Swiss Federal Tribunal, followed the
French example all the way, in the face of the express contrary legal provision,288 we must conceive that the application
of the foreign law appears unbearable to judges.
Hence, the European courts are coming back to where the
English and the American courts have remained; the case
where the plaintiff has changed to the domicil or nationality
of the forum is the really important one. Of course, there is
the evident danger of encouraging evasion of foreign laws,
286
287

See supra n. z68.

AUDINET, Note to Cass.
LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 401,
288 See supra n. 269.

(civ.) (Feb.

s,

1929) S.1930.I.81.83; but cf.
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and the French courts have been reproached on this ground,
the more so since they had been extremely sensitive to foreign
divorce "in fraud" of French law. English criticism of this
system emphasizes that a husband can, by transferring his
domicil to England, escape the indissolubility of marriage
inherent in the law of his former domicil, and thus cause
hardship to the wife and provoke legal difficulties, since the
resulting decree, in all probability, will not be recognized in
other countries involved. 289 This case has not been covered
by the Matrimonial Causes Act of I937· That Act only helps
the wife to maintain the English home, but even for this it is
not clear whether the English jurisdiction is exclusive. The
majority of the American statutes have tried to define the
jurisdiction of the courts by those various additional requirements which we have mentioned before; these clauses are
complicated and not really effective, except where the minimum residence is seriously upheld.
The case where both parties change their personal law in
favor of that of the forum, has always been felt as less shocking than the circumvention of a divorce law by one of the
spouses to the detriment of the other. Also the means of
repression need not be necessarily the same. The German
provision was intended to prevent the husband from arbitrarily
changing his law, which was the governing law; but the Hague
Convention avoided this peril by constituting the law of the
last common national law as governing. Both cases, however,
ought to be clearly envisaged in future discussions.

VIII.

CoNCLUSIONS

Three systems are outstanding. The first, the American
method of applying the lex fori to divorce suits with foreign
elements, has revealed itself as being unique. In the wide
domains of the British commonwealth of nations, and under
~ 89 CHESHIRE 361.
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the Montevideo and the Scandinavian Treaties, the litigation
takes place at the actual or, in certain cases, the last matrimonial domicil, so that the law of the forum is in harmony
with the genuine domiciliary principle. The third main
solution presented by the Continental European and the
Chinese and Japanese legislations has been derived from the doctrine that the national law of the parties must be respected,
although the domestic law has to be consulted at the same time.
The courts, in these latter countries, are open to foreigners
domiciled in the state and in many cases as well to nationals
domiciled abroad. Nowhere, however, in these two systems
do courts accept divorce suits at the domicil of the plaintiff
alone and at the same time apply exclusively the local divorce
statutes, even though the plaintiff is of foreign nationality.
This is literally the rule in this country in the case of an alien
petitioner. But the characteristic point of comparison is that
where the plaintiff, an American citizen, has by his domicil
therein become a citizen of the state, this state will assume
jurisdiction and apply its own statute exclusively, irrespective
of the past and present legal situation of the other spouse.
We have seen that no learned doctrine is able to justify this
principle. We have also alluded to some of the evils to which
it leads. But we have begun our comparative study for the
purpose of finding out whether the methods used abroad are
preferable.
The answer is, flatly, no.
The system centered around the matrimonial domicil is
of tempting simplicity and offers a splendid basis for international cooperation. However, the United States and the
states of the nationality principle cannot be expected to restore the idyllic conditions permitting such unity of rules.
Again, it has never been discussed whether it would not be
feasible and advisable to _have a court, sitting at the domicil
of one party, apply the law of the last common domicil in-
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stead of its own law, irrespective of the time when the cause
occurred.
The system of cumulative application of laws is so complicated that the difficulties connected with it seem out of
proportion to its usefulness. More fateful still, the precarious
balance between the foreign and the domestic law achieved
in the German Code and the Hague Convention has been
finally destroyed by the judicial and legislative movement
characterized by the Ferrari case. Such a fervent advocate
of the nationality principle as Pillet immediately perceived how incompatible with this principle it is to apply the
domestic law to a foreign husband. This system is in ruins. A
radical clearing up will be inevitable sooner or later.
Thus, really, it cannot be contended that the methods used
outside of this country are superior to the framework of the
American law of this subject.
Reforms can consist of a very simple development. The
requirement of a minimum residence time is today the chief
vehicle for correcting the scope of divorce jurisdiction. Uniform drafts have acknowledged its importance and insisted
that the minimum should be of one or two years. This requirement ought to be freed from the wild-grown tendrils
with which it is surrounded, and it should be enforced with
the utmost rigidity. This method demonstrated by a century's
history as being suitable to exigencies of life in America,
brings us nearer to the much spoken of "interest of the state"
in the married status of its domiciliaries. In the twilight under
which it is hard to distinguish a freshly acquired actual domicil
from a fictitious one, that is, a non-domicil, a court that must
predicate its jurisdiction upon the "interest of the state" so
defined is in an unenviable position. In order to compete with
another state in the task of adjudging any status of a person,
the state should ascertain that the person belongs to the life
of the state, regularly and definitively. Such competition can-
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not be helped. But at least evasion among the states, and
evasion by one spouse at the cost of the other, would be
eliminated. With a two years' residence, or even a period of
one year, strictly observed, any intention of obtaining divorce
under the conditions is immaterial. Besides, very few individuals are able to change their local connections completely and
to maintain their new center of private and business life during
such a time merely to gain a divorce. Not every necessary improvement, of course, can be accomplished by such a measure
alone; perhaps this is the reason why the uniform drafts have
not appeared to attract sufficiently active support to accomplish
a general reform. Where the parties are actually domiciled
in two different states, the adequate method of dealing with
the case is not to apply the statute of either state, but rather
to apply that of the last common domicil. This suggestion .
should be appreciated by future European legislators.
Whether it could be brought into the structure of the American statutory systems might be a matter of discussion.
More important, however, are reforms in the field of
domestic divorce practice. They are prerequisites also of a
better and sounder system of reciprocal recognition of foreign
decrees.

CHAPTER

12

Recognition of Foreign Divorce

1

D

IVERGENCES concerning recognition of foreign
divorces are too great to allow any systematic comparison. 2 A few texts, representing the three systems
described in the preceding chapter, illustrate the situation:
Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, § r 13. A
state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction to dissolve
the marriage of spouses of whom one is domiciled within the
state and the other is domiciled outside the state, if
(a) the spouse who is not domiciled in the state (i) has
consented that the other spouse acquire a separate home; or
(ii) by his or her misconduct has ceased to have the right to
object to the acquisition of such separate home; or (iii) is
personally subject to the jurisdiction of the state which grants
the divorce; or
(b) the state is the last state in which the spouses were
domiciled together as man and wife.
Treaty of Montevideo on International Civil Law (1940),
Article rs. The law of the matrimonial domicil governs:
(a) conjugal separation; (b) dissolubility of marriage; but
recognition of the dissolubility shall not be obligatory upon
the state where the marriage was solemnized, if the ground
invoked for dissolution was divorce and if the local laws do
not admit of that ground as such. In no case shall the celebration of a subsequent marriage, in accordance with the laws of
another state, constitute the crime of bigamy.
Article 59· Actions for annulment of marriage, divorce, or
dissolution, and, in general, actions regarding all questions
1
Comparative literature: LORENZEN, "The Enforcement of American Judgments Abroad," 29 Yale L. J. (I919) I 88, 268; VREELAND, Validity of Foreign
Divorces (1938); GUTTERIDGE, "Conflicts of Jurisdiction in Matrimonial
Suits," I 9 Brit. Year Book Int. Law ( 19 3 8) I 9; READ, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the Common Law Units of the British
Commonwealth (I 938).
2 See VREELAND, Validity of Foreign Divorces 319ff.
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which affect the relations of spouses, shall be instituted before
the judges of the matrimonial domicil. ...
German Code of Civil Procedure, § 328. Recognition of
the judgment of a foreign court is excluded:
I. If the courts of the state to which the foreign court
belongs are not competent, according to the German laws;
2. If the unsuccessful defendant is a German and has not
defended the proceeding, provided that summons initiating
the proceeding has been served on him neither personally
within the state of the court of suit nor by means of German
judicial assistance;
3· If the judgment, to the detriment of a German party,
disagrees with the provisions of article 13, par. r, 3 or articles
I 7, I 8, 22 of the Introductory Law to the Civil Code, ...
4· If recognition of the judgment would violate morals or
the purpose of a German law;
5. If reciprocity is not guaranteed....

I.

INDIVIDUAL SYSTEMS

8

England 4
A foreign final decree of divorce is recognized by English
courts, if ( 1) it is rendered by the court of any other country,
which is competent according to its own lex fori/ and (2) if
(a) the husband was domiciled in the English sense in that
country 6 at the time of the commencement of the suit for
divorce 7 or (b) if the decree would be recognized by the
court of the husband's domicil. 8
I.

3

With respect to countries not considered here, see:
For Switzerland, GAUTSCHI, "Die Anerkennung von ausHi.ndischen Ehescheidungsurteilen," SJZ. I9z6, I.
For Italy: SERENI, "Legal Problems of Divorce in Italy," z8 Iowa L. Rev.
(I943) z86, Z9I•
4
FALCONBRIDGE, "Recognition of Foreign Divorces," [I9J2] 4 D. L. R. 39;
FoSTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," I6 Brit. Year
Book Int. Law (I935) 89; ELKIN, Clunet I938, 98; CHESHIRE 36I.
5 Bater v. Bater [I9o6] P. zo9.
6
Harvey v. Farnie [I88o] 5 P. D. 153, [I8h-I883] 8 App. Cass. 43; Le
Mesurier v. Le Mesurier [I895] zo App. Cas. 517; Lankester v. Lankester
[19z5] P. Il4; Simons v. Simons [I939] I K. B. 490 (Massachusetts decree).
7
Wilson v. Wilson (I87z) [I869-I87z] L. R. z P. & D. 435·
8
Armitage v. Att. Gen. [I9o6] P. I35 (divorce decree in South Dakota
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Illustrations: (a) An English married couple went to live
in Detroit, Michigan; the wife returned to England; by agreement with her, the husband brought action for divorce and obtained a decree by default in the Wayne County Court. The
High Court of England presumed that both spouses were
domiciled in Detroit, as the husband certainly was. 9 Therefore, recognizing the Michigan divorce, the High Court dismissed an action of the wife for divorce. 10
(b) A husband, resident in Michigan according to American conceptions but domiciled in Canada according to British
law, obtained a divorce decree in Michigan. The decree was
not recognized in Canada 11 and therefore not in England
either.
English courts are known, however, by courtesy to recognize the finding of domicil by trustworthy foreign courts. 12
The recent change of legislation (Matrimonial Causes Act
of 1937) by which a deserted wife may institute suit at the
last marital domicil would seem to bring about recognition of
foreign jurisdiction under analogous circumstances; 13 no
authorities are yet known.
would be recognized in New York, where the husband was domiciled; hence
recognized in England). Cass v. Cass (I9Io) I02 L. T. R. 397, Clunet I9Io,
1259 (South Dakota decree not recognized in Massachusetts, where husband
was domiciled; hence recognition denied in England) •
9
Crowe v. Crowe (I937) I57 L. T. R. 557, [I937] 2 All E. R. 723, Clunet
I938, 97; similarly, Leigh v. Leigh [I937] I D. L. R. 773 (if nothing is
proved, the court will presume that. the foreign tribunal (again a Detroit court)
had jurisdiction over the parties by reason of domicil and that the domicil was
properly and validly established) .
1
Cf. the reasoning of FALCONBRIDGE in [I932] 4 D. L. R. 41, supra n. 4,
before the Amendment Act of I 9 3 7.
11
Rex v. Woods (I903) 6 Ont. L. R. 4I; similarly, Green v. Green [I893]
P. 89 (Pennsylvania decree).
12
Information obtained in a Swiss divorce case; see WYLER, SJZ. (I933-34)
199·
13
The contrary opinion is expressed by MAGDALENE SCHOCH in 5 Giur. Comp.
DIP. JOO.
Before the Act of I937, recognition in England and throughout the British
Dominions of a divorce rendered in New Zealand under the provision enabling
a deserted wife to sue at the last matrimonial domicil was anticipated by Mr.
Justice Denniston in Poingdestre v. Poingdestre (I909) 28 N. Z. L. R. 6o4,
I I G. L. R. 585, but doubted in the case of a Victoria decree by Chief Justice
Irvine in Chia v_. Chia [I92x] V. L. R. s66. See READ, Recognition and Enforcement 229, who shared the doubts.
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The English. rule is so exclusively influenced by jurisdictional considerations that the reasons upon which a foreign
court bases its decree are immaterial. The grounds of the foreign decree need not be in accord with the grounds for divorce
established in English matrimonial law, 14 provided, of course,
the decree does not violate good morals.
2.

The United States

15

While recognition of decrees of foreign countries attracts
scant attention, recognition of divorces rendered in sister states
is one of the most discussed subjects of American law. The
formidable complications ensuing from conflicting social
policies and constitutional controversies have not been met
with consistent and purposive judicial methods, in part due
to the limited federal control exercised over the subject matter
by the Supreme Court under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
One school of thought, indeed, has seemed to prefer cautious
case construction to any rules. However, in recent decades before Williams v. North Carolina 16 re'vived the conflict of
opinions, it was prevailingly assumed that the recognition
due under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal
Constitution depended upon the following requirements:
(a) Under that Clause as construed by the Supreme Court,
it was assumed that a state had the duty to recognize a divorce
pronounced in a sister state X:
(i) When both parties were domiciled in X; 17
(ii) (Probably) when the defendant was domiciled in X;
(iii) When the plaintiff was domiciled in the state and, in
addition, one of the following three conditions was
fulfilled, viz., that:
14 Harvey v. Farnie [I88o] 5 P. D. 153, cited supra n. 6; Pemberton v.
Hughes [1899] I Ch. 78!; Bater v. Bater [1906] P. Z09, cited supra n. 5;
Mezger v. Mezger [1937] P. 19, [1936] 3 All E. R. 130.
15
Selected older literature is listed by 1 BEALE 467 n. 3; GooDRICH 345 n.
29. For recent literature see supra p. 390, n. u.
16
Williams et al. v. North Carolina (194z) 317 U.S. z87, 143 A. L. R. 1i73.
17
Restatement§ uo; Haddock v. Haddock (19o6) 201 U.S. s6z at 570.

DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT

X is the state where the parties lived together for the last
time before they separated 18 or
The defendant has been personally served with process or
voluntarily appeared in X 19 or
(In a disputed opinion) the defendant has caused the parties
to be separated by his or her marital misconduct. 20
Inversely, no state, in the prevailing opinion, was obligated
to recognize a divorce pronounced by a sister state, if the
plaintiff alone was domiciled in the divorce state and none of
the three additional facts also appeared, particularly when the
court had assumed jurisdiction only on the ground of constructive service of process on the defendant. 21 According to
the Restatement, 22 such a divorce would be void even in the
state where it was rendered; this view, however, has been
generally disapproved. 23
Without the obligation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
the majority of the states also recognize a divorce granted a
resident plaintiff as valid when the defendant has been served
by publication only. 24 A small minority, however, have refused recognition either generally or when, at the time of the
decree, the defendant was domiciled within the forum of
recognition or in a third state which did not recognize the
divorce. 2 :>
18 Atherton v. Atherton (r9or) r8r U.S. rss; Thompson v. Thompson
(1913) 2.26 U.S. 551; Crimm v. Crimm (192.4) zrr Ala. 13, 99 So. 301.
19 Cheever v. Wilson (r87o) 9 Wall. ro8, 19 L. Ed. 604; for state cases, see
I BEALE 506 n. 7•
20 Ditson v. Ditson (r856) 4 R.I. 87; "generally accepted as law in the
United States," }ACOBS, Cases and Other Materials on Domestic Relations (ed.
z, I 939) 354 n. 2..
21 Haddock v. Haddock (I9o6) 2.01 U.S. 562..
22 Restatement § r I 3 comment g.
23 BINGHAM, "The American Law Institute vs. the Supreme Court," z I Cornell L. Q. (1936) 3.93· At present, however, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his
concurring vote in the Williams case postulates equal treatment of divorce decrees in all jurisdictions.
24
Miller v. Miller ( I92.5) 2.00 Iowa I I 93, zo6 N. W. 2.62..
25
New York, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and others which
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In principle, a divorce rendered in a state in which neither
of the parties was domiciled is not recognized, irrespective of
whether the defendant was personally served or put in an
appearance. 26 This is fundamental.
(b) This set of rules has been modified by the Williams
case to an extent still discussed. To an unbiased mind, however,
the impression made upon most practical lawyers 21 appears
right; the decision eliminates the alternative requirements
described under (iii) above altogether, so as to hold it unqualifiedly sufficient that the decree be rendered at the domicil
of the plaintiff. This construction of the case is supported by
the facts of the twin cases decided, as the Nevada court had
taken jurisdiction in the one case on service by publication and
in the other by personal service beyond the jurisdiction: of the
court. The express declaration of the Supreme Court that
Haddock v. Haddock is overruled, therefore, should not be
taken as an obiter dictum or a non-committal announcement
of a future policy. Not even wrongful desertion of the wife
by the husband, according to the majority of the Justices, is
relevant to the jurisdictional question whether the new domicil
of the husband suffices for the purpose of divorce. A divorce
pronounced in the state of the plaintiff's domicil ought to be
recognized in any state including that of the defendant's
domicil or that of the former matrimonial domicil. Whatever
criticism may be aroused, it may be justifiably claimed that
the decision frees courts and lawyers from "hopeless refinements",28 as well as from many extremely difficult fact findare variously listed by the writers; cf., for instance JACOBS, "Attack on Decrees
of Divorce," 34 Mich. L. Rev. (1936) 749, 756 n. 38; VREELAND J2.7, 3z8;
GooDRICH 348, n. 40.
26
Bell v. Bell (1901) 181 U.S. 175; Andrews v. Andrews (1903) 188 U.S.
14; Jardine v. Jardine (1937) Z91 Ill. App. I5Z, 9 N. E. (:zd) 645; Voorhis
v. Voorhis (1936) 184 La. 406, r66 So. 121; Restatement§ 111.
27 See in particular the Annotation in 143 A. L. R. 1294ff., as against the
subtle polemics by BINGHAM, "Song of Sixpence," z9 Cornell L. Q. ( 1943) 1.
28
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in the Williams case, supra
n. 16 1 at 307.
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ings, 29 and narrows considerably the number of cases where
the validity of the divorce and of a remarriage is subject to
contrary holding in different states.
An unfortunate feature of the case is due to the fact that
the majority of the Supreme Court, for certain technical reasons which are approved by learned critics,S 0 failed to enter
into a discussion of the question whether the two plaintiffs,
Mr. Williams and Mrs. Hendrix, actually were domiciled in
Reno. The court in Reno established its jurisdiction on their
residence, during the six weeks prescribed, in the "Alamo Auto
Court" of Reno. The very fact that awakened the indignation
of the courts in North Carolina, to which the victorious parties
brazenly returned immediately as newly married husband and
wife, remained outside of the decision. Yet the doctrine that
divorce judgments must be supported at least by bona fide
domicil of one of the parties within the state of judgment
should not be regarded as weakened, and it is also to be hoped
that re-examination by the court of recognition of the facts
evidencing such domicil will not be further impeded.
(c) Either under the doctrine of equitable estoppel or
under the doctrine regarding the invoking of jurisdiction,
several courts, particularly those of New York, 31 have developed a bar to the impeachment of an invalid divorce. A
person who has been an active party to a divorce suit or a
person who has in some way profited from a divorce, for instance by remarrying, is not allowed to allege the invalidity
of the divorce. This doctrine results in consequences which approach recognition of decrees that would otherwise have been
29

Note, I 43 A. L. R. I 296ff.
BINGHAM, 29 Cornell L. Q. (I943), supra n. 23, at 3: "few lawyers will
disagree." But see the dissenting vote in the Williams. case, supra n. I 6, by
Mr. Justice Jackson, at p. 320 under "III, Lack of domicile."
31
In re Ellis' Estate (I 893) 55 Minn. 40I, 4I2, 4I 3, 56 N. w. I056, 1059>
I06o; Kelsey v. Kelsey (I922) I97 N.Y. Supp. 37I 1 aff'd 237 N.Y. 5201 I43
N. E. 726; Krause v. Krause (I94o) 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N. E. (2d) 29o; Maloney v. Maloney (I94o) 22 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 334· Restatement§ II2.
30
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held void or voidable. But the application of the doctrine is
confused and uncertain. 32
(d) Another limitation on the right to impeach a foreign
divorce decree involves the review of jurisdictional facts. On
general principles, the court where recognition is sought
would be free to reopen the question whether the plaintiff
was domiciled within the state .of judgment or whether the
defendant unjustifiedly deserted the plaintiff, as facts upon
which the jurisdiction for granting divorce was based. A recent
decision of the United States Supreme Court, however, seems
to indicate that the forum is bound to give full faith and credit
to the finding of the divorce court when the defendant put in
a special appearance and litigated the question of domicil or
desertion. 33
·
Most influential is the tendency of courts, disturbed by the
inconsistent treatment of divorces in the different states, to
cover up defects in the jurisdictional justification of divorce
decrees or, in the apt description by Lorenzen, "to close their
eyes to the actualities of the situation and to allow juries to
find the existence of a bona fide domicile in the state of divorce
on technical grounds." 34 What palpably constitutes a temporary stay of a plaintiff ready to return to his real home immediately upon rendition of the decree, is dissembled as a
domicil replacing it for good, first by the divorce forum and
subsequently by that of recognition.
32
Cf; JACOBS, "Attack on Decrees of Divorce," 34 Mich. L. Rev. (1936)
749, 771; Note, 40 Col. L. Rev. (1940) 1255 and literature cited therein; Note,
122 A. L. R. (1939) 1321. Cf. the caveat in Restatement§ II2.
33
Davisv. Davis (1938) 305 U.S. 32; Case note, 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (1939)
290; Note, 3 U. of Detroit L. J. (1939) 32; Note, n8 A. L. R. (1931) 1524;
cf. other applications of the theory: Stoll v. Gottlieb (1938) 305 U. S. 165;
Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank (1940) 308 U. S. 371,
rehearing denied (1940) 309 U. S. 695. See also FARRIER, "Full Faith and
Credit of Adjudication of Jurisdictional Facts," 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (1935)
552; and Note, 53 Harv. L. Rev. (1940) 652.
34
LoRENZEN, "Haddock v. Haddock Overruled," 52 Yale L. J. (1943) 341,
348, 352, 353·
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(e) A divorce rendered in a foreign country is, of course,
not covered by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Nevertheless, a state will ordinarily recognize such a divorce under the
same circumstances that it gives credit to a sister state's decree.35 Also the method followed in ascertaining the domicil
of the divorced party ordinarily is that customary in American courts rather than determination according to the view
of the foreign divorce court. 36 Yet it has been decided in agreement with the foreign law whether a married woman sh~es
the domicil of her husband. 37 Differences from the treatment
of American decrees are most likely to occur in the respect
that the place of domicil is more easily to be found situated
in an American state than in a foreign country. 38 But in Gould
v. Gould, the Court of Appeals of New York, although stating
that the domicil of the parties had remained in New York,
held their bona fide residence in France sufficient for recognition of the French decree, in deviation from the doctrine of
Andrews v. Andrews; 39 it was, however, a special case. Since
both parties had appeared in the French suit and the decision
was based on New York law, the court held that "under the
circumstances of this case, the policy of this state is not offended
by the recognition." 40
(f) Judicial separation, granted at the matrimonial
domicil, has been held by the United States Supreme Court
35 For recent cases see Note, I 43 A. L. R. at I 3 I 3; cf. HACKWORTH, z Digest
of International Law (I94I) 38z s. I68.
36
RG. (Nov. ZI, I9z9) u6 RGZ. 353, JW. I93o, I309 no. I4 (the German court, in an Iowa case, respects whatever method is followed in the United
States).
37 Torlonia v. Torlonia (I9zo) 108 Conn. z9z, I4Z Atl. 843.
38
See supra p. 140, n. I 57·
39
I88 U.S. I4 •
.w (I9Z3) Z35 N.Y. I4, z9, 138 N. E. 490, 494· STUMBERG z8r n. 8z thinks
estoppel was the ground of the decision. In the discussion of the American Law
Institute, 4 Proceedings, Appendix (I9Z6) 348, 354 Judge Page observed that
the matrimonial domicil was in Paris; Professor Beale declared himself extremely well satisfied by this statement. The court seems to have affirmed the
domicil in New York for reasons lying outside of the case.
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to be entitled to recognition under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. 41
More generally, it has been concluded from the cases that
whenever a decree for judicial separation is granted under circumstances such as would have supported jurisdiction for
absolute divorce in the sense of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, recognition cannot be withheld. 42
Traditionally, however, where statutes have requirements
for judicial separation different from those for dissolution of
marriage, separation may be granted on the basis of personal
jurisdiction, residence of both parties being sufficient. This, it
is understood, only "protects the spouse against certain acts
of the other spouse while they are within the state," 43 without extraterritorial effect. 44
3· France4'5
France has no written law on the recognition of foreign
divorce decrees, but the practice has developed, in addition '
to the rules concerning foreign judgments in general, certain
peculiarities as regards foreign judgments affecting status and
capacity of individuals. 46 It seems, however, that a sharp
distinction is to be made between divorces in which at least
41 Thompson v. Thompson (I913) 226 u.s. 55I; cf. GOODRICH 353 n. 59·
Note, 33 Yale L. J. (I924) 426.
42
Restatement §.I I4 comment b; STUMBERG 292; GooDRICH 354 n. 6r. In
the cases concerning extraterritorial effect of divorce decrees, a state may refuse
to give effect to a limited divorce, while it would recognize a decree of absolute
divorce, Pettis v. Pettis (I9I7) 9I Conn. 6o8, IOI Atl. I3·
43
Restatement § I I 4 comment a.
44 There is no authority, GooDRICH 352, 353·
45
See DEGAND, 5 Repert. 559 and (with reference to the almost identical Belgian law) PouLLET, nos. soo-504; Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ. Divorce, nos.
I 76o, I 761. A report was issued by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and reproduced in the decision of the German RG. (March I 9, I 9 3 6) I 50 RGZ.
374, Clunet I939, I22.
46
The subject matter of the practice is extended by LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE
360 no. 3IO to all judgments which modify a legal situation (Gestaltungsurteile
in the German doctrine).
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one party is of French nationality and those in which both are
foreigners.
(a) If both spouses are of foreign nationality, foreign divorce decrees, like other foreign judgments creating or modifying status and capacity, are held effective without exequatur
by the French courts for purposes not requiring physical execution on property or coercion of persons. 47
Neither the conditions nor the scope of this rule are settled,
with respect to which the courts seem to enjoy almost absolute
discretion. One condition certainly is that the decree conform
to the requirements of both judicial jurisdiction and choice of
law by the national law or laws of the parties, in respect to
which points at least a few cases have been re-examined by
French courts. 48 Often, public policy may intervene, especially
when a fair opportunity for defense appears to have been
lacking. 49
Without being made executory by exequatur, a foreign divorce decree has the effect of forming a proper basis for remarriage before a civil official 50 and has been held in a much
discussed decision to mark the beginning of the three months
during which a divorced wife under French law 51 must claim,
47 The principle initiated by the Court of Cassation in 186o (infra n. so)
was confirmed and formulated in Cass. (civ.) (May 9> 1900) S.190l.I.185;
App. Aix (July 9, 1903) D. 1905.2·73, S.19o6.2.257; cf. WEISS, 6 Traite 4rfi.;
and with final clarifications in Cass. (req.) (March 3, 1930) S.1930.1.377; cf.
NIBOYET, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 479· Occasionally, it is true, exequatur is asked
and granted without apparent necessity; see App. Agen (July 29, 1936) Revue
Crit. 1937, 721 and the Note ibid. (annulment in Chile).
48
Cass. (civ.) (May 9, 19oo) S.x9ox.r.r85; Trib. civ. Seine (March 16,
1935) Revue 1936, 519 (the Supreme Council of the Armenian Church in
Constantinople no longer had divorce jurisdiction).
49 Cass. (civ.) (May 9, 19oo) S.x 9or.x.x 85; Trib. civ. Seine (June 29, 1938)
Clunet 1939, 61 (rejecting a decree of Cuernavaca, Mexico). Cf. App. Aix
(March 27, r89o) and Cass. (civ.) (Oct. zs, 1892.) S.r893·1·505; Cour Paris
(July 2, 1934) Revue Crit. 1936, soo (recognizing a decree of the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island granted by default against the husband who was notified
of the decree and failed to appeal; the note finds this holding "too absolute").
5 Cass. (civ.) (Feb. :z8, 1 86o) S.r 86o.r.21o. The writers base the custody
of children on the foreign divorce decree.
51 C. C, art. 1463.

°
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or otherwise lose, any participation in marital community
property. 52 These decisions are understood to express the idea
that a final foreign divorce decree of foreigners is assimilated
to a French decree. A foreign judicial separation, if recognized, may be converted into divorce.'53
Application for exequatur, however, is necessary not only
if execution is sought, as for alimentary rights or rights of
restitution, but also if, in litigation between the spouses, one
of them denies the validity of the divorce. In a case where
divorce had been granted in the United States at the instance
of the husband, the wife sued for divorce again in France;
the mere fact that she challenged the American decree persuaded the Court of Cassation to prevent recognition otherwise than by means of exequatur proceedings. 54 Further, the
regular record of divorce at the registry of civil status, essential for terminating marital liability of spouses against third
persons, cannot be obtained without exequatur. 55
This system has been adopted in several countries ·56 but
has been criticized by French 57 as well as by Italian writers,58
52

Cass. (req.) (March 31 1930) S.t930.1.377 cited supra n. 47·
Cass. (civ.) (July 6, 1922) D.I922.1.I37, 8.1923.1.5; Trib. dep. AlpesMaritimes (Oct. 25, 1927) Revue 1928, 328.
54
Cass. (req.) (Nov. II, 1908) Revue I909, 227, Clunet I909 1 753,
S.I909.I.572·
55
Trib. civ. Seine (May I9 1 I926) La Loi, Dec. 30, 1927. Cf., on the effect
of omission of transcription, Trib. civ. Seine (May 27 1 I938) Nouv. Revue
1938, 326. Marginal entry in the register is allowed but has informational, not
legal, effect.
56
See, for instance, for Belgium cases cited in Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ.
(supra n. 45).
.
For Brazil: App. Civ. Rio de Janeiro (Dec. 91 1922 and April 15, I926) no.
5405, 81 Revista Dir. Civ. (1926) 174ff.; App. Civ. Rio de Janeiro (Oct. 25,
1927) no. 2.98o, 86 Revista Dir. Civ. (1927) 389. The problem is discussed,
however, see J. M. DE CARVALHO SANTos, 9 Codigo .de Processo Civil Interpretado (194I) 21ff.; I. BoRGES DARosA, 4 Processo Civile Comercial Brasileiro (1941) 328ff.; JoA.o M. CARNEIRO LACERDO, 4 Codigo de Processo Civil
Brasileiro (I941) 373ff.
57
BARTIN, I Principes § I90; NIBOYET 952ff. nos. 850-852; PERROUD, 5
Repert. 384 nos. I47 1 I48.
58 ANZILOTTI, I Rivista (1906) 227; 5 i/JiJ. (19Io) IJI; see further citations in MoRELLI, Dir. Proc. Civ. Int. 289 n. I.
53
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who have influenced their courts to the extent that, according
to the opinion now prevailing in Italy, a foreign judgment
never has binding effect unless it has been rendered executory
by proceedings of delibazione. 59 Similarly, a Brazilian tradition
requires foreign judgments declaratory of personal status to
be submitted to "homolo gafao" (confirmation). 60
(b) In cases where a French national is a party, a decree of
exequatur seems to be indispensable for all purposes, 61 the
question whether a person is a French national being again reserved to the French courts. 62 Such a decree must be sought in
a special proceeding in the same way and under the same conditions as in all cases of foreign judgments. Just what is the
subject matter of this proceeding is highly controversial, but
there is no doubt that, despite all contrary theories, the courts
reserve to themselves the right to unlimited re-examination of
every point of procedure and substantive law and even of the
facts of the case, 63 although they may not exercise this control
completely in every case. Ordinarily, they will investigate
whether the divorce was based on a ground acknowledged by
the French municipal law. 64 Where, for instance, a Swiss court
pronounced divorce on the ground of disruption of marriage
(C.C. art. 142), the decree was not recognized, the cause not
59 Italian C. Civ. Proc. art. 94 I (as amended in I 9 I 9). In most of its recent
bilateral treaties, however, Italy ,has required an action for executory confirmation only for the purpose of forcible execution; see PERASSI in I7 Rivista (I925)
I 09; UDJNA, Elementi 95· Thus, in relation to Switzerland, no exequatur is required; see Note of the Italian Government to the Swiss Government, BBl.
I938, II 499 no. 8.
60
Sup. Trib. Fed. (July 24, I92o) no. 7I4 24 Revista Sup. Trib. (I92o)
3 56; BEVILAQUA 446.
61 Circular letter by the State's attorney of Paris, July 25, I887, Clunet I892,
644. Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ., Divorce no. r76o. Exceptions advanced by
AuDINET, r I Recueil I 926 I 240 n. 4, have been very rare.
62 App. Aix (June 4, I912) S.I913.2.92; cf. Trib. civ. Seine (Referes)
(Nov. 9, I92o) Revue I92r, 526.
.
63 GLASSON et TrssrER, 4 Traite de Procedure Civile (ed. 3, 1932) nos. Ior5,
I o I 6 and 5 ibid. Suppl. no. I o I 5 bis.
64
This includes at present the statutory provision of I 941 (amending C. C.
art. 233) that no marriage can be divorced in its first three years; see }ACOBS,
"Problems of Divorce in France," 2 8 Iowa L. Rev. (I 943) 2 8 6 at 3 I r.
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being existent under French law. 65 But it has rather astonished
the commentators that the Court of Appeals of Paris, in an
exclusively foreign case involving an Argentine husband and
his American wife, refused exequatur to a divorce decree of
the Court of Monaco on the ground that the husband had in
fact never resided in Europe, although both parties had been
fully represented in the suit·and only the parents of the husband wanted to prevent recognition of the divorce in order to
keep their son from concluding another marriage. 66 French
courts always feel repugnance to collusive influence on judicial
acts.
4· Germany

67

The statutory provisions laid down in section 328 of the
Code of Civil Procedure concern the conditions of both recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in general. This
regulation is complete and the most elaborate of all, but questionable in form and substance; it also has a peculiar disadvantage in application to divorce, since its principles were
evolved without regard to the rules of conflict of laws contained
in EG., article I 7· Questions governed by both sets of rules,
which are incongruous and overlap, have been difficult to settle.
The final result, however, may be briefly presented as follows:
(a) Where both parties are nationals of the country of divorce, a final divorce decree is almost always granted recognition and enforcement. 68 There is, of course, one self-evident
65

Trib. civ. Seine (June 10, I 936) D. H. I936. 420.
Cour Paris (March 24, I9Jo) Revue 1930, 272 criticized by NIBOYET,
ibid. In the decision of Cass. (req.) (Nov. II, I9o8) S.I909.1.572, supra n.
54, a divorce decree of Pensacola, Florida, was declared ineffective because the
husband was found to have obtained the decree by declaring under oath false
facts supporting jurisdiction.
67 STEIN-JONAS, I ZPO. § 328 II; RAAPE 4I8-424; WIERUSZOWSKI in 4
Leske-Loewenfeld I 93·
68
RG. (Feb. 28, I938) JW. I938, I5I8; see also RG. (Jan. 5, 1925) 109
RGZ. 383, JW. 1925, 765, Clunet I926, 173 (Czechoslovakian decree); KG.
(Dec. 2I, I935) JW. I936, 2466, Nouv. Revue 1937, 98 {Hungarian decree
upon a ground of alleged collusion of the parties). The same point of view was
observed in Austria, see WALKER 729, 730.
66
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condition-the decree must not violate German public policy
(C. Civ. Proc. § 328, par. 4)-but seldom can the matter be
connected with German interests closely enough to affect
them. 69
For a time it was doubtful whether recognition was to be
extended to the case where the husband is a domiciliary of
Germany. Now the prevailing opinion is in the affirmative. 70
(b) According to the system of the procedural code, the
solution stated above should also govern the case where both
parties are of foreign nationality but have obtained their divorce in a third country. But, under the principle of nationality
adopted in the German conflicts rules, a divorce may not be
recognized unless it agrees with the law of the national country
of the husband. The second view prevails in the recent literature. In summary, a decree concerning two foreigners is
certain to be recognized if it is rendered at the marital domicil
and recognized by the husband's national country. 71
(c) Where one party is of German nationality, the divorce
decrees of many countries are not recognized because reciproc69 RAAPE 419.
A divorce decree validly rendered by the national court of
the spouses by default was recognized, although not in conformance with German divorce procedure, LG. Dresden (Oct. 16, 1935) JW. 1935, 3493· The
OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 1, 1935) JW. 1935, 3488 held a Mexican decree void
because obtained in a shocking manner, but this decision has been criticized,
since the husband was an American citizen domiciled in New Jersey and the
wife had lost her German nationality by her marriage, JONAS, JW. 1936, 283;
LoRENZ, 6 Giur. Camp. DIP. 326. The decree would not have been recognized
in New Jersey, however, if properly attacked, and could be disregarded for this
reasol) in Germany. Jonas thought that as the husband had remarried in New
Jersey the divorce was recognized there.
70 If the husband is domiciled in Germany, either spouse may sue at his domicil, C. Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. r. Where jurisdiction is granted in Germany, there
is no recognition without reciprocity, C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. 2. Hence, even
with respect to foreigners recognition seems to be excluded in most cases, M.
WoLFF, IPR. 83. This, however, makes no sense; see NussBAUM, D. IPR. 441;
RAAPE 418 and 2 Dt. IPR. r86; BERGMANN, StAZ. 1935, 104; JoNAS, JW.
1934, 2555; MASSFELLER, StAZ. 1937, :u6.
71
1 FRANKENSTEIN 345ff.; RAAPE 4:u; JONAS, JW. 1934, 2555 and ibid.
1936, 283; MASSFELLER, StAZ. 1937, 227; contra: LEWALD 128 no. 174;
KIPP-WOLFF, Familienrecht (1928) 148 § 39 n. 47 and IPR. 83; WIERUSZOWSKI in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 3 8 and ibid. 76.
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ityof recognition is not guaranteed (C. Civ. Proc. § 328, par. 2,
cf. § 6o6, par. 2 and the Law on Divorce of Jan. 24, 1935, art.
2, par. 2 ). The list of countries guaranteeing reciprocity, however, is not altogether confined to those countries that have concluded treaties on recognition with Germany or to those recognizing all German judgments; it suffices that German divorce decrees are regularly recognized. Therefore, the list has
been believed to be rather comprehensive. 72
However, relations with Great Britain and the United States
in particular are in doubt. Leading authorities declare that in
neither country is there any certainty of recognition because
courts in common law countries are prepared to re-examine the
jurisdiction of the individual German tribunal and that English
courts in particular may inquire into the question of fraud. 73
On the contrary, as a practical matter, one may presume that,
in most courts of the United States, German divorce decrees
rendered at the domicil of one party are enforced with greater
probability of excluding defenses than in Germany. 74
Again, even divorces rendered in one of the countries with
which reciprocal recognition is assumed to exist, such as Denmark, Norway, Rumania (old territory), or the Netherlands,
must comply with a number of other requirements. Recognition is denied, if the husband is domiciled in Germany; 75 or
if the wife is a German national and domiciled in Germany; 76
or if the losing defendant is a German national and in the
72 See especially WIERUSZOWSKI, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 8 8-9 2; and for instance AG. Hannover (Oct. 26, 193I) IPRspr. I9J2, no. 73 (Uruguay); KG.
(Dec. I 9, I 9 32) ibid., no. 74 (Yugoslavia) .
73 STEIN-}ONAS, 2 ZPO. § 328 (ed. I6, I938) nos. no, I32; RAAPE, 2 D.
IPR. I 85 considers the position of England and Sweden not clear.
74 See FELLER, "Die Vollstreckbarkeit von Urteilen amerikanischer Gerichte
in Deutschland," JW. I93I, Iu; Ruo. MUELLER, "Die Anerkennung von
Urteilen, Beschliissen und Anordnungen auslandischer Gerichte und von ausHindischen Schiedsspriichen im Recht der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika,"
5 Z.ausl.PR. (I93I) 905 (on divorce) 927; KG. (May 3, I935) JW. I935>
27 so (as to Illinois).
75 C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. I; cf. ibid. § 6o6 par. I.
76 C. Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. 2 and Law on Divorce of Jan. 24, I9JS, art. 2.
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suit was not served personally through the German authorities; 77 or if divorce was granted on a ground unknown to
German law and without stating facts which constitute a sufficient ground for divorce under German law; 78 or if divorce was denied to the disadvantage of a German party, while
it should have been granted according to German law; 79
and finally also, if the decree is at variance with German public policy. In the case of German parties, this last point includes
numerous possibilities, most of which are covered by the other
conditions of recognition. 80 In fact, not often is a foreign divorce concerning a German subject recognized except by virtue
of some international treaty.

5· Soviet Union
In consequence of the principle that either spouse is able
to terminate the marriage at his pleasure, it is presumed in
Soviet Russia that any act of an authority in other countries
designed to dissolve a marriage of Soviet citizens is supported
by the intention of at least one party and therefore valid as a
nonregistered divorce. A decree of the People's Commissary
of Justice of July 6, 1923,81 states that every dissolution of
marriage obtained in a foreign country according to the local
laws will be recognized in the U.S.S.R., irrespective of where
and when the dissolved marriage was celebrated, unless the
marriage of a Soviet citizen has been dissolved or annulled on
, formal grounds contrary to the will of both spouses. 82 No
77
78
79

C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. I no. 2; RG. (June I5, I936) JW. 1936, 2456.
C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. I no. 3; cf. EG. art. I7 par. 4·
Same provision as supra n. 78.

80 RAAPE
81

4IO,

Sec. 2 of the Decree, which in German translation was reproduced and analyzed together with the Circular letter of the People's Commissary of the Interior of June 2, I9 2 I, no. I9 and the Decree of the Commissary of Justice of
Feb. 2I, I927, by H. FREUND, Das Zivilrecht in der Sowjetunion (I927) I, in
4 Die Zivilgesetze der Gegenwart 7I; H. FREUND, Das Zivilrecht Sowjetrusslands (I924) 69; Makarov, Precis 399; see also German RG. (June 24, 1927)
IPRspr. I926-27, no. 70; Swiss BG. (June I5, I928) 54 BGE II 225, 228, 231.
82
On the limitation expressed in the last sentence, see German RG. (April 4,
I928) I2I RGZ. 24, 27.

RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DIVORCE

479

provision has been held necessary in the case where only one
party is of Soviet nationality. 83
6. The Hague Convention on Divorce
By the Hague Conv~ntion on Divorce, article 7, the member states agree to recognize a divorce or separation decreed by
a court competent according to the Convention, provided the
dispositions of the Convention have been observed, and, in
case the decision has been rendered by default against a defendant who fails to appear, he has been cited in accordance
with the special provisions of his national law for the recognition of foreign judgments. 84
A divorce or separation decreed by an administrative jurisdictional authority shall likewise be recognized everywhere,
if the law of each of the spouses recognizes such divorce or
separation.
Since under articles 1 and 2 the national law of the parties
must be observed by the divorce court, recognition depends
upon a re-examination of facts and motives. 85
The Convention is understood not only to authorize but
to obligate the courts to refuse recognition, if the treaty requirements are not satisfied~ 86
7· Latin-American Conventions
The Montevideo Treaty provides for reciprocal recognition
of divorces decreed at the matrimonial domicil, 87 or at the
last matrimonial domicil, in case the parties have been judicially separated or, according to the recent draft, the wife
has been deserted and has not established a new domicil of
MAKAROV, Precis 400 with hypothetical comment.
For comment see MEILI-MAMELoK, IPR. 240 § 45·
85 LG. Miinchen I (Jan. 17, 19o8) 4 Z. Rechtspflege Bayern (19o8) 295.
ss App. Milano (Nov. 21, 1906) Monitore 1907, 133, 3 Rivista (19o8) 390,
Clunet 1908, 1267; KosTERS 528; LEWALD in Strupp, 1 Worterbuch des Volkerrechts und der Diplomatie 470 VII; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 571 n. 104; VREELAND 229.
87 Treaty on international civil law (1889) art. 13, (1940) art. 15.
83
84
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her own. 88 This simple principle was incorporated in the
C6digo Bustamante which for once, abandoning its neutrality
to the criterion of the personal law, prescribes that the law of
the matrimonial domicil is to apply. 89 Of course, the court
must have observed the treaty requirements respecting the
applicable law, which are not quite so simple in the Havana
Convention as in the Treaty of Montevideo. The reservations
for non-recognition vary in scope. The C6digo Bustamante 90
reserves to "each contracting state the right to permit or
recognize, or not, the divorce or new marriage of persons divorced abroad, in causes which are not admitted by their personal law." The reservation contained in the new draft of the
Montevideo Treaty is much more restricted; it covers only
the case where the country of celebration does not permit
divorce and grants the right to refuse recognition on this
ground only to this country. 91
8. The Scandinavian Convention on Family Law of 1931

92

This Convention assures reciprocal recognition, without
confirmation or re-examination, of all decisions rendered in
matrimonial causes according to the treaty provisions. Actions
for separation or divorce between nationals of the participating
states are decided, under the basic rule of these provisions, according to the law of the state where both parties are domiciled
or where they had their last common domicil, if one of them
is still do"miciled there.
There are, thus, no defenses to a divorce decree of another
Scandinavian country, except that the case does not come under
the Convention or, perhaps, that the matter is pending in the
forum. 93
88

Treaty on international civil law (I 940) art. 59_par. z with art. 9·
Art. 56.
90 Art. 53, see comment by BUSTAMANTE, La commission des jurisconsultes
de Rio I zx.
91
(I940) art. IS(b). See supra p. 4z7.
92
Art. zz referring, among others, to arts. 7, 8, Io.
93 Art. 7 par. t.
89
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Other inter-Scandinavian conventions provide for the mutual enforcement of alimentary awards (Feb. IO, I93I) and
other judgments (March I 6, I 9 3 2). 94

9· Bilateral Treaties
Before the first World War, very few conventions existed
for securing mutual enforce~ent of judgments; the most outstanding is still in force-the French-Swiss Treaty of June I 5,
I 869, which, according to present prevailing opinion, is applicable also to divorce decrees. 95 In the nineteen-twenties, a
wave of international adjustment in Europe brought about a '
series of treaties for reciprocal judicial assistance, especially
through negotiations of France, Germany, Italy, and the
states succeeding· the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. 96
Great Britain, however, while also endeavoring to establish
a system of reciprocal recognition upon a treaty basis, has concluded only two treaties with foreign countries, the first of
which, with France, declares itself inapplicable to matters of
status and capacity 97 and the second, with Belgium, renders
inoperative its most important provision with respect to these
matters. 98
94

See BLOCH, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 6z7, 636.
See SECRETAN, Revue 1926, 199; DEGAND, 5 Repert. 574 no. 193. The
contrary view formerly frequent in Switzerland is maintained by GAUTSCHI, 26
SJZ. I 929, I. The treaty also covers recognition of measures ancillary to divorce, such as awarding custody of children. See Cass. (req.) (Nov. 3, 1936)
Clunet I937> 293· The French-Belgian Treaty of July 8, I899, was facilitated
by the identical codes; see on the content, PERROUD, 5 Repert. 409.
Also still in force is the Treaty between Colombia and Ecuador of June I 8,
I 903 on international private law, art. XVI of which deals with divorce, only
to deny the right of remarriage ifthe divorce fails to agree with the law of the
other state.
96
On the French-Italian Treaty of June 3, 1930, see PERRouo, Clunet I 934,
275; on art. 3 of the German-Swiss Treaty of Nov. 2, 1929, 109 League of
Nations Treaty Series (I930-1931) 274, see VoRTISCH, 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936)
17; KG. (May 25, 1936) JW. 1936, 3577; JoNAs, ibid.; LORENZ, 7 Giur.
Comp. DIP. no. 33· On the application of the Italian-Swiss Treaty of Jan. 3,
1933, to matters of status, see App. Roma (Nov. 27, 1934) with Note, SCERNr,
j Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 31 and the cases cited infra p. 483, n. 100.
97
Treaty of Jan. I8, 1934, art. 2 § 3b, 171 League of Nations Treaty Series
(1936-1937), 183 at 186.
98
Treaty of May 2, 1934, art. 4(3), 173 League of Nations Treaty Series
(1936-1937) 291 at 299.
·
95
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II.

pARTICULAR PROBLEMS

As the general doctrine of recognition and enforcement of
judgments ought to be discussed in its proper place, topics
involved in this problem, such as jurisdiction of the foreign
court, finality and conclusiveness of the decision, reciprocity,
opportunity for defense, and fraud, cannot be treated at length
here. There are, however, a few typical situati~ns found in
the field of foreign divorces, which permit comparative survey.
Courts in contemplating such groups of cases may apply different legal categories to obtain the same result; indeed,
several of the numerous legal requisites for recognition may be
invoked at once without entirely exact discrimination, if a
court feels that the foreign divorce decree should not be accepted.
r. Scope of Recognition as Contrasted with Enforcement
Recognition, as contrasted with enforcement, 99 has more
importance in the matter of divqrce decrees than in ordinary
judgments, but the effects of recognition are not uniformly
determined.
(a) Usually, as a minimum effect, a foreign divorce decree
which agrees with the essentials for recognition can be set
up as a defense against the alleged existence of the marriage
in any suit for separate maintenance or restitution of conjugal
rights, for separation, or for divorce, etc., without bringing
an action on the judgment or, on the Continent, without an
application for an executory decree. 100
99 Cf. Restatement § 42(d); YNTEMA, "L'execution internationale des sentences arbitrales," 2 Memoires de l'Academie Internationale de Droit Compare,
part 3, 357; Hague Draft of a Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments, arts. I and II, Actes de la Cinquieme Session 193.
100 France: Cass. (req.) (March 3, 1930) S.1930,1.377; Cour Paris (July 2,
1934) Revue Crit. 1936, sao; Trib. civ. Seine (March 16, 1935) Revue Crit.
1936, 519·
Germany: C. Civ. Proc. § 328; RG. (June 24, 1927) IPRspr. 1926-27, no.
70.
Greece: App. Athens, no. 33, (1926) 37 Themis 470 (not recognizing an
American divorce); but cf. TENEKIDE:s, Clunet 1937, 598.
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(b) Likewise, the decree provides full evidence of the dissolution of the marriage before a civil official or other marriage
officer when remarriage is attempted. 101 The conditions of its
fitness for recognition are to be examined by the officer or any
authority or court supervising him and not through an action
on the judgment. 102
(c) The effects of a divorce on the name of the wife, on her
ability to be reinstated in her former nationality, or on her
domicil, fall within the scope of mere recognition. 103
(d) While the decree is entered upon the records of civil
status without the steps necessary for enforcement, according
to the German and Swiss regulations, 104 in France, on the
contrary, transcription in the register of civil status is denied
unless a -decree of exequatur is obtained. 105
(e) Recognition nowhere covers the enforcement of peItaly: App. Torino (July 25, .I93o) Monitore I93o, 9I I, 5 Z.ausl.PR.
(I 9 3 I) 844 (see also five Italian decisions, ibid. 843, concerning recognition
outside the Hague Convention) ; App. Fiume (June I o, I 9 3 7) 29 Rivista (I 9 3 7)
398, Clunet I938, 932; cf. ScERNI, 9 Annuario Dir. Comp. (I934) 340; but
see supra p. 48 I, n. 96.
Scotland: The Court of Sessions, Outer House, by Lord Moncrief£, in Arnott
v. Lord Advocate [I 932] Scots L. T. 46, in recognizing an Ohio decree, granted
a decree of declarator for exceptional a,id, while as a rule the grant of a decree
to give validity to the domiciliary decree which already had universal validity
would "be a trespass against international comity."
Switzerland: App. Bern (July 6, I935) 72 ZBJV. (I936) 429; cf. II
Z.ausl.PR. (I937) 669 (divorce of Swiss nationals in Oregon recognized without action because the award required no enforcement); cf. also BEcK, NAG. 3 78
no. I 6o.
However, in Sweden: Law of I 904 with subsequent amendments, c. 3 § 7
requires a confirmation of the foreign divorce decree for the celebration of a
remarriage in Sweden.
101
Belgium: App. Liege (Jan. 29, I924) Jur. Liege I924, 76; cf. PouLLET
649 n. 4·
France: Cass. (civ.) (Feb. z8, I86o) S.I86o.I.2Io; see supra p. 472.
Germany: RAAPE 4I6 VII I.
Switzerland: BEcK, NAG. 379 no. I6I.
102 See citations in preceding note.
103
BEcK, NAG. 3 79 no. I 6 I.
104
Germany: RG. (May I8, I9I6) 88 RGZ. 244 against former practice
of lower courts.
Switzerland: Civil Status Regulation § I I8 par. I.
105
Trib. civ. Seine (May I 9, I 926) cited supra p. 473, n. 55·
For Italy, cf. VDINA, I Giur. Comp. DIP. I 5o.
Portugal: Decree on Civil Status of Dec. 22, I 9 3 2, art. 3 91 § 2.

DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT
cuniary duties arising from the decree or of rights to exercise
custody over children, or other provisional orders. 106 It has
been asserted, 1<1 7 and seems correct, that recognition of a ·
foreign divorce repugnant to the domestic principles of the
forum may be granted, while executory enforcement would
be denied. In the Netherlands, foreign divorces may not be
executed and enforced at all but are capable of being recognized.108
2.

Scope of Res Judicata

Is full faith and credit due to a foreign decision dismissing
an action for divorce on the merits? This question has arisen
on the Continent, because generally defeat in a lawsuit as well
as victory may constitute res judicata. Nevertheless, it has
been argued that a subject of the forum should not be barred
from suing under his own law after having been rejected under
a foreign law less favorable to him. In fact, in Switzerland
foreign decrees denying divorce to a Swiss citizen are said not
to be entitled to recognition. 109 A better considered solution
is given in Germany; a foreign judgment unfavorable to the
application of a German national is recognized, if the decision
is in conformity with German divorce law. 110
In the United States, the binding force of a judgment dismissing a suit for divorce on the merits seems to be virtually
the same whether it is rendered by a domestic or a foreign
court. It could hardly be otherwise, since the divorce court
applies its own law, and the forum of recognition does not
re-examine the merits.
106
BECK, NAG. 381 no. 168.
107 }uLLIOT DE LA MoRANDIERE,

in Republica de Colombia, Comisi6n de
Reforma del C6digo Civil (1930-1940) Z17, z18.
108 See 1 BERGMANN 404.
109
See BEcK, NAG. 377 no. 157·
110 See RAAPE 410 V x.
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3· Divorce Without Judicial Litigation
Many legislators and even treaty-makers are so accustomed
to contemplate contentious proceedings and a decree of a state
court as the only way to obtain divorce, that they overlook the
possibility of other forms of divorce being used abroad. The
difficulties of interpreting the pertinent narrowly drafted texts
are increased in numerous systems, for instance, in the elaborate
but contradictory and incomplete German enactments,111 by
failure to coordinate the procedural rules on recognition of
foreign judgments with the choice of law rules on the extraterritorial effect of private acts and by failure to regulate
clearly the recognition of foreign acts of administrative
justice. 112
Recognition of foreign forms of divorce unknown to the
forum ~s traditionally barred by public policy with respect to
nationals or subjects of the forum, as distinguished from
foreign married couples. But the general trend is in the direction of replacing the former reluctance to recognize foreign
modes of divorce by a broader-minded outlook.
(a) Decisions of foreign ecclesiastical courts are probably
everywhere treated as equivalent to decrees of ordinary courts.
The minority opinion is, however, that religious divorces
should be recognized even when they are not supported by
the consent of the state in whose territory they are rendered, 113
provided only that they are recognized by the state of which
the parties are nationals-a species of renvoi. The prevailing
view 114 requires an ecclesiastical court to be authorized by
m See supra p. 475·
112

See on the "inchoate" state of the Anglo-American doctrine of administrative acts, YNTEMA, "L'execution internationale des sentences arbitrale&," z
Memoires de l'Academie lnternationale de Droit Compare, part 3, 348 at 354·
113 See 3 FRANKENSTEIN 560 n. 70 and the decisions cited by him.
114
3 ARM!NJON §§ 34> 35; M. WOLFF, IPR. 13Z; NUSSBAUM, D.IPR. 164
n. 5; this also seems to be the meaning of American cases such as In re Rubenstein's Estate (19p) 143 N.Y. Misc. 917, Z57 N.Y. Supp. 637; In re Spondre
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the state where it is sitting, as well as by the state of which the
parties are nationals or domiciliaries, according to the principle
governing status.
Illustration: Orthodox Russians are divorced by the
Council of the Orthodox Church in Paris, Polish Jews by a
rabbi in the Netherlands, divorces not recognized by the
country where pronounced nor under the prevailing opinion
in third countries, but recognized by the national law. Supposing that the domicil was in the home country, the answer
would probably be negative also in American courts.
Recognition of a religious decree means giving full civil
effect to the divorce. Where a Bulgarian national of Orthodox
faith had been married in the Netherlands to a Dutch woman
according to both temporal and ecclesiastical ceremonies and
the Bulgarian Church decreed divorce, the Orthodox tribunal
of course considered only the religious marriage and ignored
the Dutch civil ceremony. But a Netherlands court recognizing this divorce should not have assumed that the Dutch
civil marriage remained undissolved. 115
(b) Divorce or separation pronounced by an administrative jurisdictional authority has been expressly declared recognizable by the Hague Convention on Divorce (art. 7, par. 2 ),
provided that the national law of either spouse recognizes
such act. This leaves the national laws free to decide. But
there is no reason why, under any system of nationality or
domicil, a decree rendered in the name of the King of Denmark 116 or by bill of Parliament (if still available) should
(19 17) 98 N. Y. Misc. 524, 162 N. Y. Supp. 943; Miller v. Miller ( 1911)
70 N. Y. Misc. 368, 128 N. Y. Supp. 787; Leshinsky v. Leshinsky ( 1 893) 5
N.Y. Misc. 495, 25 N.Y. Supp. 841; cf. FREEMAN, 3 Treatise of the Law of
Judgments (1925) 3095 § 1510 formulating the condition "if valid where

given."
115 Rb. Amsterdam (March 3, 1930) W. 1930, 12175 approved by 3 FRANKENSTEIN 409 n. 2.
116 On recognition of a Danish royal decree in Italy, see Trib. Roma (April 8,
1908) Clunet 1910, 670; Germany: KG. (Jan. 23, 1939) Dt. Recht 1939, 1015
no. 3 8 has pronounced the principle that the Danish Royal decree, as an administrative decree, is to be recognized but depends on the same conditions as a judicial
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not be recognized as readily as a court decree; the protection
against arbitrary dissolution seems greater than in many
courts. 117
It is true that administrative jurisdiction over divorce is
usually given upon the basis of a mutual agreement of the
parties, and this circumstance raises a doubt that we may consider separately.
(c) In fact, non-contentious proceedings, if followed by a
decree of any independent authority, need not necessarily be
regarded as an obstacle to recognition at a forum where mutual
agreement is excluded by the municipal law. But in such cases
difficulties have been experienced with respect to subjects of
the forum of recognition and also with respect to foreigners
when the forum reviews the grounds for divorce. 118
A particular problem exists with regard to the conversion of
a foreign limited divorce into a domestic absolute divorce. In
several countries, a judicial separation may be transformed
into a divorce a vinculo without proving new grounds, after
some time has elapsed since the separation. This institution
usually presupposes conte-ntious litigation, in which the disruption of the marriage has been examined by a court before
granting separation. If so, a separation obtained abroad upon
a mere mutual agreement, as is possible in Chile, Italy, the
decree and fulfills all requirements of German C. Civ. Proc. § 328 by analogy.
In the instant case recognition was refused, the husband being a German and
domiciled in Germany, according to § p8 no. 1. For a Danish husband, Reg.
Praes. Schleswig (Jan. 23, I9JZ), see StAZ. I9J2> I97> b; for a Danish couple,
the husband being domiciled in Brazil, see Brazil Sup. Trib. Fed. (Jan. 3 I, I933)
2I Rev. Jur. Bras. (I 933) 26. Cf. for various opinions, WIERUSZOWSKI, 4 LeskeLoewenfeld I 78 n. 485.
117 CHESHIRE 367, declaring inconceivable nonrecognition in such cases, goes
too far in extending recognition to any· local form. See also KEITH, "Some
Problems in the Conflict of Laws," I 6 Bell Yard (I 9 35) 4 at I I.
118 For instance, French courts refuse recognition to a judgment on "acquiescence," regarding the procedure as affected by "irregularity," arg. C. C. art. 92
(new, art. 249); likewise Swiss App. Freiburg i. Ue., IO SJZ. I76, no. 49· A
divorce by Danish royal decree, if the husband is a German, is not recognized in
Germany, Pruss. Ministry of Interior (June IS, I928), quoted in StAZ. I932,
I 9 7. In many countries the matter is in doubt; also under the Hague Convention,
see 3 FRANKENSTEIN 567.
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Netherlands, in the countries of Austrian law, and others,
cannot suffice as the only ground for an absolute divorce at
the forum; this has been held in Belgium,119 France/ 20
Hungary, 121 etc. It is also agreed that the Hague Convention,
in providing that separation ought to be recognized by the
participant states (art. 7), means a separation pronounced by
a court upon contested proceedings. 122
Although thes~ limitations are reasonable, the German
courts took an intransigent attitude in construing the dissolution of the conjugal union, which was the only separation
admitted by the Civil Code, as a unique institution, indispensable for conversion under the Code, and hence irreplaceable by any foreign type of separation. 123
(d) The forms of divorce permitted by the laws of Soviet
Russia have engendered special problems. Under the initial
Soviet legislation of I 9 I 8, a divorce could be obtained either
by mutual consent and official registration or by application
of one party to a court, notice to the other party by summons,
and a decree which the court was bound to give. The marriage
law of 1926 emphasized still more sharply, by abandoning
any court action, the nature of divorce as a private declaration
that may be pronounced by one of the spouses without cause.
119

Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (July 4, I9I3) KoSTERS-BELLEMANS 218.
Cour Paris (May I4, I9o2) I4 Z.int.R. (I904) Ioo (separation
in Chile); App. Amiens (March 2 I, I9o6) Clun~ I 9o6, I I 38; App. Grenobie
(May 23, 1924) Revue I924, 222; Cass. (civ.) (July 6, I922) Clunet 1922,
7I4 (Ferrari case no. I); Cour Paris (July II 1 I930) Revue I930, 68o. Trib.
civ. Seine (July 15, 1935) Nouv.Revue I935 1 553; Cour Paris (Feb. 4, 1937)
Clunet 1937, 283 (decree of the Italian Consular Tribunal in Alexandria on
the basis of Italian law) - all concerning Italian mutual agreements. Cf.
LEREBOURS-PIGEONNI:ERE 40 I § 339a, against BARTIN, I Principes 424 § I 7 r ;
cf. BARTIN, 2 Principes 32 8 § 3 I 9·
Of another character is the Argentine separation of a Chilean man and a
French woman in the case of Trib. civ. Seine (Dec. 13, I898) Clunet I92I
(sic), :2.15.
121
Hungarian law applied for the province of Burgenland by the Austrian
Supreme Court (April 25, 1925) 37 Z.int.R. (1927) 393 in the matter of an
Austrian mutual agreement of separation from bed and board.
2
1!2 Hague Convention on Divorce, art. 5·
123
See supra p. 433, n. 187.
12°France:
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It is said that, if the marriage has been recorded, registration
of divorce is possible but not essential, except under the
Ukrainian Family Law of May 3 I, I 926, which recognizes
only registered marriages and divorces, and under the White
Russian Code (art. 23), if a factual marriage has been judicially established. 124 The Family Protection Law of June 27,
I 93 6 (art. 2 7) orders the registrars to summon the parties
to appear at the registrar's office but does not change the divorce law. 125
Whether these various forms can be recognized has been a
much discussed question, especially in Germany. The German
Reichsgericht finally established the view that all Russian
types of divorce may be recognized in application to nonGermans domiciled in Soviet Russia 126 but that the forms now
in use whereby the private ·dissolution of marriage is not
declared by any sort of decree, though possibly registered,
are unable to affect the marriage of a German spouse. 127 For
Russian nationals domiciled and divorced in Russia, recognition seems to be unquestioned everywhere; thus, a seemingly absolute rejection of Russian divorces in Italy, 128 for
instance, cannot be taken literally. But Russian divorces, which
may be recognized in Switzerland, 129 have been refused recog124
This seems to be the thesis of MAURACH, 3 Z.osteurop.R. (I 9 36) 100, I o6.
I do not assume any responsibility as to the statements on Soviet law.
125
See WERTHER, 4 Z.osteurop.R. ( I93 8) 437: the official Sovetskaja
Justicija warned that art. 18 of the Family Law remained in force.
126
RG. (April4, 1928) 12I RGZ. 24; RG. (Feb. 28, 1938) 92 Seuff. Arch.
244, JW. I938, I5I8; and the unanimous opinion of writers; see FREUND, JW.
1928, 88o.
~ 7 Leading case: RG. (April 22, I932) 136 RGZ. I42, I46; see also the
decision of Feb. 28, I938 cited in the preceding note. A Russian divorce decree
before I926, involving Germans, was recognized in the decision of the RG.
(April 4, 1928) I2I RGZ. 24, assuming that the wife's adultery which under
Russian law was not to be stated in the Russian decree, was the real cause of
the divorce, and this was a sufficient ground under German law, though irrellevant
under the Russian; this method is no longer applicable to Russian divorces without decree.
128
App. Milano (June 30, 1927) 19 Rivista (1927) 575; cf. FEDOZZI 472ff.
129
Switzerland: Just. Dep., BBl. I928, II 3 IO no. I 7; a unilateral divorce by
declaration of one spouse is excepted as offending public policy by BEcK, NAG.
391 no. 197.
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mtton with respect to their own nationals in Poland. 180
Opinions in England are in conflict; the thesis of Cheshire
that consistency demands recognition of any Russian divorce
form with respect to a married couple in Russia, irrespective
of the nationality of the parties or the place of celebration,131
results in a perfect parallel to the doctrine of the Reichsgericht, nationality being replaced by domicil. It is doubtful,
however, whether 'a court in America would make use of
such a doctrine. Since in this country the domicil of one
party is deemed to support jurisdiction for divorce, analogy
would result in recognizing a Russian divorce where one party
is domiciled in Soviet Russia and the other in the United
States. For the purposes of immigration, the State Department recognizes such a divorce. 132
Recent Soviet legislation. According to newspaper notices,
the Soviet laws concerning marriage and divorce were radically
modified in the summer of I944· Unfortunately, at the time
of publication, precise knowledge of this legislation was not
available.
(e) The same principles that applied in Germany to Russian divorce procedures have prevailed in German courts and
probably els~where, with respect to the arbitrary repudiation
of a marriage by the husband under old patriarchal regimes,
such as the Jewish, the Egyptian, or the former Turkish law.
True, it would be intolerable for a foreign husband to be allowed to send his bill of divorce to his wife from a place
130
Poland: Supreme Court (Feb. s, 193I) 6 Z.f.Ostrecht (I9JZ) 383. With
respect to Latvia see the note in 1 Z.osteurop.R. (I934-1935) 82.
131 CHESHIRE 365. For the actual British cases see infra n. 134.
KEITH in DICEY, Append. 939 and in 16 Bell Yard (I935) Io-n, supra
n. I I 7, seems to reject Russian divorce of an "English marriage" because they
lack a proceeding of judicial character. FALCONBRIDGE, Annotation [I9JZ] 4
D. L. R. so suggests recognition of mutual agreements in the country of common
domicil but non-recognition of any decree without due notice to the defendant
and a fortiori of a unilaterally registered divorce declaration. MAIKAROV, Precis
404 recommends recognition of registered and judicial unilateral divorces but
not of non-registered divorces of Soviet citizens.
112
HACKWORTH, z Digest of International Law (I94I) 383.
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within the forum. 133 But there is nothing to affect the territory of the forum where a customary right to divorce is
exercised abroad and both parties are members of the same
creed and nationality which permit such dissolution. 134 A
court, however, may feel interested in the wife's right, iJ
she is or was until the marriage, a subject of the forum. 185
4· Jurisdiction

136

and Procedure of the Divorce Court

(a) E ,"Cclusive jurisdiction. No foreign divorce decree is
recognized when exclusive jurisdiction is claimed at the forum
where recognition is sought. This is the case in England,
Argentina, etc., if the matrimonial domicil is located within
the forum, in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, etc., with
133

LG. Berlin (Oct. 19, 1937) JW. 1938, 2402, cf. supra p. 418, n. 115.
Case of Helene Bohlau, a noted writer, who had married a Mohammedan,
LG. Miinchen (Sept. 28, 1904) 14Z.int.R. (1904-) 585; OLG. Miinchen (March
24, I9o5) r6 ibid. (1906) 38; Bay. ObLG. (Sept. 29, 1905) I6 ibid. (I9o6)
286; OLG. Miinchen (Nov. 22, 1909) 20 ibid. ( 1910) 529, Clunet, I 906, I I 73·
See also LG. Dresden (Dec. 22, 1931) IPRspr. 1932, no. 72 (Egyptian repudiation).
The British cases Spivack v. Spivack ( 1930) 46 T. L. R. 243 and Sasson v.
Sasson [1924] A. C. 1007, although distinguishable by some particularities,
are arguments for an analogous doctrine; see CHESHIRE 365-367. On the
problematic case of Rex v. Superintendent Registrar of Marriages, Hammersmith,
ex parte Mir-Anwaruddin [1917] 1 K. B. 634, 642, see CHESHIRE 363-368;
FoSTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," 16 Brit.
Year Book Int. Law (1 935) 91; KEITH, r6 Bell Yard ( 1935) ro, supra n. r 17,
135
OLG. Dresden (Jan. I8, 1927) StAZ. 1927, 219 and AG. Dresden
(Oct. 6, 1930) IPRspr. 1931, no. I50 (former German nationality of the wife)
refused recognition of Egyptian or Turkish tribunals. Where one spouse is a
German national, the RG. now requires a foreign "judgment" according to BGB.
§ 1564, RG. (April 41 1928) 12.1 RGZ. 24; RG. (April 22, 1932) 136 RGZ.
142 (on Russian divorces supra n. 127). The Bohlau case, supra n. 134, and
that of OLG. Dresden (Jan. 18, 1927) IPRspr. 1926-27, no. ro would probably
be decided by non-recognition nowadays.
136
On the subject of jurisdiction with respect to foreign judgments in general,
comparative studies have been undertaken by LORENZEN, "The Enforcement
of American Judgments Abroad," 29 Yale L. J. (1919) 188, 268; YNTEMA,
"L'execution internationale des sentences arbitrales," z Memoires de l'Academie
lnternationale de Droit Compare, part 3, 348 and "The Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Anglo-American Law," 33 Mich. L. Rev. (1935) 112.9;
NUSSBAUM, D.IPR. 1611f., 441 and his Principles 229ff.; GUTTERIDGE, "Le
conflit des lois de competence judiciaire dans les actions personnelles," 44 Recueil
19 33 II u I. As to the special field of recognition of divorce decrees, see the
conclusions of VREELAND's book, Validity of Foreign Divorces 3z61f.
'
134
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respect to nationals of these countries, 137 and in many countries,
if the parties are domiciled in and nationals of such countries.
(b) · International jurisdiction. 138 Despite the many confusing differences relating to the jurisdictional requirements
of recognition in the enactments and doctrines of the world,
there is one condition universally observed, viz., that the,court
of judgment must have had jurisdiction in the international
sense, i.e., according to the conceptions of the forum where
recognition is sought. A better considered formula demands
only that courts of the state of judgment, not just the court
of the instant case, be competent in the eyes of the law of the
forum.
The most firmly established ground for defense to a foreign decree in this country is that neither party was domiciled
at the divorce forum. 139 This, in general, or even the absence
of the matrimonial domicil/ 40 is a defense everywhere, 141
with the important exception, however, that under the na137
Supra p. 39 8; see for Austria OGH. (Feb. 26, 19 35) Oest. Anwalts Zeitung
1935, 297, 8 Jahrb. H. E. (1936) no. 1563.
138 On the conception see NEUNER, lnternationale Zustandigkeit ( 1929) and in
I3 Annuario Dir. Comp. (I938) part 1, 349·
139 Restatement § I I I. See I BEALE § I I I. I. For decisions invalidating for
this reason Mexican divorces see Note I43 A. L. R. I313ff.
140 Apart from the English and Argentine materials, see, for the Brazilian
practict! under the former law, Sup. Trib. Fed. (Oct. 6, 19o6) 2 Revista dir.
civ. (I9o6) 373 (a Portuguese court was incompetent to render a divorce, the
defendant husband being domiciled in the Federal District of Brazil). In the
case Sup. Trib. Fed. (July 24, I92o) 64 Revista dir. civ. (I922) sos, the
husband was both domiciled and naturalized in Brazil.
141
See for instance German C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. I in connection with
§ 6o6 par. I; France: Seine (April n, I935) mentioned by BATES, "The
Divorce of Americans in France," 2 Law and Cont. Probl. (I935) 322 at 325
n. IO (Reno decree, neither party residing in Nevada).
Both this rule and the American principle were egregiously ignored by OLG.
Hamburg (Oct. 1, 1935) JW. 1935, 3488 and its critics, JoNAS, JW. 1936,
283 and LoRENZ, 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. 322 no. 253, discussing a strange "new
way" believed necessary by the court to justify not recognizing a frivolous
Mexican divorce granted the husband, an American domiciled in New Jersey,
against his wife, who had been formerly and afterwards became a German
national but was an American at the time of the decree.
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7g par. 3; a divorce of a Swiss domiciled in the
United States is recognized if rendered by the judge of the domicil but not if
rendered in Mexico, Just. Dept., BBl. 1938. II 499 no. 9·

RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DIVORCE

493

tionality principle divorce may be. decreed by the national
state without the fulfillment of domiciliary requirements. 142
This is the foremost consideration in the struggle against the
"divorce mills," but it also has a much less desirable effect on
the various cases where the wife is considered by the divorce
court to have a separate domicil but is not so considered in the
forum where recognition is sought. 143
(c) International treatie.s. A remarkable advance has been
conceded to the principle of domicil in recent international
treaties. The Codigo Bustamante (art. 52) proclaimed international jurisdiction for divorce to be at the matrimonial
domicil, in contrast with the general policy of the Convention
not to specify the personal law (art. 7) and despite the protest of Brazil, which then followed the nationality principleY4 The Franco-Itali~n Treaty of June 3, 1930, on the
enforcement of judgments (art. II, par. I) secured recognition for the decisions of the court of the domicil or, in their
142
France: Cass. (req.) (April 29, 1931) S.I931.1.247·
Germany: Code of Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. 2.
Brazil: S. Ct. (Jan. 31 1 1933) 21 Rev. Jur. Bras. (1933) 26.
English courts generally are not supposed to recognize such jurisdiction. They
have recently been said, however, to give effect to a decree rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction dealing with its own nationals, both of whom had
agreed to submit their dispute to that tribunal "as a clear, final and binding
decision upon all the world." See Mezger v. Mezger [1937] P. 19 at 28 per
Langton, J. This would mean that the parties can dispose of the question of jurisdiction.
143
There is a line of decisions rejecting American decrees for this reason in
Canada: see Thompson v. Crawford [1932] 2 D. L. R. 466 (Ont. 1932), aff'd
[1932] 4 D. L. R. zo6, 41 0. W. N. 231 (Nevada decree with consent of the
husband), cf. FALCONBRIDGE, r Giur. Comp. DIP. 37; Wyllie v. Martin (1931)
44 B. C. 486, [1931] 3 W. W. R. 465 (California decree); MacDonald v. Nash
[1929] 4 D. L. R. 1051 (Manitoba court did not recognize the Nevada decree);
Gilbert v. Standard Trusts Co. [1928] 4 D. L. R. 371.
Italy: App. Trieste (July 19, 1933) 25 Rivista (1933) 469 and citations
(on the occasion of a Swiss annulment of marriage).
Belgium: supra p. 407, n. 71.
144
See Reservation of the Delegation of Brazil in signing the Treaty of Habana,
and the law enforcing the treaty, Diario Off. (Jan. xr, 1929); see also
EsPINOLA's letter to the Conference of Habana of January 27, 1928, and the full
statement by ESPINOLA, printed with the judgment of the Federal Supreme
Tribunal May 14, 1937, App. Civ. no. 683r, 26 Rev. de Critica Judiciaria 361,
364.
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absence, decisions at the residence of the defendant, without
excepting status matters, and the same devices have been
adopted in other European treaties, 145 despite the fact that
all the countries involved are traditional followers of the nationality principle.
(d) Opportunity for defense. Due notice of the divorce
suit, whether considered an independent requirement or a
requisite of jurisdiction is often qualified to exclude service by
publication, as was done until I 942 in a minority of states of
the United States. 146 It is not a new experience that "every
country claims for its own courts wider extraterritorial authority than it concedes in return to foreign tribunals." 147 This
position is also taken in countries which allow service by publication in their own rules of procedure.
Lack of due notice may be cured, according to many rules,
by the personal appearance of the defendant. But it is the
second most used ground of defense to a foreign divorce decree
rendered by an ill-reputed court. Another typical case is that
in which the husband in suing abroad causes the notice to be
sent to a false address of the wife to impair her defense; this
case has also been handled in the category of fraud or public
policy.14s
140 153 League of Nations Treaty Series (r934) 135, 141. It is interesting
to see how vigorously the Italian Supreme Court, leading the judicature of the
country of Mancini, in interpreting the Italian Treaty of April 6, r 922 with
Czechoslovakia, emphasizes the importance of the husband's domicil for jurisdiction in matrimonial causes; Cass. (April z6, 1939) Giur. Ital. 1939, I, r,
879, affirming App. Roma (July 19, 1938) Foro ltal. 1938, r, 1314, Giur.
Ital. 1938, I, 2, 452, Clunet 1939, 177.
146 VREELAND 328 enumerates with some doubts: District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Montana, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Wyoming.
147
Cave, J. in Heinemann & Co. v. Hale & Co. [r89r] 2 Q. B. (C. A.) 83,
87; cf. YNTEMA, supra n. 136, at 396.
140 Drastic illustrations:
England: Rudd v. Rudd [1924] P. 72 rejects a decree of the state of Washington of the United States, the plaintiff husband having mailed a copy of his
application to an English address where his wife had never lived, and by
advertising the suit in a Seattle newspaper which she never read.
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Other particulars of the proceedings of the judgment
court are not re-examined as a general rule, 149 except under
the French system of unlimited control. But when the defense
is believed to have been obstructed, for instance with respect to
evidence, 150 some way is usually found to protect the offended
interest; modern regulations contain express clauses for this
purpose.m It may be quoted, incidentally, that the Federal
Supreme Court of Mexico has, in repeated decisions, declared divorce statutes of such states as Yucatan and Champecha unconstitutional on the ground that they impair the
right of defense. 152
Switzerland: BG. (May I3, I938) 64 BGE. II 74, 79 refused recognition
to a Spanish divorce because the husband, knowing that his wife lived in
Switzerland, did not notify her of the proceedings; in this case not even the
judgment was served on her. /
Canada: Delaporte v. Delaporte [1927] 4 D. L. R. 933, 6I Ont. L. R. 302.
France: Cass. (req.) (Nov. I I, I 908) S.I909.I.572, Revue 1909, 227
(United States decree; the husband had falsely pretended not to know the
wife's residence). See also infra n. I 5o.
149
England: In Crowe v. Crowe (I937) I57 L. T. R. 557, [I937] 2 All
E. R. 723 it is expressly stated that the defense based on fraud, as authorized
in Bater v. Bater LI9o6] P. 209, is limited to fraud in affecting jurisdictional
facts.
150
The United States: In Bethune v. Bethune (1936) 192 Ark. 8u, 94 S. W.
(2d) I043 a Mexican decree was refused recognition on several grounds among
which insufficient evidence is mentioned.
Belgium: Trib. civ. Antwerp (June 19, 193I) Clunet 1932, I I04 (fraudulent
statements to make the defense impossible).
France: Trib. civ. Seine (June 3, 1938) Clunet 1939, 87 and (June 29, I938)
Clunet 1939, 61 (both regarding Mexican decrees and fraudulent manoeuvres
of the husband to impair the defense of the wife).
In the Argentine case, Cam. civ. 2 de la Plata. (Nov. 21, 1939) 68 J. A.
577 a Mexican decree was rejected because no contact whatever with. the divorce
state existed.
m Hague Convention on Divorce, art. 8 and all recent treaties on enforcement
of judgments.
German C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. 2, etc.
In France "freedom of defense" is always considered an essential and in some
decisions indicated as :fl.owing from natural justice, quite as in England; see
PERROUD, 5 Repert. 377 no. II8.
152
SeeS. Ct. (May 9, I934) 41 Seman. Jud. part 1, 191; S. Ct. (May u,
1936) 48 ibid. part 2, 2290; S. Ct. (July 8, 1933) 38 ibid. part 2, I442; S.
Ct. (Nov. 29, 1933) 39 ibid. part 3, 2547.
On the American reaction to Mexican divorces see HACKWORTH, 2 Digest of
International Law (1941) 384.
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5~ Anti-Divorce Policy of the Forum_

(a) NationaLs of the forum. If absolute divorce is forbidden by the municipal law of a country, it is perfectly understandable under the principle of nationality that the subjects
of the forum are also prohibited from divorcing abroad. This
interpretation seems obvious to the Italian courts, which will
not recognize a foreign absolute divorce where both, or even
only one, of the parties have been of Italian nationalityP.a
T_he same point of view obtains in Spain 154 and was held in
' France before divorce was reestablished in r 8 84. 155 All the
recent French divorces of Italians, like that in the Ferrari case,
are naturally regarded as invalid in Italy and have been criticized in France also, precisely because they are inconsistent
with former practice as well as with the fraud theory of the
French courts. r.fia
: But this attitude is not the only one possible. In Brazil the
matter is in doubt and has formed the subject of the most
diverse decisions involving the submission of foreign divorce
decrees for homologa(ao, i.e., confirmation for the purpose of
enforcement. Some _authorities had considered a foreign divorce as capable of full recognition in case the wife was of
Brazilian nationality, the personal law of the husband being
decisive for status questions.u 7 The prevailing opinion, howe~er, held for a long time by a majority of the Federal Sul

153 Cass. .Torino (June 6.1. 1919) Revue 19Zo 498; Cass. Roma (Nov. x3,
1
t919) Revue 19zo, 498; App. Milano (Dec. 71 1916) Clunet 19181 312; App.
Milano (March 3> l9Zl) Monitore l9ZI, soo; Clunet l9U, 194; App. Firenze
, (March xo, 19z3) Monitore 19z3, 401, Clunet 19Z3 1 xozx; App. Genova
(Feb. z8, 1938) Rivista 19391 331 1 Clunet 19391 171 (English divorce of two
Italians having married in England).
154 Unanimous opinion, see MANRESA, 1 Comentarios al·C6digo Civil Espafiol
99; INGL01T, IISRevistaGen.Legisl.yJur, (1909) zs8, z88.
155
Ca8s. (civ.) (Feb. z8, x86o) S.186o.1.:uo.
~56 Seesupra p~ 443·
.
1 7
: ~ See RoDRIGO OerAvro; Le droit .international prive dans la legislat~on
bresilicmne no. 6x; BEVILAQUA 3zz n. 19 and in 6 Repert. 167 no. 4I·.W:~t;re.
t1te ~usband was of Brazilian nationality and domicil, the Sup. Trib. Fed;,(J'~y
24, 192o), 64 Revista dir. civ. (1922) sos spoke of lack of jurisdiction pl:~e:,
Portuguese court.
,
'
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preme Court and adopted by Rodrigo Octavio · when he
joined the Court/J> 8 was that the foreign husband may remarry abroad, but that homologafao with respect to effects
of divorce in Brazil is to be limited to property effects which
a Brazilian judicial separation can :also produce. Such partial
enforcement was also 'granted when both parties were of
Brazilian nationality. 159 The new law of I 942, despite its
principle of domicil, provides that a foreign divorce of two
Brazilian parties is not recognized; if one of them is a Brazilian, the divorce is recognized with respect to the othe! who,
however, may not remarry in Brazil.1 60 This provision seems
to place husband and wife on an equal footing; it probably
does not interfere with the enforcement of pr<;>perty effects.161
Still another solution was given by a surprisingly liberalconstruction of the Austrian prohibition of absolute divorce
for Roman Catholics. In its last thirty years., the Austrian Supreme Court admitted that, if one spouse 162 was a foreigner
at the time of the marriage or even only at the time of suit; a
foreign divorce not only hac;:l full effect for him but also freed
the other party~ although the latter was of Austrian nationality and Catholic religion. 168
Courts of third countries facing such contrasts between the
law of the divorce court and the personal law have sometimes
felt themselves to be in a dilemma; some have recognized a
158 Sup~ Trib. Fed. (Aug. z8 192.9) no. 86o, Clunet 1932. I Ill! the opinien
1
1
of RODMGO 0CTAVIO is also published in 11 ~ch. Jud. Suppl, (192.9) 197•
See ten other decisions (1913-1933) in GUIMARAES, 11 Brasil-Acordiios I67
no. z9.zz9 1 particularly that of Sup. Trib. Fed. (Nov. 41 I916) also in Clunet
1919• 402.,
'
.
.
159 In this sense, the 'most general opinion is summarized in tl,te decision of the
App. Div. of the Distr. Fed. Court no. 4830 (Jan. 2.9, 1935) I IS Revista dir.
civ •. (I9JS) ISS, Clunet I936, 975· Sup. Trib. Fed. (July r, I942.) no, i:o3z,
64 Arch. Jud. (194~) 194.
160 :Lei de lntroduc;ao art. 7 § 6; EsPINOLA, g...,;B Tratado 1067.
·
·
161 ESPINOLA, s-B Tratado 1067 no. 3 however, declares that in the case of
1
two Brazilian spouses foreign divorce will not be recognized for any effect. ··
62
1 Divorce of two Catholic Austrian spouses, of course, was not reco~ized,
OGH. (Nov. 6,11934) Oest. Anwalts Zeitung I935,. 15, 8 Jahrb. H. E. (1936)
No._619.
168
Infra notes 2.2.•1-J 22.5.
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divorce irrespective of the public order of the national law,
where their own public policy was not offended. 164 But actually
courts generally follow their own principle on status questions.
An Italian national who has obtained a divorce in the United
States is not allowed to remarry in France, Germany, Cuba,
or any other country following the nationality rule. 165 Under
the Swedish statute, however, the exception obtains that, if a
party's marriage has been dissolved in one country and he is
prohibited from remarrying under another foreign law, i.e.,
his personal law, his second marriage should not be annulled
on this ground. 166
(b) Marriage celebrated within the forum. The Argentine
Civil Marriage Law 167 declares that a party to an Argentine
marriage cannot remarry after a foreign absolute divorce.
The prevailing, though contested, interpretation considers
the foreign dissolution of a marriage celebrated in Argentina
invalid 168 and the foreign dissolution of a foreign marriage
valid, even to the extent that the parties may remarry in
Argentina. Consistently with the principle of domicil, no distinction is drawn according to the nationality of the parties.
The situation is still more striking with respect to the Treaty
of Montevideo on civil international law, which expressly forbids the dissolution of a marriage celebrated in a country not
permitting divorce (i.e., a participant state). 169 The courts
of Uruguay feel authorized, by the clause of the Final Protocol reserving public policy, to pronounce divorces of Argentine nationals domiciled in Uruguay without any regard to
164

See, for instance, Trib. Seine (Nov. 18, 1901) Clunet 1902, 103.
Cj. RAAPE 424; differently 3 FRANKENSTEIN 100, 563.
166 Swedish Marriage Law of 1904, c. 2 § 2.
167 Art. 7·
168
See supra p. 432, n. 178.
169 The courts are decided on this point; see RoMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int.
Priv. 319; 2 V1co 87, and recently Cam. civ. 2 de la Cap. (Dec. 30, 1940)
21 La Ley 440 (marriage celebrated in Delaware, U.S., dissolved in Montevideo) with dicta for the case of marriages celebrated in a country where divorce
is prohibited.
1

~
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170

the place of celebration of the marriage.
In Argentina,
while there remains some doubt about the Civil Code, there
can be none concerning the express provision of the treaty
(art. I 3), requiring that the law of the place where the marriage was celebrated must concur with the law of the matrimonial domicil in permitting a divorce. This provision inserted
in favor of Argentine law leaves the Argentine courts no choice
in refusing recognition to Uruguayan divorces of parties married in Argentina. 171 A second marriage celebrated in Uruguay
is considered null, 172 i.e., as either adultery or concubinage
with appropriate effects, 173 the children illegitimate,174 the
wife unable to obtain maintenance or, a&er dissolution of the
second marriage, alimony. 175 All this construed under the
sanction of an int~rnational treaty sounds strange. 176
Under the new draft of the Montevideo Treaty, third
member states are to recognize any divorce rendered at the
marital domicil; this, of course, restores the full impact of
the domiciliary principle, which is otherwise con~iderably restricted by the present treaty. 177
In Chile, the matter is covered by three sections not quite
consistent, from which it has been concluded that persons

°

17 For a recent example see Ap. Montevideo (Feb. I9, I94I) 39 Rev. Der.
Juris. Adm. 82. Opinion of CALANDRELLI cited and approved by Cam. civ, 2
de la Cap. (Dec. 30, I94o), supra n. I69.
111 Recent surveys on the attitude of the Argentine courts: 5 Boletin del
Instituto de Ensefianza Practica de la Facultad de Buenos Aires (I939) I991
Note in 39 Rev. Der. Juris. Adm. (I94I) 8z.
112 Cam. civ. 2 de la Cap. (May 8, I93I) 35 Jur. Arg. 94I; (Nov. 14, I9J2)
IOI Gac. del Foro too; Cam. civ. I de la Cap. (Sept. u, I932) 39 Jur. Arg.
371 and (Feb. I9, I934) 45 ibid. 270; and after others (Oct. 24, I938) 35 Jur.
Arg. 94I,
173
Cam. civ. 1 de la Cap. (Sept. u, 1932) 39 Jur. Arg. 37I-4o8; Cam. civ.
2 de la Cap. (Nov. 14, I932) 101 Gac. del Foro Ioo.
174 2 Vrco 8 I no. I o9b.
175 Ap. Buenos Aires (March 14, I935) Revista del Foro (Peru) I 935, 952,
954, Clunet I937, 124.
176 2 Vrco 84. Yet the new draft, art; I5, changes nothing in this particular,
except that the Argentine courts will not be explicitly compelled by the wording
of the treaty to maintain the prevailing interpretation of art. 7 of their Civil
Marriage Law.
177 Treaty on international civil law, draft of I94o, arts. IS and 59·

soo
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married in Chile, whether Chileans or foreigners, if divorced
abroad, may not remarry in Chile, although their foreign
remarriage would be recognized. 178
(c) Foreigners. Divorce of foreigners by a foreign decree
has usually been recognized despite a municipal law hostile
to divorce, although often after some hesitancy. The forum is
considered not really interested in the status of foreigners. 179
Moreover, a foreign divorce has been regarded as creating
vested rights. 180
The French Supreme Court, at the time when divorce was
forbidden in France, held that a foreign divorcee could marry
a Frenchman in the country. 181 Along the same line of thinking, Italian courts, after having been divided on the question
for a long time, are now prepared to grant a decree of exequatur for foreign divorce decrees concerning non-Italian
parties, including former Italian nationals, 182 and do not object to the remarriage of such parties in ltaly. 183 This liberal
attitude suffers an exception, if any, only in the case of a
marriage celebrated in Italy in accordance with a canonical
ceremony and with civil effects, 184 for such a marriage is exclusively subjected to the ecclesiastical tribunals and there118 Chile, C. C. arts. 120, I2 t; Ley de Matrimonio Civil, art. I 5· See VELOSO
CHAVEZ, Derecho Interriacional Privado (I931) II7, II8.
179
See QUADRI, 3 Giur. Camp. DIP. no. 32.
18
Cf. e.g., NIBOYET, Revue Crit. I936, I3o; ZuLETA (Colombian), Comision
de Reforma del Codigo Civil (1939-1940) 96; So-ro, ibid. 233 .
181
.
French Cass. (civ.) (Feb. :1.8, t86o) D.t 86o.1.57, S.r 86t.t.2 Io; cf.
Cour Orleans (April I9, r86o) D.186o.z.82 (same case); Cass. (civ.) (July 15,
1878) D.r878.I.340, Clunet I878, 499· For justification see 3 ARMINJON 44;
suggesting that the most practical and also most equitable solution is not to
question what has been done in the domain of another system.
182
See infra n. 22 I.
183
App. Roma (Oct. 29, 1884) Clunet I886, 6zo; App. Milano (Nov. 29,
1887) Clunet 1889, 168; Cass. Torino (Aug. 1, I922) Clunet 192.3, 391; Cass.
(April 8, 1931) Foro ltal. 1931, I, 546, Clunet 1932, 22.2.; App. Milano
(Apri123, 1931) Clunet 1932.• 519 (Hungarians divorced in Hungary).
184
A pure ecclesiastical ceremony does not count here because it is of no eff.ect
under Italian law.
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• fore susceptible only of annulment and separation from bed
and board. 185
While in Italy a canonical ceremony is always voluntary,
since a secular form also exists, in Spain every marriage of
Catholics pertains to the Church. 180 But even an American
citizen, not a Catholic, married in Spain and divorced anywhere, is considered unable under Spanish law to remarry in
Spain. 187 Likewise, the Polish Supreme Court held that, under
the applicable Polish law, an American citizen of Catholic
faith who had been 'married and d{vorced in the United States
could not remarry in the former Austrian and Russian part of
Poland. 188
Particular rigor obtained in Brazil, as the courts, despite
their former nationality principle, generally denied recognition to foreign divorces not only of Brazilian nationals but
also of foreigners domiciled in Brazil. 189 This policy may find
even more support under the new law.
(d) Bigamy. It must be noted that nonrecognition in the
185 App. Milano (Dec. z7, I938) Foro Ital. I939, I, IZI6, Clunet I939,
763, I9 Rivista (I940) 99, on the basis of Cass. (June I I, I934) Foro Ital.
1934, I, 1o6z. Contra: App. Brescia (Nov. 9, 1938) Foro ltal. 1939, I, 12.u,
Clunet I939, 763; and App. Brescia (Oct. 2.7, 1938) Rivista I939, 407. Cf.
Bosco, zs Rivista (I933) 38.
186 Spanish C. C. arts. 42., 75ff.; Trib. Sup~. (March 31, 1911) Revue 1914,
6J5.
187 In the prevailing opinion, 'the law of Spain is identified with Canon Law
to the extent that, on principle, no divorce a vinculo is either granted or
recognized, even to non-Catholics, despite their national law permitting it. Trib.
Supr. (March 3I, 19I1) Revue 1914, 635; LASALLA LLANAS 139; TRiAs DE
BEs, Estudios de derecho internacional privado 42.9 n. z and Der. Int. Priv. no.
143. It is no true exception that a foreign civil marriage of Catholics may be •
divorced abroad; the marriage itself is invalid in the eyes of Canon Law; See
CoVIAN, Art. Divorce in 12. Enciclopedia Jur. Esp. 446, 448. For other literature,
cf. SERIN, Les conflits de lois dans les rapports franco-espagnols en matiere de
mariage, de divorce and de separation de corps (19z9) 87.
In Brazil to the same effect Ct. App. Civ. Rio de Janeiro (Oct. z., I919) 55
Revista dir. civ. (192.0) 52.3, Clunet I92.1, 990; but see supra n. 159.
188 Polish S. Ct. (Dec. I 7, I 9 3 6) 4 Z.osteurop.R. ( 19 3 7) 4 7.
189 The principle has been stated, although breaking it by majority vote by
a very cautiously framed exception, in the decision of the Sup. Trib. Fed; no.
993 (July 17, I940) 58 Arch. Jud. 83 on the ground of jurisdictional considerations that may be questioned.

502

DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT

cases discussed under (a) and (c) supra does not mean that
remarriage following the divorce is bigamous in the criminal
sense. Even the Spanish Supreme Court, after having declared invalid a German divorce of a German national who
had undergone a Catholic marriage ceremony in Spain,
refused to consider his remarriage bigamous because in
accordance with his national law he could well think his action
justified. 190 As the Treaty of Montevideo has been understood 191 and as its new draft expressly states,192 entering upon
a second marriage after divorce at the matrimonial domicil
does not constitute bigamy under any law in the member states,
including Argentina.
6. Requirement of Similar Grounds
(a) In most states of the United States, at English common
law, 193 and in many other countries, it is immaterial whether
the ground upon which a foreign divorce is based is adequate
under the law of the forum too.
(b) In a number of jurisdictions, however, domiciliaries or
nationals, as the status principle may be, are protected against
foreign divorce decisions, unless there is agreement with the
divorce grounds established by the lex fori.
An important example is given by the New York courts,
whose traditional policy so far has been to refuse to recognize
190
Trib. Sup. (April 7, I9I5) 12 Revista Der. Jur. y Ciencias Soc. (Chile)
(I9I5) part 3, 9, Clunet I9I7, 732, Revue I9l9, 6II (the divorce in the case
was invalidated by Trib. Sup. (March 3I, I9II) Revue I9I4, 635, cited
supra n. p. 5oi, n. I87).
191
Argentina: Cam. crim. de la Cap. (July I, I932) 38 J. A. IZJ7· See also
z V1co 8J no. Io9a.
192
( 1940) art. 15b.
193
The doubt whether the lex domicilii abroad could also govern the case of an
English marriage was removed by Harvey v. Farnie [I88z-I88J] 8 App. Cas.
43; Pemberton v. Hughes [1899] 1 Ch. 781; Bater v. Bater [1906] P. zo9 by
Sir Gorell Barnes at z 1 7; the principle was recently confirmed by Mezger v.
Mezger [1936] 3 All E. R. qo, [1937] P. 19 (conduct short of adultery
under§ I568 German C. C.).
Similarly, Canada: Leigh v. Leigh (Ont. Ct. App.) [I937] I D. L. R. 773
(Michigan decree on the ground of desertion to Canadian residence).
Greece: 6 Repert. 430 no. 98.
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any decree of divorce obtained "upon grounds insufficient for
that purpose in this state, when the divorced defendant resides
in this state and was not personally served with process and
did not appear in1the action." 194 The last limitation, of course,
was necessitated by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution but also seems to be in accord with Gould v.
Gould, 195 dealing with a French decree. This practice evidently is affected by Williams v. North Carolina.
British subjects, domiciled in England or Scotland but
living in India or certain other British possessions, may obtain
divorce in the local courts under the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act of 1926; among other conditions, the
grounds of divorce must be those recognized by English
law.196
An analogous restriction with respect to foreign divorces
of their nationals obtains in a number of countries following
the nationality principle. 197
~ 94 Johnson v. Johnson (1933) 146 N. Y. Misc. 93, 95, 261 N. Y. Supp.
523, p6; the rule has been steady since Jackson v. Jackson (t8o6) 1 N.Y.
(Johns. Cas.) 424; cf. Beeck v. Beeck (1925) 2II App. Div. 720, 208 N.Y.
Supp. 98.
195
(1923) 235 N.Y. 14, 138 N. E. 490.
195
Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act, 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. V, c.
40; 3 &4 Geo. VI, c. 35: Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act, 1940,
301.
197 France: Trib. civ. Seine (May 2, i9I8) Clunet 19I8, n82 (even with
respect to foreigners). Trib. civ. Seine (June to, 1936) D. H. 1936, 420
.(exequatur denied one spouse being of French nationality and the ground for
divorce not agreeing with French law). NIBOYET 754 bases the rule on the idea
that there is no vested interest,
Greece: Trib. Athens, 47 Themis 582, Clunet I937, 597 (Turkish decree).
The Netherlands: H. R. (Nov. 24, 1916) W. 10098; Rb. Rotterdam (June
28, 1935) W. IZ99I (South African decree). Does H. R. (April I, 1938) W.
1938, no. 989, however, give the judge discretion even over status judgments?
See VANDER FLIER, Grotius 1939, 204, 208.
Poland: Law of 1926 on private international law, art. I7 § 3 provides that
Polish law must be applied; in more recent practice, however, recognition is
denied unless a treaty assures reciprocity, see supra p. 398, n. 30.
Portugal: (probably also beyond the domain of the Hague Convention) see
CUNHA GONC):ALVES, I Direito Civil 692 pars. 1 and 2.
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. to, 1930) 56 BGE. II 335 and (May 13, 1938)
64 BGE. II 76 at 78 (if one of the spouses is a Swiss national and domiciliary,
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In Germany, however, it is sufficient that the foreign decree
state facts which constitute valid grounds for divorce under
German law, 198 although the decree may have been based
upon other grounds or no grounds at all or upon mutual
agreement. This theory of substitute ground is a concession to
a more liberal coru:eption of migratory divorce but gives
meager justification for the fortuitous chances of searching in
a foreign decree for facts held irrelevant by the foreign court.
(c) A corresponding regard for the legislation of third
states is shown by the Swedish law, 199 providing that a divorce
decree rendered by a foreign authority may not be recognized,
unless a ground for divorce existed under the law of the state
whose nationals the parties were.
7· Evasion
(a) Fictitious change of personal law. The requirements of
similar grounds and also in part of jurisdiction result in a bar
to subjects of the forum who seek dissolution of their marriages abroad under easier conditions than they find at home.
Indeed, a considerable number of the cases which have been
termed evasion from or circumvention of the domestic provisions on divorce are sufficiently dealt with under the heading
of exclusive jurisdiction of the forum or ·lack of international
jurisdiction of the divorce court.
the rule of NAG. art. 7g par. 3 that Swiss jurisdiction and law give way to the
foreign domicil is inapplicable).
Cuba: Divorce law (Decreto-Ley) 2.06 of May 1o, 1934, art. 58: Foreign
divorce judgments between Cubans and foreigners are recognized if the basis
of the judgment was equal or analogous to any of the divorce grounds recogl)ized
in the above Decreto-Ley 2.06.
In Peru a similar principle seems indicated by the decision of the Lima court
of Oct. 4> 1935, Revista del Foro 1935; 913, Clunet 1937, 12.4, recognizing
dissolution of a marriage celebrated in Peru between a foreign diplomat and
a formerly Peruvian woman, because the divorce was based on grounds recognized in the recent Peruvian C. C.
198
C. Civ. Proc. § 32.8 no. 4 in combination with EG. art. 17 par. 4, as
interpreted by RG. (Apri14, 192.8) 12.1 RGZ. 2.4.
199
Law of 1904 with amendments, c. 3 § 5·
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(b) Fictitious change of domicil. Fictitious change of
domicil occurs in the frequent cases where the parties falsely
assert that a domicil exists within the divorce forum, as demanded both by the divorce court and the court of recognition.
The British 200 and Swiss 201 authorities consider collusion or
fraud going to the root of the jurisdiction as a defense against
recognition. Similarly, all American courts seem to hold that
recognition is not due to a divorce obtained under a "residence
simulated for this purpose" or not established "bona fide with
intention of a permanent domicil." 202 This rule has been
developed, in contrast to the English doctrine, 203 under the
standard of the state where the judgment is rendered and not
of the forum of recognition. "With respect to divorce decrees,
however, the result is hardly distinguishable, and this is true
also of the five state statutes and various court practices 204
that contemplate the same factual situation from the angle of
the evaded domiciliary law. The Massachusetts and Maine
statutes preceded and the statutes of Delaware, New Jersey,
and Wisconsin followed and adopted the evasion section of
the otherwise ill-fated Uniform Annulment of Marriage and
Divorce Act; 205 they deny force to a foreign decree of divorce if, to use the wording of the Delaware statute: 206
"Any inhabitant of this State shall go into another State,
territory or country in order to obtain a decree of divorce for
a cause which occurred while the parties resided in this State,
200 Bater v. Bater [1906] P. 209; cf. Mezger v. Mezger [1937] P. 19; Crowe
v. Crowe (1937) 157 L. T. R. 557·
201 BEcK, NAG. 359 no. 100 with literature.
202 See cases in 2 7 C. J. S. ( 1941) Divorce § 3 32 n. 11 ; see also SCHOULER,
Domestic Relations§ 1983, 2101; 1 WHARTON § 228.
203 See YNTEMA, supra n. 136, 387.
204 VREELAND 329 places twelve states in this category.
205 The Uniform State Law was drafted by the Divorce Congress of Philadelphia in November, 1906, and approved by the Commissioners but finally retired
by them to be replaced by the draft of a Uniform Divorce Jurisdiction Act of
1930, based on other princieles.
206 Del. Rev. C. (1935) § 3525, identical with the model.
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or for a cause which is not ground for divorce under the laws
of this State."
This text with its twin clauses, however, is puzzling.
In the second clause, ''inhabitant" clearly means, as it does
generally, a domiciliary who has remained domiciled in the
state. This case, "or for a cause, etc.," may be fairly well
defined by assuming that the parties were in fact continuously
domiciled in the state of recognition and that they or the
plaintiff fraudulently alleged that they were domiciled in the
divorce forum and, furthermore, that the ground upon which
the decree was rendered is no cause for divorce in the state.
The first case, "cause which occurred, etc.," looks mysterious.
"Inhabitant" must have the same meaning as in the second
alternative, and this seems to be generally agreed, since the
statutes, with the possible exception of New Jersey, are not
applied where the parties move to another state for purposes
other than to obtain a divorce. 207 If, thus, the first case is also
concerned with a fictitious foreign domicil, what is left for
the second case? For, if all causes that occurred during the
residence of the parties in the state are precluded from consideration by the divorce forum, what other cause can practically be in question? Perhaps the draftsmen thought that
even a cause which is legally sufficient in both jurisdictions
should be averred and decided exclusively by the court at the
actual domicil; thus, the first clause would favor the jurisdictional and the second the substantive law of the domicil.
But there is no confirmation of such an interpretation to be
found anywhere; Vreeland, the sole critic, contents himself
with rejecting the entire clause as indefensible on principle.208
~07 See 1 WHARTON § zz9 for the Massachusetts statute; Note in 7 Minn. L.
Rev. (19z3) 2.40 and especially as to and against some mysterious decisions of
the New Jersey Supreme Court, Note, ZI Mich. L. Rev. (19z3) 9zz; GooDRICH
(ed. t) § IZ7 n. 39i VREELAND IJ5 1 330.
208 VREELAND 340. We may presume a connection with the obscure limitations of jurisdiction discussed supra p. 454·
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It has been held that divorce void under these rules cannot
be subject to estoppel.2° 9
(c) Fictitious change of nationality. In a less obvious way,
change of l)-ationality has also sometimes been termed fictitious
and hence regarded as incapable of supporting recognition of
a divorc<:: granted under the new national law. For a better
understanding, one ought to remember the migratory divorces,
typified by the pilgrimages of Americans to Paris, Reno, and
Chihuahua. When divorce was forbidden in France, the Bauffremont-Bibesco case discussed below was a celebrated example. Austrian Catholics went over the Hungarian border
for divorce. Italians, whose law still prevents absolute divorce,
emigrated to Fiume to be divorced, so long as that city did
not belong to Italy.
The Bauffremont case was the cornerstone of a French doctrine of fraude a la loi, which, enjoying for a time great
prominence, opposed evasion of the law of the forum by
agreements, adoptions, and gifts, as well as by divorces and
judicial separations, the latter, however, being known as the
classic domain of this doctrine. 210 The princess of Bau:ffremont,
Belgian by birth and French by marriage, changed her citizenship by naturalization in the then independent German state
of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and was there divorced under her new
personal law; then she married the Rumanian prince Bibesco.
The French Court of Cassation declared the naturalization of
the woman, as well as her divorce and remarriage, fraudulent
and void, these acts having occurred for the sole purpose of
escaping from the prohibitions of the French law. 211 This doctrine has been followed in other French decisions and by Bel209 See JACOBS, "Attack on Decrees of Divorce," 34 MichL. Rev. (1936) 749,
777, n. 127 and n. u8.
210
DEGAND, 5 Repert. 5 54 no. 8o.
211 Cass. (civ.) (March 18, 1878) S.1878.L193; see also the similar case
Vidal, Cour Paris (June 30, 1877) Clunet 1878, :z68, where the fraud was
agreed upon by both parties.
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gian, Italian, and Latin American courts 212 but has slowly
lost its force in France itself. 213 The writers are aware that
the acquisition of a foreign citizenship is an exercise of foreign
state sovereignty that cannot be denied. 214 Moreover, the conception of fraude ala loi has made way in prevailing theory
for a more general and elastic idea of public policy.
In Italy, however, where the subject of forbidden divorce
remains of particular importance, courts and writers insist
that a change of ·nationality may well be simulated by the
parties for divorce purposes, i.e., not seriously intended, which
is different indeed from acts so intended to evade the law. If
they intend in reality to remain Italians and formally to regain their Italian citizenship at the first possible moment,
especially when they have not transferred their domicil to
their alleged new homeland, according to an express requirement of the Italian nationality law, 215 they may have acquired
a second nationality abroad but not lost the Italian one. Since
they have double nationality, they are treated, according to
the rule, 216 as nationals. 217
(d) Effective change of personal law. Indeed, the main
doctrine of divorces in fraudem legis has been abandoned in
212 Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Aug. 5, 188o) Clunet 188o, so8 (in the same
affaire Bauffremont); Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 19, 1882) Clunet 1882, 364.
Italy: App. Torino (July 22, 1912) 6 Rivista (19u) 588, Revue 1914, 187;
App. Trento (Feb. 26, 1930) 23 Rivista (I93I) 248.
213 PERROUD, Clunet I926, 19; AuDINET, II Recueil I926 I 226; J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 48I; contra: DEGAND, 5 Repert. 555 no. 83.
214 See especially the Italian writers ANZILOTTI, 6 Rivista ( I9rz) 595;
UDINA, Elementi no. 137; also FEDOZZI 277, 482, although he retains a distinct
theory of fraud.
215
Act no. 555 of June IJ, 1912, art. 8.
216 See supra p. no.
217
Cass. Torino (April II, I92I) IS Rivista (I923) I53i App. Brescia
(Jan. 24, 1923) Clunet 1924, 257; App. Genova (May 24> I923) Clunet
I924, IIZ9· Cj. the writers cited in note 2I4 mpra.
In France, LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE I 37 no. I I 4 contends that the courts
are unable to set aside the acquisition of a foreign nationality by an individual
but are able to restore his character as a Frenchman, if the conditions of naturalization have been proved fictitious, the naturalized person never having. intended to settle outside of France.
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France. 218 By changing nationality, a party changes his personallaw automatically. Divorce under the acquired statute is
said to be not fraudulentagainst the prohibition of divorce but
against the law of nationality, and consequently the former
country cannot react through private lawsuits, though it may
refuse the person's reinstatement to his previous nationality.
Italian courts have recognized most of the Fiume divorces 219 and similar decrees that came before them. 220 The
highest court recently confirmed the principle, hitherto prevailing though contested, that exequatur is not denied a
foreign decree, even if the parties were formerly of Italian
nationality. 221
Italy, however, resorts to political measures against former
Italians divorced abroad. Ordinarily, they are barred from reg~ining Italian citizenship, 222 and an Italian intending to
marry such a person is not likely to obtain the governmental
authorization prescribed by Fascist discriminatory legislation.223
The Austrian Supreme Court went so far as to recognize
not only the divorce of a former Austrian of Catholic faith
who had become a Czechoslovakian citizen, but also the un218
Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 5, I922) Clunet I929, 1258; Trib. civ. Seine (July I5,
I935) Clunet I936, 867. With respect to the underlying theory, cf. J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 48 I n. 4•
219
The divorce decrees of Fiume granted to Italian nationals have :finally
been confirmed on the whole by Royal Decree of March 20, I924, no. 352 art.
4; cf. App. Roma (May 3I, I927) Giur. Ital. I927, I, 2, 400.
220
E.g. App. Milano (Nov. 24, I92o) Monitore I92I, I8, Clunet I921,
625; and now in the :first place Cass. (June 8, 1932) Foro Ital. I932> I, I452,
25 Rivista (I933) 91; App. Bologna (June 4, I936) Giur. ltal. I936, I, 2,
422 (Hungarjan decree); App. Trieste (April 22, I937) Giur. Ital. I937, I,
2, 29 8 (Greek decree). There are contrary decisions, however, where the
Hague Convention does not eliminate the question, see e.g. Cass. Roma (May
I5, I928) Clunet I93I, 758; App. Roma (Dec. I5, I936) Giur. ltal. I937>
I, 2, 209 (Turkish decree).
221
Cass. (July I3, 1939) Foro ltal. I939> I, 1097, Rivista I940, 478, the
court recalls the plenary decision of Cass. Roma (Dec. 30, I 9 I I) Foro Ita!.
I9I2, I, I48 and others; cf. the note ibid.
~ 22 Law of June 13, I912, no. 555 on nationality, art. 9·
223
Law of November I7, I9J8, no. I728, art. 2; see SERINI, "Legal Problems
of Divorce in Italy," 28 Iowa L. Rev. (1943) 293.
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married status of the other party who had remained an
Austrian national, 224 and to consider unmarried an Austrian
Catholic woman who had changed to a foreign nationality,
obtained a divorce, and then resumed her Austrian citizenship.225
The Tribunal of Amsterdam had recently to decide a case
which could be regarded as a true prototype of a fraudulent
divorce.' 226 A Dutchman clandestinely acquired Estonian nationality and, on the basis of a brief residence in Riga, obtained
a Latvian divorce from his wife under the rather scandalous
procedure of Latvia. The court acknowledged that the woman
had become an -Estonian citizen without knowing it and
thereby was subjected to the law of that nationality. Fortunately, the judges found an older agreement of maintenance
which could be taken as a basis for allocating adequate compensation to the wife. This rule also obtains in Brazil. 227
An important limitation is contained in the Hague Convention on Divorce (art. 7 in conjunction with art. 4). It may
be il.lustrated by the following example. Italian spouses acquired Hungarian nationality and obtained a divorce in a
Hungarian court on the ground of desertion; the time of the
desertion was calculated by including six months during which
the parties still had been of Italian nationality. Recognition
was refused in Italy. 228
224 0GH. (June 30, 1937) Zentralblatt 1937, 814 no. 46o; Clunet 1938,
354· This liberal practice was initiated by the plenary decision of Dec. II,
1924, 6 SZ. no. 396, Judikatenbuch no. 18, and continued in numerous later
decisions, for instance OGH. (May II, 1932) 14 SZ. no. 108; (Nov. 14, 1934)
8 Jahrb. HR. 1935, no. 28; (Sept. 24, 1935) 8 Jahrb. HR. 1935, no. 2161,
with the exception, however, of that of OGH. (March 27, 1935) 8 Jahrb. HR.
1935, nos. 1564, 1565, Clunet 1935, 1028. Cj. WALKER 635.
225 OGH. (May II, 1932) 14 SZ. no. 108, I Giur. Comp. DIP. 327; OGH.
(Oct. 8, 1935) J.Bl. 1936, I03; Clunet 1937, 335· Cj. WALKER in r KLANG's
Kommentar 321, 322.
226
Rb. Amsterdam (Dec. 22, 1936) W. 1937, no. 47·
227
BEVILAQUA, 6 Repert. 167 no. 43·
228 See ultimately App. Firenze (Feb. 25, I933) 25 Rivista (I933) 467; Cass.
(Nov. 15, 1932) I Giur. Comp. DIP. 391 no. 104; Cass. (Jan. 15, I937) Foro
Ital. 1937, I, 217, Giur. Ital. 1937, I, 1, uo and the literature cited by MoNACO,
7 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 153.
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8. Additional Application of Public Policy
With all the many specific obstacles to recognition of
foreign divorce decrees, it seldom happens that the subsidiary
intervention of public policy in its general functions is invoked. Just one case may be reported; the Tribunal de la
Seine rejected the prayer of a French woman for recognition
of a German decree of divorce which declared her guilty of
anti-German utterances-a paradoxical treatment of the applicant. 229
9· Renvoi
An interesting regard for the personal law has been introduced into the English and the New York law by a practice
related to renvoi. In the English case of Armitage v. Attorney
General/ 30 a divorce decree granted in South Dakota was
recognized in England, because it would have been recognized
in New York where the matrimonial domicil was. It is generally concluded therefrom that any decree affecting the status
of husband and wife which is held valid by the private international law of the domicil, is effectual in England. 231
New York courts have established an analogous practice in
connection with their well-known special rule by which they
refuse to recognize as binding a foreign divorce decree against
a spouse domiciled in New York, who was not personally
served with process. Although the rule is said to be for the
protection of New York citizens, in the case where the defendant is domiciled in another state, the courts of New York
make their position dependent upon the effect given to the
decree in the state of the defendant's domicil when ren229
Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 23 1 1922) Clunet 1923, 295 criticized by 3 FRANK·
ENSTEIN 543 n. x6. For the disregard of penal prohibitions to remarry contained in foreign divorce decrees see SECRETAN, Revue 19261 219, and supra p.
283, -n. 169.
230
[x9o6] P. 135.
231
CHESHIRE 363; cf. FALCONBR!DGE, "Conflict of Laws as to Nullity and
Divorce," [1932] 4 D.L.R. x, 44·
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dered.
Extension of this renvoi has been advocated as a
vigorous contribution to greater uniformity. 233
In an analogous way, under the principle of nationality,
as we have seen, consistency requires that a divorce rendered
in a state other than the national state should be recognized
in third countries, if recognized in the national state. 234 Thus,
indeed, some uniformity is achieved.
Illustrations: (i) (AG. Hannover (Oct. ro, 1931)
IPRspr. 1932, no. 73.) Both parties were of Argentine nationality; they had married in Argentina. A divorce obtained
in Uruguay was not recognized by the German court, because
it was not recognizable under Argentine law.
(ii) (KG. (Feb. II, 1938) JW. 1938, 870.) The husband
of Austrian nationality and Catholic faith was domiciled in
Budapest, Hungary; the wife had acquired Hungarian nationality. The divorce rendered in Hungary was sufficient to
allow the woman to remarry even under Austrian practice. 235
This Austrian practice has to be followed, said the Court of
Appeals of Berlin.
A further case brings us to a combined application of the
New York rule and this European rule.
(iii) (KG. (Oct. 14, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, no. 147.) Both
parties were Germans who had emigrated to the United
States, seemingly to New York. The wife established domicil
~ 32 Ball v. Cross (1921) 231 N.Y. 329, 132 N. E. 106; Dean v. Dean ( 1925)
241 N.Y. 240, 149 N. E. 844; Powell v. Powell (1925) 2u App. Div. 75o,
208 N.Y. Supp. 153; c/.·Restatement, New York Annotations§ 113, 86.
233 9 Harv. L. Rev. (1926) 640; LoRENZEN, "Renvoi in Divorce Proceed3
ings Based upon Constructive Service," 31 Yale L. J. (1922) 191, 194; Lorenzen suggests applying this doctrine to foreign parties; this seems possible without difficulty if we conceive of the New York rule as based on domicil rather
than on the citizenship of the parties.
234 Austria: WALKER 730.
Germany: supra n. 16 5.
In France, a similar result should follow from the two generally adopted
requirements for recognizing a foreign decree, that it must originate from a
court having jurisdiction by French conceptions and that the decision should
agree with that obtainable in application of French conflicts law; but see the
controversy reported in 10 Repert. 150. '
Switzerland: controversy, see BECK, NAG. 396 no. 12.
235
Supra n. 224.
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in Reno and obtained a divorce there. The husband lived at
the commencement of the suit in Brooklyn and later in Manhattan. The first condition for recognizing the Nevada decree
in Germany was (C. Civ. Proc. § 328, no. I) that the courts of
the state to which the foreign tribunal belongs are competent
according to German laws, i. e., of the domicil of the husband
(C. Civ. Proc. § 13 par. I) at the decisive moment of the divorce suit (C. Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. I). The Court of Appeals
of Berlin held that the "state" to which the Reno. court "belonged" was Nevada and not the United States, an obviously
correct statement. 236 But the court dismissed the suit for
recognition for the sole reason that the husband was not
domiciled in Nevada but in New York. It should have asked
the question whether a New York court would recognize the
decree, although the answer might have been in the negative
on the ground of the special rule of New York.
· If the domicil of the defendant husband, at the time of the
commencement of the action had been, for example, in Connecticut and later in New York, the Nevada decree would
have been recognized in Connecticut-upon the mere personal service of the husband in Connecticut 237-and therefore
also in New York, since commencement of the divorce action
is regarded as the decisive moment for fixing jurisdiction. In
consequence, the German court would have to recognize the
divorce, whatever the German theory as to the time element
maybe.

III.

CoNCLUSIONS

The Supreme Court of the United States, in recent times, has
evidently found it necessary to smooth out the complicated conditions of mutual recognition of divorce decrees among the
states. Thus far, the Court has increased the import of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause in two respects. The Davis
case 238 has declared that a party contesting in the divorce state
236
Cf. also annotation on the case, I Giur. Cornp. DIP. I 50 no. 39·
237
Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve (I914) 88 Conn. 689, 9z Atl. 684 (regarding a South Dakota decree).
238 Supra p. 469.
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the validity of a divorce on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
for instance, by appeal, forfeits his right of collateral attack in
all other states. The Williams case 239 enlarges the domain of
compulsory recognition by eliminating the defense based on
lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
This second step effectuates a far-reaching simplification of
the rules on recognition. Moreover, and this is a point well to
be noticed, an ancient remainder is eradicated, to the great
benefit of rational procedure; the lawyers of this country customarily think of "personal jurisdiction" as based on determinate manners of service of process. But the manner in which
a defendant is cited to attend the trial seems out of relation to
modern circumstances. What does it practically mean in our
days, whether a party receives a summons to appear in court
by the hands of a sheriff or marshal, by Federal mail, or by
any reliable means of communication at whatever place in the
United States? A husband or wife, in particular, may very well
be required to traverse any distance in the country in such a vital
cause. The costs of travel may make a difference, but, at that,
the matter of bearing the costs may or may not need a general
reform. On the whole, the ruling that the domicil of one party
supports divorce jurisdiction, according to most of the state
statutes before the Williams case and under the Constitution
according to this decision, is not so much of an innovation as a
clarification and simplification of the subject.
However, this change of law will signify salutary progress,
only if the domicil of at least one of the parties in the divorce
state remains a basic postulate, strongly enforced by all courts
involved. It is not very encouraging that this point was discarded so easily in the decision of the Williams case. The necessity of a serious and honest domicil has become the only remaining protection of deserted spouses and, what is more, of the
divorce legislations so ambitiously advanced in individual
239

Supra p. 467.
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states. Without this last barrier, it would be true that the laxest
divorce practice would prevail over all others.
In the light of this experience, the tendency of the Davis
case or, to be specific, the application of the "boot strap doctrine" to divorce, is frankly to be regretted. If divorce jurisdiction be assumed on a fake affirmation of domicil, the mistake is not effaced by its repetition. Courts may be inclined to
construe a defendant's acquies!=ence to allegations of domiciliary facts or to a judgment as effective waiver of the right
of collateral attack, although this clearly runs against the old
established principles prohibiting parties to a matrimonial
cause from disposing of their rights. But to treat a protesting
party like an agreeing one, in conflict with the principle that a
party specially appearing for the purpose of denying jurisdiction should not lose thereby his analogous defense in
another state, is particularly bad law in a field where truth
should prevail.
The most effective weapon to fight evasion would be the requirement of a "minimum residence," if sternly observed in
granting jurisdiction by the court of divorce and likewise in
other courts when they re-examine the existence of a bona fide
domicil in the divorce state. Quite recently, Lorenzen also has
suggested that residence should extend over a reasonable period of residence, "say six months" and seriously considers
that the Supreme Court or Congressional legislation should require such period as a requisite of due process. This corroborates my postulate, with the difference that Lorenzen
admits mere residence as sufficient, on these conditions, as a
fair basis for jurisdiction in divorce. 240 In my opinion, jurisdiction in these cases has been stretched as far as it may
reasonably be, if it is to be grounded in the domicil of only
one party. That such domicil should be replaced altogether by
240 LoRENZEN, "Haddock v. Haddock Overruled," 52 Yale L.
352·

J.

(1943) 341,
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a mere temporary residence of one party is an idea that is
becoming familiar through the operation of the divorce mills
but which grievously encourages the evil of migratory divorce.
As to international relationships, the present chaos can be
remedied only by thorough reforms of the domestic and conflicts laws. The claims of countries following the national
law principle must be decisively relaxed; on the other hand,
the irresponsible attitude with which lex fori is applied in
other countries ought to be renounced.

CHAPTER

13

Effects of Divorce
I.
I.

EFFECTs OF NoN-RECOGNIZED FoREIGN DIVORCEs

View of the Country of Divorce and of Third States

N the United States, it is possible that a divorce pronounced in one state may not be recognized in a sister
state, because the court did not possess the jurisdiction required under the Constitution. In such cases, it is disputed
whether the divorce is valid in the state where it was decreed. 1
But if so, as is commonly agreed, both parties to the dissolved
marriage are undoubtedly able to remarry in the state of divorce, although not in every other state.
Yet, in comparable situations in countries following the
nationality principle, other solutions have been reached. In
France 2 and Switzerland/ an Italian (or a Spaniard, a Chilean, a Colombian), whose national law forbids the dissolution
of his marriage, is not permitted to remarry, despite his divorce in a French or Swiss court. Such a divorce may have been
granted either by inadvertence or on a theory like that of the
Ferrari case, whereby one party of French nationality is entitled to divorce irrespective of the national law of his spouse. 4
In Germany, the question whether an Italian divorced in a
German court for some exceptional reason-for instance be-

I

1

For invalidity, Restatement §§ I II, I I 3 comment g. Supra p. 466, n. :u.
Trib. civ. Seine (May 5, 19I9) S.192.1.2..9, Revue 1919, 543; cf. NIBOYET,
S.192.1.2..9; DEGAND, 5 Repert. 557 no. 92.. It is notable, however, that the
reporting judge at the Cassation Court in the Ferrari case considered remarriage in France quite possible for the Italian husband~ see Bull. Soc. d'ttudes
Leg. 1930, 104. LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 400 no. 338 is of the same opinion,
although he thinks the husband would be unable to sue for divorce.
3 Swiss Circular Letter {June 2.9, I92.9) Clunet I9JO, 539 advises civil officials to refuse remarriage to an Italian whose marriage has been dissolved in
Switzerland.
4 Supra PP• 442.-445·
2
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cause the wife was of German nationality-could be permitted
to marry in Germany, has been difficult. In such case, which
should prevail: the authority of res judicata owing to a
domestic judgment, and in consequence the man be considered
unmarried, or compliance with the Italian family law ordained
by private international law, and the capacity of the man to
remarry be denied ( EG. art. I 3) ? While the older decisions
followed the first, procedural, line of thought, 5 numerous
writers have insisted on the requirement-allegedly posited by
the principle of conflicts law 6 and by this construction have
impressed several courts. 7 Opposition to this view exists 8 and
is justified. It is well-nigh absurd to regard a person divorced
at the forum as married. Should he succeed in having the new
marriage celebrated, not even those who recognize the foreign
impediment presume to regard it invalid. 9
Dutch and Belgian courts have realized that divorce should
never mean dissolution of the marriage for one party and
continuance of marriage for the other. A Spaniard of Catholic
faith, mistakenly divorced in a Netherlands court, was permitted to remarry in the jurisdiction in view of the formally
binding force of the Dutch decision and of the record in the
register of civil status. 10 In Belgium, as we have seen, courts
for the same reason either deny divorce to a couple of mixed
5 KG. (March q, I9II) 23 Z.int.R. (I9I3) 33I, aff'd RG. (March 2I,
I912) JW. I912, 642.
6 LEWALD u8 no. I631 STEIN-JoNAS, I ZPO. § 328 F n. I34, 2 ZPO.
§ 6o6 n. 221 RAAPE 4041 M. WoLFF, IPR. I331 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb.
40I 1 and particularly 3 FRANKENSTEIN IOI n. I591 ibid. I02. MELCHIOR 25I
reaches the same result on his theory of the preliminary question.
7 OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 3, I923) 43 ROLG. 347; AG. Hannover (I928)
IPRspr. I929, no. 7I and especially KG. (July II, I924) StAZ. I924, 3061
KG. (Oct. I7, I93o) IPRspr. I93I, no. 621 KG. (March 7, I938) JW. I938,
1258 no. 27.
8 BAR, 8 Z.int.R (I898) 4631 REICHEL, Auslanderscheidung, 124 Arch. Civ.
Prax. 200; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. I63 n. 2, and cf. 4391 WIERUSZOWSKI in 4
Leske-Loewenfeld I 77 n. 4791 MASSFELLER, JW. I938, 1259.
9
KG. (March I 3, I 9 I I) 24 ROLG. I 9, approved on this point by RAAPE
4041 KG. (March 7, I938) JW. I938, 1258 no. 27.
10
Rb.Rotterdam (April I4, 1930) W. 12197.
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nationality, when the personal law of one party is hostile to
divorce, or grant dissolution with effect for both parties. 11
A similar problem arises in a third state when a foreign divorce decree is not recognized by the personal law. Again, the
opinion classifying the question as concerning capacity to
marry rather than the effects of divorce, has found favor. 12
In fact, in this case, refusal of remarriage is not in open conflict with the authority of the forum, so that the primary rule
for questions of status may have free play.
View of the Personal Law

2.

The country to which a party belongs will normally deny
any legal effect to a foreign divorce which it does not recognize; maintenance will be granted as by virtue of a valid marriage. Thus, remarriage or further marriages of either party
will be considered invalid, the issue illegitimate, et cetera. A
maintenance order, predicated on the assumption of jurisdiction in rem by a foreign divorce court, even though issued in
personam, has been regarded as void in England, because the
foreign court was considered incompetent to grant divorce and
the order was ancillary to divorce. 13
In actual fact, of course, any divorce subjects the conjugal
union to a most severe shock. 14 The facts that one party has
instituted an action for divorce, that this party has remarried
and cohabited with a new spouse, may each constitute a ground
for divorce by the other party, if divorce is allowed at all in
11

Supra pp. 444-445·
See for France: AuDINET, II Recueili92.6 I 2.36; DEGAND, 5 Repert. 557
no. 9I; for Brazil: Trib. Sup. Fed. (Nov. 4, I9I6) Clunet I9I9, 401; for
Germany the authors supra n. 6.
13 Simons v. Simons [1939] I K. B. 490.
14 3 ARMINJON 44 thinks indeed that a prohibition of divorce by the law of
the forum should be directed exclusively against a second marriage, the marital
union being hopelessly destroyed by the foreign divorce. Cf. DEGAND, 5 Repert.
556 no. 88. Refusal to restore conjugal community after a foreign divorce is
not considered desertion in Denmark; see MUNCH-PETERSEN, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 748 n. 96.
12

520

DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT

the home country. 15 The same result is reached through those
statutory provisions in the United States whereby the procuring of a divorce outside the state by one party gives the
other party a ground for divorce, although these provisions
also cover other cases. 16
A foreign decree, however, may be partially recognized in
the country of the personal law. Thus we have seen that in
some cases a foreign spouse has been regarded as released from
the bonds of marriage, while the spouse who is a subject of
the forum remains bound. Under the Ohio statute, this particular case entitles the latter to a divorce. 11 The outstanding
example of one-sided effect ascribed to divorce is presented in
this country by the special rule in New York that, in the absence of personal jurisdiction, a foreign decree of divorce obtained against a spouse domiciled in New York is good by
estoppel as to the libelant but not good as to the respondent. 18
Under the Brazilian practice mentioned above, 19 the .Brazilian
party to a mixed marriage dissolved abroad remained married
15 England: Adultery, at that time the only ground for divorce, was found in
Clayton v. Clayton [1932] P. 45; in Lankester v. Lankester [1925] P. 114
a similar result. would have been adjudicated but for connivance of the applicant in the foreign divorce.
Germany: ObLG. Bayern (May 24, 1924) 2 Jahrb. FG. 148; OLG. Konigsberg (Oct. 29, 1914) Pos. Mschr. 1914, 157, cited by NussBAUM, D. IPR. 164
n. 2. LG. Berlin {Jan. 9, 1937) JW. 1937, 1307 (adultery committed by celebration of a marriage "by dispensation" in Austria~. Doubts in other decisions
were concerned with the requisite of fault for divorce, which is no longer indispensable under German law.
16 Florida: Stat. ( r 941) § 6 5.o4, No. 8 : "that the defendant has obtained a
divorce from the complainant in any other state or country."
Michigan Stat: Ann. (1937) § 25.86, No.6: "And the circuit courts may, in
their discretion, upon application, •.. divorce from the bonds of matrimony
any party who is a resident of this state, and whose husband or wife shall have
obtained a divorce in any other state." Cf. supra p. 404.
Ohio: Code Ann. (1940) § 11979, No. ro: "the procurement of a divorce
without this state, by a husband or wife, by virtue of which the party who procured it is released from the obligations of the marriage while they remain
binding upon the other party."
17 See preceding note.
18 People v. Baker (1879) 76 N.Y. 78, 32 Am.Rep. 274, consistently followed; see Restatement, New York Annotations§ r 13 at 85.
19
Supra pp. 496-497.
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in the eyes of Brazilian law, but the non-Brazilian spouse was
capable of remarrying even in Brazil. 20 The new Brazilian
law seems to reverse the latter rule. 21 ·
Moreover, a foreign divorce a vinculo, though not recognized in Brazil, is given the same effect upon the property of
the spouses as a Brazilian separation from bed and board; this
concession has been termed the only possible compromise. 2.2

II.

EFFECTS OF vALID DIVORCES

The effects of divorce or, pursuant to another conception,
the continued effects of marriage after "dissolution" 23 are
usually discussed in the United States with respect to (I) alimony, ( 2) dower, and (3) custody of children. 'In recent
times, civil law lawyers have used broader categories for each
of these subjects; they distinguish the influence of divorce
upon ( 1) personal relations between husband and wife, ( 2)
marital property, and ( 3) parental rights.
For the purpose of conflict of laws, further division of the
subject is necessary. On the one hand, we must distinguish the
inquiries: (a) whether the divorce court has power under its
own law to decide upon those effects or some of them; (b) if
it has power so to decide, which law it must apply; and (c)
whether its decision is recognized and enforced in other jurisdictions. On the other hand, there are analogous problems in
case a divorce decree has been rendered in one jurisdiction and
a related suit, as for alimony or custody, is brought in another.
20 BEVILAQUA,

6 Repert. 167 no. 41.
Brazil: Lei de lntrodw;ao ( 1942) art. 7 § 6.
22 Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. {Nov. 4, 1916) Clunet 1919, 402.
23 NEUMEYER, IPR. ( ed. 1) 21. It need hardly be mentioned that no problem
exists with respect to the fact that every divorce decree, if recognized, determines
the time, the extent, and the conditions for terminating the bond of marriage.
E.g., a Belgian court grants exequatur to a French divorce without requiring
that the d~cree be recorded within two months, as is necessary for a Belgian
decree, by a different interpretation of art. 264 of the Civil Code common to
both countries; Trib. civ. Termonde {Oct. 17, 1936) Rechtsk. Wkbl. 19361937' 1634, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 183.
21
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Not all these diverse problems have been dealt with explicitly, although some have been vividly discussed in a few
countries and others are engulfed within other topics. There
is no point in subjecting all these questions to one sole conflicts
rule. Earlier writers in Europe contended that all effects of
divorce are governed by the national law, whereby ordinarily
the law presiding over the divorce was meant. 24 But the conflicts rules derived from the nationality principle have been
differentiated; there are different rules for personal relations
of the spouses, for property relations, for parental rights and
duties incident to the granting of divorce, and, moreover,
th~re exist problems peculiar to marriages of mixed nationality. The prevailing tendency, briefly reported below, favors
in each topic application of the rule that is called for by t;.he
most nearly related sphere of family life.
We still find rules of broader scope in a few regulations,
characterized by the preponderance of the last matrimonial or
common domicil. For instaR.ce, a Danish court will recognize
not only the limitations on the right of remarriage resultant
from a divorce decree of the foreign matrimonial domicil, but
also its legal effects on the property of the parties. 25 By article
55 of the C6digo Bustamante, "the law of the court before
which litigation is pending" determines the judicial consequences of the action and the terms of the judgment with
respect to the spouses and their children. It seems that this
court is ordinarily that of the matrimonial domicil. Particularly elaborate is a provision of the Scandinavian Convention
on Family Law, in which divorce jurisdiction with certain exceptions is fixed at the last common domicil. It seems instructive to reproduce this provision:
In connection with petitions for separation or divorce, the
same or another authority of the divorce state may decide also
24 See e.g., 2 FIORE no. 695; also though more careful, WEiss, 3 Traite 7oz.
25
MuNCH-PETERSEN, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 747 n. 94·
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on the provisional suspension of conjugal rights to property
division, damages, alimony, and parental rights. (Art. 8,
par. r.)
Claims later instituted concerning alimony or parental
rights are decided in the state in which the defendant spouse is
domiciled. This applies also to modification of awards rendered in another of the participant states. If, by the law of the
state in which separation or divorce has been pronounced,
alimentary sums for a separated or divorced party may not be
awarded or increased, no such decision can be made in the
other participant states. (Art. 8, par. 2.)
In rendering decision under articles 7 and 8 in each state,
the law there in force is to be applied. Decisions, however, on
division of property or on damages always must be based on
the law applicable to the conjugal property relations according
to article 3· (Art. 9, par. r.)
For civil law countries, it should be borne in mind that
jurisdiction is a matter entirely different from choice of law;
the former is not here involved.
I.

Effects on Personal Relations between Husband and Wife

(a) Name, capacity, gifts, etcetera. What law determines,
for instance, whether a divorced wife ought to resume her
maiden name, to retain that of her husband, or to have her
choice as under the common law? Should a divorce court
determine this question according to its own family (or other)
law, or according to the same family law that was applied in
granting the divorce, or according to the law that governed
the personal relations of the parties during coverture? The
subject matter includes, among other things, alimony, a topic
presenting peculiarities.
( i) The law of the forum. The application of the domestic
law seems natural within systems that make the matrimonial
domicil the exclusive basis for jurisdiction and choice of law
in granting and recognizing divorce. But also in Switzerland,
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although divorce is not granted unless the foreigners' national
law accords, Swiss law determines every divorce decree and
its ancillary effects. 26
In the United States, probably the law of the divorce forum
governs. Except for alimony, however, the question seems
not to have been discussed.
(ii) The law of divorce. To control the effects of divorce,
the decidedly prevailing opinion on the European Continent
has selected, among the various possibilities offered by the
nationality principle, the law under which the marriage was
dissolved. 27 In Germany, this is the national law of the husband at the time when the divorce suit was instituted (EG.
art. I 7, par. I); in France, the national law of the party at
whose instance divorce is granted. This rule refers to problems such as:
What name the wife ought to bear; 28
26
See supra p. 429 and ibid., n. 169.
OG. Zurich (Dec. 8, '937) 38 Bl. f. Ziirch. Rspr. '939> 105 no. 42 therefore
states that even if in the national courts the effects of divorce would not be
expressed in the divorce decree itself and established by rules different from the
Swiss rules, a Swiss divorce decree always causes Swiss law to be applied to all
problems of damages and moral compensation, support, property, etc.
27 France: for status and capacity see DEGAND, 5 Repert. 555 no. 86; NIBOYET
nos. 642, 753 pars. 6 and 7·
Germany: RG. Plenary Decision (June 25, 1898) 41 RGZ. 175, 9 Z.int.R.
(1899) 382, Clunet 19oo, 161; KG. (May 30, 1938) JW. 1938, 2750 (explains
in agreement with the dominant opinion that EG. art. I 7 par. I also governs
the effect of divorce on personal relations such as name and alimony, while the
reservation in par. 4 for-German law is inapplicable).
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. II, I9II) 37 BGE. I 400 (foreign divorce of Swiss
nationals) ; cf. BEcK, NAG. 398 no. I6; ibid. 37 5 no. 148.
:Similarly Guatemala: C. C. (1926) art. 218.
The Hague Convention on Divorce contains no rule on the effect of divorce,
see LEWALD in Strupp, 1 Worterbuch des Volkerrechts und der Diplomatie 471

VIII.
~ 8 France: Cour Paris (Dec. 15, 1936) D. H. 1937. 72 (the national law of
the foreigner); Cour Paris (June 16, 1904) Revue I9o5, I46 (French law
applied to the name of an American ex-wife because of renvoi) ; Trib. civ.
Seine (Dec. 22, 1923) Gaz. Trib. I924.2.204 (Frank Jay-Gould, after his
divorce [see the New York case of Gould v. Gould cited supra p. 503], sued his
former wife and the Alhambra Theater in Paris to enjoin them from advertising her performances under the name of Edith Kelly-Gould; the injunction
was granted under French C. C. art. 299 because the defendant had submitted
to French law in the divorce suit with the collateral argument that New York
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Whether restrictions on the wife's capacity to contract disappear automatically with the end of the marriage; 29
Whether gifts between the spouses may be revoked; 30 ·
Whether confidential communications between the spouses
remain privileged in testimony. 31
In addition, agreements between the spouses concerning a
future divorce, since not operative during coverture, do not
pertain to the law of marital relations but to that of divorce. 32
According to this law, such agreements may be licit; if so,
resort to a divergent public policy of the forum seems unnecessary to German courts. 33 French judges, however,
always suspicious of an intention to facilitate divorce by consent, are inclined to assume that such agreements constitute
an offense to the French public order. 34
(b) Alimony following a foreign divorce. 35 In accordance
with an old conception, in England divorce still ends any
law permitted the same right to the plaintiff). For literature see PILLET, I
Traite Pratique 627; TAGER, Chinet I933, 96.
Germany: law of divorce, not the personal law of either spouse: KG. (Oct.
13, I9I6) 33 ROLG. 343; LG. II Berlin (May 2o, I927) IPRspr. I926-27,
no. 75; cf. KG.,(Dec. I7, I926) IPRspr. I926-I927, no. 74·
Switzerland: controversial; see STAUFFER, NAG. art. 8 no. I5; BEcK, NAG.
373 no. I45, ibid. 466 nos. :u6, 227; cf. ibzd. 398 no. I6, ibid. 4I4 no. 67.
A Swiss divorced woman must resume her premarital name, but if a woman
after a foreign divorce recovers Swiss nationality, she is entitled to the name
she has according to the foreign law. See Just. Dep., BBl. I924; II 24 no. 2;
GAUTSCHI, 26 SJZ. zz; Government of Bern, 27 SJZ. I37, no. 23.
29 RAAPE 430 no. 6; M. WoLFF, IPR. I32 n. I4·
In France: BARTIN, who
had advocated the law of the forum, now suggests with WEISS, 3 Traite 702,
the personal law of the woman; see BARTIN, 2 Principes 3 I I § 3 I 6.
30
RAAPE, 2 D. IPR. I87.
31 This point familiar in American law is not expressly mentioned in the
European literature.
32
Germany: KG. (Sept. 25, I933) IPRspr. I933, no. 32 (Hungarian law);
OLG. Naumburg (Feb. 26, I936) JW. I936, I798; cf. RAAPE, 2 D. IPR. I87;
LoRENZ, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. I02.
33
C/. also KG. (Dec. :z.x, I935) JW. I936, 2466.
34
See Cass. (req.) (July 29, I929) Revue I93I, 334; Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 26,
I938) Nouv. Revue I938, 567 (where the decree was rendered in France) and
the decisions cited in Nouv. Revue I938, 570 n. I, and contra: COSTE-FLORET,
7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 2I5 no. IZI.
35 See especially HARWOOD, "Alimony after a Decree of Divorce Rendered on
Constructive Service," 24 Kentucky L. J. (I936) 24I. See }ACOBS, "The Enforce-
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duty of support between former spouses. Therefore, no action can lie to obtain alimony after a divorce a vinculo, whether
pronounced by an English or a foreign court. A recognized
foreign decree of divorce even terminates a former English
maintenance order. 36
In the United States, many difficulties have been encountered. Although the English conception that the duty of
support does not survive the dissolution of the marriage has
not been maintained in this country, only this English background seems to explain a certain opinion that has proved
very strong in the past, viz., that the rendering of the divorce
decree 1s the last moment for alimony to be recovered. \Vhere
such a doctrine is invoked against a suit for alimony, undesirable situations may arise. Thus, a divorce court in one
state may refuse to order the defendant to pay alimony, because it knows that according to the prevailing opinion, it does
not have the necessary jurisdiction in personam. 37 Yet, the
court of another state having the required personal jurisdiction, regards a suit for support after divorce has been pronounced as impossible. The result is the same when the foreign
court awarded alimony but did not have proper jurisdiction.
The diversity of jurisdiction in rem and jurisdiction in personam presents a second source of difficulties. Paradoxically,
it follows from the historical development, that the requirements for service of process on the defendant in such ancillary
actions in personam, as enunciated by the Supreme Court, are
greater than in divorce suits. It seems a neglected fact that
ment of Foreign Decrees for Alimony," 6 Law and Cont. Probl. (1939) 250;
Note, 53 Harv. L. Rev. (1940) II8o; Note, 40 Mich. L. Rev. (1942) 596;
SAYRE, "Recognition by Other States of Decrees for Judicial Separation and
Decrees for Alimony," 28 Iowa L. Rev. (1943) 321. On the enforcement of
alimentary decrees throughout the world, see International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law, L'Execution a l'etranger des obligations alimentaires (Rome, r 9 38) .
'
36 Pastre v. Pastre [r93o] P. 8o, 82 (French divorce); Mezger v. Mezger
(1936) 155 L. T. R. 491, [1937] P. 19, Clunet 1937, 138 (German divorce).
37 This has been contested but is now treated as settled. See 2 BEALE 1435·
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the social importance of marriage and its dissolution surpasses
the significance of any alimentary orders.
A third unexpected complication arises from interference of
the estoppel idea. In cases where a wife sued for divorce in a
jurisdiction powerless to grant alimony but where the right
thereto was at issue, she has been deemed to have waived her
claim to alimony once and for all by choosing such a divorce
court. This all too technical idea, which has not been adequately criticized, is so faulty that its influence should not
go far.
Finally, difficulties of another kind are encountered when
an alimentary order is sought to be enforced in another jurisdiction. In particular, orders which may be altered have been
considered to lack the finality necessary for enforcement.
It would not be helpful to discuss all these disturbances at
length. Recent writers assure us that the entire doctrine is in
an evolutionary stage, and that extraterritorial effect is given
to decrees for alimony "with very great completeness." 38
Courts and statutes show themselves more and more anxious
to overcome formalistic obstacles, to help deserted wives and
children. The indigent ex-husband has also found more favor
than before. Through such an evolution, the American doctrine approaches the views of the European laws.
In civil law countries, the nature of the duty incumbent
upon a former spouse is far from undisputed in theory; does it
follow from a breach of the marital duties? That it does was
the leading idea of older codifications, including the German
Civil Code. Or is the family relation partly conserved despite
the dissolution of the marriage tie? Modern doctrines are inclined in some degree, indeed, to consider the obligation
imposed by law as an effect of the former family relation and
therefore as belonging to the field of family law rather than to
the domain of ordinary obligations e."< ·tege. In any case, the
88 SAYRE, ~8 Iowa L. Rev. (1943) 333, supra n. 35·
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existence of such obligations is not doubted; their incidence is
continuously extended. For instance, the recent German marriage law no longer maintains that only an exclusively guilty
ex-spouse can be required to support the innocent other party;
it declares it to be sufficient that the defendant was mainly at
fault in disrupting the marriage and even allows equitable
awards beyond this limit. Thus, since alimony rests on the
same foundations as any family law institution, no technical
impediment obstructs the application of a foreign alimentary
regulation. Moreover, litigation for alimony is usually separable from the divorce suit so that nothing prevents an action
for alimony being brought in another country than that where
the divorce was pronounced.
Difficulties arise, however, first, because a foreign divorce
is quite often refused recognition and, secondly, because of the
intervention of some distinct local policy at the court where
the award is sought.
In Germany, the law of divorce is applied with nicety; it
signifies the law of the husband at the time when the action for
divorce was instituted. 39
In France, it seems that the law governing marital relations during coverture is preferred, 40 the alimentary obligation
39 KG. (Feb. x6, 1909) 19 ROLG. xo6, 20 Z.int.R. (x9xo) 227, Clunet
191I, 286 (without any doubt); LG. Altona (March 19, 1926) JW. 1926,
1357 (Danish law denying judicial remedy applied); KG. (Feb. 9, 1929)
IPRspr. 192.9, no. 15; OLG. Naumburg (Feb. 26, 1936) JW. 1936, 1798.
This practice was in force before the Biirgerliche Gesetzbuch, see RG. (June
25, 1898) 41 RGZ. 175 (supra n. 27) and RG. (July u, 1898) JW. 1898,
545, 9 Z.int.R. (1899) II6, Clunet 19oo, 635. In the case of a German husband, a technical difficulty was presented by the requi:rement of guilt of the
defendant and innocence of the applicant when the foreign decree of divorce
contained no statement on the matter. But this obstacle could be overcome;
see KG. (May 3, 1935) JW. 1935, 2750, and also RAAPE 426 II 1; the question
is certainly not worse under the new law.
The Italian Court of Cass. (May 3, 1934) Monitore 1934, 889 gives much
weight to the statements and awards of the foreign divorce decree but seems to
decide the case according to Italian law perhaps because the plaintiff wife had
recovered her Italian citizenship.
40
NIBOYET 753·
In Portugal, CUNHA GON\<ALVES, 1 Direito Civil 695 seems to advocate application of the husband's national law under the same viewpoint.
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being traced back to the marital duty of support. Bartin, however, limits this classification to that part of the money award
that the French courts base on article 301 of the Civil Code,
while other grants of alimony under the heading of damages
should be governed by the law of the place of wrong. 41
Jurisdiction for alimony is assumed in the Netherlands at
the. instance of domiciled persons on the basis of foreign divorces. Here again the law applied seems to be the lex fori. 42
The Swiss Federal Tribunal has taken another view in con~
sidering the problem of jurisdiction. If the divorce was rendered abroad, even if involving Swiss citizens, jurisdiction for
ancillary effects is not exercised, unless the foreign courts refuse to assume jurisdiction because of the Swiss domicil of the
party; 4a in such event, the Swiss court is required to intervene
in order to prevent a denial of justice, 44 the lex fori being applied.45
Effects on Marital Property

2.

If a foreign decree of judicial separation has been recognized, it must be examined, in the first place, to determine
whether it is intended to terminate the property regime. With
this purpose in mind, French courts have stated that an Italian
separation by mutual agreement and judicial confirmation,46
as well as a Spanish separation from bed and board, 47 does not
have the effect of property separation (separation de biens),
41

BARTIN, 2 Principes 313.
,
See BW. amended by§ 828a Rv. (law of May 16, 1934, S. 253) and H. R.
(April 5> 1937) W. 1937, no. 661 declaring that the alimentary duty falls
under the first book of the Code and also if based on a divorce pronounced in
Germany. Cf. H. R. (March 8, 1934) W.12752 for a decree of the Netherland
Indies; see other cases in 11 Z.ausl.PR. ( 19 3 7) 21 o.
43
BG. (March 29, 1928) 54 BGE.II 85; BECK, NAG. 370 nos. 133ff.; ibid.
420 nos. 8 9ff.
44
BG. (Dec. IO, 1936) 62 BGE. II 265, Praxis 1937, 56. On modification
of a domestic decree, if the defendant is domiciled abroad, see BG. (Nov. 22,
1935) 61 BGE. II 225, Clunet 1938, 973, and criticism ibid. 974·
45
Constant practice since BG. (June 13, 1912) 38 BGE. II 43, 49; see BG.
(Dec. 10, 1936) 62 BGE. II 265, 267.
48
Cour Lyon (June 3, 1926) S.1928.2.12I.
47
Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. I 3, I 908) Clunet I 908, 832.
42
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which the French separation de corps has under the Civil Code
(art. 3 I I ) . 48 But a separation from bed and board rendered
in a Netherlands court necessarily effectuates a separation of
property under article 298 of the Civil Code; 49 if the parties
be Germans, therefore, this effect would not be recognized by
their national courts. 50
All remaining questions concerning property regimes must
obviously be answered by the law governing the property relations of the parties during coverture. For instance, after a
dissolution of community property by an absolute divorce,
whether a domestic divorce or a foreign divorce recognized as
valid, the mode of partition of the community fund is naturally governed by the law governing marital property. 5 1
Often a marital property settlement or a statute provides
explicitly what must be done in case of divorce. Where such
provision is lacking, a rule applicable in the event of the death
of one spouse may reasonably be resorted to, while the lex fori
of the divorce court is ruled out. 52
In agreement with this view, in common law countries the
effect on movables of any divorce, domestic or foreign, and in
Argentina of a foreign recognizable divorce, is governed by
the law of the husband's domicil at the time when the movables
were acquired; the effect on immovables by the law of the
situs. In accordance with this rule, a wife's claim to dower
depends upon the law of the situs regarding dower and estoppel rather than upon that of the divorce court, unless the
implications of the divorce decree as to dower be recognized
at the situs. 53 In France, in conformity with the conflicts rules
48
BARTIN in 7 Aubry et Rau 402, and NIBOYET 752 are in doubt whether
this effect belongs under the heading of rules on marital property or those on
the personal relations of husband and wife.
49
Rb. Haag (Dec. to, i929) 6 Z.ausl.PR. (19p) 849; Rb. Almelo (June
24, 1931) W. 12370 and App. Arnhem (June 29, 19p) W. 12627, 11
Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 209 no. 59·
50
M. WOLFF, IPR. 132 n. 15; STAUDINGER-ENGELMANN§ 1586 Ill A, c(4).
51
Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. 25, 1882) Clunet 1882, 74·
52
DEGAND, s Repert. 558 no. 96; NIBOYET 752 II 1; M. WoLFF, IPR. 132.
63 On the effect on the wife's claim for dower, see HARPER, "Effect of Foreign
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on matrimonial property and in contrast with the conflicts
rules on inheritance, immovables are not subject to special
treatment. 54
The question, too, whether or when an agreement to regulate property relations after divorce is valid, has appropriately
been decided according to the law governing marital property
during coverture. 55
A particular position is taken in the United States when divorce courts are empowered to make dispositions of property
of the spouses or to adjudicate damages between them. It
would seem that a corresponding order of the court ought to
supplement the regulation of property between the parties.
In connection with the unsettled extraterritorial effect of personal decrees of a court of equity, dispositions of this kind,
particularly when one party is ordered to convey land in
another state to another party, have produced interstate difficulties. 56
3· Custody of Children
American courts disagree greatly on the conditions under
which a court has jurisdiction in divorce proceedings to settle
a dispute concerning custody of the children. It is disputed
whether a pronouncement of this sort affecting the children
Divorce upon Dower and Similar Property Interests," z6 Ill. L. Rev. (1931)
397; HARPER and TAINTOR, Cases 1079 n. JZ.
54
App. Monaco (May 7, 1910) S.19IZ-4-25, Clunet 1910, 1p7; App. Monaco (March 16, 19u) Revue 19rz, 789.
55
KG. {Dec. :u, 1935) JW. 1936, 2466, Nouv. Revue 1937, 98 (agreement
valid under Hungarian Marriage Law of 1894, § 92, recognized according to
EG. art. 15, setting art. 17 (law of divorce) aside). Contra: KG. (Sept. 25,
1933) IPRspr. 1933, no. 32 (applying EG. art. 17 not only to alimentary but
also to property agreements).
56
Enforcement was granted at the situs, probably in view of fraud committed
against the order in Spalding v. Spalding (1925) 75 Cal. App. 569, 243 Pac.
445; Matson v. Matson (1919) 186 Iowa 6o7, 173 N. W. 127; Mallette v.
Scheerer (1916) 164 Wis. 415, 160 N. W. 182; refused in Bullock v. Bullock
(1894) 52 N.J. Eq. 56I, 30 Atl. 676; Fall v. Fall (1905) 75 Neb. 104, IIJ
N. W. 175. Cf. STUMBERG no.
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is to be treated as a judgment in personam or as a judgment
in rem. Statutory power conferred on a divorce court to award
custody, however, seems to be recognized in other states 57
unless circumstances are changed, provided both parties were
residents of the divorce forum and the child, therefore, had
no other domicil. For, in the most widespread and authoritative opinion, jurisdiction to determine the custody of children
is primarily located at the domicil of the child. 58
There is concern expressed in the literature, however, that
the jurisdiction of the forum for awarding custody should not
be obtained unilaterally by one spouse, drawing the child away
without the other's consent.
Every court in the United States applies its own municipal
law, so that again there is no question of choice of law. In
England and Argentina, and under the Conventions of Montevideo and of the Scandinavian States, the forum coincides with
the conjugal domicil. In France, the lex fori, rather than the
personal law, is applied, even in cases such as the Ferrari case,
where only one of the spouses had acquired French nationality; 59 but probably not where two foreigners are concerned
and the child is of foreign nationality too. 60
In Germany, however, the conflict of law problem has been
thoroughly separated from that of jurisdiction and extensively
discussed. The lex fori was applied in a single case where
the divorced wife of foreign· nationality had later acquired
German nationality, on the ground that the domestic regu57

Restatement§ I46; see 2.7 C.]. S. (I94I) Divorce § 329·
Restatement §§ I I 7, I45· GooDRICH, "Custody of Children in Divorce
Suits," 7 Cornell L. Q. (I9ZI) I and GooDRICH§ I32.. A disturbing element
is the view "that a court having jurisdiction to a ward the custody retained j urisdiction to modify its award although the domicile of a child has been changed
in the meanwhile to another state," LORENZEN, "Developments in the Conflicts
of Laws I90Z-I942," 40 Mich. L. Rev. (I942) at 798.
59
Cour Paris (Dec. ZI, I937) Gaz.Pal.I938.I.405, D. H. I938.I86, Clunet
I938, 482..
60 Cf. WEiss, 3 Traite 702.
But Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 29, I9o4) Clunet
I 905, I 87 has applied French law to decide the provisional custody of the
children in a suit of an American wife against her Turkish husband.
58
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61

lation (BGB. § 1635) was mandatory. But this construction
has been generally rejected as an excessive expression of the
exigencies of public policy. According to another opinion
the relationship between the former spouses as respects custody of the children was considered governed by the law determining the right to divorce (EG. art. r 7 ), while other matters would fall under the conflicts rule determining the parentchild relation (EG. art. 19). 62 But prevailing opinion now
holds that every right of a parent to custody, education, or
visiting affects the children's interest and has to be determined
by the law that governs legitimate filiation. 63 Where German
spouses have been divorced abroad by a recognized decree but
custody was not awarded in accordance with German family
law, the order is regarded as a temporary measure only. 64
In the Netherlands also, not the law of the forum, now repeatedly applied to govern divorce, but the ordinary conflicts
rule on parental and filial relations is applied. 65 Accordingly,
the law of the child governs, while in Germany that of the
father is applicable. The classification is the same, however,
and would be suitable to any country.
By this time, it should be understood everywhere that custody of children or any other incident of parental relations
is not a matter substantially ancillary to divorce, although the
divorce court may have power to take care of these matters
61

RG. (Feb. 2o, 1913) 81 RGZ. 373·
612 HABICHT 143, 152; LEWALD 1201 137. Another opinion suggested simply
applying EG. art. 17 (law of divorce), see NrEDNER 54, art. 17 comment 4d;
NIEMEYER, IPR. des BGB. 157; RGR. Kom. (ed. 8) prel. no. 6 to§ 1616.
63
KG. (March 6, 1929) 41 Z.int.R. (1929) 413; KG. (Feb. 1o, 1933) JW.
1933 1 2065; KG. (May 3, 1935) JW. 1935, 2750; KG. (May 12, 1938) Nouv.
Revue 1939, 251; OLG. Breslau (May 91 1938) Dt. Recht 1939, 869 following
RAAPE 482; see also RAAPE, 2 D. IPR. 187; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 164 n. 4·
64
See decisions of KG. preceding note.
65
See Rb. Amsterdam (June 24, 1937) W. 19371 no. 970; Hof Amsterdam
(Feb. II 1 1937) W. 1937, no. 950.
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (March 1, 1928) Clunet 1928, 482 (personal law
of Australian parents applied in principle).
Italy: Trib. Napoli (July 13, 1932) Rivista 1933, 281 (Italian law, the
parents having, after Hungarian divorce, recovered Italian nationality).
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and a divorce is a seasonable occasion to regulate custodianship.
If the court applies its own family law, as it does in this
country, it should qualify its application in the not infrequent
cases where the applicant has been able to choose the forum
at will. Whatever the principle of assuming jurisdiction may
be and whatever the binding effect of an award of custody,
the applicable law should be determined in conformance with
the standard adopted in filiation matters.

CHAPTER

14

Annulment of Marriage
I.

ANNULMENT DISTINGUISHED FROM DIVORCE

ONFLICTS rules determining the extraterritorial
effect given to annulment of marriage are concerned
in the first place with any decree or judgment declaring a marriage void or annulling it and intended to operate in
rem throughout the world, i.e., with the effect of res judicata
for all persons. These rules, however, must evidently also be
applied to annulments, such as those in certain of the states of
the United States, that are conclusive only against the parties
and those claiming under them. All types of void and voidable
marriages are included.
Annulment is no longer confused with divorce, as it was in
former times/ although some American statutes still speak of
divorce granted for antenuptial causes such as bigamy, incest,
duress, physical incapacity, or near kinship. 2 It is certain that
a decree of "divorce" in such cases has nullifying effect. 3 In
exact terminology, nullity cannot be based on grounds other
than those existing at the moment of the solemnization of the
marriage, while divorce must have a cause either posterior to
the celebration or at least continuing during coverture. In the
law of conflicts, this seems to be accepted. 4
·Nevertheless, the Restatement mentions annulments, the
causes of which antedate the marriage but the effects of which

C

1 COKE on LITTLETON (HARGRAVE and BUTLER) 235a; BLACKSTONE 440 ..
2 r VERNIER §§ so, 68, 7o, p, 73; ScHOULER, Domestic Relations §§ 1154,
1155; Reese v. Reese (1929) 128 Kan. 76z, 280 Pac. 751.
3
See 27 C. J. S. (1941) 537-538.
'Restatement§ 115 comment c; Sorenson v. Sorenson (191.4) 122 N.Y.
Misc. 196, 202, zoz N.Y. Supp. 62o, 625.
Brazil: App. Civ. Capital Sao Paulo no. 6441 (Aug. 5 and July 27, 1912)
6o Gaz. Jur. Sao Paulo (1912) 195.
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operate only from the time of the decree. 5 These are considered
in the Restatement according to the rules of conflicts estab- ,
lished for divorce rather than those relative to annulment. 6
It is difficult to understand the reason for this treatment. The
Swiss Code and also the German law as recently reformed contain precise parallels; they provide for rescission of marriages
on grounds that existed at the time of the marriage celebration
and with the effect of terminating rather than annihilating
the bond of marriage. 7 The effect described is similar to divorce. Yet, for the purpose of conflict of laws, the Swiss and
German institutions have rightly been classified in the category
of annulment. They are governed by the personal law of
the person entitled to sue and not by the law which would
govern divorce. 8 Annulment can never be governed by the
law of the forum, as divorce is in the United States. The
. reasons are perfectly understood in this country; 9 an impediment vitiating the celebration of a marriage must be evaluated
under the law establishing the req~irements of that celebration.
5 Restatement § I I 5 ( 2). I BEALE § I I 5.2 asserts that in most states annulment takes effect at the time of the decree of annulment and therefore takes place
at the present domicil. A contrary statement that such effect is prescribed by
only a few statutes is to be found in 3 8 C. J ., Marriage § I 3 9 with the citation
of New York only, for which state the Restatement, New York Annotations,
§ I I 5 (2) declares that no such annulment exists there. In fact the text of the New
York Domestic Relations Law§ 7 on marriage "void from the time its nullity
is declared by the court of competent jurisdiction," has been construed as meaning
retroactive operation of the judgment and destruction of the marriage ab initio.
See Matter of Moncrief (I92l) 235 N.Y. 390, 139 N. E. sso; SEALY, Law
of Persons and Domestic Relations (ed. 2, I9J6, New York) 562; HAMMILL,
"The Impediment of Nonage," 3 The Jurist (I943) 475, 477 n. I I.
6 Restatement § 136(a).
7 Swiss C. C. art. I32.
German Marriage Law of I938, § 42 par. I which provides that the effects
of a rescission of a marriage are determined according to the provisions concerning the effects of divorce.
8
RG. (May 7, I936) I5I RGZ. 226 classified the Swiss action annulling the
marriage under EG. art. 13 par. I; RAAPE, 2 D.IPR. 145; his assertion that
the wife does not lose the nationality acquired by the marriage (at I 75) is inexact; cf. for Switzerland, BECK, NAG. 263 no. I 59·
9
Cf. on this point, the explanation of GoODRICH 355·
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ANNULMENT oF THE MARRIAGE oF FoREIGNERs

r. Jurisdiction
(a) Court of the place of celebration. When marriage was
conceived of primarily as a contract,10 jurisdiction for deciding
on its validity or invalidity was thought to be vested naturally
in the tribunal of the place of celebration. This is still the
rule in Argentina/ 1 and as recently as 1938 a court in Paris
tried to justify French jurisdiction over a marriage of foreign
parties by a similar argument. 12
The English authorities asserted the jurisdiction of the
English courts to annul English marriages until recent years. 13
The present decisions are understood to say that where the
parties are domiciled abroad, the jurisdiction loci celebrationi-s
of the English courts is neither exclusive nor complete; it
concurs with that of the foreign domicil and is restricted to
absolutely "void" marriages, such as those vitiated by bigamy
or the non-observance of formalities. Annulment of "voidable" marriages on the ground of coercion, essential error, or
impotence, is considered exclusively reserved to the domicil~ary court, because it effects a change of status. 14 This dis10 I BEALE 5 I o professes this conception and strongly advocates the jurisdiction of the place of celebration.
11
2 Vrco no. 79·
12
Trib. civ. Seine (June 3, I938) Revue Crit. I938, 668, Clunet I939, 87.
13 Simonin v. Mallac (I86o) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67; Linke v. Van Aerde (I894) Io
T. L. R. 426; Valier v, Valier (I925) I33 L. T. R. 830 and the problematic
cases Ogden v. Ogden [I9o8] P. 46 and Sottomayor v. De Barros [1877] 3 P.
D. I, [I879] 5 P. D. 94·
14
Inverclyde v. Inverclyde [I93I] P. 29; see the important comment by
CHESHIRE 344; Goddard, L. J., in a dictum in Simons v. Simons [I939] I K.
B. 490, 498, summarizes the law to the effect that since I 748 the court of the
place of celebration has been regarded as having jurisdiction to pronounce the
marriage null and void for failure of due celebration. The problem was ignored
in Easterbrook v. Easterbrook (I944) 170 L. T. R. 26; see Note, 6o Law Q.
Rev. (I944) us.
Canada: Fleming v. Fleming (Ont. S.C. 1934) [I934] 0. R. 588, [I934]
4 D. L. R. 90; W. v. W. (Manitoba) [I934] 3 W. W. R. 230; cf. FALCONBRIDGE, Annotation [1932] 4 D. L. R. 2, 28ff.; 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. I90 no.
88. See also READ, Recognition and Enforcement 243.

DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT
tinction seems formalistic. It has also been pointed out that,
in view of the British reluctance to recognize a change of
domicil, a place where the parties live (without, however, being there domiciled) and have been married, provides a natural
forum to try the validity of the marriage. 15
In the United States many cases have favored the older
English rule, 16 and some statutes have also preserved it, at
least under certain circumstances. 17 Thus, the jurisdiction of
the place of celebration has not completely disappeared. But
it no longer has a significant role-the principle of domicil has
decidedly won out. 18
(b) Court of the domicil. At present, the regularly competent court is that of the domicil, and this is true, not only
in the countries which use domicil as the test for determining
status and consider paramount the interest of the domiciliary
state in the validity ofthe marriage bond/ 9 but even in the
countries generally following the principle of nationality. 20
The motive of the rule is to permit domiciled foreigners to
bring their matrimonial causes before the local courts instead
of compelling them to travel to their national countries.
15 KEITH, "Some Problems in the Conflict of Laws," I6 Bell Yard (I9J5),
4 at I6; MoRRIS, Cases I79 criticizes the entire doctrine.
16 See I BEALE 5II; GooDRICH 3 57, and, as a recent illustration, Mayer v.
Mayer (I929) 207 Cal. 685, 696, 279 Pac. 783, 788.
17 See I VERNIER § 52 table XXI and Supplement.
18 See McMuRRAY and CUNNINGHAM, "Jurisdiction to Pronounce Null a
Marriage Celebrated in Another State or Foreign Country," I 8 Cal. L. Rev.
(I930) I05.
19
GOODRICH 3 55.
20 The United States: Restatement § I I5; GooDRICH 357·
England: Inverclyde v. Inverclyde [I9JI] P. 29, cited supra n. I4.
Canada: Fleming v. Fleming (Ont. S.C.) [I934] '0. R. 588, [I934] 4 D. L.
R. 90; Diachuk v. Diachuk (Manitoba, K. B.) (I94I) 49 Man. R. I02.
Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text of I889, art. 62; text
of I940, art. 59·
·
France: (if there is no domicil abroad) Trib. civ. Seine (June I7> I927)
Revue I928, 332; Trib. civ. Seine (April 3, I930) Revue I930, 46o.
Germany: C. Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. I; cf. KG. (June 4, I934) IPRspr. I934>
no. I4I; same for a declaratory statement that the marriage is non-existent:
RG. (Jan. s, I925) Io9 RGZ. 384.
Switzerland: The domicil of the plaintiff spouse is considered decisive by
BEcK, NAG. 252 no. uJ.
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As the matrimonial domicil is normally at the husband's
domicil, the latter is usually regarded as decisive. There are
exceptions not unlike those for granting divorce; 21 they cannot
be discussed here.
In contrast with divorce, which is refused to foreigners in
a number of states when the jurisdiction of the forum is not
recognized by the homeland, 22 jurisdiction for annulment is
not made dependent on such considerations, except perhaps
in Switzerland. 23
(c) Court of the national country. Consistently with the
nationality principle, in practically all Continental countries
nationals of the forum may sue for annulment irrespective of
their domicil. 24 In a few countries this jurisdiction is exclusive
of foreign courts. 2 :; Sometimes a court defies its own general
principle of domicil in order to help a national of the forum. 26
Moreover, for a wife who had belonged to the forum up to
the time of her marriage, jurisdiction is assumed without
difficulty on the consideration that a void marriage did not
actually change her nationality.
21
Restatement § I I 5 and about eleven state statutes allow suit to be brought
in the country where either party resides; see I VERNIER§ sz.
212 German C. Civ. Proc. ~ 6o6 par. I is limited by par. 4 only with respect
to divorce; see KG. (Nov. 7, I935) z7 Warn. Rspr. 19z; 3 FRANKENSTEIN zo3
n. 85.
23
OG. Zurich (Oct. Io, I928) Bl. f. Ziirch. Rspr. (I929) 139, no. 66, Clunet
19301 SZ4· To the contrary effect, App. Bern (Oct. z7, I9z7) 1.4 SJZ. (I9Z7I9z8) ZJ5 no. 54 assumes that the legislator forgot the case, and that the German provisions furnish the best solution; in the instant case jurisdiction is granted
to a former Swiss woman who married an Italian in Switzerland.
24
Cf. for instance France: Cour Paris (May z8, 188o) Clunet I88o, 3oo;
GouLE., 9 Repert. So nos. 403ff.
Germany: C. Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. z sentences 1 and :z.; ibid. par. 31 sentence
z, extensively interpreted by STEIN-JONAS, z ZPO. § 6o6 V.
Switzerland: App. Bern (Oct. 1.7, 19z7) 1.4 SJZ. (197.7-19Z8) Z37·
25 Supra pp. 397-398.
In the Netherlands, art. 154a of the BW. has been interpreted as requiring a
petition of the Dutch State Attorney and annulment by a. Dutch court; see
Rb. s'Gravenhage (August ::.6, 1938) W. I939, no. 36.
26
·
See, for instance, Denmark: Ostre Landsrets Domme (May u, I9zo)
U.f.R. I9zo, 6z8, z Z.ausl.Pr. (I9z8) 866, applying, moreover, the Danish law
instead of that of the domicil.
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The provisions of the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction are
not applicable to annulment. 27
2.

Applicable Law

(a) Rule. It has been explained above 28 that the rule
embodied in section 136 of the Restatement is universally
adopted. A court will apply the sanctions of the same law
that is applied in ascertaining whether a marriage has been
validly celebrated. 29 While in the United States this means
that generally the law of the place of celebration alone is consulted, with the sole exception of certain absolute prohibitions
of the law of the domicil of either party, in most countries formalities and intrinsic validity are tested by different .criteria.
The law of the forum, so significant for divorce, in principle is
immaterial for annulment. 30
In consequence, the judgment usually pronounces the kind
of nullity provided for by the applicable law rather than that
of the lex fori. The German Supreme Court, for instance, in
a case where a Swiss national obtained an annulment on the
ground of having been deceitfully induced to enter into the
marriage, adopted the sanctions of the Swiss Civil Code rather
than those of the German law, and declared the marriage void
ex nunc only, with the effects ordained by Swiss law. 31 The
Swiss Federal Tribunal declared a marriage void under the
Austrian law of the parties whereby the marriage was retroactively destroyed ( Allg. BGB., § I 6o ), holding no support
for the time previous to the judgment to be due, contrary to
Swiss law (C. C. art. 132, par. 2). 32
27

KG. (June 14, 1913) 27 ROLG. 108; RG. (May 7, 1936) 151 RGZ. 226.
Supra pp. 229, 286.
29 See LASALA LLANAS I 30, I 33; TRiAS DE BEs 83, Ioo. In Spain the jurisdiction of state courts applies to few nullity cases only for which the writers
seem to favor the lex fori.
30 This has been confirmed, against contrary opinions in Switzerland, by BG.
(Dec. 2, I943) 69 BGE. II 342, 344·
31 RG. (May 7, I936) 15I RGZ. 226; cf. MASSFELLER, JW. 1936, I949;
LoRENZ and ECKSTEIN, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 54·
32 BG. (Feb. 22, I934) 6o BGE. II 75 no. 2.
28
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(b) Policy of the forum in favor of marriage. The principle
described above has been limited by special clauses in favor
of the marriage in Sweden and Switzerland. The Swedish
statute provides that a marriage between two foreigners,
formally valid but void because of an intrinsic defect under
the national law of one or both of the parties, should not be
annulled in Sweden, unless it is also void under Swedish law
or unless the King orders the foreign law to be applied. 33
The Swiss statute contains another clause; a marriage celebrated abroad, invalid according to the laws of the place of
celebration, cannot be declared invalid in Switzerland, unless
it is also invalid according to Swiss law. 34 Hence, no marriage
is annulled for formal defects. The Federal Tribunal, in a
recent decision, restricts this provision to Swiss citizens. 35
Both provisions give substance to the otherwise very obscure
rule that traditionally goe.s through the Continental literature
-that, even in the field of conflicts law, public policy of the
forum is more favorable to the marriage after its celebration
than when its celebration is still pending. In general, the
difference between curable and nullifying defects is taken care
of by the private law distinction between directory and mandatory prohibitions of marriage, and there is usually no question
but that this distinction is observed in accordance with the law
governing marriage requirements, without consulting the laws
of the forum.
(c) Policy of the forum against the marriage. The forum
may nevertheless impose its own grounds for impeaching a
marriage. American courts, exercising jurisdiction for annulSweden: Int. Fam. L. of I 904, c. z § I.
Chile: C. Sup. (Sept. z6, I939) Gac. Trib. I939 II I8z, likewise refused
annulment of a German marriage on a ground of German law unknown to
the forum ..
34 NAG. art. 7£ par. 2.
35 BG. (Dec. z, I943) 69 BGE. II 341., 345·
Many other doubts exist.
GAUTSCHI, "Uber die Anerkennung auslandischer Eheschliessungen" 1.7 SJZ.
32I, 31.3 explained that foreign marriages may be simply contested by collateral
attack so long as they have not been recorded in the Swiss register.
33
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ment, are inclined to consider nullity on the ground of bigamy
or incest without regard to the law of the place of celebration
or that of the domicil. 36 Moreover, in particularly shocking
cases, public policy will be affirmed. 37 In Europe, the best
formulation of prohibitive public policy seems to agree with
the result attained in practice in this country and in England
with respect to polygamous marriages. A marriage valid under
the law applicable according to the ordinary rule of conflicts
will be regarded as valid at the forum, provided not only its
celebration but also its existence within the forum does not
offend the local public order. 38 In this field, it may happen that
any law may be applied in order to help a deceived woman. 39
(d) Adjustment of the applicable law. We may recall here
the conflicts arising out of the varied scope of annulment of
marriage in the national laws. While under Soviet Russian
law a marriage may 'be very simply dissolved but cannot be
annulled, some German writers suggest either that a Soviet
marriage may nevertheless be annulled 40 or that it may be
dissolved, 41 on the assumption that the Russian institution of
divorce also covers the ground of the German annulment.
Analogous cases may occur everywhere.
But where divorce is forbidden and annulment allowed on
an abnormal scale, especially by a broad construction of error
36 See STUMBERG 2.66.
37Jn Cunningham v. Cunningham (1912) :z.o6 N.Y. 341,99 N. E. 845, Clunet 1913, 663, an 18-year-old girl married the valet of her parents secretly in
New Jersey; the Court annulled the marriage on the ground of nonage and lack
of parental consent according to the principles of discretion prevailing in New
York irrespective of the unsettled question whether the marriage was valid in
New Jersey.
38 See, for instance, RAAPE 8o2; M. WoLFF, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb.
402,
39Brazil, Sup. Trib. Fed. (April :z.o, 1932) App. Civ. no. 3533, 23
Arch. Jud. 421 applied the New York law to the marriage of a German wife
with a husband, native of Austria and naturalized United States citizen, in view
of the fact that under German law, applicable to a deceived party, her action
was lost by limitation.
40 3 FRANKENSTEIN 196.
41 RAAPE, 2 D. IPR. 177.
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in marrying, neither divorce nor annulment will be granted
to foreigners against their personal law.

III.

REcOGNITION oF FoREIGN ANNULMENTS

In the recognition of foreign annulments, reference may be
made in every respect to the principles governing the recognition of foreign divorce decrees. The Restatement, § 115,
even considers the matter identical with dissolution of marriage
by divorce.
Thus, it has been decided according to this principle in
England that a nullity decree pronounced by the court of the
foreign matrimonial domicil is entitled to universal recognition; while this was first settled only with respect to a marriage celebrated abroad, 42 it has now been declared also in the
case of an English marriage. 43
In France, it has been held that in the event one party is
of French nationality, French law must be applied and a decree
of exequatur is indispensable for recognition. 44
In Italy, jurisdiction of the state courts is not exclusive, 45
but a canonical marriage with civil effect celebrated in Italy
after the effective date of the Concordat cannot be annulled by
any temporal tribunal. 46 A fraudulent, i.e., not serious and
42

Salvesen v. Adm'r of Austrian Property [1927] A. C. (H. L.) 641.
This point, left open by the House of Lords in the Salvesen case, was
decided more definitely than in De Massa v. De Massa [1939] 2 All E. R. 150
(Note, 48 Law Q. Rev. (1932) 13; CHESHIRE 352), in Galene v. Galene [1939]
P. 237, [1939] 2 All E. R. 148 (English marriage, French domicil of the husband, French decree of nullity on the ground of want of the father's consent;
the decree was recognized irrespective of the choice of law).
44 See VALERY 838 no. 594, and 1074 no. '749, and the French diplomatic
note in RG. (March 19, 1936) 150 RGZ. 374·
4ll Cass. (July 22, 1930) Testa v. Rosasco, Giur. Ital. 1930, I, 1041; see Swiss
Federal Tribunal (June 17, 1932) 58 BGE. II 190. On the requisite of domicil for recognizing a Swiss decree of annulment see PERASSI, 25 Rivista (1933)
43

473·

46
App. Milano (June 27, 1933) Giur. Ital. 1933, IV, 222, 25 Rivista (1933)
260; cf. FEDOZZI 456; App. Torino (March r, 1937) Giur. Ital. 1937, I, :z,
212, Clunet 1938, 929; Cass. (June l l , 1934) Foro Ital. 1934, I, 1061; App.
Trieste (Nov. 29, 1934) Clunet 1937, 165. An ecclesiastical tribunal is a
court: RG. (Dec. 16 1 1920) Warn. Rspr. 1921 1 no. 35·
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effective, change of domicil by the parties does not create
international jurisdiction for annulment. 47
Where a foreign annulment based on the incapacity of a
party has applied a law other than the national law of the
party, the court of the national country, following the principle;:
of nationality, will not recognize the decree. 48 But it will, if
the legal provisions are fairly similar. 49
A curious combination of recognition and exclusive jurisdiction is illustrated by an Austrian case of 1937. 50 The marriage of an Austrian-with a Yugoslav woman was annulled by
the competent ecclesiastical court in Yugoslavia. The Austrian
court found that the decree was to be recognized under the
treaty existing between the two countries. But to satisfy
formally the constant axiom that the Austrian courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the status of nationals, the marriage
was again annulled. This recalls certain duplications of divorce,
such as in Michigan. 51

IV.
I.

EFFECTS OF ANNULMENT

Partly Effectual Void Marriage ·

A delicate question concerns the phenomenon that a void
or annulled marriage may nevertheless produce legal conse47

App. Genova (Aug. II, 1936) Monitore 1937, 237, Clunet 1937, 910.
Italy: Cass. (June u, 1937) F_oro ltal. 1937, I, 1371.
49
App. Trieste (Sept. 17, 1936) Monitore 1937, 17, Clunet 1937, 389 (decree of Lima, Peru, annulling the Italian marriage of two Italians on the ground
of impotence according to the Peruvian C. C. (1851) art. 167, art. 107 of the
Italian C. C. being similar "in substance"). While Swiss nullity decrees based
on impotence are also generally recognized, in the case of App. Milano (May
28, 1936) Monitore 1936, 456, Clunet 1937, 164, recognition was refused for
other reasons, among which was the fact that the allegedly incapable woman
had a living child; in this respect an element of re-trial entered under the guise
of public policy. Contra: Cass. civ. (June II, 1937) Giur. Ital. 1937, I, r,
762; and see on the problems involved, PAGANo, Note to Cass. civ. (April 17,
1939) Giur. Ital. 193.9, I, 1, 705; App. Bologna (Jan. r6, 1939) Giur. Ital.
48

1939, I, 2, 309.

w OLG. Graz (March 31, 1937) 55 Zentralblatt (1937) 437 no. 248,
51 See supra pp. 404, 52o, n. 16.
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quences. There are institutions marking a middle ground between valid and invalid marriages; the most widely known
and; indeed, the most benevolent 52 of them is the French
mariage putatif, which has its roots in the canon law and its
ramifications in numerous jurisdictions including Louisiana, 53
Quebec, 54 and Latin America. 55 Yet French writers and courts
disagree hopelessly on the proper conflicts rule.

Illustration: In the case of Stephens v. Falchi, which came
up in Quebec, 56 the parties were domiciled and married in
Montreal and divorced in a French court. The woman then
married in Paris an Italian, Falchi, who was domiciled in
Italy. A marriage settlement was expressly made subject to
Italian law. The Stephen divorce was invalid under the law
of Quebec (and, hence, also in Italy). Therefore, the second
52
French C. C. art. 20I declares that marriage that has been declared null
produces nevertheless civil effects as regards both the spouses and their children
when contracted in good faith. According to art. 202, if only one of the spouses
acted in good faith, the marriage produces its civil effects only in favor of this
spouse and the children born of the marriage. This provision goes so far as to
treat the protected persons as though the marriage were valid. Furthermore,
it includes all possible defects of marriage and even non-existent marriages; see
Cass. (req.) (March 14, 1933) D.I933.1.28, Gaz.Pal.t933·1.966; cf. for an invalid ceremony before an English consul, Cour Paris (Jan. I 6, I 895) Clunet
I895, I057, and for bigamy, Trib. civ. Seine (May II, I933) Gaz. Pal.I933·
2.202; Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 25, I936) Nouv. Revue I937> 85; Cour Paris
(March 30, I938) Nouv. Revue I938, 353· In the case of a marriage of Canadians from Quebec before a Catholic priest in France, see Berthiaume v. Dastous
[I 930] A. C. 79, supra p. 2 r 2; cf. LEE, "Cases on the Conflict of Laws from the
Law Reports of the British Dominions (I9JS-I937)," 2I Journ. Camp. Leg.
(I939) 28. Finally, good faith is presumed; cf. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE,
I Precis 229 No. 478; BINET on Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 5, I9I3) D.I9I4.1.28I. To
contrary effect, e.g., the Belgian Rb. Antwerp (Oct. 28, I939) Rechtsk. Wkbl.
889 no. I46, declares that a non-recorded religious marriage between Polish
Jews in Warsaw is non-existent and does not produce the protection under C. C.
art. 2.01.
53 La. Rev. Civ. C. Ann. (I 9 32) arts. I I 7, II 8 identical with French C. C.
arts. ·2oi, 2.02.
54 C. C. Lower Canada: arts. I 6 3, I 64,
55 See on the law of Chile, with comparative notes, R. M. ECHAVARRiA,
"Apuntes sabre el matrimonio putativo y la bigamia," 34 Revista Der. Jur. y
Ciencias Soc. (I 93 7) part I, 3 7·
56 Stephens v. Falchi (Queb. K. B.) [1937] 3D. L. R. 6os, aff'd by Sqp. Ct.
of Canada [I938] S. C. R .. 354; cf. LEE, :n Journ. Camp. Leg. (I939) 28,
supra n. 52..
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marriage was "annullable." 57 Suppose it was annulled. Should
the provisions of the French, the Italian, or the Quebec statutes
be applied to determine whether the second husband married
in good faith, and whether he could sue for the usufruct arising from the settlement?
Are there no such questions in the common Jaw countries?
In England, in fact, there are none, since an annulment of a
marriage seems to annihilate all its effects. The courts of many
of the states of the United States, however, have the power,
by or without a statute, to grant alimony or compensation in
the decree of annulment and to dispose of the property of the
spouses "as in divorce." 58 It has probably never been doubted
that such powers are to be exercised exclusively in accordance
with the rules of the forum, even when the voidness of the
marriage was based on the fact that the parties had gone
through a formally defective marriage ceremony in Louisiana
or that one of them had been incapable of marrying as a
domiciliary of Louisiana.
In both England and the United States, however, problems
of conflicts law have arisen with respect to the legitimacy of
children born of void marriages. 59
On the effects which a putative marriage exercises on the
personal rights and duties of husband and wife, the following
theories have been advanced by writers and adopted by courts
on the Continent and especially in France:
(a) The personal law should govern, a theory that comprises several propositions:
(i) If both parties are nationals of the forum, the law of
the forum should be applied under all circumstances. 60 The
57
Because the marriage never was annulled, the court awarded the usufruct
flowing from the marriage settlement according to Italian law, upon a
complete, though unconvincing, reasoning under the French law of the place
of celebration. It is not clear why the doctrine of putative marriage is also
mentioned.
58
See 1 VERNIER§ 53•
59
See infra n. 73·
80
Cass. (civ.) (March zs, x889) Clunet x889, 64z and other decisions; see
VALERY 1076 no. 750.
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same should be done, if the personal law of both spouses contains rules approximately similar to the lex fori. 61
(ii) In mixed marriages, the old rule that the law of the
husband governs the personal marital relations has been extended to questions of what effects of marriage survive an
annulment. 62
(iii) According to another opinion, where one party is a
French national, this party should always enjoy the farreaching benefit of the French Civil Code, article 299· 63 In a
generalized and now widely adopted version, a party having
married in good faith enjoys the benefit which may be granted
to him by his national law. 64
(b) Some courts have applied the law of the forum "for
reasons of justice and good morals" 65 or without any justification.66
61 App. Alger (June z8, 1887) Clunet 1889, 616; Trib. civ. Seine (June
x6, I9o6) Clunet I9o7, I42; App. Agen (July 29,'I936) Revue Crit. I937,
721.
62 App. Alger (May z6, I879) D.x88o.2.I6I; App. Orleans (Jan. xo, 1894)
Clunet !894, 536; Cour Paris (Aug. 3, I898) Clunet I898, Io8o; PILLET,
1 Traite 566 no. 2681 NIBOYET 73 7 no. 627; CuNHA GoNc;;ALVES, I Direito
Civil 687. Contra: 2 ARMINJON 460 reproaches the writers that they forget that
the existence of a marriage is precisely in question. But see the text against this
pseudo-logic.
63 VALERY I076 no. 750; AuorNET, Clunet I93o, 322; NIBOYET, Revue
Crit. 19 34, I 34·
64
W.AIHL, Note to Cass. (civ.) (July 30, 19oo) S.1902.1.225; cf. App. Alger
(May z6, 1879) S.1879·2.28I; Trib. civ. Seine (May n, I933) Revue Crit.
1934, I29; Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 25, I936) Revue Crit. I938, 84 (expressly against the lex fori and the lex loci celebrationis and for the personal
law); BARTIN, 2 Principes 2I 2 § 29 I; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 389 no. 33 I;
in Italy, FEDOZZI 455·
65 App. Aix (Feb. I3, I9I2) Clunet I9I3, I229; Trib. civ. Tunis (June 14,
1906) Clunet I907, 439; and a general trend described by BATIFFOL, Revue
1937> 433·
66
Trib. civ. Seine (June 28, 1913) Clunet I916, 170; Trib. civ. Seine (Jan.
xo, 1912) Clunet 1916, 178; Cour Paris (Nov. 12, 1913) Clunet 1916, 178;
Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 22, I937) Revue Crit. I937> 65o (Orthodox Serb and
French woman married in Serbia by Catholic priest; on the lack of motivation
see BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937, 432); Cour Paris (March 30, 1938) Revue
Crit. I939> 119 (Italian wife, later of French nationality).
Belgium: Trib. civ. Antwerp (July 7, 1932) 19 Bull. Inst. Beige (1933)
174 (lack of consent by the English father of the bride).
Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. (April 12, 1933) 28 Arch. Jud. 456 in the case of a
Brazilian woman separated by judicial decree, marrying in New York an Eng-
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(c) A theory allegedly flowing from general principles, and
for this reason preferred by recent German writers, considers
that the law violated by the attempted marriage is the naturally
competent law to determine what legal effects are left to the
apparent conclusion of the marriage. 67
As a matter of fact, the French courts have always found
a ground for applying the French provision in favor of a
French party, unless his or her bad faith was proved or both
parties had fraudulently evaded the French marriage requirements, in which case good faith was considered absent. 68 This
practice involves exaggerated protection of nationals and
is a measurably excessive extension of public policy to an
ordinary rule of private law, as Battifol has pointed out. 69
A suitable theory may perhaps be derived from the opinion
described under (a), (ii), referring to the law of the husband.
We &hould, however, consider on the one hand that the
conflicts rules by no .means have to be identical for personal
relations between husband and wife (maintenance, name of the
wife, alimony), property relations, custody of children, and
succession on death. 70 On the other hand, the protection which
the French, German, Swiss, and other systems in varying degree grant to an innocent pseudo-spouse should be technically
lishman, held that she and her issue were not entitled to any rights of putative
marriage, because she must have known her disability to remarry (this result
could be reached in several ways). An analogous case of a Brazilian woman
was decided to the same effect by Trib. civ. Seine (June 28, I913) Clunet I916,
I70·
67 CHAMPCOMMUNAL, Revue I 91 o, 56; 2 ARMINJON 460; AUDINET, I 1
Recueil I926 I 175 at 2IO and in Clunet I93o, 322; Cass. (civ.) (July 30,
I900) D.I901.I.3I7, S.I902.I.225.
Germany: KIPP-WoLFF, Familienrecht (1928) § 39 A III at 144, and M.
WoLFF, IPR. I22; RAAPE 339, 45I; rejected by the Reichsgericht (Nov. 11,
I937) JW. I938, Io8 infran. 73·
65
Cour Paris (Aug. 3, I898) Clunet 1898, Io8o.
69
: BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937, 432. To the opposite effect,§ 1344 of the
German BGB. is believed of public order by RAAPE 340; WIERUSZOWSKI in 4
Leske-Loewenfeld I 55; M. WoLFF, IPR. I22.
70
•
See 2 ZITELMANN 75 I and 3 FRANKENSTEIN 2 I 7 (not one but several different "statutes"). But for property relations, the latter (3 FRANKENSTEIN
396), like his adversary, RAAPE, 340, applies a separate personal law of the
wife in contradiction to the German Code, EG. art. 15.
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construed as a residuum from the parties' attempted marriage,
some shelter left in the ruins of the house. The benefit to that
party is not so much an effect of the violation of prescriptions,
as suggested in connection with the opinion tinder (c), as it
is an effect of the marriage despite its "nullity." We may observe generally that what in legal terminology is called void
may nevertheless have some effects. Such rudimentary consequences, however, must lie within the framework of the normal
effects which the transaction would have had if it had been
valid. 71
Hence, it is submitted that all relations between the parties
should be determined by the law that would have been applied to the respective kind of relation, had the marriage been
valid. 72 Consequently, in common law countries the personal
relations of the parties should be treated according to the law
of the domicil on the ground of which jurisdiction has been
assumed. Suppose a party to a marriage celebrated in Louisiana
was under age and the marriage therefore void, either because
the party was domiciled at the time in Louisiana or because
of the law of his or her domicil applied by Louisiana according
to its domiciliary principle. The personal relations of the
parties have to be treated without regard to the Louisiana
doctrine of putative marriage, if the marriage is annulled in a
common law state where the parties are now domiciled. This
solution agrees with the result of a lex fori theory but is based
upon the lex domicilii as governing the personal effects of marriage. With respect to movables, the law obtaining at the
domicil when the movables were acquired governs, as it would
if the marriage were valid, in favor of the party acting in good
faith, etcetera.
71
See my construction of "damages from reliance": RABEL, "Der so gen.
Vertrauensschaden im schweizerischen Recht," 27 Z. Schweiz. R., N. F. (1908)
291ff.
'
112 This suggestion seems to agree with some remarks of DIENA, 2 Prine. 156
and UDINA, Elementi I 8o no. qo.
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The status of children born of void marriages must certainly
be treated under the law governing legitimacy 73 (unless a
special rule is devised as in the C6digo Bustamante ),14 and the
share which a pseudo-spouse may be allotted in the distribution
of assets of the other party is governed by the rules on inherirance. 75 Whether an innocent wife may also acquire the nationality of the husband by a putative marriage is a matter of public
law, but in France it seems by prevailing opinion to be included
in the "civil effects" of marriage. 76
2.

Protection of Third Parties

Under a probably general American rule, a man is liable for
necessaries furnished to a wife to whom he is not legally married, if he lived with her and held her out to the world as his
wife. 77 The conflicts rule on necessaries, as stated in section
459 of the Restatement, recognizes an implied authorization
by the husband, either as part of the law of the man's domicil
or under circumstances defined by the law of the state where
the necessaries are furnished. Is this rule applicable also if
73The United States: Restatement § 137 and comment; Moore v. Saxton
(I9I6) 90 Conn. I64, 96 Atl. 96o; Green v. Kelley (I9I7) 228 Mass. 6o2,
II 8 N. E. 235; McNamara v. McNamara ( I922) 303 Ill. I 9I, I 35 N. E. 4Io.
Cf. on the statutory provisions declaring legitimate the issue of prohibited
.
marriages 1 VERNIER § 48; 4 ibid. § 24 7.
England: The rule would be the same if Shaw v. Gould (In re Wilson's
Trusts) (I 865) L. R. I Eq. 247 had not partly disturbed the doctrine; CHESHIRE
387 asks for overruling and FosTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of
Conflict of Laws," I 6 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I 9 35) 84, 89 for a reform law.
Germany: RG. (Nov. II, I937) JW. I938, Io8 (against RAAPE 45I); KG.
(July 9, I937) JW. I937, 2526, Clunet 1938, J4I; also KG. (Dec. 9, I92I)
42 ROLG. 97i KG. (Feb. 27, 193I) IPRspr. I9JI, no. 83: they apply the law
governing filiation, i.e., EG. arts. I 8 and I 9·
14 C6digo Bustamante art. 49 as compared with art. 57.
75 See supra p. 376.
16 A contrary decision of Trib. civ. Boulogne (Dec. 20, I935) Clunet I936,
375 was reversed by App. Douai (April I, I936) D.1936.2.7o, with note by
RoUAST; Revue Crit. I937, 75, with note by CALEB at 78; see also VALERY 237
no. zoo; NIBOYET I94 no. I47; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE I24 no. 104.
77
Frank v. Carter (I9I6) 2.I9 N.Y. 35, I13 N. E. 549; Jordan Marsh Co.
v. Hedtler (I921) 238 Mass. 43, 130 N. E. 78.
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the man is not a husband legally? No reason seems to exist
why the answer should not be in the affirmative.
A related question was prompted by the provision of the
German Civil Code protecting a third person who has entered
into a transaction with, or obtained a judgment against, a
spouse of a void marriage. The nullity cannot be set up to
defeat his rights, if it was not pronounced in a judgment and
was unknown to him (BGB. § 1344, German Marriage Law of
1938, § 32). It has been suggested in Germany that this
domestic provision be extended by analogy to international
situations, i.e., where German spouses have celebrated an invalid marriage abroad and live in the forum, or foreign
spouses whose marriage is void under their national law are
domiciled in the forum. 78 Third parties should be protected
against the effects of a nullity not stated in a judgment and
unknown to them.
78

M.

WoLFF,
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PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

Subject Matter

TER dealing with marriage and divorce rules, American case books on conflict law and the Restatement
finish the chapter on family or status law with the
four topics of legitimacy, adoption, custodianship of parents,
and guardianship. We shall see, as we have seen in considering the subject of marriage relations, that the relationships
created by legitimate birth, legitimation, and adoption have
a broader scope in the civil than in the common law. For instance, under the civil law, support is an important incident
of legitimate as well as of illegitimate relationship and is governed in principle by the personal law, while in the Restatement it is treated separately and left to the law of the forum.
To do justice to all legislations, we have to divide the matter
into smaller topics, viz., in the first place, (i) legitimate birth,
(ii) legitimation, (iii) rights and duties of legitimate parents,
(iv) adoption, and ( v) illegitimacy. On the other hand, custodianship, which in the common law is the inclusive and essentially homogeneous repository of all rules concerning infants, must, for the purposes of our survey, be subdivided into
two different parts. Family law principles are embodied in
1 Among the special articles on the subject reference will be made more
particularly to RAAPE, "Rapports juridiques entre parents et enfants," so Recueil
1934 IV 405, and to TAINTOR, "Legitimation, Legitimacy, and Recognition in
the Conflict of Laws," 18 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) 589, 691.
For a comparative survey of the municipal laws, see VEITH, Kindschaftsrecht,
4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 770; for materials, vols. 1 and z of BERGMANN'S
work..
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the rules that determine the rights and duties of parents as
such, while the constitution of other guardians and the management and supervision of the estate of a child or any other
ward may be better treated in connection with the administration of other estates. Our discussion, therefore, will be limited
to the matters more closely allied with the special consideration of family law.
The existing written conflict rules differ, as in other respects,
also with respect to their subject matter. While, for instance,
the recent Italian code contains one provision on the relationship between parent and child, 2 the German Introductory
Law 3 has different provisions relating to' (I) legitimacy as
the origin of legitimate relationships, ( 2) the relationship between parents and a legitimate child, (3) the relationship
between an illegitimate child and his mother, (4) the duties of
support of the illegitimate father, ( 5) legitimation and adoption, and ( 6) custodianship of all kinds. And, whereas Germany treats legitimation and adoption together, 4 Poland joins
legitimation and recognition/ Switzerland legitimation,
recognition, and adoption, 6 and the C6digo Bustamante/ as
well as the recent Greek code, 8 have one rule on legitimation
alone.
Institutions Involving an Act of a Party

2.

(a) In some statutes of this country, the term, adoption,
is given to the institution otherwise known as legitimation by
voluntary declaration. Moreover, legitimation in the proper
sense is often confused with the qualified recognition by a
parent through which an illegitimate child obtains an ameli2 C. C. (1942.) Disp. Prel. art.

2.0 par. 1.
EG. arts. r8-zJ.
EG; art. 2.2..
5 Law of 192.6 on international private law, art. u; cf, China: Law of 1918,
.art. 13; Japan: Law of 1898, art. 18.
6 NAG. art. 8.
7 Arts. 6o-62..
8 C. C. (1940) art. 22..
3
4
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orated position, although remaining illegitimate. Also, in some
other countries, the terminology oscillates. In fact, there are
in this field many institutions of mixed character existing in
the world. For the purpose of the law of conflicts, however,
it is of primary importance to distinguish the following groups
of institutions:
(i) Acts through which an illegitimate child receives the
full status of legitimacy (legitimation in the ordinary sense).
(ii) Acknowledgment of paternity or maternity whereby
(as by certain other circumstances) an illegitimate child may
receive an improved position without r~aching the full position
of a legitimate child. This group includes very different degrees of position. The child may be assimilated to a legitimate
child in most respects, or it may, on the contrary, be granted
only particular prerogatives, as under those numerous statutes of the United States which confer nothing but rights of
inheritance upon a recognized child. 9
(iii) Recognition as a condition for any effect of illegitimate
filiation as required in the French and in the other legislations
following the French system.
(iv) Institutions of a still more restricted nature such a::;
the faculty of the husband to give his name to an illegitimate
child of his wife under Austrian and German laws. 10
(b) The broad distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children is considered fundamental, legally as well as
socially, except in a few countries. It would seem natural,
therefore, that the same conflicts rules should govern legitimacy by birth, legitimation, and adoption, insofar as by these
institutions the full degree of legitimacy is reached. On the
other hand, we can understand that conflict rules with respect
to illegitimacy are different from those governing legitimacy
9 See, for instance, Pfeifer v. Wright (I 930) 4I F. (2d) 464; cf. Note, 29
Mich. L. Rev. (I93o) 258.
10 Austria: Allg. BGB. § I65 par. 2; Germany: BGB. § I7o6 par. 2; see
infra p. 612, n. I I.
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by birth. However, existing rules do not altogether agree with
these simple distinctions.
(c) Recognition of foreign institutions has been strongly
influenced by some aprioristic doctrines:
(j) The influential English doctrine that a status unknown
to the forum cannot be recognized has considerably impeded
the progress of reciprocal recognition of institutions regarding
parent and child. As stated in our general discussion in Chapter 5, the hope is justified that this doctrine may be considered overruled. 11
(ii) American courts are inclined to recognize foreign acts
but to give them the same effect as ascribed to the most nearly
related domestic institutions. This doctrine is preferable to
the English rule just mentioned, but it too is unsatisfactory.
By such an approach, e.g., a child, illegitimate abroad, has
been treated as legitimate at the forum for purposes of inheritance.
(iii) The idea mentioned under ( ii), inexact in application
to illegitimacy, is perfectly right with respect to legitimacy.
In the various countries, the status of legitimate children,
though qualified by different minor features, is regulated in
an essentially similar manner so far as the personal relations
between parent and child are concerned. Hence, recognition of
a foreign created legitimacy means that a child born or legitimated or adopted in one country will be treated as legitimate
in another, with the incidents determined by the law of the
forum. This means also that, if the domicil or the nationality
determinative of personal status is changed, the rights of legitimate parents and children are transformed accordingly. This
mutability of parental relations is a phenomenon that has only
begun to attract some attention. 12
11
Supra pp. 175-178.
12 RAAPE 464 III 1. Application to English law has been attempted by MANN,
"Legitimation and Adoption in Private International Law," 57 Law Q. Rev.
(1941) uz, 126.
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3· Liberal Trends
Recently, some well-meaning courts and writers have tried
to counteract the narrowness of traditional doctrines. Thus, it
has been postulated that the personal law of the child should
govern rather than that of the parent, 13 or that public policy
should override any conflicts rule referring to a foreign law
less favorable to legitimacy than the domestic law. 14 But the
advantage of the child can only be secured by a conflicts rule
that directly refers to that law most favorable to the child in
each particular case. Conflicts rules formulated in this manner 15 have proved to be of difficult application in German
law. 16 Moreover, consideration of family policy should be
left to substantive legislation, except in a very restricted domain of public policy, where courts consider foreign bastardy
statutes as plainly backward and a disgrace to the law.

II.

LEGITIMATE BIRTH

A.

I.

RULES

Personal Law of the Parent

Common law and civil law agree in submitting the question
of birth in lawful wedlock to the personal law of the parent.
The tests are domicil or nationality respectively. American
law, however, disagrees with all others by the distinctly proclaimed principle of determining the child's legitimate relationship to each parent separately. 17 In fact such an equal
position of men and women, although apt to create complicated situations with respect to the child, may be considered
fair to all parties. In other countries, however, the law of the
male parent is applied to determine the legitimate relation13 See infra p. 56 I.
14
TAINTOR, IS Can. Bar Rev. (I940) at 7oo, 7oi, supra n. I; cf. ibid. 7I5.
15 Poland: Law of I926 on international private law, art. 2I par. 2.
16
See RAAPE 2 I df., 359ff. on EG. arts. 12, I 6, par. 2.
17
Restatement § I 3 7, cj. ibid. § 13 8.
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ship also between mother and child in order to maintain the
unity of the family and particularly in view of the consequences
for the nationality of the issue.
The head of the family whose law governs legitimacy is,
in the German law, correctly characterized as ''the husband
of the mother." To say that legitimacy is predicated on the
personal law of the ''child's father" is a tautology that has
caused confusion to English writers. 18
Hence, under American law, if the parents are domiciled in
different states at the time of the birth of the child, the law of
each party's domicil decides his relationship to the child.
Where, for instance, the marriage of the parents is recognized
as valid in Iowa and considered invalid in New Y ark, the
child is legitimate as to the mother, domiciled in the first
state, and illegitimate as to the father, domiciled in the second
state. Under English law, the child would be illegitimate with
regard to both parents.
Contacts: domicil or nationality. The domicil of the father
or mother is the test in the United States. The domicil of the
father, as head of the family, is the test in England and the
other countries generally following the domiciliary principle.19
Nationality of the mother's husband is decisive almost
everywhere in the rest of the world. 20 The personal law has
18 CHESHIRE 380; caught in that tautology which he believes to be a "theory,"
feels compelled to state that "practicability must not be sacrificed to theory."
19 England: CHESHIRE 376.
Argentina: 2. Vtco no. I 40.
Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 220 no. 52.
Nicaragua: C. C. Tit. Prel. art. VI (9).
The Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law starts pronouncing in
art. I 6, unchanged by the text of I 940, art. 2o, that "the law that governs the
celebration of the marriage determines legitimate birth and the legitimation by
subsequent marriage." However, the next section (art. 17, text of I 940: art. 2 I)
submits "the questions of legitimacy other than those concerning the validity or
nullity of the marriage" to the domiciliary law. This means probably that art.
1 6 is corrected by art. I 7; the special rule on marriage, as in the other countries,
governs only the question whether the marriage, or subsequent marriage, is valid.
- This seems to be the opinion also of 2. VI co, no. I 74· But why has art. I 6 not
been cancelled at least in 1 940?
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to govern because the stability of the family, the honor of the
married woman, and her marital rights stand upon this matter.21 An exorbitant exception in favor of the lex fori is made
by a National Socialist law of 19 3 8 that extends the application of the German laws to the contestation of legitimacy
in the case where only the mother is of German nationality at
a certain date. 22
Renvoi is applied according to general rules. 23
2.

Personal Law of the Child

The personal law of the child has been advocated by a few
writers/ 4 although sparsely applied in actuallaws. 25 According to this opinion, it would be material in this country whether
the child's domicil at birth is with the father or the mother. 26
In a country 'following the principle of nationality, the child's
20
Austria, prevailing opinion, WALKER 782 n. 11 (the Austrian law of parent
and child seems to have stayed in force).
Belgium: POULLET 506 no. 387.
Belgian Congo: C. C. (1895) book 1, art. 12.
Finland: Law of 1929, § 18.
France: prevailing opinion.
Germany: EG. art. 18.
Greece: C. C. (1940) art. I7 par. 1.
Italy: C. C. (1942) Disp. Prel. art. 20 par. I.
Switzerland: NAG. arts. 8 and 32. (for Swiss domiciliaries).
China: Law of 1918, art. 12.
Japan: Law of 1898, art. 17;
Poland: Law of 192.6 on international private law, art. I8.
21
LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 4IO no. 346.
22
Cf. EG. art. I 8 par. z, added by art. 2. § 8 of the Law of April I z, I 9 3 8,
to modify and complete family law provisions and on the condition of apatrides
(RGBl. I, 38o).
23
Germany: RAAPE 487 whose illustration however is questionable; M.
WoLFF, IPR. 135 no. 6.
24
France: WEISS, 4 Traite 27; AUDINET no. 62.5; see contm: SURVILLE 447
no. 305; DUGUIT, Clunet, I885, 353, 359; CHAMPCOMMUNAL, Revue 1910,
. 57> 6I,
.
.
Belgium: see RoLIN, 2 Principes 137 no. 613; PouLLET so6, no. 387;
Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ. 618 no. 581.
25 C6digo Bustamante art. 57· Art. 8 sentence 2 of the French law of July
24, 1921 concerning the conflicts law of Alsace-Lorraine, refers to the law of
the child the "proof of filiation," whatever that means. Two decisions of the
court of Bucharest to this effect, conflicting with others, are cited by PLASTARA,
7 Repert. 68 no. 198.
26
TAINTOR, I 8 Can. Bar Rev. (I940) at 597, supra n. I; cf. ibid. 6o2.
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national law ~annat be found without knowing whether it is
legitimate; thus nationality would depend upon legitimacy,
and this again upon nationality. Such a vicious circle, it is true,
may be avoided by legislation on nationality whereby the
child acquires a nationality of its own on the ground of jus
soli or a temporary nationality which may suffice for provisional legal situations. It must be conceded, furthermore,
that the traditional system based on nationality is weakened
to the extent that separate nationality of wife and child has
been recognized. But the idea of applying the child's law instead of that of the parent seems to come simply from the
desire to employ in the forum of the child once more the law
of the forum. 27 It is still the dominant opinion that the child's
domicil or nationality is perfectly immaterial, 28 the reason
still proclaimed being that the existence and unity of the
family is at stake. 29
Indeed, if the state of the child's domicil is said to have a
concurrent interest in its status, 30 this interest is negligible
compared with the interest of the fa~ily. Moreover, the interests of the child are not, and certainly should not be, more
protected by the court of his domicil than by any other. And
the law of his domicil may as well be unfavorable to the child
as favorable.
3· Time Governing Ascertainment of Applicable Law
The decisive and natural time for determining the applicable law is considered to be the moment when the child is
born. In the German and other enactments, it is added that, if
the child is born after the death of the mother's husband, the
personal law of the husband at the time of his death gov.27

See e.g., LEREBOURS-PIGEONNLERE 4I5 no. 349 (B).
unanimous opinion, see RAAPE 447; Bay. ObLG. (March zz,
I9z4) 23 Bay. ObLGZ. 56.
Switzerland: BG. (June 29, I928) 54 BGE. I 230.
29 DrENA, 2 Prine. I 79; RAAPE 447·
80 TAINTOR, 18 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) at 6o3, supra n. I.
28 Germany:
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erns; 31 in a generalized version, the same rule applies in the
case of any dissolution of the marriage occurring before birth. 32
It follows that the law determining whether a child is
legitimate is immutable; no change of status of parent or child
after this date alters the result. This is in sharp contrast to the
fact that a voluntary change of status elected by the husband
before the child's birth may influence its legitimacy.
Precisely in view of this liberty of the father, occasionally
the decisive time has been assumed to be that of the conception
rather than that of the birth, 33 a solution generally held impractical, because birth can be ascertained much more easily
than conception. 34 But an American author 35 has recently
suggested that "the rule should be stated in terms of the
creation of legitimacy by the law of the domicile of the parents
either at conception or birth of the child." He thinks that the
writers and the courts have been wrong in regarding only
the time of birth or have overlooked the possibility of the
parents' change of domicil between conception and birth of
the child. Yet, no mistake has occurred in the formation of
the rules. The purpose of conflicts law is not the same as that
of substantive private laws. These may consider a child born
during the time of wedlock as legitimate (as common law
does) or declare a child en vmtre sa mere as already born
inasmuch as this fiction is advantageous to the child (as Roman
law does). Conflicts law refers to one legislation and leaves
it to this legislation whether to go back from birth to con3! Germany: EG. art. I 8.
Poland: Law of I 9::6 on international private law, art. 18 par. z.
China: Law of I9I8, art. u, znd sentence.
Japan: Law of I 898, art. I 7, znd sentence.
32 Greece: C. C. (I940) art. I7 par. z, in agreement with the German interpretation of EG. art. 18; cf. RAAPE 449·
33 Denmark: App. Copenhagen (July 17, I9I6) 2 Z.ausl.PR. (19::8) 866
no. 7· SURVILLE 447 no. 305 advocates a fiction of earlier birth where it would
be more favorable to the child; RAAPE 448 would like an exception to the rule
in the case of a fraudulent change of nationality.
34 SCHNITZER 203, concerning Swiss law.
35 TAINTOR, I8 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) at 597, supra n. I.
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ception. The suggested terms would essentially modify the
rule; this seems inadvisable, if for no other reason than because of the wide uniformity already reached. Moreover, the
law of the time of birth has been adopted in the different legislations, because this is a fact that can be ascertained without
any fiction.
4· Soviet Russia
The law of Soviet Russia knows only one category of parentchild relations: it does not admit any difference between
legitimate and illegitimate children. 36 How, therefore, ought
we to classify in a Western court children whose parents were
domiciled in or nationals of, Soviet Russia? Are they to be
regarded without distinction as legitimate or illegitimate? 37
The second answer is absurd, and, since the Russian law intends to abolish the category of illegitimate children, the
solution must be the same as in the case of the statutes of
Arizona and North Dakota which declare all children the
legitimate offspring of their natural parents. 38 In the latter
case, indeed, there is no doubt regaraing the effects in a foreign
court.
36

Soviet Russian Code of family law of I9z6, art. z5.
The question has been discussed with reference to legitimation by the writers
cited infra p. 57 8, ns. I I3, I I4·
38
Arizona: Ariz. Code Ann. ( I939) § z7-40I; North Dakota: Comp.
Laws Ann. (Supp. 19z5) § ro5oobi (Laws I9I7, Ch. 70 §I). See comment to
the first in Fladung v. Sanford (I938) SI Ariz. zii, 75 P. (zd) 685; Hazelett
v. State (I94o) 55 Ariz. I4I, 99 P. (zd) IOI. The authors of the official
Supplement to the I9I3 Comp. Laws of North Dakota, I9IJ-I9Z5, vol. III
p. I496, assert that Chapter 5B consisting of Laws I9I7, Ch. 70 "was evidently
intended to be repealed" by the Uniform Illegitimacy Act, consisting of Laws
I9Z3, ch. 165 (§:§ Io5ooai-I05ooa37 of the Compiled Laws I925). This
change would be exactly inverse to the Arizona legislation having adopted first
the Uniform Illegitimacy Act and then replaced it by the acknowledgment of
all illegitimate children. This mystery should be removed by the legislature of
North Dakota.
37
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I.

SCOPE OF THE RULES

Validity of Marriage as Condition

The first condition for legitimacy by birth is normally a
valid marriage between the mother and the man alleged to
be the father. Validity of the marriage, therefore, is a "preliminary question" in examining legitimacy according to the
law governing lawful birth. But this law does not extend
to the validity of the marriage. It is universally agreed that
the law governing the formal and the intrinsic validity of marriage according to the rules discussed above in Chapters 7
and 8 are applicable also to this question. Even the writers
who regularly assign preliminary questions to the law governing the principal question agree that marriage is always,
without exception, tested according to its own particular rule
of conflicts. 39
A remarkable consequence occurs where a foreign marriage
is regarded as valid under the main conflicts rule of the forum.
Children born of such a marriage are considered legitimate,
even if the personal law of the parents at the time of the birth
considers the marriage invalid. 4 ° For illustration, if two
Greeks, being of Orthodox faith and domiciled in Greece at
the birth of a child, had gone through a temporal marriage
ceremony in Paris, the marriage, though considered invalid in
Greece, is recognized as valid in most countries; in the latter
countries, the children must, therefore, be considered legitimate, provided that they would be so under Greek family law
if the marriage had been celebrated by a Greek Orthodox
priest.
There are complications also on the opposite side of the
pro~lem. The forum may regard a marriage as invalid either
39 MELCHIOR 2.59 § 173; WENGLER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 148, 2.06 {with
different explanations).
40 WENGLER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) i48, 2.14.
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in accordance with the law governing marriage, for instance
because formalities are lacking, 41 or despite this law for reasons of public policy respecting polygamy, incest, or adultery.
We might well question the wisdom of holding a Chinese marriage of Chinese domiciled persons invalid for local purposes
as being polygamous; but if we do so, the marriage cannot be
regarded as valid for the purpose of personal relations. Even
if the law governing legitimacy (for instance the law of the
parent's domicil at the time of the birth) recognizes such a
marriage, the special conflict rules on marriage prevail.
The situation is different, of course, where the law governing the problem of legitimacy accords legitimacy without a
valid marriage. 42 This situation will be considered later.u
2.

Presumptions of Legitimacy

The well-known .presumptions for establishing birth in
lawful wedlock, which form the main body of the municipal
regulations of legitimacy, are not mere rules of evidence; they
are substantive law. 44 This may safely be alleged with respect
to any present legislation and seems to be acknowledged almost everywhere. Hence, the law applicable to legitimacy
governs the questions at what time, and under what circumstances, the presumption of legitimate birth arises, on what
ground the presumption may be rebutted, 411 within what
41 A religious ceremony without civil marriage is non-existent in Germany,
under EG. art. 13 par. 3· Is the father's national law recognizing the marriage
applicable to the parental relations? No: OLG. Miinchen (March xo, 192.1) 42
ROLG. 98; Yes: KG. (July 9, 1937) HRR. 1937 no. 1446.
42 For this reason only, the criticism by 1 FRANKENSTEIN :136 on the decision of
OLG. Miinchen (precedent note) is justified.
43
See infra pp. s681f.
44 France: WEISS, 4 Traite 25; LEREBOURs-PIGEONNIERE 412 no. 348;
BATIFFOL, 8 Repert. 412 no. 52.
Germany: RAAPE 460; 4 FRANKENSTEIN 22.
Quebec: Lefebvre v. Digman (x 894) 3 Rev. de J ur. 194 and others; see
I }OHNSON 339•
45
E.g. OLG. Miinchen (May 15 1 1933) 29 Z.Rechtspflege Bayern (1933)
278; 5 Giur. Comp. DIP. 135 no. 48 (the Austrian law of father allows proof
of the impossibility of cohabitation, even though he was at the same place as
the mother) •
.
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period, by whom, 46 and against whom, legitimacy may be
contested or action for a declaratory statement denying legitimacy may be brought; what events terminate the right to
disown the child, whether alleged recognition of paternity
may be revoked, under what conditions and in what time, 47
and similar problems. In particular, European courts apply
the provision of a foreign personal law to determine the time
within which an action for contesting paternity must be
brought; for instance, an Austrian 48 or a Swiss 49 husband is
given a period of three months for this action.
.
3· Public Policy
Public policy is not interested in regard to the problems
just mentioned.
However, as usual, French courts reserve many provisions
of their code for imperative application, irrespective of the
nationality of the parties. This is done, for instance, with
that French rule, which exists also in Louisiana, 50 that a husband is not allowed to disown a child by alleging and proving
his own impotence; such a source of scandal must be closed,
the French courts think. 51
46
E.g., Swiss BG. (June zo, I9z3) 49 BGE. II 3I7 (children born in Switzerland during the formal existence of their mother's marriage with a German
are not entitled to contest their legitimacy, according to the German law of the
time).
47
One year in Germany (BGB. § I594 par. I); six months in Sweden {law
concerning legitimate birth of June I 4, I 9 I 7, § z) ; one or two months in
Louisiana (Rev. Civ. C. Ann. (I93z) art. I9I); one month in Turkey (C. C.
of Feb. I7, I9z6, art. z.p); etc.
48
Austria: Allg. BGB. §I 58; RG. (Jan. u, I939) HRR. I939, no. 376 (4);
OLG. Naumburg (Dec. 3, I936) HRR. I937• no. II46.
49
Swiss C. C, art. z53; LG. Mainz (June 6, I9z6) 4I Z.int.R. (I9Z9) 4I5,
IPRspr. I9z9, no. So. See also KG. (Feb. z8, I93I) JW. I9JZ, zz96, IPRspr.
I93z, no. 89 (father a national of the former Kingdom of Poland). Trib. civ.
Bruxelles (April z8, I9IO) Pasicrisie I9IO. III. I95· Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Feb.
6, I9I4) Clunet I9I4, 993 (Bavarian, became father in I893). Contra: OLG.
Frankfurt (Dec. 3-I7, I9Z5) JW. I9z6, z858, IPRspr. I9z6-I9z7, no. 77·
50 La: Rev. Civ. Code Ann (I93z) art. 185.
61
Even in France: WEiss, 4 Traite z3; PoULLET 504 no. 386. Many French
decisions deal with the .form necessary for foreign documents of birth, see J.
DONNEDIEU DE VABllES 385.
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C. CHILDREN OF INVALID MARRIAGES

(a) United States: general rule. Many statutes in the
United States legitimize the issue of certain or of all prohibited marriages. 52 Marriage, in this case, is not a condition
precedent to legitimacy. The comments on these statutory
provisions have made it perfectly clear that legitimacy is not
an incident of marriage, but an independent subject. Hence,
the law of the domicil of the parents, whose relationship to
the child is in question at the time of birth, determines legitimacy or illegitimacy. 53 It is the same conflicts rule as though
the marriage were valid.
Sometimes this conflicts solution has been explained as due
to the policy of favoring the innocent issue, 54 which naturally
forms the reason of the statutory provisions. This is an erroneous transplantation of social purposes from the substantive
law into international private law. The law of the domicil
of the parents applicable under our rule may be decidedly
more favorable to the child than the law governing the marnage.
(b) England. The rule is the same in England with the
exception that the House of Lords' decision in Shaw v.
Gould 55 has disturbed the problem in the case where a child
is born to a marriage not recognized in England, because a
previous divorce of one parent is not recognized there. In the
See 1 VERNIER § 48, 4 VERNIER § 247•
Restatement § 13 7 and comment. Moore v. Saxton (I 9 I 6) 90 Conn. I 64,
96 Atl. 96o (bigamous marriage, birth in California); Green v. Kelley (I9I7)
228 Mass. 6oz, liS N. E. 235 (bigamy); Harding v. Townsend (I932) z8o
Mass. 256, I8z N. E. 369 (bigamy); apart from the special rules of New York
(discussed below on p. 569) exceptions for public policy are rare; see Greenhow
et al. v. James, Executor (I 8 8 5) 8o Va. 6 3 6, 5 6 Am. Rep. 6 o 3 ( miscegenous
marriage).
As to polygamy see TAINTOR, I8 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) at 594, 7II supra
n. x.
54
Cf. cases cited by TAINTOR, r 8 Can. Bar Rev. (I 940) at 595, 697, supra
52
53

n.

I.
55 In

re Wilson's Trusts, Shaw v. Gould [I86s] L. R. I Eq. 247, aff'd I868
L. R. 3 H. L. 55·
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case mentioned, the child was declared illegitimate, although
the father was domiciled in Scotland at the time of the birth
and Scotch law had no objection to legitimacy. This decision
has been sharply disapproved by recent English writers. In
their opinion, the court should have recognized the legitimacy
of the children under Scotch law, while appropriately refusing to recognize the validity of the marriage. Cheshire 56
suggests that the case should be overruled, while Foster 57
thinks a statutory enactment is necessary. Against this criticism, American writers have emphasized the interest of the
English law in the matter because of the English domicil of
the mother. 58 But under English as well as generally under
Continental conflicts rules, the child's relations to both parents
are governed by the personal law of the father alone, that of
the mother being entirely immaterial.
Also, New York courts have declined to recognize legitimacy under similar circumstances, viz., when, according to the
New York "special rule," a foreign divorce and, in consequence
thereof, a remarriage was invalid and the child was born during the second marriage. 59 This evidently must be taken as a
part of the general policy of New York courts against marriages that are "polygamous, incestuous, or prohibited by
law," 60 the New York courts resolving for ·themselves what
marriages are to be so qualified. In the leading case, Olmsted
v. Olmsted, the Supreme Court of the United States decided
that by such an attitude the Full Faith and Credit Clause was
56

CHESHIRE 387.
FosTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," 16 Brit.
Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84, 89.
58 z BEALE 706; TAINTOR, 18 Can. Bar Rev. ( 1940) at 6oo, supra n. 1.
59
Olmsted v. Olmsted (1908) 190 N.Y. 458, 467, 83 N. E. 569, 571, aff'd
zr6 U.S. 386, see infra n. 61 (bigamous subsequent marriage with following
divorce from first wife); In re Thomann's Estate (193z) 144 N.Y. Misc. 497,
z58 N.Y. Supp. 838 (divorce not recognized in New York for lack of personal
service, remarriage in Russia).
60
See In re Bruington's Estate (1936) r6o N.Y. Misc. 34 at 37, z89 N.Y.
Supp. 7Z5 at 7z9 (children of bigamous marriage).
57
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not violated, 61 but it remains uncertain whether the independence of state doctrines would likewise be maintained in cases
other than those where inheritance of real estate or a remainder under a will is at issue and only immovables in the
state are involved. 62 However this may be, the peculiar policy
of the courts of New York has been severely and convincingly
criticized, in particular with respect to a repetition of the doctrine in the Bruington case of 1936 63 after the legislature of
New York had begun to follow the trend of courts and statutes
benevolent to children. 64
(c) Germany. The prevailing American rule has its exact
counterpart in the German practice. 65 The national law of the
pseudo-husband is applied in determining legitimacy, whether
this law acknowledges legitimacy irrespective of the good
faith of the parties 06 or conditionally upon the good faith of
one party (putative marriage). 67 The Reichsgericht has expressly rejected the theory that the law governing the nullity of the marriage should determine also whether or not the
children are to be considered legitimate. 68
(d) 0 ther countries. The policy practiced in other countries
probably runs along similar lines. French writers, it is true,
advocate again the exclusion of children born in adultery,
from any recognized legitimacy/ 9 but even this restriction is
not certain. 70
(1910) 216 u.s. 386.
See TAINTOR, 18 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) at 691 1 692, supra n. 1.
63 Supra n. 6o.
MNote, 46 Yale L. J. (1937) 10491 1054; TAINTOR, 18 Can. Bar Rev.
(1940) at 7101 supra n. 1.
65 RG. (Nov. u, 1937) JW. 1938, 1o8; KG. (Dec. 9, 1921) 42 ROLG. 97;
KG. (Feb. 27, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, no. 83; KG. (July 91 1937) JW. 19371
2526, Clunet 1938, 341.
66 E.g., Swiss C. C. art. 133.
67 E.g., French C. C. arts. 201 202; Ital. C. C. (1865) art. u6; C. C.
1
(1942) art. 128; German BGB. § 1699.
66
RG. (Nov. ll, 1937) JW. 1938, 108 rejecting RAAPE 499·
69 See especially LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 41 I no. 347·
7°Compare the practice whereby the spouse in good faith and his or her
children of the bigamous marriage enjoy the benefit of putative marriage. See
61
62
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LEGITIMATION BY SuBsEQUENT MARRIAGE

An old institution of civil law but unknown to the British
common law and expressly rejected by the Statute of Merton,
legitimation by the marriage of the child's natural parents,
has been introduced by statute in all but three jurisdictions
in this country, 71 in all of the common law provinces of Canada
during 1920 to 1928,72 and in England by the Legitimacy
Act, I 926. 73
An important difference exists on the question whether in
addition to the marriage some recognition of the child is required. This requirement, in contrast to the German tradition,
exists in the Latin systems and in almost half of the American
statutes, a fact regretted by Vernier 74 as inconsistent with the
purpose to improve the status of children born out of wedlock.
It ensues from this system that a child may be considered
legitimate only in relation to one parent. Moreover, the
French system take's into account which parent is first to
recognize the child.
A.

I.

RULES

Decisive Time

English courts, starting from ·the thesis that legitimacy is·
determined by the law of the child's domicil of origin, viz.,
his father's domicil at the time of his birth, regarded it essential that this law recognize the possibility of legitimation
by a later marriage. 75 This artificial theory, already rejected
supra pp. 545-550 and particularly Cour Paris (March 30, 1938) Nouv. Revue
1938, 353·
71 4 VERNIER § 243·
72 1 JoHNSON 344 n. 1; for Ontario see Ontario Legitimation Act, 1921, 11
Geo. V, c. 53, as amended 1927, Rev. Stat. Ontario, c. 187 s. x, same in Rev.
Stat. Ontario 1937, c. 216.
13 16 & 17 Geo. V, c. 6o.
14
4 VERNIER § 243·
75
In re Wright's Trusts (1856) 2 K. & ]. 595, 6o4; In re Goodman's Trusts
(188J) 17 Ch. D.' 266; In re Andros (1883) 24 Ch. D. 637; In re Grove,
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by Savigny, 76 has been eradicated in England by the Legitimacy Act of I 926 77 but has nevertheless been adopted as a
common law rule by Beale 78 and the Restatement. 79 The
ancient basis for this rule, namely, that birth may give the child
a certain faculty to be legitimized, 80 appears in the older English doctrine and also in Beale's theory in the form of a supposed logical necessity that the child must have a "potential
legitimacy" by the law of the father's domicil. Probably no
American decision of actual importance reflects this preconceived idea. 81 However, under the circumstances, Scott, L. J.,
in In re Luck (I 940 ), 82 was justified in thinking the theory to
be connected with the American law, although eliminated
from the English. He stated:
"The very idea of attributing to a newly-born child, to a
filius- nullius, a sort of latent capacity for legitimation at the
hands of the natural father to whom he is denied any legal
relation, seems to me an even more absurd legal fiction and
even less convincing than that mythical contract of marriage
supposed by the canonists to have been entered into at the
moment of procreation."
In England, 83 as well as in the United States, 84 it has become perfectly certain that, in the case of a subsequent marVaucher v. Treasury Solicitor (I888) 40 Ch. D. 2I6. For history and criticism
see MANN, "Legitimation and Adoption in Private International Law," 57
Law Q. Rev. (I94I) IIZ, ll5-I2Z.
76 SAVIGNY 338 § 380, tr. by GUTHRIE 302.
77 Legitimacy Act, I 9 2 6 § I (I) for English and § 8 (I) for foreign
domiciliaries.
78
2 BEALE 706-709 § § 139.1 and 139.2.
79 Restatement § I3 7.
8
Cf. SCHAEFFNER, Entwickelung des Internationalen Privatrechts (Frankfurt, 184I) 49 § 37, tr. in GUTHRIE'S translation of SAVIGNY 308.
81 See cases in 73 A. L. R. 94I, 952ff. and cf. MINOR 2I6ff.; Notes, 20 Harv.
L. Rev. (1907) 400; 46 Yale L. J. (1937) 1051 n. 15; also STUMBERG 305
n. 30, although he surprisingly acknowledges the "logic of the English point
of view"; TAINTOR, I8 Can. Bar Rev. (I940) at 6I9, 62o, 628, supra n. 1.
82
/n re Luck's Settlement Trusts [1940] Ch. D. 864, 9I2.
83
/n re Askew [1930] 2 Ch. D. 259.
84 Stack v. Stack (I887) 6 Dem. Sur. (N.Y.) 28o, I5 N.Y. St. Rep. 416;
Dayton v. Adkisson (I889) 45 N. J. Eq. 6o3, I7 Atl. 964; De Wolf v.

°
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riage, the time when the child was born is of no importance.
Also in other legislations, although some provisions contain
obscure elements, 85 as a rule the applicable law is simply that
of the time of legitimation. In some texts, this is emphasized
with the express statement that the status of the parent at the
time of the conception and of the birth are immaterial. 86 Such
a statement corresponds in the broader field of legitimacy in
general with the idea that legitimacy is acquired or denied
by the law of the time when it originates, whether by birth or
by marriage or by decree or "any other cause," as is the
formula of the recent Finnish law. 87
We may take it that where, under the legislation thus governing, an act of legitimation is void, it cannot be helped by
later events. This is also the general proposition of the American cases. 88 The status created at the time of a subsequent
marriage (or any other act of legitimation) is permanent.
Adequate application of this principle to the legislations
of the French system (where a formal acknowledgment of
paternity or maternity is an essential part of legitimation by
subsequent marriage) depends upon the question whether
recognition is allowed after the marriage. In the older style
of these enactments, the recognition had to take place before
or as part of the act of celebrating the marriage, 89 so that the
status was fixed at the moment of the marriage. 90 Now the
Middleton (I893) I8 R.I. 8Io, 31 Atl. 2.71; c/. Note, 46 Yale L. J. (1937)
1049, 1051 n. IS.
85 Especially art. 315 (new 349) of the Argentine Civil Code is defectively
drafted .
6
.8 E.g., Argentina: C. C. art. 315 (new 349).
Portugal, Law for the Protection of Children of Dec. 2.5, 1910, art. 2.,
87 Finland: Law of I 929, § 22; cf. Poland: Law of I 926, § 22.
88 Smith v. Kelly (1851) 23 Miss. I67 (subsequent marriage during domicil
in South Carolina does not legitimate an issue previously born; the later domicil
of the family in Mississippi was of no avail). For the general rule see In re
Presley's Estate (1925) 113 Okla. x6o, 164, 240 Pac. 89, 93; TAINTOR, 18
Can. Bar Rev. ( 1940) at 617, supra p. 555, n. 1, and infra p. 587, n. 169.
89
Code Napoleon art. 33I, widely copied.
90
WEISS, 4 Traite 90.

574

PARENTAL RELATIONS

French and some other municipal laws permit recognition of
paternity or maternity after a subsequent marriage, 91 and
either postpone the effect of legitimation until the later
event 92 or make it retroactive to the time of marriage. 93 It
may well be concluded that the decisive moment for the choice
of law also is deferred to the time of recognition. The personal
law of this later moment decides on the question of retroactivity. Such a view might be suitable also to this country, where
in many jurisdictions acknowledgment must be added to a
subsequent marriage in order to complete legitimation and is
generally permitted after the marriage. 94
Such a supplement to a previous act of legitimation may
likewise be accomplished in the case when the parent has acquired a new personal law. The provisions of this new law determine the decision without regard to any former personal
law. Suppose the parents have married after the birth of the
child, when they were domiciliaries or nationals of a country
whose law does not know legitimation by marriage. If they
change their personal status afterward and their new personal
law allows legitimation and considers a belated recognition
sufficient, such recognition can be effected accordingly. 95
2.

Contacts: Usual Rules

(a) Law of Domicil. The law of the domicil of the parents
at the time of marriage governs legitimation by subsequent
marriage in England and in the United States. It is quite
possible that a child, in view of its illegitimacy, has a separate
91 Spain: C. C. art. 12.1; France: C. C. art. 331 as amended by Laws of Dec.
30, 1915 and of Aprilzs, 1924.
92 Bulgaria: Law of Dec. 17, 1889 as amended by Decree of Oct. zz, 1935,
art. r8; Italy: C. C. (1942) art. 2.83 "or from the day of a recognition posterior

to the (subsequent) marriage."
93 Spain: C. C. art. r 2 3. The preliminary draft of the Italian Civil Code
(1930) art. 320 followed this rule; cf. Relazione sul progetto (1931) 167.
94
In the case of Smith v. Kelly, supra n. 88, at r 70, the father would have been
able, according to the said view, to add to the ineffective South Carolinian marriage an acknowledgment in Mississippi.
95
See RAAPE, so Recueil 1934 IV 405, 441.
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96

domicil at that time, but this does not count. Analogous
rules obtain in Argentina/ 7 Switzerland (with respect to
foreign legitimations by foreigners), 98 and the other countries
following the domiciliary principles. 99
(b) Law of Nationality. The national law of the father at
the time of marriage or recognition governs the problem under
most European conflicts laws. 100
3· Personal Law of the Child
Under some of the more recent conflicts legislations, however, the personal law of the child is observed in determining
the question whether legitimation requires certain conditions
96 Restatement § 140, comment b adds, it is true, a caveat that the law of the
child's domicil might be sufficient to grant legitimation; but the basis for this
allegation is not apparent.
97 Argentina: C. C. arts. 313-315 (new 347-349), very difficult to understand.
RoMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int. Priv. 330, calls these articles manifestly contradictory; V1co does not attempt any comment. Such an attempt was risked by
the Berlin KG. (Feb. s, 1932.) IPRspr. 1932., no, 96.
98 Switzerland, NAG. art. 28. In the case of a husband of Swiss nationality,
the application of Swiss law is provided by the Federal Constitution, art. 54·
See BuRCKHARDT, Kommentar der Schweizerischen Bundesverfassung 5 r 3ff.;
BECK, NAG. 2.46 no. ro6.
99
Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 22.1 no. 53·
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 576 no. 12.6.
Uruguay: Ap. Montevideo (April 27, 19Io) Clunet I9I4, 674.
Brazil: Introductory Law (I 942) art. 7> apparently covering the problem.
100
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (June I9, I907) Clunet I 907, 462., PoULLET
5I4 no. 395·
Finland: Law of I929, § z.z..
France: prevailing opinion, see PILLET, I Traite 644 no. 3I3· SuRVILLE 459
no. 3I3; NIBOYET 770 no. 65I (z).
Germany: EG. art. z.z par. I.
Greece: C. C. (I940) art. z.z..
Guatemala: see MATOS no. 2.74 (except where the child is not under parental
power) but, under the actual laws, it would be more consistent to apply the
domiciliary test.
"Italy: C. C. ( I942) Disp. Prel. art. z.o par. 1.
Japan: Law of 1898, art. I 8.
Poland: Law of 1926, art. 2.2 .
.Switzerland: NAG. art. 8; where the marriage is celebrated in Switzerland,
see BG. (May 3 I, I9I9) 45 BGE. I 155, r 63; BG. (Jan. 28 and May zo, 1914)
40 BGE. II 295, 302. BECK, NAG. 171 no. 64. If the father is a German or an
Italian, authorization by the court is needed, Just. Dept., Bundesblatt 1941,
11 OJ no. 8, 1 I 04 no. 9·
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to be fulfilled in the person of the child, such as consent by
the child or its guardian. 101
Occasionally the national law of the child has been claimed
to govern legitimation as a whole. 102 This opinion has been
generally rejected, however. 103 The contrary view prevails
for the good reasons that legitimation is an effect of marriage,
that one law should govern the family as a unit, and that the
child's entrance into this family should not be prescribed
by another legislation. The English Act of 1926 refers distinctly to the law of the father's domicil, because otherwise
a domiciled Englishman could. be burdened with a child legitimized abroad. 104 It is equally certain in the United States that
neither the law of the domicil of the child nor that of the
mother controls any acts of legitimation by the father. 105
Moreover, if the child's own law is adverse to the legitimizing
effect of marriage, the child should not suffer therefor .106
In a third opinion, the law of both parent and child must
concur for every requisite in allowing legitimation. 107 As usual,
GEBHARD, Draft I (1881) § 22, Gebhardsche Materialien 7·
China: Law of I9I8, art. 13.
Japan: Law of I898, art. I8.
Codigo Bustamante art. 6o, but see infra n. 109. Cf. BAR§ 102, n. 4· However,
what conditions of such kind are provided for in actual legislations? RAAPE
559 deals with the requisite of consent by a child of full age.
102 In France a few decisions about 1926-1927 were to this effect; also BARTIN
in 9 AUBRY et RAU § 546, 8I, n.8 ter; see also for the Netherlands, MuLDER
I 2Q-I 22,
103 For France, see BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 19 35, 6z 3 no. I 4; J. DoNNED lEU
DE VABRES 497•
104
See Note, 7 Cambr. L. J. (194I) 405.
105
Blythe v. Ayres (1892) 96 Cal. 532, 572, 31 Pac. 915; In re Presley's
Estate (1925) II3 Okla. I6o, 240 Pac. 89.
106
PILLET, I Traite 647 no. 3I5; PoULLET 514 no. 395; Novelles Belges,
2. D. Civ. 62.0 no. 591; RAAPE '551 (b), 558 (b); Trib. civ. Seine (Dec. zi,
19I6) Clunet I917, I419; Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 23, I857) D.I857.L423, S.I858 •.
1.294· .
107
France : Isolated decisions.
Italy: DIENA, 2 Prine. I83.
The Netherlands: KosTERS 550; VAN HASSELT, 6 Repert. 635 no. 200, Codigo
Bustamante art. 6o in fine.
Brazil (under the former law): BEVILAQUA, I Codigo Civil (ed. 6, I940)
In trod. art. 8 no. I 8.
101
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such a doctrinary cumulation of laws is a very inconvenient
solution.
4· Rules on Effects of Legitimation
Most of the rules mentioned determine both the act of
legitimation and the effect of this act. In some codifications,
however, special rules have been provided with respect to
the effects of legitimation. 108 The C6digo Bustamante, in particular, states that:
"The effects of legitimation and the action for contesting a
legitimation are governed by the personal law of the
child." 109
It seems that this rule is destined in the first place to take
care of the case where the 'legitimated person has retained
his separate nationality and under his national law becomes of
full age earlier than under that of the parent, 110 but the
fact that by such an event parental power is terminated rests
upon the nationality law and upon the law of status and is
not an incident of the parent-child relation.
5· Renvoi
As is their wont, French and German courts apply renvoi/ 11
and English courts follow in applying any law that is applied at the domicil of the parent. It was in fact a case of
108 Japan: Law of 1898, art. 18 par. 2.
China: Law of 1918, art. 13 par. 2.
109 Art. 62.
110 See BusTAMANTE, 2 Der. Int. Priv. 74·
lil France: Cour Paris (March 23, x888) S.x888.2.IJI, Clunet 1889, 638
(Irishman); Trib. civ. Seine (Dec. 21, 1916) Clunet 1917, 1419 (Englishman
from Mauritius).
Germany: KG. (Nov. 21, 1930) IPRspr. 1931, no. 88; and in the same case,
KG. (Feb. 5, 19 32) IPRspr. I 932, no. 96 (marriage of an Argentinian domiciled
in Florida, law of Florida applied); LG. Wiesbaden (Oct. xo, 1932) JW. 1933,
193 (Englishman if domiciled in the Netherlands, Dutch law applied).
Italy: a decision of App. Firenze (Jan. 23, 1919) 12 Rivista (1918) 288,
against t~e current Italian doctrine.
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legitimation that gave rise to the celebrated judgment upon
renvoi of Lord Maugham in In re Askew. 112
6. Soviet Russia
The problem offered by the Soviet Russian law and those
American statutes which make no distinction between legitimacy and illegitimacy has been more discussed in connection
with the subject of legitimation than with that of legitimate
birth. A German court has held that the child of a Russian
who married the German mother after the birth was illegitimate, because the Russian law does not know legitimation. 113
However, as the Russian law does not discriminate and as
under German law the child who was, before the marriage, an
illegitimate relative of the mother, would become by the marriage a fully recognized child of both parents, legitimacy
agrees with the spirit of both legislations involved. 114 An
analogous view is certainly appropriate in this country where
the parents of a previously born child marry in Arizona or
North Dakota. 115
B.

SCOPE

Validity of the Marriage
Conforming to principles mentioned before, the validity of
the marriage is to be determined under the ordinary rules
concerning the formalities, on one hand, and the intrinsic
validity of marriage, on the other.
Illustration: The parents, Frenchmen, having lived in concubinage in France, went to New York and continued there to
live together. French courts made the recognition of the marI.

112 In re Askew [1930] 2 Ch. 259, Clunet 1931, 175, followed in Collins v.
Att. Gen. (1931) 47 T. L. R. 484, 145 L. T. 551. Cf. 6 Z.ausl.PR. (1932) 62o.
113 StAZ. 1930, 44, cited with apparent approval by NussBAUM, IPR. 172
n. 6.
114 This solution was foreseen by RAAPE 568, 569; and RAAPE, so Recueil
1934 IV at sos.
115
See supra n. 3 8.
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riage dependent upon the question whether their relation had
assumed at some time the character of a common law marriage
under New York law, and this is pertinent also to legitimation.116
Conditions and Effects of Legitimation
Where the marriage is valid under all laws concerned, the
conflicts rule is applicable to. the questions:
(i) Whether legitimation follows from the marriage always, or never, or not for the issue from adulterous or incestuous cohabitations,117 or only for certain privileged classes
of children, for instance the issue of a couple engaged to
marry; 118
Whether legitimation is invalid where it is proved that the
child has not actually been begotten by the husband or borne
by the wife of the marriage;
Whether consent of the child is required, 119 et cetera.
( ii) Regarding the acts sometimes required in addition to
the marriage ceremony, particularly the formal acknowledgment of paternity or maternity as required by the French
Civil Code, art. 331, and its many followers. 120 This provision has been applied by the French courts as an incident of
the personal law to Frenchmen at the forum and abroad. 121
Likewise, where the man is of Bulgarian nationality, a court
in Germany (where no such requisites exist) requires recognition by both parents according to the Bulgarian provision. 122
2.

ll6See the case of Trib. civ. Havre (Feb. 14, 1907) and App. Rouen (Feb.
26, 1908) Clunet 1909, 1057; the question was left open only because the
recognition of maternity was missing in any case.
117 France, England, Italy, the Netherlands, etc.
us E.g., Sweden: Law of June 14, 1917 on Illegitimate Children, cj. Law of
June 27, 1924.
ll 9 Chile: C. C. art. 210 (adult child); art. 211 (child with tutor or curator).
120
La. Rev. Civ. Code Ann. (1932) art. 198. Belgium: C. C. art. 331, cj.
342 (b). The Netherlands, Rumania, Sweden, Brazil.
121 Cass. (req.) {Jan. 2o, 1879) 8.1879·1.417; Cass. (civ.) (April 20, 1885)
D.1886.1.23; Cass. (req.) (July 8, 1886) Clunet 1886, 585.
122
KG. (Nov. 29, 1929) HRR. 1930, no. 882, IPRspr. 1930, no. 85 (on the
ground that the Bulgarian provision requiring recognition is not meant for
evidence of the procreation only).
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Conversely, where foreigners marry in the Netherlands, the
Dutch requisite of recognition is released in favor of the national law not requiring recognition. 123
Since in the new text of the French Civil Code, art. 2 3 r,
postnuptial recognition is allowed but must be effectuated by
court proceedings, this requirement, too, is to be considered
a part of the substantive personal law 124 rather than a formal·
ity with territorial effect. 125
(iii) Respecting the effect attached to legitimation:
Whether legitimation is effective from the time of marriage
or retroactively from the birth or from the date of recognition
(Anglo-Canadian laws, for instance, prefer the effect from
birth); 126
Whether already existing children born in wedlock retain
rights of "primogeniture"; 127
Whether rights normally included in legitimacy are denied; 128
Whether in particular the child receives the name of the
father. 129
3· Invalid Subsequent Marriage
A delicate question arises, if the subsequent marriage is
considered invalid at the forum; under what law should we
determine whether, nevertheless, the child is legitimized?
Express municipal provisions are made in the Ger,man and
Swiss Civil Codes/ 30 whereby the rules of putative marriage
123 VAN HASSELT, 6 Repert. 635 no. 201.
124 BATIFFOL, 8 Repert. 424 no. 124; a strange case of application: Trib. civ.
Rochelle (May 29, 1934) Clunet I935 1 370.
125 SURVILLE, Clunet I9I6, 769, 780.
126 See Ontario Legitimation Act, I92I, II ·Geo. V, c. 53, as amended I927,
Rev. Stat. Ontario, c. I87 s. I, also in Rev. Stat. Ontario I937• c. 2I6 and I
JoHNSON 344 n. I. The time of the marriage is maintained as date of effectiveness

of the legitimation 'in Quebec, C. C. art. 2 39·
127
Cf. Austrian Allg. BGB. § I6I.
128
Germany:·cf. Bay. ObLG. (June 8, I92I) 42 ROLG. HiS (Czechoslovakian decree of legitimation withholding rights of inheritance).
I29 See E. H. PERROUD, Clunet I91 I, 503; 4 FRANKENSTEIN I6I n. 40.
130 BGB. § I 72 I; Switzerland: EGGER, 2 Kommentar zum Schweizerischen
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should be applied by analogy. Such an analogy is convenient
also in the field of the law of conflicts. In the same way that the
personal law of the parent at the time of the marriage determines whether legitimacy is dependent or not upon a valid
marriage, the law governing legitimation by subsequent marriage should determine also the effect of an invalid subsequent
marriage. 131
In the United States it has been contended, however, that
where the marriage was void no effect could be recognized with
respect to the children. 132 As a matter of fact, the statutes
conferring legitimacy on children, irrespective of the intrinsic
validity of the marriage, have overlooked the case of a subsequent marriage, but it may be asked whether courts should not
grant analogous application 133 by virtue of the liberal construction generally given these beneficial statutes. Were this
done by the domiciliary law, no other jurisdiction would have
any reason to refuse recognition.
The inverse case that the marriage is considered invalid
under the per;onal law but valid under the internal rules,
has been discussed in Germany; the father's personal law was
said to determine the parent-child relationship in this case
also. 134
4· Acquisition of Nationality
Nationality of the parent is regularly transferred by legitimation to the child in the Continental European laws. This
Zivilgesetzbuch art. 2 58 (I) (b). In France, the construction of C. C. arts.
20I and 202 is in controversy; see PLANIOL, I Traite elementaire de droit civil
(ed. 8, I920-I92I) 362 no. II09.
131 In this sense also 4 FRANKENSTEIN I 53 (d), while RAAPE 570 follows
his theory referred to, supra p. 570, n. 68.
132 2 BEALE 708 n. 5· The decision in the Matter of Look Wong (I9I5) 4
U.S. Dist. Haw. 568, cited by BEALE, does not seem to support this view, but it
has been expressed in Adams v. Adams (I89I) I54 Mass. 290, 28 N. E. 260
even with respect to the liberal California legislation.
133
Cf. Note, 46 Yale L. J. (I937) I049, IOSI n. I6.
134
RAAPE, JW. I934> 295I; same in 50 Recueil I934 IV 405, 487 no. 63
against other opinions.
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raises peculiar problems, particularly in France. 135 English
law excludes this acquisition of nationality. 136

S· Prohibitive Public Policy of the Forum
Much thought has been given to those municipal provisions which prevent legitimation of the children conceived
or born in polygamous, incestuous, or bigamous relations.
There is no such provision in most American jurisdictions nor
in Germany, the Scandinavian countries, nor Switzerland. The
Venezuelan Civil Code expressly permits legitimation by subsequent marriage even though the parents were incapable of
marrying at the time of the conception. 137 The former text
was similar, but it prohibited the recognition of children born
to such marriages. 138 Yet British and French influence has
prompted a great number of provisions against such a legitimation. Recent French reforms modifying the famous article
335 of the Code Napoleon brought only partial relief. 139
(a) United States. The courts of New York persist in
their general policy of outlawing the children of "prohibited"
marriages. 140 In the other states, the weight of authority recognizes the domiciliary law without objection stemming from
an opposed local policy. 141
135 Law on Nationality of August 10, I 92 7> art. 1 (4) ; ANCEL "La nationalite
de !'enfant legitime," Clunet I 9 3 3, 5.
136 Abrahamv.Att.Gen. [1934] P. 17.
137
Venezuela, C. C. (1942) art. 227 par. 2.
136
Venezuela, C. C. (1922) art. 248 par. 2, cf. art. 233·
139 Amended by Law of Dec. 30, 1915; c/. I tal. C. C. ( 1942) arts. 251, 281.
140 See Olmsted v. Olmsted (1908) 190 N.Y. 458, 83 N. E. 569, aff'd 216
U.S. 386 and In re Bruington's Estate (1936) 160 N, Y. Misc. 34, 289 N. Y.
Supp. 725, cited supra notes 59 and 6o respectively.
141
M und v. Rehaume ( 19 1 1) 51 Colo. u 9, 1 17 Pac. 159 (near relationship) ;
Moore v. Saxton (1916) 90 Conn. 1641 96 Atl. 960 (bigamy); Succession of
Caballero (1872) 24La.Ann. 572 (miscegenation); Green v. Kelley (I917)
228 Mass. 6o2, u8 N.E. 235 (bigamy); Ng. Suey Hi v. Weedin, Commissioner
of Immigration (1927) 21 F. (2d) 8o1 (polygamy); see also Holloway v.
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore (1926) 151 Md. 321, 134 Atl. 497 at 499·
The case of Matter of Look Wong (1915) 4 U. S. Dist. Haw. 568, where
recognition of children of a Chinese marriage was withheld, has been called
unfortunate and unsound, Note, 3 I Harv. L. Rev. (I 9 I 7) 892. See also
McNamara, v. McNamara (I922) 303 Ill. I91 1 IJS N. E. 410 (legitimation
by conduct).
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(b) England. According to the British Legitimacy Act of
926, the offspring of an adulterous union cannot be legitimated when the parents are domiciled in England, but no
such express clause has been added in section 8 (I) dealing
with marriages celebrated while the spouses are domiciled
abroad. By reasonable interpretation, it has been held that a
child born of a father with a foreign domicil is legitimated according to the domiciliary l~w without interference by English
public policy. 142
(c) Continent. Similarly, legitimation is recognized in
France when foreign nationals marry abroad, 143 except in
the case where the parents, both formerly French, have
abandoned their nationality for the purpose of evading the
French provision against legitimation of adulterines. 144 However, the problem has been much discussed, 145 and an increasingly nationalistic attitude of the Court of Cassation has
made from what is left of article 335 of the Civil Code, after
repeated modifications, a rule of "ordre public international." 146 This possibly means that adulterine children
I

142 /n re Collins v. Att. Gen. ( 1931) 47 T.L.R.486, 145 L. T. 551. CHESHIRE
391 n. z, raising a formalistic doubt, is too much impressed by the opinion of a
Chancery official.
143 Cour Paris (Aug. z, 1866) S.1866.z.34z; Cour Paris (July z, 19z6)
Clunet I9Z7, 77· Belgium: App. Bruxelles (June I9, I907) Clunet I907, II54·
144 Cour Paris (July I 6, I9oz) Clunet I9o3, 39z (French parties had become
Swiss citizens).
145 On the different opinions and the stages of development of the cases see
WEISS, 4 Traite 94; VALERY 1147 no. l. 8o8; NIBOYET 77I no. 6sz; LERE·
BOURS-PIGEONNIERE 318 no. Z79> ibid. 4II no. 347; BARTIN, z Principes 359
§ 3Z4 (critical); Notes to Cass. (civ.) (March 311 1930) by SAVATIER, D.1930.
1,113 and BATIFFOL, 8 Repert. 4z5 nos. I34ff. and Revue Crit. 1934, 615.
146
Cass. (civ.) (March 31, 1930) D.1930.I.113 at uS, S.I9JI.I.9 and ibid.
at 177, Case Note by GENY; Clunet 1930, 6so, Revue Crit. 1934, 615 (a
Russian, Reweliotty, married and being father of children by this marriage, had
an illegitimate child in France by one Struve, whom he married after having been
divorced from his first wife. Both parents had acknowledged the child. The
Czarist law admitted legitimacy, and the Soviet Russian law ignores any qualifications of children. The Appeal Court refused recognition for the double reason
that the child, being of French nationality, was subject to French law. LERE·
BOUR5-PIGEONNIERE 412. n. 1, and 415 n. I stresses the point that the Supreme
Court did not disapprove of the second ground, although it did not examine it.
Similar in Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (March 27, I930) Pasicrisie 1930·3·173
and Trib. civ. Liege (Nov. 13, I93o), both in Revue 1933,358, even for the case
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cannot be legitimated where any one of the three persons involved is of French nationality or a part of the facts happened
in France. The courts are apprehensive that the people may
become accustomed to polygamy!
Where all three persons are of foreign nationality, however, the objection of public policy is unlikely to be raised
in a European court. 147 But renvoi may have an influence on
these considerations. For instance, where an Englishman was
domiciled and married in the Netherlands, a German court,
by renvoi from the national English law, applied Dutch law
in determining that the premarital issue was not legitimized
because born in adultery. 148
Also on the grounds of public policy, the Appeal Court of
Hamburg 149 refused to recognize a legitimation valid under
Dutch law, where an unmarried woman of German nationality, mother of a German child, married a Dutchman and both
parties recognized the child as their own. The German courts,
like those of some American jurisdictions/ 50 regard as necessary for legitimation that the man marrying the mother shall
in fact be the father. The Court extended this requirement
to the foreign legitimation of a German child, on the ground
that, if the child is not actually an offspring of the married
couple, its interest ought to be protected as is done through
the other form of legitimation, viz., in the course of legitimation by state authority. This reasoning results, however, in
creating a double status of the child as legitimate abroad and
where recognition was made abroad, on the worn authority of 5 LAURENT 554
no. z66.
147 Cj. KosTERS 538, 554·
148 LG. Wiesbaden (Oct. 1o, 1932.) JW. 1933, 193, IPRspr. 1933, no. 51.
149
OLG. Hamburg (Aug. 16, 1935) Hans. RGZ. 1935, B 495 no. 135.
150 Pike v. Standage (1919) 187 Iowa 1Ij2, 175 N. W. u; Helm v. Goin
(192.9) 2.2.7 Ky. 773 at 778, 14 S. W. (zd) 183; Eichorn v. Zedaker (192.4)
109 Ohio St. 6o9, 144 N. E. zs8; Harper v. Harper (1932.) 159 Va. ZIO, 165
S. E. 490; Mooney v. Mooney (19IZ) 2.44 Mo. 372., 148 S. W. 896.
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illegitimate at the forum, 151 and should not be followed in the
jurisdictions mentioned above.
6. Permissive Public Policy of the Forum
Occasionally, the father's law prohibiting legitimation has
been disregarded for reasons of a benevolent local policy. 152
French courts affirmed the effect of legitimation under French
law where an Englishman married a French woman, although
legitimation was not yet recognized by English law. 153 This
may be the right decision, provided the couple is domiciled
in France. 154
7. Law of Situs

The famous English case of Birtwhistle v. Vardillm has
retained authority, inasmuch as a state where land is situated
may require birth in lawful wedlock for the capacity of inheriting land, although in other respects foreign legitimation
by subsequent marriage is recognized, and certainly in England
it has been recognized in all respects by the law of r 926. 156
Very few American cases have followed this doctrine, 157 more
suitable, indeed, to old feudal institutions.
151 Cf. EcKSTEIN and LoRENZ, notes to the decision in 6 Giur. Comp. DIP.
no. I32.
152
RAAPE 562 (a), 563 in· the case of a Belgian domiciled in Germany who in
adultery had a child by a German woman, later married the mother of the child
in Germany.
153
Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 23 1 I857) S.I858.I.293 (sounding as though French
law were always applicable); Cour Bourges (May 26, I858) S.I858.2.532 1
D.I 858.2.I 78; App. Rouen (Jan. 5, I 887) Clunet I 887, I 83; Cour Paris
(March 23, 1888) Clunet 1889 1 638, approved by VALERY 1148 no. II. 8o2;
but disapproved by most writers, see WErss, 4 Traite 96ff.; DESPAGNET 8 38 no.
277; SURVILLE 461 no. 313.
154
NJBOYET 734 no. 6:1.5 II.
155
(I826) 5 Barn. & C. 438; (I835) 2 Cl. & F. 57 I; (I84o) 7 Cl. & F. 895.
156
See F ALCONBRIDGE, "Conflict of Laws: Characterization," I 5 Can. Bar
Rev. (1937) us at 242 (giving information on the Canadian legislation).
157
Alabama: Lingen v. Lingen (I87I) 45 Ala. 4IO (no recognition of any
status created by foreign legitimation); Florida: Statutes (I94I) § 731.23 (7);
Williams v. Kimball (I895) 35 Fla. 49 1 16 So. 783; Pennsylvania: 48 Pa.
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IV.

LEGITIMATION BY OTHER AcTs

ccLegitimatio per rescriptum principis," by which the emperor in the Roman imperial epoch elevated a child to the
status of legitimacy, has been preserved in numerous civil law
countries. The state's chief acted on the instance of the father,
or of both parents, or upon the father's wish expressed in a
will. 158 In some countries, the legislature 159 or the monarch or state president was replaced by courts. 160 This method
has been followed in a few common law jurisdictions of the
United States. 161
Moreover, legitimation may be effected by parental acknowledgment or by conduct of public repute, so as to place
the child upon the footing of a legitimate child. Thus, in
eight states of the Union by oral or written, and in Michigan,
by written acknowledgment, 162 legitimation is performed for
all intents and purposes. 163 We are not dealing_now with institutions conferring limited rights upon an illegitimate child.
The subject includes, however, those kinds of legitimation
which give the child a full position of legitimacy minus the
right of inheritance, as in Delaware and Czechoslovakia. 164
Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) § 167 (Act of May 14, 1857, P. L. 507, § 1);
Smith v. Derr's Adm'rs (r859) 34 Pa. 126. Contra: see Note, 46 Yale L. J.
(r937) 1049 and cf. on the cases TAINTOR, r8 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) at 715,
supra n. r.
15
8 E.g., Austria: All g. BGB. § r6z.
Germany: BGB. § 1723.
Italy: C. C. (r865) art. 198ft., C. C. (1942) art. 284ff.
The Netherlands: BW arts. 329, 330.
Spain: C. C. art. no.
159 See, e.g., the Arkansas special statute of Oct. 2 7, 18 3 5, referred to in
Scott v. Key (r8s6) rr La. Ann. 232.
160
Peru: C. C. ( 19 36) arts. 3 14, 3 1 9 ; Venezuela: C. C. ( 1 9 1 6) art. 25 I,
C. C. (1942) art. 230. See also Switzerland: C. C. art. 260.
161
Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee; 4 VERNIER 181 § 245·
162
4 VERNIER § 244·
163
4 VERNIER 1 83 § 246.
164
4 VERNIER § 245. Allg. BGB. § r62. In fact, faced with a Czechoslovakian
decree of legitimation, the Bay. ObLG. (June 8, 1921) 42 ROLG. 105 held
that the status was concerned and the act should be recorded at the civil status
register.
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United States

The conflicts rule of the United States, in the evidently
prevailing opinion, 165 is the same as that concerning subsequent marriage; the law of the domicil at the time of the
act governs. It does not matter whether the foreign legitimation has been executed in a form not known at the forum,
as for instance by a special statute, nor whether the child would
have been barred from legitimation by the policy of the forum.
These principles have been very clearly expressed. 166 Also,
the child's domicil is not taken into consideration; a legitimation by acknowledgment has been upheld in California despite the English domicil of the child, 167 quite as, conversely,
the Virginia statute of I 866, legitimating colored children,
was refused application in Massachusetts in respect to a father
who was domiciled there, although the child resided in Virginia.168 A domicil of the father or even of all parties at a time
posterior to the legitimating act is without importance. 169
2.

England

No case had occurred in England before the Legitimacy
Act of I 926, where a foreign legitimation other than by subsequent marriage was in question, 170 and the Act likewise
limited itself to recognizing English and foreign legitimations
by marriage. Soon afterwards, however, in the case of In re
165
Restatement § 140; STUMBERG 303, 304. The author of the Note in 46
Yale L. J. ( 19 3 7) 1046, 1o 53 thinks that the doctrine is in a "chaotic condition,"
but this contention is not well supported by the few deviating cases and the
absence of authority as to certain details.
166 See e.g., Adkins, J. in Holloway v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore
(1926) 151 Md. 321, 134 Atl. 497; Buchanan, J. in Scott v. Key (1856) 11
La. Ann. 2 3 z {legitimation by special statute of Arkansas legislature) quotes with
STORY§ 51 from BouLLENOIS: "Habilis vel inhabilis in loco domicili est habilis
vel inhabilis in omni loco."
167
Blythe v. Ayres (1892.) 96 Cal. 532., 31 Pac. 915.
168
Irving v. Ford (1903) 183 Mass. 448, 67 N. E. 366.
169
Eddie v. Eddie (1899) 8 N.D. 376, 79 N. W. 856; In re Presley's Estate,
Anderson v. Presley (192.4) 113 Okla. 16o, 2.40 Pac. 89, supra p. 573, n. 88.
170
Supra p. 57 1 •
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Luck, it happened that an Englishman, when domiciled in
England, procreated an illegitimate son and, while domiciled
in California, acknowledged him pursuant to the California
Civil Code, section 230, by receiving the child into his family
with the consent of his wife and by obtaining a decree of legitimation from the time of birth. It would have been a reasonable
expectation that the legitimation should simply be recognized
under the law of the father's domicil at the time of the act, by
analogy to the rule laid down in the law of 1926. The father's
domicil at the time of the birth should be of no significance.
However, the Chancery judge reached this result by resorting
to the child's law/ 71 which was an unwarranted breach with
the principles in force. Two of the three Lords of Appeal Were
apparently so strongly under the spell of the dogma abolished
by the Legitimacy Act, that they refused recognition because
of the father's English law as of the time of the birth of the
child.l1 2 The resulting decision is obviously regrettable. 173
3· National Law of Parent
In the countries following the nationality principle, the rules
are the same as in the case of a subsequent marriage. Hence,
a foreign legitimation agreeing with the national law of all
parties is recognized; even though the specific procedure is unknown to the forum. For example, French courts respect a
foreign legitimation by state authority although unknown to
French municipallaw. 174
Where the parties are of different nationality, usually the
father's law alone is applied. 175
171

In re Luck's Settlement Trusts [I940] Ch. D. 323 at 329.
In re Luck's Settlement Trusts [I940] Ch. D. 864 at 890.
173 See TAINTOR, I8 Can. Bar Rev. (I940) at 62I-627, supra n. I; MANN,
"Legitimation and Adoption in Private International Law," 57 Law Q. Rev.
(I94I) IIZ, II8-I22; FALCONBRIDGE, Comment in I9 Can. Bar Rev. (I941)
37, 42, also criticizes the dissenting vote of Scott, L. J.
174
See Cour Paris (April IJ, I 893) Clunet I 893, ssn WEISS, 4 Traite IOI;
VALERY II 50; POULLET 5I4 no. 395·
175
See for instance -!\.pp. Bern (May II, I939) 36 S]Z. (I940-I94I) 128
no. 23. Swiss C. C. arts. 26off. applied although the woman and the child were
112
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But with respect to legitimation by acts other than marriage,
it is convenient to require the consent of the child or of some
competent agent on its behalf, as municipal legislations frequently provide/ 76 and there is a tendency to apply such
provisions of the child's law as an exception to the rule referring to the father's law. The German statute (EG. art. 22,
par. 2) directly provides that in the case of a German child
the consent of the child or of the persons and courts charged
with the care of it should be secured in accordance with the
German rules. 177 French courts and certain writers require
application of French law every time that any party is of
French nationality. 178
4· Argentine Doctrine
Another application of local public policy, enunciated in
Argentina, is that a legitimation by act of a foreign state should
not be recognized because "it presents a privilege." 179

V.

REcOGNITION oF FoREIGN LEGITIMATION

Much discussion has been devoted to the relations existing
between the above-mentioned rules and the conflicts rules
concerning succession upon death.
I.

Validity of Legitimation as a Preliminary Question

There is a general problem respecting the law applicable
to legitimation or adoption, when either one is a condition for
Germans. For an opposite view requiring that the parties and the authority
rendering the decree belong to the same state, see WEiss, 4 Traite I 04; contra:
ROLIN, z Principes I 58 no. 6z8.
176 Cj., for instance, German BGB. § I p6 in contrast to § I 7 I 9 (legitimation
by subsequent marriage) ; Peru: C. C. (I 9 36) art. 3 zo; Venezuela: C. C. (I 942)
art. 233·
177 It is controversial whether this rule is applicable to foreign children. The
prevailing answer is in the negative. See RG. {July II, 19z9) IZ5 RGZ. z66;
RAAPE 549; NussBAUM, IPR. I73, n. 3·
178 See the criticism by CHAMPCOMMUNAL, Revue I9IO, 57, 73·
179 z V1co no. I 7I at u7.
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an individual's sharing in a succession upon death. 180 Where
a claim to participate in a distribution of assets, governed by
the inheritance law of state X, is based on a legitimation created
in state Y, should the validity of the legitimation be adjudicated under the law of X or Y? This question occurs in its
purest forp1 in third states; should a court in state Z apply
its ordinary conflicts rule concerning legitimation or does application by such court of the inheritance law of X by implication include the conflicts rule of X regarding legitimation?
(There is, of course, nothing to recommend the lex fori of
Z, or the substantive legitimation law of X as such.) The
problem is significant only where the conflict rules on inheritance and those on legitimation or adoption result in contrasting solutions. No case in the English or American practice to
illustrate this contrast has been found by Robertson, 181 and
only one German decision of the kind has been found. In this
case, an Alsatian in adultery had a child by a woman whom
he afterwards married. He acquired French nationality by
the Treaty of Versailles but died in Germany. As well known,
Frenchmen cannot legitimize adulterine children, but Germans are allowed to do so. As the man's succession under the
German conflicts rule was governed by French law, the court
decided to apply French rules of conflicts. Under the French
conflicts rule concerning legitimation, as the court understood
it, the legitimation operated in favor of the child in spite of
its adulterine position, because the parties were German at
the time of their subsequent marriage. Acknowledging the
legitimacy of the child, the court therefore ordered that it
share in the succession. 182
The case is instructive in two respects and helps us to distinguish two problems.
180 The logical necessity- of applying the law of the state of inheritance to the
preliminary question has been expounded by MELCHIOR § 1 75; WENGLER,
8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 148 at x66; also RoBERTSON, Characterization IJtff.
lSlRoBERTSON, ibid. 135, 151,
182 OLG. Karlsruhe (March :zo, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, no. 96, Revue 1932, 702..
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One of these problems, neglected in Europe, holds an
interest in this country, in view of the persistent effort to
separate statutes of legitimacy (or status) from statutes of
distribution. In the French law, the statute of distribution
furnishes only the words: "enfants et descendants" (C.C. art.
73 r ). Legitimacy, of course, is presupposed, but an adulterine
child is only indirectly excluded by reason of its incapacity to
be iegitimized. And only the conflicts rule on legitimation
prescribes that the ban on adulterine children ceases where all
facts happened abroad and at the time did not concern a
French national. This seems, in fact, to be the averred doctrine; 183 at least the German court was entitled to assume its
correctness.
We may conclude that, if recognized at all, the foreign act
is valid in our jurisdiction as measured by its own law. It
cannot be recognized for the purpose of family law and eliminated for the purpose of distribution.
What the European literature discusses, however, concerns
the other problem, namely, ~hether the German court should
have decided the validity of the legitimation according to its
own Germ;m conflicts rule on legitimation, 184 instead of following the provisions of French law because it governs the succession.185 The individual case gives no solid basis. for arguing
this question, since the legitimation could not be denied validity in any event; it had been effectuated in Germany by parties
then of German nationality. Arguments of practical convenience may be considered. If such preliminary questions are
subjected to the statutes regulating inheritance, consistent application of these statutes may be facilitated. On the other
hand, by applying const_antly the law l.ndicated by the forum's
special conflicts rules on legitimation or adoption, consistency
in deciding the effects of the same marriage or adoption is
promoted. The latter consideration appears preferable.
D.x 930.I.II6; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE
RAAPE, 50 Recueil 1934 IV 494·
185 LEWALD, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 454·
183 SAVATJER,
184

318

no, 279•
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Effect of Foreign Legitimation on Inheritance Rights

2.

Where a child has been legitimized under the law of state
X and an inheritance is governed by the laws of state Y,
should the effect of the legitimation on the inheritance be determined under the inheritance law of X or Y? This much
discussed question has no serious significance, if we understand legitimation to mean an act elevating the illegitimate
child to full legitimacy. The analogous question concerning
foreign adoption is less simple, because an adoption may pro- ·
duce various degrees of rights. It is obvious that full recognition of a foreign legitimation assi~ilates the child to legitimates in the sense of any statute of distribution which does not
except legitimized children, an exception practically occurring
only in anachronistic applications of the Statute of Merton. 186

VI.

RELATIONS BETWEEN LEGITIMATE PARENTS AND CHILD
A.

RULES

A comparative survey of this topic has to face a situation
similar to that encountered with respect to the effects of marriage. The Continental systems start from a comprehensive
notion of parental power, historically derived partly from
the Roman patria potestas, partly from the Germanic munt,
and result in the recognition of a status governed by the personal law of the parent. In common law, much is left to the
rules concerning contract, tort, and support; the remaining
small domain of domiciliary law is difficult to define.
Even so, we may be astonished at the scarcity of conflicts
rules that are discussed in this country with respect to parental
rights and duties. The Restatement(§§ 144-148) devotes to
parental power as a status only one conflicts rule, subjecting
"custodianship" of a legitimate child to the law of the father's
domicil at the time of birth, and treats jurisdiction for modify186

See cases cited supra p. 58 5, n.

I
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ing custody in a few sections. Support and domicil are dealt
with separately, but neither personal property of a child nor
the authority of a parent to act for the child are expressly
mentioned in the chapters on property and contracts, respectively. Such subjects as personal services and earnings of children do not seem to fit under any rule of the 'Restatement.
This neglect, of course, is not accidental. Whereas Wharton
and Story dedicated some space to the differences of civil and
common law conceptions about this matter, subsequent writers
seem to reduce the "status" of legitimacy to custodianship,
which word, used in this connection, probably means no more
than personal care and education, excluding maintenance
(which otherwise may be included in the term). Exactly as
with respect to matrimonial rules, the methods of civil law
and common law are divergent; concentration of the effects
of legitimacy under the aspect of family law in the Continental
conception contrasts with dispersal into several topics in the
American system. To account for all implications of the personal law, we have to base our survey upon the broader scope
of the civil law doctrines.
I.

Personal Law of Father

Wherever the unity of the family law is in the foreground
of thought~ the personal law of the father is deemed to determine the relation between both parents and the child, even
when, as today, wife and child may have separate personal
laws. This has remained the rule especially in Germany, Italy,
Belgium, Japan/ 87 and in the French dominant opinion/ 88
187 Nationality:
Germany: EG. art. 19 sentence r.
Italy: C. C. (1942.) Disp. Pre!. art. 2.0 par. 1.
Belgium: RoLIN, 2. Principes 100 no. 587, 646; POULLET 482. no. 374;
Novelles Belges, 2. D. Civ. 759·
Japan: Law of I 898, art. zo.
China: Law of 1918, art. IS.
188
France: Cass. (civ.) (Jan. IJ, I873) S.I87J.x.q, Clunet 1874, 2.45; Cass.
(civ.) (March I4, 1877) S.x878.I.2.5, Clunet 1878 1 167 (in this case the
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where the national law of the father governs the entire complex of relations, as well as in other countries, including
Switzerland, 189 where the law of the father's domicil governs.
Correspondingly, in this country, "custody" is governed by
the domiciliary law of the father, 190 although sometimes the
opinion is expressed that parental power should always be
subject to the local policy of the parties' momentary residence.191 The only exception to the rule of the foreign domicil
should be urgent public policy, and this not so often as is
generally claimed.
2.

Cases of Different Nationalities

The now frequent cases where the parties have different
personal laws are treated variously.
(a) Certain writers of the civil law countries, now followed
by some legislations and courts, suggest that a personal law
of the child different from that of his father should prevail. 192
The favorite argument for this view is that paternal power in
modern law serves only the welfare of the child; this is true,
but it is no argument for the national or domiciliary law of the
child.
parents were Frenchmen and the child a foreigner). See NIBOYET 784 no. 6741
and for cases ibid. 7841 no. 67 5; SURVILLE 47z n. I; PILLET, 1 Traite 659 no.
328.
189 Domicil: Switzerland: (for Swiss citizens abroad) NAG. art. 9· Treaty of
Montevideo on international civil law, text of 19401 art. 181 correcting the
existing art. 14.
190 Restatement § 144 combines this rule with § 30 deClaring that the child
normally shar~s the father's domicil; thus no change of award of custody would
occur regularly against the law of the father's domicil under§ 145.
191 See especially 1 WHARTON § § 253
1 254· For England, WESTLAKE
§ 4 infers from the old case of Johnstone v. Beattie (1843) 10 Cl. & F. 42 1 113 1
114 that the authority of a foreign parent over his child living in England is
recognized to the extent to which an English parent would have similar
authority, whatever that means.
192
Finland: Law of 19291 § 19.
Codigo Bustamante art. 69 (with broad exceptions on which later).
Austria: see WALKER 786.
France: SURVILLE 468 no. 319 1 ibid. 472 no. 320 n. 2; DESPAGNET 8zx no.
269 II; CHAMPCOMMUNAL1 Revue 19101 716 1 718; WEISS 1 4 Traite 27 1 1461
164; Cour Paris (Aug. 51 1908) Clunet 1909 1 173.
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The problems of the common law lie on another plane.
British law, followed in this instance in Scotland, 193 recognizes
the jurisdiction of the child's domicil as competent, although
not exclusive. Likewise in this country," the state of domicil
of the child can change the custody of the child from one
parent to the other, or to, or from both." 194 The courts apply
their own substantive laws, but the doctrine of the child's
domicil by operation of law corrects this apparent rupture
of the system. 195 So long as the family lives together, there
is no question at all; even if the community is disrupted by
one parent abandoning the child or by separation or divorce
of the parents, the child is considered domiciled with one of
the parents.
(b) The Polish law has adopted the last national law
common to both parties, as in conjugal matters. 196
(c) The recent Greek Code, elaborating the subject matter, makes the relation between legitimate parents and their
child dependent: (i) upon the national law that was last common to the father and the child; (ii) in absence of such, upon
the law of the father at the birth of the child; (iii) if the
father is dead, upon the last law common to the mother and
the child; and (iv) in absence of such, upon the law of the
mother at the death of the father. This symmetrical solution
solves all possible cases but is arbitrarily chosen. Moreover, in
both this and the Polish regulations, paternal rights and duties
are determined by a law that may be alien to both parties for
the time being. 197
Brazil: 2 PoNTES DE MIRP.NDA. uo.
The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (May 18, 1934) W. 12791 (authority of the
father, a foreigner, over a Dutch child, determined by Dutch law).
193 Ponder v. Ponder [1932] Session Cases 233,4 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. u3.
194
Restatement § 14 5.
195
Restatement § 3 3.
196 Poland: Law of I 926 on international private law, art. I9; criticized by
SCHNITZER 209 n. I.
197 Greece C. C. I 940, art. I 8. See also infra p. 6o 8.
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(d) In another opinion, both laws are to be cumulatively
applied. 198
(e) Also the law more favorable to the person sued on account of an obligation of parent-child relationship has been
advocated. 199
(f) The law of the forum has been applied, where one
party was a national of the forum, sometimes as an expedient
because of the unsettled conflict laws, but in France as a
declared policy where either the father or the mother is of
French nationality, even though the child be a foreigner. 200
3· Renvoi
Where the rule refers to foreign law, renvoi may be applied ..2ol
B.
I.

ScoPE OF THE RuLES

Maternal Rights

The rules outlined above determine what rights the mother
has during the father's lifetime and after his death.
Illustration: After the death of his German father, a son
was entrusted to an uncle in Italy and later was released from
his German nationality. It was held that, under German conflicts law, the mother, being of German nationality, retained
1 8
~ z ZITELMANN 889; 4 FRANKENSTEIN 70, n. 161; CAVAGLIERI Z4Zj FEDOZZI soz; Trib. Venezia (Jan. 30, 19JZ) Z4 Rivista (193Z) 106; see contra:
RAAPE 464.
19
9 E.g., Cass. ltal. (July 31, 1930) Monitore 1931, IJZ.
200
Cass. (civ.) (Jan. q, 1873) 8.1873·1.13, D.1873.I.Z97· Cf. RoLIN, z
Principes 187 no. 649. Cass. (civ.) (March 14, 1877) S.1878.1.z5, D.1877.1.
385; cf. Clunet 1878, 167. App. Bordeaux (July z3, 1897) Clunet 1897, 10z8.
Germany: German law applied where the mother is of German nationality and
the child stayed with the mother in Germany, see RG. (Feb. zo, 1913) 81 RGZ.
373; OLG. Miinchen (Aug. z4, 1938) HRR. 1938, no. 1463.
201
Germany: (although EG. art. z7 does not expressly order renvoi in this
case), RG. (Dec. z9, 1910) JW. 1911, zo8, ZJ Z.int.R. (1913) 336 (Australian
party); Bay. ObLG. (March q, 19t'z) 13 Bay. ObLGZ. 136, z6 ROLG. z57;
Bay. ObLG. (April u, 19u) 4z ROLG. u6 (New York parties); KG. (April
17, 1914) Jz ROLG. 31 (Russian from Baltic province); Bay. ObLG. (Oct.
16, 19z5) Z4 Bay. ObLGZ. z7o.
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her maternal powers, so that no guardian was to be appointed. 202
2.

Personal Care

The content of paternal or maternal rights embraces "care,
advice and affection," 203 in other words, personal care and
education. Religious education is included, insofar as it is considered of private concern 204 and the foreign law does not
offend public policy by compromising religious freedom. 205
The law governing parental relations extends to the action
by which a parent entitled to custody sues the other parent for
restitution of the child; 206 in the prevailing opinion, also
after a divorce, this law excludes the law under which the
divorce has been granted. 207
The French decisions are divided; the majority apply
French law under the color of public policy/ 08 and an English
court is likely to follow the same method in the case of a
ward of the court. 209 In the United States, it seems difficult
to tell in what cases a cour~ may be inclined to apply a foreign
law. Correction and chastisement have always been indicated
as an example of parental power limited by the territorial
habits of the place where they are exercised. 210 Probably a
202
OLG. Dr~sden (Jan. 16, 19oo) 21 Ann. Sachs. OLG. 309 no. 15. Similar:
. A Dutch widow has no maternal power and therefore cannot be authorized by
the court like a German mother to alienate her child's immovables, KG. (Oct.
10, 1907) 35 Jahrb. FG. A 15.
203
Simonds, J., In re Frame [1939] Ch. D. 7oo, 704.
204
KG. (July 26, 1904) 15 Z.int.R. (1905) 325.
205
DIENA, 2 Prine. 191; RAAPE 476.
206
RG. (Nov. 14, 1912) 68 Seuff. Arch. 163, 23 Z.int.R. (1913) 316
(Austrian law); RG. (May 23, 1927) IPRspr. 1926-1927, no. 79 (Bulgarian
law; the form of procedure, however, is subject to the law of the forum).
207
Supra p. 533; Bay. ObLG. (Oct. 8, 193o) IPRspr. 1931, no. 84.
208 See Trib. civ. Seine (June 18, 1934} D. H. 1934· 471, Clunet 1935, 619
and the practice reviewed by BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937, 427ff. who wishes
that a foreign personal law be observed with vigilant criticism rather than to
be neglected.
209 See In reB-'s Settlement, B- v. B- [1940] Ch. 54·
210 1 WHARTON § 254; Codigo Bustamante art. 72.
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parent's renunciation of his right to visit would be held contrary to public order, as has been held in Germany. 211
The requirement of parental consent to the child's marriage, as discussed earlier, is included in parental rights under
civil law, while it is categorized with formalities according to
the traditional British view and is, without qualification, subject to the law of the place of celebration under the American
conflicts rules.
3· Duty of Providing a Dowry
Whether a parent has a duty to settle property as a dowry
for his daughter, as he has under the German law but not
under Dutch law, is a question determinable under the rules
outlined above. 212
4· Protecting Interference by Courts
Many cases have dealt with the power of courts to protect
children who are resident at the forum, against parents who
are foreigners. German courts are ready to recognize that it
is primarily a matter of the personal law of the parent,
whether and under what conditions parental rights can be
abridged or terminated. Such remedies as are provided in the
Italian or the Dutch civil codes have been found sufficient. 213
Where the national law did not offer an adequate basis for
intervention of the German court, temporary measures were
always permitted. 214 Incidentally, where the welfare of a
211 KG. (Nov. 14, 1930) IPRspr. 1931, no. 8.
212
RG. (April u, 1923) Leipz. Z. 1923, 449·
213
KG. {June 5, 1921) 53 Jahrb. FG. A 56 {Italian law); KG. {Nov. 28,
1913) 45 Jahrb. FG. A 18 (Dutch law). See also KG. (Sept. 6, 1935) JW.
1935, 3483 {applying Austrian law); Bay. ObLG. (Dec. 6, 1933) JW. 1934,
699 and Bay. ObLG. (Feb. 14, 1934) JW. 19341 1369, IPRspr. 1934, nos. 63,
64 (Lebanon law).
214
RG. {May 23, 1927) IPRspr. 1926-1927, no. 79 and cited writers. In a
constant practice sec. 63 par. 1 (2) of the Law on Youth Welfare of July 9,
1922, providing for emergency education of depraved children, is applied to
foreigners. See RG. (June 30, 1927) 117 RGZ. 376; RG. (May 22, 1933) JW.
1933 1 45,5 Giur. Comp. DIP. 137 no. 51.

PARENT AND CHILD

599
child resident within the country appeared to be menaced,
public policy was often invoked in favor of the local remedies,
but this view has been challenged recently. 215
A similar practice in favor of the personal law exists, for
instance, in the Netherlands. 216 In Switzerland parents domiciled within the country are subject to Swiss law under the
domiciliary principle itself. 217
The lex fori at the domicil of the child simply is applied in
the United States 218 for controlling and transferring custody.
The Bustamante Code expressly reserves the law of the
forum, depriving the parents of their power "by reason of incapacity or absence, or by judgment of a court." 219 To justify
the similar practice of the French 220 and the Belgian 221
courts, an author who is otherwise not favorable to extending
public policy has adduced that mistreatment of a child arouses
public indignation and harms morals. 222
Also in the countries prepared to observe foreign law, temporary residence is sufficient not only to bring provisional
legal aid to the child so long as the national country does
1215
KG. (Jan. u, I934) IPRspr. I934, no. 62 denies jurisdiction as to
foreigners if any one of the parties interested in an order regulating custody or
right of visitation is not to be found within the territory of the state. OLG.
Miinchen (May I8, I938) HRR. I938, no. u8I, (although the child was at
the forum, depriving the Bulgarian father of his powers was held excluded because the Bulgarian law did not recognize such a measure).
216
The Netherlands: Rb. den Haag (Jan. I3, I939) W. I939> no. 2.86
(although the wife was Dutch and the parties lived in the Netherlands, Austrian
and German laws were applied as the child's national law, the mother was
entrusted with the personal care, and the father excluded from visiting the child).
217
BG. (Sept. 29, I 927) Praxis I927, 456. The powers of a Dutch father
(domiciled in the Netherlands) are characterized under Dutch law: BG. (Feb. 3,
1939) 6s BGE. 1 I 3•
218
Restatement § I 48.
219 Art. 72.·
22
France: Law of July 2.4, 1889 as amended Nov. 15, I92.I; on the application to foreigners see PILLET, Clunet 1892., -5, and I Traite 66o no. 32.8; WEiss,
4 Traite I57; App. Colmar (March 2.8, 1935) Clunet 1936, 642..
221
Belgium: Law of May 15, I912 on Protection of Minors; for application
of provisions on the forfeiture of parental power to foreigners see App. Liege
(July Io, I917) Pasicrisie 1917.2..2.54; Trib. Liege (Nov. 2.3, 19I7) Pasicrisie
I9I8.3.82..
222
BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. I937> 418, 42.9.
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not assume its care,223 but also to assist a father or mother in
coercitive actions against a child, according to the locallaw. 224
6oo

5. Parental Interest in Child's Property
The Roman paternal ccdominium'' in all family property
had given way in the imperial period to a right of "administration and enjoyment" upon property acquired by the children and not excepted from this right. Property either of infants or of children less than eighteen years old is still
subject to such paternal encroachment in many civil law countries,225 including Louisiana. 226 By some American statutes,227 a parent has control of the property given by him to
the child, although only as an administrator. Such control in
the predominant interest of the child, with or without 228 duty
to account for the revenue, is frequent in modern legislations. 229 Common law and the legislations of Sweden and
Czarist and Soviet Russia do not contain any such legal powers
of parents, but at common law parents have a right to the
earnings of the child, which right affects the property as
well as produces obligations. In other countries, on the con223 For this situation see Bay. ObLG. (Feb. I4, I934) IPRspr. I934, no. 64;
Swiss BG. (Feb. 3, I 9 39) 6 5 BGE. I I 3 (where it is stated that art. 7 of the
Hague Convention on custody does not cover the case).
224 Italy: Cass. Torino (April I3, I9o9) Clunet I9Io, 673 (Spanish parties).
Germany: KG. (Dec. I6, I9J8) JW. I939> 350 (Danish mother and daughter).
225 E.g., France: C. C. art. 3 84.
Germany: BGB. § § I649, I6p.
Switzerland: C. C. art. 2.92..
Italy: C. C. (x865) art. 22.8, C. C. (I942.) art. 3Z4·
Argentina: C. C. art. 287 (new pi).
Brazil: C. C. art. 389.
Mexico: C. C. art. 43o.
Peru: C. C. (I936) art. 398, 8.
Japan: C. C. arts. 89o, 89I.
China: C. C. art. Io88 par. 2..
226
La. Civ. Code Ann. (Dart. I932) art. 22.3.
227
Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri; see 4 VERNIER 23 § 232.
22
8 E. g., Austrian Allg. BGB. § x
229
See VEITH, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 782.
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trary, earnings are a favorite exception to the management or
usufruct of the parents.
In the law of conflicts, immovables must be treated separately, because of their particular position at common law.
(a) That immovables are governed by the lex situs also
in regard to the paternal rights, 230 was a doctrine shared by
many statutists and older French authors. 231 In more recent
times, no civil law text has followed this doctrine, 232 except
the Montevideo Treaty of 1889; 233 its new draft of 1940
joins the general doctrine of the civil law, that the entire assets of the child are governed uniformly by the personal
law. 234 This is the domiciliary or national law, ordinarily of
the parent, while in the C6digo Bustamante it is again the law
of the child. 235 For instance, the usufructuary interest allowed
to a parent by the French Civil Code (art. 384) is said to
depend upon the personal law of the parties. 236
But how is this mutual recognition among the countries
adhering to the personal law to be effectuated? For illustration, the French and German paternal rights in the real
property of a legitimate child are of different nature. The
French right is an ordinary usufruct; the German one has a
special character and is not recorded in the land register; they
230

STORY § 463; WESTLAKE§ 166.
See COLMET-DAAGE, Revue de droit fran~ais et etranger I 844> 401, 406;
TROPLONG, z Droit civil explique, privileges et hypotheques, no. 429 (the legal
·hypothec upon French immovables of a guardianship has been established abroad,
since the "statute" is a "real one") .
232 Legal provisions in Germany: EG. art. 19 ; Poland: Law of 19 26 on
international private law, art. 19; Italy: C. C. ( 1942) Disp. Pre!. art. 20 par. 1;
C6digo Bustamante art. 70.
Doctrine and practice in Belgium and France: see 6 LAURENT 3 6 § 15; ROLIN,
2 Principes 183 no. 646; WEISS, 4 Traite rso, 151; Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 13, I87J)
D.1873·1.297; Cass. (civ.) (March 14, 1877) S.r878.r.25, D.r8n.r.385,
Clunet 1878, 167.
For the provisions of German EG. art. 28 and Polish Law of 1926, art. 19
par. 3 respecting the Anglo-American treatment of immovables, see supra p. 342.
233
Treaty on international civillaw (1889) art. 15.
234
Treaty on international civil law (1940) art. 19.
235 Art. 70.
236
SURVILLE 469 no. 319.
231
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differ also as to the periods of duration. If the father is of
French nationality, should his right be transformed with
respect to German immovables into a German ccNutzniessung;"? 237 This suggestion would amount to applying the law
of the situs as at common law. The system of personal law requires rather that the French type of right be recognized in
its true nature in Germany; 238 consequently it should be
recorded in the German public register to satisfy the requirement of the law of situs for creating an ordinary usufruct.239
(b) Personal property of the child is submitted everywhere to the personal law, i.e., the domiciliary law 240 or the
national law 241 of the parent.
The C6digo Bustamante limits the domain of the personal
law, by the proviso that no prejudice shall arise in. foreign
countries "to the rights of third parties which may be granted
by local law and the local provisions in respect to publicity and
specialty of mortgage securities." 242 In the other countries
this limitation is included in the rules on property themselves.
6. Authority of Parent
A parent generally is entitled to represent his child i:n private transactions or court proceedings dealing with its personality as well as its property. The system of personal law
embraces all connected problems, such as the question whether
the parent is able to act on behalf of the child by force of law,
or must be appointed guardian, or needs authorization by a
court or a family council for the special purpose.
Illustration: A German prince had a minor son who was a
British subject. The question for what transactions on behalf
of the son's property the father needed the consent of the
237 This was suggested by RAAPE 463, 476, 487.
138 RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) z41, z78. ·
239
4 FRANKENSTEIN 49•·
240 1 WHAR.'J'ON § zss {adhering to German writers).
241
Seee. g., German EG. art. 13; NIBOYET 785 no. 675.
142 Art. 71·
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court controlling guardianship was decided by a German
court in accordance with the father's German law. (EG. art.
19; BGB. § 1643). 243 To the same effect, an English
father, 244 a Dutch mother, 245 and an American father 246
were deemed, according to their respective laws, to be without
authority to represent their children, so that temporary trustees
had to be locally appointed.
The practical difficulties and great costs involved in procuring sufficient authority in some states of this country have
thus come to be noticed in German courts. In one case, for
this reason, the American father preferred to let the child's
property remain in Europe. 241
It is doubtful, however, whether such observance of foreign
law is usual in many countries. Common law conceptions are
opposed to subjecting dealings with immovables to the personal law, and this view is shared in certain civil law countries. 248 As to movables, the law governing contracts enters
into competition. Finally, peculiar considerations of convenience have a strong influence upon all rules respecting administration of estates. For these reasons, the subject ought
not to be discussed further at this place.
7. Duties of Support
Support due to children by parents and to parents by children is in most countries the subject of specific obligations de243 KG (March 141 1910) 39 Jahrb. FG. A 198 (expressly rejecting the
application of the child's law).
2uLG. Darmstadt (Sept. 9 1907) 9 Hessische Rechtsprechung (1909) 13
1
~~

.

245

KG. (Dec. 19, 1907) 35 Jahrb. FG. A 151 19 Z.int.R. (1909) 239 1 242.
Hs AG. Tauberbischofsheim (June 14, 1910) zo Z.int.R. (1910) 545· Other
German cases: RG. (Feb. 9> 1925) 110 RGZ. 173 (a Polish father needed
authorization by the Polish court for disposing of a German immovable under
the Polish law). RG. (March 28, 1931) JW. 1932, 588 (an Italian mother,
living with the child in Germany, needed authorization by an Italian court). KG.
(AprilS, 1914) Recht 1914, no. 2691 (an Austrian father must have the consent
of court for repudiating the child's share in a succession on death, etc.).
247
0LG. Dresden (March 4, 1913) 35 Ann. Sachs. OLG. 63,13 Z.int.R.
(1903) 467.
248 In the Netherlands the personal law of the parent governs also in respect
to immovables; see for cases VAN HASSELT 91 § 9·
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pendent on legitimacy. 249 There is the same contrast as in
matrimonial matters, 250 between the rule asserted by the Restatement (§ 458) m of applying the law of the forum and
the systems established upon the assumption of familial duties
to support. 252 In such countries as France, the law of the forum
is applied only as a check upon the foreign national law under
the theory of public policy, but it operates on a large scale. 253
Also in England, it has been considered a common law rule
that "liability of a father to maintain his son must be determined by the law of the place of the father's domicil." 254
It has been inferred from this rule that generally any alimentary liability is governed by the law of the domicil of the
person against whom a claim is made. 255 This seems a doubtful conclusion. Should not the law of the head of the family
govern?
8. Determination of Domicil of the Child
The old rule of private law confers upon the child the
domicil of his father by operation of the law, irrespective of
the factual circumstances. 256 This is still so much a normal
249 In the United States, most statutes provide maintenance for natural children
while in twenty jurisdictions only legitimate or legitimized children have the
right to support, see 4 VERNIER § z 34·
250
Supra pp. 31.4-325·
25 1 For important complements, see Restatement, New York Annotations

306 § 457·

252 Germany: According to the dominant opinion, EG. art. 19 is applied (law
of the parent); see LG. Frankfurt (Oct. z9, 1931) JW. 1931., 1.307, IPRspr.
193z, no. 91. Italy: Cass. (July 31, 1930) Monitore 1931.1.qz n. 10 (prefers
the personalla w more favorable to the debtor! )
253 NAsT, 1 Repert. 400 no. 38. In Belgium: the same trend of the courts is
noticed by PouLLET 481 no. 373, who advocates the standard of the forum only
as minimum award; cf. supra p. 31.4·
254 Salter, J., in Coldingham Parish Council v. Smith [1918] z K. B. 90, 96.
255 DICEY 551 Rule 143 (i) (z), 550 n. i.
256 Thus the German BGB. § 11 says simply: A legitimate child shares .the
father's domicil. Restatement§ 30. Swiss BG. (June 6, 1907) 33 BGE. I 371,
378. The English cases have not properly decided whether a child really retains
its father's domicil as of the birth invariably throughout minor age; see FosTER,
"Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," 16 Brit. Year Book
Int. Law (1935) 84 at 87.
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conception that in interpreting the Treaty of Versailles a minor
has been considered resident at the place where his father or
guardian was residing. 257 Modern conceptions, however, have
established exceptions to the rule in more and more countries. 258 Moreover, the cases in which the child shares in the
domicil of the mother are not identical in the various jurisdictions.
Of general interest is the case where the husband of the
mother contests the child's legitimacy by a suit at the court of
his own domicil on the ground that this is the legal domicil
of the child. It has been objected that the law there in force
is operative only when the child is born in lawful wedlock,
which the plaintiff denies. However, the German Reichsgericht encounters this argument of a vicious circle (unduly
popular in the law of conflicts) by the consideration that a
child is to be regarded as legitimate so long as its position is
not destroyed by judgment. 259
Characterization. But the main question is, which law, the
personal law or the law of the forum, should operate in determining domicil by force of "law"? The general idea prevailing in this and other countries has been that, for the
purposes of jurisdiction and venue, "domicil" has to be charac- ·
terized according to the local law of the forum. 260 The Reichsgericht, however, declares that the foreign family law, as the
personal law of the father, is applicable even though the problem is of a procedural character. 261 Jurisdiction in particular
for disputing legitimacy, thus, becomes a privilege of the court
at a domicil recognized by the country of the parent, a limi257 Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (Oct. 19/Dec. 14, 1927, Feb.r,
1928) 7 Recueil des decisions des tribunaux arbitraux mixtes 502, commenting
on art. 296 of the Treaty of Versailles.
258 C/. Restatement § § 3 r ff.
259
RG. {Jan. u, 1939) HRR. 1939, no. 376.
~France: App. Toulouse (May 22, r88o) Clunet, r88r, 6r.
261 RG. decision, n. 259 supra, and former decisions.
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tation of jurisdiction highly desirable in matters of status regarding the entire family.
Other difficulties have been realized in practice, where a
parent having custody deserts the child. To impose upon a
child the domicil of an emigrated father, as a German court
believed to be the law/ 62 is indefensible. The Restators have
found a better answer, but they maintain a fictitious domicil
of the child at the place of the parent who last abandoned
it.268 A wholly satisfactory solution would probably be found,
if the habitual residence of the child were substituted for the
legal domicil, whenever the family life is definitively disrupted.

9· Tort
It may be briefly noted in recalling the analogy of marital
relations that in this country actions for tort between parents
and child as well as responsibility of a parent for wrongful
acts of a child are purely tort matters, while in civil law they
are primarily incidents of the family law.
C.

CHANGE OF STATUS

Mutability of Incidents of the Child's Status
As we have seen, legitimacy once created under the personal
law of the parent, either by the birth of the child or by legitimation, is a permanent status. However, the content of the
rights and duties flowing as incidents from this status is, in
the dominant opinion, modified by a change of the personal
law deemed to be decisive for the child's status. 264 The same
is true where custody has been awarded or transferred by
court order; the meaning of this custody is altered, if parent
and child (at common law) move to another jurisdiction or
(in most civil law countries) change their nationality, even
I.

262

Bay. ObLG. (Feb. 14, 1934) JW. 1934, 1369, IPRspr. 1934, no. 64.
263 Restatement§ 33, to be read with Restatement§§ :1.1, 54 and 109.
264 The subject is treated principally by RAAPE 464.
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though the decree regularly will be recognized until reexamination of the situation of the child at the new forum of
the parties.
This phenomenon is the same as the better known change of
incidents of personal property rights where a movable is
transferred to another state. We have encountered a third instance in the transformation of non-pecuniary matrimonial
relations. 265 Such mutability is a general feature of rights of
an absolute character.
Illustrations: (i) An American citizen and his fourteenyear-old daughter, a rich heiress from her mother, move to
France. Hereby the father acquires (by change of domicil
and renvoi) a usufruct upon the movables and French immovables belonging to the daughter and not subject to a trust.
The usufruct is recognized in all other countries.
( ii) An Italian married couple went to Hungary and acquired Hungarian nationality in order to obtain divorce.
Afterwards both were restored to Italian citizenship. By this
fact, Hungarian law lost any influence upon further decisions
concerning the custody over the children. 266
2.

Different Personal Laws

In the case where only one of the two parties, either the
parent or the child, changes his status, the decision depends
on the person whose law governs under the conflicts rule.
Illustration: A minor German girl, by her marriage to a
Greek national, lost German and acquired Greek nationality.
But under her new Greek status, she neither became of age
nor subject to a guardianship of her husband. A German court
held that as article 1 9 of the Introductory Law to the Civil
Code considered only the national law of the parent, the
change of nationality did not affect the father's authority to
act on her behalf. 26 r
265
Supra p. 302..
266 Trib. Napoli (July q, 1932.) 2.5 Rivista (1933) 2.81.
267
OLG. Dresden (June 2.8, 192.6) IPRspr. 192.6-192.7, no. 78,
§ 1630 par. I and§ 1633.

cf. BGB.
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This rule, however, has been replaced in the Polish and
Greek Codes by rules referring to the last national law common to both parties. 268
Illustration: In the example just given, the result in a
Greek court would be the same. But if the father alone changed
to American nationality and not his daughter, their relations
. would under the Greek rule remain governed by German law,
both before and after her marriage to the Greek national.
This imitation of a rule good for protecting a wife against
her husband's arbitrary change of status is questionable. The
father is free to take minor children into a new citizenship
without their consent. Why then, should he be bound by their
unchanged nationality? Nevertheless, German law has a
similar rule, which forms an exception in favor of the lex fori;
if a German parent changes nationality while the child retains
German nationality, German law governs. 269
3· Non-retroactivity
By reasonable interpretation of the conflicts rule, a change
of status does not operate with retroactive effect upon the incidents of parental relations. The name of the child, an emancipation performed under the former law, income from
the child's property once devolved to the parent/ 70 remain
unaffected. For instance, under the German Civil Code
(§ 1620 ), a daughter has a right to a trousseau in the case of
marriage. The Italian Supreme Court granted a suit of a girl,
formerly of German nationality but Italian by marriage,
against her German mother, on the ground that the marriage
only perfected the mother's pre-existent obligation. 271 The
German Reichsgericht decided to the same effect in a case
268
269

Supra p. 595·

EG. art. 19 sentence 2. No analogous application to foreign children is
permitted in the prevailing opinion, see LEWALD 132 no. 183; RAAPE 469.
270 STAUFFER, NAG. 62 no. 2.
·
271
Cass. Ital. (July 31, 1930) 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 844.
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where a German ·father had acquired Swiss nationality. 272
Such interpretations, restricting' the impact of the change of
status, are certainly more valuable than anytheory of vested
rights of parents and children.
No American doctrine on this subject seems to exist. Results similar to those described could be reached by an analogy
to the doctrine obtaining in the case of matrimonial property.
Thus each single incident would be governed by the law of the
parent's domicil at the time of the incident.
272 RG. (April u, 1923) Leipz. Z. 1923, 449·
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Illegitimate Children 1
I.

MoTHER AND CHILD

WOMAN and her child born out of wedlock are considered to be in blood relationship; in the legislations
of the French type, however, no claim can be based
upon it before the mother recognizes the child. The relationship is characterized either as "illegitimate" and of a special
nature or assimilated to the regular mother-child relation
constituted by wedlock. Differences exist also in almost every
particular. They are mirrored by the multiformity of the conflicts rules.

A
1.

Contacts

The law of the forum is applied in the United States 2 and
under the present Montevideo Treaty. 3
1 Comparative substantive law:
RoBBINS and DEAK, "The Familial Property Rights of Illegitimate Children:
A Comparative Study," 30 Col. L. Rev. (1930) 308-329 ( a historical summary).
FREUND, Illegitimacy Laws of the United States and Certain Foreign Countries,
U.S. Dep't of Labor, Children's Bureau, Publ. No. 42 (1919).
Illegitimacy, Standards of Legal Protection for Children Born out of Wedlock,
Report of Regional Conferences, U. S. Dep't of Labor, Children's Bureau, Publ.
No. 77 (1921).
LUNDBERG, Children of Illegitimate Birth and Measures for their Protection,
U.S. Dep't. of Labor, Children's Bureau, Publ. No. 166 (1926).
TOMFORDE, DIEFENBACH, WEBLER, Das Recht des unehelichen Kindes und
seiner Mutter im ln-und Ausland (ed. 4, 1935).
REXROTH, Uneheliche Kinder, 6 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. (1938) 633-676.
2
U. S. Restatement § 454·
3
Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law (1889), art. 18: The
rights and duties resulting from illegitimacy are governed by the law of the state
in which they are claimed to be exercised.
Nicaragua: C. C. Tit. Prel. art. VI (1o).
Codigo Bustamante art. 63 as to the declarations of maternity.
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Most countries refer to the personal law of the mother,
tested by her domicil 4 or nationality. 5
Minority solutions refer to the child's personal law 6 or
resort to the so-called distributive application of both parties'
laws, so as to determine the duties of either party by his qr
her law. 7
The English law is sui generis. Only English law is applied,
and then only if the child is born in England or, if born
abroad, of English parents. 8
Scope

2.

The applicable law covers the questions:
Whether the mother enjoys a power analogous to that of a
legitimate father;
What other rights she may have over the child's person
and property; 9
Whether the child bears the name of the mother, 10 and
4 Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. uo no. 53· Also BAR § 204 was
1
of this opinion.
5 Austria: 1 EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ § z8 n. 38; WALKER 814 n. 42..
Germany: EG. art. 20 with regard to Germans but generally extended to
foreigners. RG. (May 13, 1911) 76 RGZ. 2.83; KG. (July 9> I92.4) so Z.
Ziv. Proz. (192.6) 337; OLG. Karlsruhe (Nov. z6, 1926) 37 Z.int.R. (I927)

J88.

Greece: C. C. (I 940) art. I 9: last common national law; in absence of such
the national law of the mother at birth.
Italy: C. C. (I942) Disp. Prel. art. :zo par. I.
Poland: Law of I926, art. :zo: Where the laws of mother and child di:ffer,
the last common national law.
The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (April I 7, I9J6) W. I936, no. 72.I (speaking of a case where both parties were of the same foreign nationality at the
time of birth of the child).
6 Finland: Law of December s, I 92.9, § zo.
Codigo Bustamante: art. 64 as to the name of the child. ·
7 Japan: Law of June IS, I898 art. 18; China: Law of Aug. 5 I918 arts.
1
1
1
I 6, I 7· For details see infra p. 6 r 5·
8
2 HALSBURY (I9J8) 583 no. 804.
9
Rb. Haag (Nov. z9, 1934) W. 1936, no. 652. (authority of the mother to
act knowledged under German law, while under Dutch law a guardian ought to
have been appointed).
1
°C6digo Bustamante art. 64 (law of child).
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whether the mother's husband may give his name to the
·child; 11
Whether it shares her domicil by force of law; 12 and
The question of alimentary duties of each party.
As the above mentioned conflicts rules differ greatly from
those on legitimacy, a court may have to consider a person
an illegitimate child of his mother under one law and a legitimate child of his father under another law, as, for instance,
by German conflicts rules, where the father is of Finnish nationality and the mother a German. 13 This split result approaches American principles. 14 Equally surprising is the outcome in a French case where a Polish man and an Italian
woman both recognized their child. By the father's recognition
t~e child acquired Polish nationality, and consequently Polish
law was applied; under Polish municipal law the mother had
authority to act in the name of the child, while under her own
Italian law this authority would have belonged to the father. 15
The inclination of French courts to apply French law
against all their own principles has inspired one of the most
objectionable decisions of the Court of Cassation. A French
mother recognized her illegitimate daughter, after the latter's
marriage to an Englishman had made her a British subject,
and sued for support. Although a reciprocal action of the
daughter would have been determined (and denied) by English law, the mother's claim for aliments was granted under
French law, which, in the court's conception, conferred upon
the mother "an imprescriptible right of recognizing the
child." 16 The fact that the affection of this mother for her
11 German courts and prevailing doctrine, see RG. (Nov. 23, 1927) 119 RGZ.
44; NussBAUM, IPR. r"7 5; RAAPE 49 7ff.

The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (April 25, 1923) W. II072.
12 HABICHT

158.

13 RAAPE -,500.
14

Supra pp. 559-56o.
.Triv. civ. Nice (Feb. z, 1903) Clunet 1903, 859. Cf. Italian C. C. (1865)
art. 184 par. z.
.
16
Cass. {civ.) (March 8, 1938) Revue Crit. 1938, 653, Nouv. Revue 1938,
no, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 124, criticized by BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1938, 655.
15
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daughter was evidently discovered only after about twenty
years when wealth had come to the latter should exclude any
equitable considerations that might otherwise move a court.
Change of Status. As a rule, a change of the personal law
on which the choice of law depends is determinative, the relationship between mother and child, of course, being determined originally according to the law applicable at the
time of the birth. Yet, the German Code (EG. article 20)
reserves application of German law in the case where the
mother becomes a foreigner and the child remains a German.
This contrasts unfavorably with the Dutch conceptions under
which a foreign child retains what rights it acquired by birth,
although the mother may acquire Dutch nationality and not
recognize her child according to Dutch law. 17

II.
1.

FATHER AND CHILD

Classification

Today in the domestic laws, some right of a child to support
by his illegitimate father is universally known. The nature
of the claim varies greatly, however; it may be based on a
natural obligation, a liability to exonerate the public relief
organizations from avoidable charges, tortious acts accompanying the cohabitation (rape, seduction, etcetera), the simple fact
of cohabitation itself, or the fact of impregnation. In Norway
and Finland, an obligation to pay alimony is imposed on any
man who has cohabited with the mother during the critical
period (so-called pay-father), the liability being entirely
severed from any presumption of paternity.
In addition to the support for the child, if a man is assumed
to be the true father, other incidents may be included in the
relationship between the parties, such as those concerning the
name of the child, care and education, marriage impediments,
inheritance rights of the child, alimentary rights of the father,
17 VAN HASSELT
1

Supplement 3z.
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et cetera. The municipal laws acknowledge more or fewer
of such incidents, and some of them establish a gradation according to different situations. For instance, the Swiss Civil
Code includes, besides the ordinary protection of children
born out of wedlock, the award of "status" to a child either
by recognition or, in certain cases such as seduction, by judgment (art. 323). A special kind of "illegitimate relationship"
is created with effects on name, care and education, and nationality; courts may even confer parental power on the
father. Also, the ordinary lawsuit for support may vary in
correspondence with the varying structure of the rights allotted. The child may be provided with a simple action for
payment of money, or with an action seeking a formal declaration of paternity, or, combining these two types of remedy,
with a petition for incidental declaration of paternity constituting res judicata and for adjudication of payments.
Many other differences of the municipal regulations have
made the corresponding conflicts rules a field of utter confusion, often deplored; public policy, playing a dominant
role adds complication.
In most countries, the conflicts rule is unsettled. Where
statutory provisions exist, they are imperfect or need construction. As a typical example, article 2 1 of the German Introductory Law refers to the mother's national law only for the
purpose of dete.rmining the support duty of the father. Extension of this rule to the entire relation between father and
child was assumed for a time and embodied in the Polish
Law of 1926 (article 21, paragraph 1). Opinion prevailing
now prefers for substantial reasons, to take the limitation of
the rule literally and to reserve all problems other than those
related to support to the father's personal law. 18 An action
18 See LEWALD 145 no. 2031 RAAPE 529ff.; M. WoLFF, IPR. 137; LG.
Konigsberg (May 30, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 66. Contra: NussBAUM, D.IPR.
176 n. 4> against whom 4 FRANKENSTEIN 108 n. 2..
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for support, however, although combined with a demand for
a preliminary declaratory statement of paternity, is considered
to fall under the enacted rule. 19
Recent legislators are aware of the broader sphere of the
p-roblem. The Finnish Law of 1929 establishes different rules,
the mother's personal law governing generally, while the illegitimate father's law determines inheritance rights. 20 Th~
C6digo Bustamante assigns to the personal law of the child
the rules concerning its right to a name, determining the proofs
of filiation, and regulating the child's inheritance (article 57),
but applies the lex fori to the right of maintenance (article
59). 21 Also, a draft of the Greek Civil Code made similar
distinctions; the Code rejecting them is clearly intended to
cover the entire ground, like the Polish law. 22 A similar distinction follows from the Swiss statute, which subjects status
questions, especially of domiciled foreigners, to the national
law (NAG. article 8), but purely alimentary suits, according
to general principles, to the law of the defendant's domiciJ.2 3
The courts classify the above mentioned action for declaration
of "status" as a status in the sense of the first group, and they
therefore treat it as belonging to exclusive Swiss jurisdiction. 24
The Dutch Hof den Haag recognized in 1937 an ordinary
Swiss judgment condemning a Dutchman as illegitimate
19

LG. Frankfurt a.M. (Aug. 17 1 193z) JW. 1933 1 191 1 IPRspr. 1933 1 no. 48.
7 Z.ausl.PR. (1933) 107.
21 In the French and English translations, 86 League of Nations Treaty Series
(19z9) No. 1950, pp. 137, z7o, article 59 is incorrectly restricted to legitimate
children. The French translation of article 57 is mistaken in rendering "legitimidad" by "paternite," 86 ibid. p. 137.
22 Draft, art. zs par. z (Revue Crit. 1938, 348); see MARIDAKIS, 11
Z.ausl.PR. (1938) 124; C. C. (1940) art. 20.
23 BG. (Oct. zz, 1919) 45 BGE. II 503; BG. (May 15, 1925) 51 BGE.
I xos; BG. (March 24, 1927) 53 BGE. II 89, 92.
24 The action is available only against Swiss nationals before Swiss courts; see
BG. (July 6, 1916) 42 BGE. II 332; BG. (Oct. 22, 1919) 45 BGE. II 5031 BG.
(Nov. 22, 1934) 6o BGE. II 338. Where the defendant is an Italian, Italian
law governs, and an action for declaration of status, if any, must be instituted
in Italian courts, Cour de Justice, Geneve (June 21 1 1928) 36 SJZ. (1939-1940)
2.03 no. 141.
20 HERNBERG,
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father to pay alimony, although he would have been able to
prove the defense of plurium concumbentium (several cohabitants), exonerating him under Dutch, though not under Swiss
law; the problem was thought to concern the status of the
child, determinative in the opinion of the Court. 25 The Dutch
Supreme Court, however, subsequently held that support is
not relative to status, because a preliminary declaration of
paternity is no more than a mere fact; hence, the law of the
defendant Dutchman was applied. 26
Without doubt, a conflicts rule limited to the duty of support is insufficient to cover the field, and it may well be that
the contacts should be chosen differently for support and the
other incidents of illegitimate parenthood.
Contacts

2.

The rule applying the law of the place of conception was
originated by the tort idea in European common law practice 27
and is still applied in Sweden. 28 Sometimes, the birthplace
replaces the less practical place of conception. 29
Numerous rules subject the entire matter to the law of the
forum, 30 either because the matter is regarded as of imperative
policy or becau?e it lacks a convincing classification.
Hof den Haag (April 26, 1937) W. 1937, no. 538.
H. R. (Aprilr, 1938) W. 1938, no. 989. For criticism see VANDER FLIER,
Grotius 1939, 190 and citations. An analogous decision: Hof Arnhem (Nov. 15,
1938) W. 1939 no. 299 (illegitimate child born in Czechoslovakia, and of
Czech nationality, defendant of Dutch nationality; the alimentary duty belongs
to the patrimonial law; the personal law includes, at the most, the declaration
of paternity) .
27 Former German common law: LG. Frankfurt a.M. (Jan. 25, 1893) 3
Z.int.R. (1893) SII.
~ 8 Swedish Sup. Ct. (Hogsta Domstol) {Aug. 18, 1915) 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928)
871 (Swedish defendant, cohabitation in Hamburg; exceptio plurium concumbentium admitted according to German law).
29
The Netherlands: H. R. (Feb. 7, 1919) W. 10393, N.J. 1919, 322. Italy,
interprovincial law: Cass. (April 30, 1926) Giur. ltal. 1926, I, r, 1055.
~ SAVIGNY § 3 74 at p. 279; tr. by GUTHRIE p. 254.
United States: Restatement§ 454: "No action can be maintained on a foreign
bastardy statute." C6digo Bustamante art. 59 (for aliments).
Austria: OGH. (Feb. 19, 1924) 6 SZ. no. 66; OGH. (March 4, 1937) 19
SZ. no. 70; WALKER 815 and in I KLANG'S Kommentar 328. But see infra n. 38.
2.';
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Personal law is applied in very different conceptions, as
determined by:
The domicil of the mother at the time of the conception
or birth; 31 the domicil of the man 32 at the time of the conception or the birth; 33 the domicil of the man as defendant
at the time of the commencement of the action; 34 the national
law of the mother; 35 of the child; 36 of both cumulatively; 37
Denmark: Sup. Ct. (Hojesteret) (June 22, 1915) 2 Z.ausl.PR. (I928) 865;
CriminalandPoliceCourtCopenhague (May4, I897) IoZ.int.R. (I9oo) 293·
Finland: Law of 1929, § 21 sentence 1 (for aliments); § 2I sentence 2 (for
all claims against Finns).
The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (June 29, I925) W. II424; but contra
Hof den Haag (May 2o, I927) W. 1I814; Rb. Maastricht (April 28, I932)
W. I 2684 and almost all other decisions.
The Treaty of Montevideo (I889) art. I8, Treaty of Montevideo (I94o)
art. 22 provide that the rights and duties concerning illegitimate filiation are
governed by the law of the state in which they ought to be "effective."
Similar, Nicaragua C. C. Tit. Pre!. art. VI (I o). It is highly obscure as to
what this means.
31
Domicil of the mother:
(a) At the time of birth; older Prussian practice, see Gebhardsche Materialien
2I 6.
(b) At the time of the conception: last Prussian practice before 1900 following
the thoroughly considered Plenary decision of the Obertribunal (Feb. I, x851)
37 Entsch. no. I; FoERSTER-Eccws x Theorie und Praxis des Preussischen
Privatrechts (ed. 5, x887) 64; alleged Norwegian practice, but controversial,
see CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 576 no. 128.
32
Domicil of the man :
England: Coldingham Parish Council v. Smith [I9I8] 2 K. B. 90, per Salter,
}.; WESTLAKE 105 § 58a concludes convincingly that "the liability of·a father
to maintain his son is determined solely by the law of the father's domicile."
But BEALE I433 § 457.2 infers the primary importance of the place "where
support is needed," meaning probably the domicil of the child.
Norway: Sup. Ct. (x9I8) 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 873 no. 52.
33
Switzerland: BG., Civ. Div. (March 24, I927) 53 BGE. II 89, 92, following BG., Constitutional Division (May 15, 1925) 51 BGE. I 105; Bern 47
ZBJV. 663, no. 43; see ScHNITZER 213.
34
France: NIBOYET, Notions Sommaires ( I93 7) 192 no. 320. Former obiter
dictum of the Swiss BG. (Oct. 2, I 913) 39 BGE. II 495, 499; BG. (Oct. 22,
I919) 45 BGE. II 503.
35 National law of mother:
Germany: EG. art. 2I.
Czechoslovakia: Draft of Code on International Private Law, § 36 (1),
adopted by Sup. Ct. Briinn (Dec. 9, 1927) JW. I928, 1476.
36 National law of the child:
Brazil: Sup. Trib. (Aug. 29, I9oo) 84 0 Direito 547 (inheritance by
will).
Finland: Law of I929, § 21 in fine (claims other than for aliments against
foreigners).
France: some decisions before the first world war following 5 LAURENT 5 I 5,
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the national law of the man;
cumulatively. 811

88

of the man and of the child,

3. Public Policy
(a) After having produced every possible opinion on the
subject, the French doctrine now struggles to keep a balance
between the personal (national) law of the child, which is applicable in theory, and the French law which is applied on
many grounds. In the first place, French law prevails where
French nationality depends on filiation, since it ought never
52.31!. and other writers; again in increasing consistency: Cass. (req.) (June 8,

192.1) Mihaesco, Revue 192.4, 73; Cass. (civ.) {Jan. zo, 192.5) Tomatis,
S.192.5.1·49, D.192.5.1.177, Clunet 192.5, 709, Revue 192.5, 532.; Cass. (civ.)
(April1, 1930) D.1930.1.89, Clunet 1930,973, Revue 1930,2.931 Cass. (req.)
(March s, 1935) Fernandez, D.1935•1•57• Revue Crit. I935, 775, Nouv.
Revue I935• s8; Cass. (civ.) {July zo, I936) Revue Crit. I937, 694.
Similar for foreign children: Cass. (civ.) {June 2.I, I935) Gaz. Pal. 1935.
2..348; App. Colmar (June IS, 1934) Nouv. Revue I934> 8o9.
The Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (May 2., I9I3) W. 9557, Clunet I92.o,
765 (child born in the Portuguese colony of Loanda, Dutch father, Portuguese
law); Rb. Rotterdam (June 2.5, I934) N. ]. I935• 960 ("constant practice");
Rb. Haarlem (Nov. z, I92.6) W. u697 {termination of alimentary right).
Cj. also I VAN HASSELT 78; VANDER FLIER, Grotius I9J7> I66; VANDER FLIER,
Grotius I939, I9o.
C6digo Bustamante art. 57 (c/. art. 59).
37 National law of mother and child cumulatively:
Polaqd: Law of 192.6, art. 2.I (except where both father and mother are
domiciled in Poland, art. 2.I par. z).
Writers, especially in Italy, see MoRELLI, 9 Annuario Dir. Comp. (I934)
III I42. no. 476.
38 National law of defendant:
Austria OGH. (Feb. 8, I9J8) 2.0 SZ. 64, no. 34· Cj. ibid. 2.65, no. uS; but
see for public policy, infra n. 44·
France: Courts in former periods, see J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 381 n. z,
and still App. Poitiers (Jan. 2.9, I92.9) Clunet 192.9, 1046; SURVILLE 448 no.
306; NIBOYET 757 no. 645, 763 no. 649, and NIBOYET, Note S.I92.5.I.J05.
Germany: for problems other than alimentary, see supra n. 18.
Greece: C. C. (I 940) art. 2.0.
Italy: Cass. (Oct. 2.1, 192.5) 17 Rivista (I92.6) 515; App. Milano (May u,
I9JI) Monitore I93I, 612..
Siam: Act on Conflicts Laws, Sect. 36, cf. LEWALD, Regles generales des
confiits de lois (1941) 36 n. 10.
ae National law of father and child:
France: a few decisions after the war, see J. DoNNED!EU DE VABRES 494 n. 5·
Italy: Cass. {April 7, 1932.) Foro ltal. Rep. 1932., Filiazione 686 nos. 38,
39; Cass. {July Io, 1936) 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. 145 no. 75·
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to be based on a foreign law. 40 "The question of filiation is absorbed by the higher one of nationality." 41 Only once, in a
decision of the Court of Paris, does the private law question
seem to have been duly isolated. 42 Where a child is born in
France, it is thought invested with a provisional French nationality and, for this reason, subject to French law; moreover,
it cannot lose this provisional nationality except by French
law or a foreign law similar to the French. 43
(b) In an analogous way the law of the forum prevails
in some other countries, when one party 44 or the defendant 4 ;;
is a subject of the forum, or both parties 46 dwell within the
forum. The Polish law declares Polish law applicable (instead
of the common nationality of mother and child at the time of
birth), if both father and mother are domiciled in Poland at
the time of birth and Polish law is more favorable to the
child.47 German law refuses to impose upon a German defendant a duty of support beyond what the internal law grants. 48
4
°Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 30, 192.0) D.I9ZI.I.177, S.I921.1.24I, Clunet 1923,
89; Cass. (civ.) (Feb. zs, and March 3I, 1930) D.I9JO.I.IIJ, S.I930.I.32I.
Cf. GAUDEMET, Rev. Trim. D. Civ. 19:1.1, 218; see ~upra p. 138.
41
Trib. Nancy (Feb. 13, 1904) D.I904.2.249·
~ Cour Paris (Nov. 4, 1932); cf. Cass. (civ.) (July :u, 1933) Revue Crit.
1934, 405ff., criticized by LEREBOUllS-PtGEONNIERE 414 n. I,
43
Cour Paris (July 2, 1926) D. H. 1926. 441, Clunet 19%7, 77·
"Austria: OGH. (I938) 20 SZ. 265, no. u8 (dictum).
Denmark: Sup. Ct. (Hojesteret) (June u, 19I5) 2 Z.ausl.PR. (I928) 865
and Western Court (Vestre Landsret) (Oct. 4, I928) 7 Z.ausl.PR. (I933)
924 (mere residence of the father at the commencement of the action suffices for
application of Danish law).
.
The Netherlands: often, although not consistently, see I VAN HASSELT 79
and Supplement 3 Iff.
45
Switzerland: OG. Zurich (Oct. IJ, 1936) Bl.f.Ziirch. Rspr. 1938, 39, no. 2I.
46
Germany: LG. Hamburg (Oct. 13, 1932.) IPRspr. 1932, no. 94; LG.
Frankfurt (July 30, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 7; RAAPE, 2 D.IPR. 210 (controversial) •
47
Poland: Law of 1926, art. 21 par. 2.
~Germany: EG. att. 2I last clause: "No greater claims, however, can be
enforced than what have been constituted by German law." Understood as
merely protecting Germans, RGR. Kom., n. 2 before§ 1705; LG. Hartenstein
(Nov. 18, 1929) IPRspr. 1930, no. 79· What is the equivalent of an award
under the German law? See for illustration cases in IPRspr. 1930, nos. So-83.
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These exceptions to the personal law do not leave much space
to the pretended principle. There are yet others.
(c) Where, as between foreign parties, their national law
excludes suits involving the question of paternity, the action is
dismissed as a rule by courts following the nationality principle. Thus, the Italian provision before I 93 9, that no actions
lay on the ground of paternity except in the cases of abduction
or rape, was observed in Germany, 49 France, et cetera. On
the other hand, the action is also rejected where the national
law allows but the municipal law of the forum refuses the
claim. So long as the famous maxim of the Code Napoleon
(article 340) was in full sway that "la recherche de la paternite est interdite," foreign children were unable to sue their
foreign parents in France/ 0 and the same prohibitive policy
operated in Italy/ 1 the Netherlands, 5 2 Guatemala, 5 3 etcetera.
The French courts have transferred this doctrine to their
mitigated provision, as it has stood since I 9 I 2. No action is
admitted, unless the precautions and conditions precedent provided in the present article 340 are fulfilled, i.e., unless paternity appears manifest by written evidence or recognition. In
this opinion, foreign laws more liberal than the French offend
the public order aiming at "the honor and peace of families." 54
Laws which render paternity actions still more difficult than
the French have free play. 55
48
LG. Stuttgart (Dec. 31, 1931) JW. 1932., 14.15, IPRspr. 1932., no. 93,
against RAAPE 52.1. Dutch parties: no action according to BW. arts. 338, 342.
par. 1, 343 par. 1, 344, LG. Leipzig (Sept. 2.3, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, no. 49·
But see below n. 63. The new Italian C. C. (1938) art. 2.67, C. C. (1942.) art.
2.69, recognizes four grounds for action.
60
Contra, 2. FIORE 2.72. no. 733, 2.79 no. 739, 2.83 no. 741.
61
FEDOZZI 496.
52
BW. art. 342. par. 1.
53
MATOS 32.4ff. nos. 2.71, 2.72..
54
Cass. (civ.) (Jan. zo, 192.5) S.192.5.1.49; and in most definite manner
Cass. (civ.) Rohmann c. Kellerhals es-qual (March z6, 1935) S.1936.t.89,
D.I9J5.1.61, Nouv. Revue 1935, 58, Revue Crit. 1935, 768; Cass. (civ.)
(Nov. 30, 1938) Gaz. Pal. 1939·1.2.03, Nouv. Revue 1938, 838.
65
See the criticism of BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 19 34, 61 8; ibid. 19'3 5, 61 7.
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To illustrate special points, domestic provisions respecting
the time limit within which the child's conception is presumed
are often held to be imperative. The old Prussian practice did
not follow this view; whether the European common law, determining the time as running from the 300th to the I 82nd
day, or the Prussian Landrecht, fixing it from the 2 85th to the
2IOth day should be applied, was determined according to the
domicil of the mother. 56 But the courts of Austria 51 and
France 58 refused to deviate from their own rules. Also,
whether a defendant whose cohabitation is proved may raise
the defense of several cohabitants is decided by contradictory
rules, according to the personal law or the lex fori, 59 etcetera.
Reasonably, the Swiss Federal Tribunal has stated that the
exception allowed the defendant cohabitant under article 3 I 5
of the Swiss Code, that the child's mother led a frivolous life,
does not imperatively operate against a foreign national law,
since such dissimilarities are to be borne under the principle
of territorialism (meaning domicil) dominating the Swiss international private law. 60
Finally, the award of alimony often is either simply controlled by the law of the forum, 61 or, even if the personal law
56

Prussian Obertribunal, 54 Striethorst 47 1 no. I 2.
OGH. (March 4, I937) I9 SZ. no. 70, applying Allg. BGB. § I6J.
58 France: after the time determined in C. C. art. 340, a suit is not taken in
hand, even though the child acquired French nationality only after the end of
it; Cass. (req.) (July I5 1 I936) Revue Crit. I937 1 I5I; Cass. (civ.) (May 27 1
I937) Revue Crit. I938, 82. Cj. NIBOYET, Revue Crit. I934> IJS; BATIFFOL,
Revue Crit. ·I935> 622; ibid. I938, 83; see also the criticism by CosTE-FLORET,
7 Giur. Comp. DIP. I29 no. 64.
59 Personal Law: Also on this point the Prussian courts constantly applied the
domiciliary law of the mother; see I REHBEIN 84, no. 23. Germany: personal
law of the mother against foreign defendants, see LEWALD I 44, I 46ff.; RAAPE
513· Lex fori: Austria: OGH. (Feb. I9 1 I924) 6 SZ. I 52 no. 66, and WALKER
8 I 8 n. 59, declaring the rejection of exceptio plurium concumbentium ( Allg.
BGB. § I6J) as imperative.
On the Dutch controversy, supra pp. 6 I s-6 I 6.
60
BG. (March 24, I927) 53 BGE. II 89, 94·
61 The lower Dutch courts applied the personal law of a natural father or of
the minor child to the question who had to sue for the child; but the Supreme
Court, H. R. (June q, I924) W. 11295 declared the appointment of a special
curator under art. 344h of the Dutch BW. indispensable.
57
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is primarily applied, the usual amounts of support are considered as the maximum 62 or, conversely, the minimum. 63
By the latter consideration, a foreign law granting little or
no support is eliminated as inhuman or scandalous.
What persons may be liable to support the child,64 or in
what circumstances the right to institute the action is forfeited
or lost by limitation, 65 has been held subject to the personal
law.
4· Time Element

If the law of the place of birth or the mother's personal law
at this date obtains, it is implied that a pregnant girl who, before confinement, changes her nationality by marriage or
otherwise, or changes her domicil, respectively, will thereby
affect the fate of the child she gives birth to afterwards, unless the child acquires a nationality of its own by jus soli. On
the other hand, a change in the local connections of the person
whose personal law at birth is decisive does not affect alimentary duties as once established or denied. 66 The Polish
62 France: Most decisions take it for granted that French law is applicable;
Trib. Seine (June 18, 1934) Clunet 1935, 619. BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937,
431 praises the prudence of Cass. (civ.) {July 2o, 1936) Gaz.Pal.I936.2.696,
7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 135 no. 65, Revue Crit. 1937, 694 because the court specifies the characteristics of § 1708 of the German BGB. which make the section
inapplicable in France.
Germany: RAAPE 521 contends that an award under foreign law which would
ruin the defendant should not be given. Contra: Italy: FEDOZZI 496.
63
Germany: LG. Hamburg (Oct. 13, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, no. 94; LG.
Frankfurt (July 30, 1934) JW. 1934, 2644, IPRspr. 1934, no. 7 (English
mother and child); AG. Kehl (Sept. 22, 1935) 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. 298 no.
242 (Luxemburg); LG. Hamburg (Sept. 2, 1936) JW. 1936, 3492 (Old
Rumania).
Contra: Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (March II, 1933) Clunet 1933,
1041 (Belgian public order not interested). Germany: LG. Stuttgart (Dec.
31, 1931) JW. 1932, 3831.
,
64
German LG. Hartenstein (Nov. 18, 1929) IPRspr. 1930, no. 79 (paternal
grandfather liable under Swiss law).
65
Swiss BG. (Oct. 22, 1919) 45 BGE. II 503, sos.
66
SwissBG. (March 24, 1927) 53 BGE. II 89.
Germany: RAAPE 514; same, so Recueil 1934 IV 405, 454ff.
Italy: Cass. (Dec. 2, 1933) Foro ltal.I934·I.683.
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law generalizes this rule so as to include all relations between
father and child. 67
French courts followed this rule until the first World
War 68 and occasionally later up to 1920. 69 As, however, the
cases became more frequent where a child changed its nationality between its birth and a judgment for alimentation, the
highest Court developed a peculiar doctrine amounting to the
following rules: A foreign child acquiring French nationality
is subjected to French law. 70 A child of French nationality
changing to foreign citizenship is also subject to French law on
the ground of the theory of vested rights. 71 This theory "turns
so as only to protect the lex fori," 72 a purpose which seems
disproportional to the fact that the French law is backward
on this point and puts the child at a disadvantage.
No such questions arise in this country, as each court applies its own state statute.

S· Renvoi
In this particular field, the German statute has omitted to
provide for renvoi. It has been applied nevertheless, 73 against
some opposition. 74
67

Poland: Law of 19::6, art. ::1.
VALERY 1145 no. 807; BATIFFOL, 8 Repert. 410 no. 35; 3 ARMINJON 50
no. 47• Cf. }. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 381.
69
Cour Paris (Dec. ::2, 1920) S.1921.2.97·
7°Cass. (req.) (June 8, 19::1) Mihaesco, Revue 1924, 73; CourParis (March
27, 1933) Contardo, Revue Crit. 1934, 135; Cass. (req.) {July 1 s, 1936) Contardo c. Chaffy, Revue Crit. 1937, 152; Cass. (civ.) (May 27, 1937) Roure c.
I
Maumy, Revue Crit. 1938, 82.
71
Cass. (civ.) {June 28, 193::) Revue 1932, 685 at 688, Clunet 1933, 368;
Cass. (civ.) (May 27, 1937) Revue Crit. 1938, 82.
72
}. DoNNED!EU DE VABRES 499·
73
AG. Stuttgart (Oct. 22, 1930) JW. 1931, 157, IPRspr. 1931, no. 87
(American mother: the American courts, applying the law of the forum, are
deemed to approve of the domiciliary court doing the same, following an opinion
of the writer). Also the French App. Rennes {July 24, 1923) Clunet 1924.
410 seems to apply New York law because the father still was domiciled in New
York.
74
See RAAPE, 2 D.IPR. 209; EcKSTEIN, 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. 298 no. 242.
66
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III.

RECOGNITION OF A CHILD

In the French system, adopted in many countries, acknowledgment of a child by father or mother must precede any
claim of rights on the ground of illegitimate relationship and
moreover is a condition of legitimation. In another phase,
recognition may improve the situation of an illegitimate child
without reaching full legitimation (Greece, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, and others) or only exclude the exceptio plurium
concumbentium (Germany). We are dealing therefore not
with one but several distinguishable institutions of private
law.
I.

Formalities

Formalities, which greatly differ, 75 would be expected to
suffice if complying with the place where the act of recognition
occurs. 76 But the rule "locus regit actum" is challenged by
the personal law. Dominant opinion in France, in particular,
requires a formal "authentic" declaration such as is usual
in France when a Frenchman recognizes a child abroad and
lets the local regulation determine only what solemnity "authentic" documents ought to have. 77
In the Restatement, § I 40, the law of the parent's domicil
seems to extend to all questions including formalities. Probably, this is the actual law. 78
75

F.or the United States see 4 VERNIER § 244·
Swiss BG. (Dec. 19, 1940) Praxis 1941 1 no. 9 at 23ff.
77 Trib. civ. Pau (May q, 1888) Clunet 1893, 858. Less clear Cass. (req.)
(Aug. 21 1897) D.1898.1.377> S.1900.1.283, Clunet 1898, 127 (Frenchman
recognizing his child in Singapore by a "testamentary letter," a kind of will
unknown to and invalid under English local law).
Contra: LEREBOURS-P!GEONNIERE 413 no. 348.
Germany: RAAPE po advocates the local form, but at 522 the personal law
respecting the question whether recognition can be made in a private will.
18
Cf. Richmond v. Taylor (1913) 151 Wis. 633, 139 N. W. 435, and z
BEALE 711 1 § 140.1.
76
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2.

Substantive Requirements

The personal law seems to be universally applied. It does
not have to be the same Jaw, however, that governs the alimentary obligation. Prevailingly, the domicil 79 or the nationality 80 of the recognizing parent is determinative, since
the conditions of an act burdening its author and particularly
his capacity should depend upon his law. Hence, even courts
which subject the alimentary action to the law of the child or
consider this law cumulatively proclaim the rule. Nevertheless, sometimes the law of the child, 81 or the cumulated laws
79 U. S. Restatement § 140; Pfeifer v. Wright (I930) 4I F. (:zd) 464; In
re Forney (I9I9) 43 Nev. 227, I84 Pac. 206, I86 Pac. 678; Eddie v. Eddie
(I899) 8 N.D. 376,79 N.W. 856; 2 BEALE 7II § I40.I. (the laws of mother
and child are not to be consulted, because the act is beneficial for the status of
the child).
Former Prussian law: Prussian Obertribunal (April II, I856) 32 Entsch.
kg!. Ob. Trib. 40I no. 5 I (recognition by a minor domiciled at a
place under Prussian law executed in a territory of French-Rhenish law
was invalid according to Prussian law. The court notes, at 406, as singular
that the recognition would have been valid according to Rhenish law, and
would have bound the minor as a confession of impregnation under Prussian law, if executed in a territory of the latter law; it regrets a hardship caused
"by the conflict of heterogeneous legal systems." This adds an argument to the
adoption of the lex loci actus. But, today a court would establish an extraterritorial confession, although the declaration was made abroad).
80
Brazil (former law): Sup. Trib. Fed. (Feb. 8, I896) Clunet I896, IORo,
70 0 Direito IJ, Ap. Civ. no. I4I.
France: dominant practice from I892 on, see]. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 495;
Cass. (civ.) (Jan. I7, I899) S. I899·I.I77> D.I899.I.329i Cour Paris (April
30, 1935) Nouv. Revue 1935, 7o; BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1935, 623 no. I4i
and now confirmed by Cass. (civ.) (March 8, 1938) Fontaine c. Pulteney,
Nouv. Revue 1938, 120, Revue Crit. 1938, 653. The Swiss Federal Trib. (BG.)
(June 2o, 1929) 55 BGE. I 147, I49 remarks that this theory is necessitated by
the effect of the recognition on procuring the child French nationality.
Germany: RAAPE 523, III 3 (a).
Greece: App. Athens no. 445 (I896) Clunet I897, 621.
Italy: Cass. (April 7, 1932) Foro Ital. Rep. 1932, 686 nos. 36 and 39; Cass.
(July 10, I936) 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. 145, no. 75·
Switzerland: BG. (Dec. :z:z, I909) 35 BGE. I 668, 675; Just. Dep., BBl.
I939, II 283 no. xI (a former Swiss national, naturalized in Canada, cannot
adopt children in Switzerland complying with Swiss law only). Correspondingly,
the BG. (Dec. 19, 1940) Praxis I94I, no. 9 at 23 has applied NAG. art. 28
to the recognition by a Swiss father domiciled in France, thus determining the
effects by renvoi under Swiss law.
8! C6digo Bustamante art. 57·
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of the parent and child, 82 or the child's law limited to the
capacity and consent of the child, 83 have been adopted or advocated. In the only American case that is known to be in
point, 84 Italian law, being that of the child's domicil, was applied, and on this basis the court held it sufficient that the
father, newly immigrated, had executed a power of attorney
in Philadelphia and sent it to Italy, whereupon his agent recognized the child formally in Italy. The fact that the man had
been domiciled in Italy, at least until a short time before,
and for the time being perhaps was merely resident in this
country, may have influenced the decision. But it would be
reasonable to recognize the validity of a recognition sufficient
by the child's law where, as in this case, the parent practically
makes an appearance in the child's country. Still more can be
said in favor of giving the child those remedies for opposing
a recognition, or for contesting its validity, which the child's
own law provides. 85

3· Scope
The personal law determines:
Who may recognize, e.g. after the parent's death;
Under what conditions; 86
Among French writers, recently, NIBOYET 769 no. 65o; LEREBOUR.sPIGEONNIERE 4I8 no. 350; BATIFFOL1 Revue Crit. I938 1 655 (insists on this
opinion even after the decision of the court of cassation of March 8, I 9 3 8).
82 United States: TAINTOR, "Legitimatioil, Legitimacy and Recognition in the
Conflict of Laws," I8 Can. Bar Rev. (I940) 589 at 612.
France: Some decisions and writers, see WEISS, 4 Traite 461 3 AR.MINJON 47
no. 44££., AuoiNET1 Note S.I9zo.z.65.
Belgium: PouLLET su no. 391.; Novelles Belges, z D. C\v. 6I9 1 no. 587.
Italy: ANZILOTTI 1 1. Rivista (I907) IIS; DIENA1 1. Prine. I8I; CAVAGLIERI
'-44ff.
83
Japan: Law of June IS, I 898 1 art. I 8.
China: Law of Aug. 51 I9I8 1 art. I3 (speaking of "recognition").
84
In re Moretti's Estate (I9JZ) I6 D.&C. (Pa.) 7I5 1 commented on by
TAINTOR, I8 Can. Bar Rev. (I94o), supra n. 8z 1 at 6u.
85
Italy: Cass. (April 71 I93z) Foro ltal. Rep. (I9Jz) 686 nos. 38 and 39·
The Netherlands: VAN HASSELT, 6 Repert. 634 no. I95·
86
The Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (Jan. '-7• I9I3) W.9438 and (May :z,
I913) W. 9557 (paternal recognition under foreign law during the lifetime of
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Whether before the child's birth, and whether after its
birth;
Whether the child must have reached a certain age;
Whether the child's consent is required;
Whether adulterine children can be recognized and under
what conditions; 87
Under what conditions and by whom a recognition may be
contested; 88
And, as submitted earlier, all effects of recognition. 89
The effect of acknowledgment or recognition on the problems of succession upon death, in any consistent rule, should
be determined by the same rule as that governing the formation of the act, 90 unless the inheritance statute either rejects
children born out of wedlock or admits illegitimate children
the mother without her consent recognized, although prohibited by BW. art.
]]g).
87

.

Bruxelles (July 15 1 1904) 17 Pand. Per. (Belg.) 1904, no. 859, Novelles
Belges, 2 D. Civ. 619 no. 586 (recognition abroad under foreign laws valid);
public order is advanced by AUDINET, Revue 1917, 516 at SZ7i PoULLET 509
no. 390.
88 France: Trib. Seine (Dec. 24 1926) Clunet 1928 710 (Russian recognizing
1
1
Italian child, Soviet Russian law); App. Colmar (Nov. 28, 1930) Clunet 19321
470 (German law; on the person entitled to contest); Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 171
x8gg) S.18gg.1.t77 1 8 D.H.x8gg.I.]Z9 1 Clunet 18991 546, and Cass. (req.)
(Jan. g, 1906) Revue 1907 1 154 (case of Bourbon de Bari, I.talian law); much
criticized by the critics, ANZILOTTI, 3 Rivista (1908) 171, Note, and WEISS 4
Traite 73, 75; PILLET, Note, S.18gg.x.177 and BARTIN, Note, D.H.1899·1.334,
among others, were of different opinions).
Germany: LG. Frankfurt a.M. (Aug. I7 1 I932) JW. I933 1 I9I 1 IPRspr.
I 9 3] 1 no. 48 (in application of EG. art. 2 I, sentences I and 2 hold that the
recognition cannot be anulled but recovered as undue enrichment).
89 The Netherlands: Arbitration Court for maritime accident insurance (Feb.
26, I938) 42 Bull. lnst. Int. (I940) 69 no. I0992 (recognition under German
BGB. § I 7 I 8 does not constitute a relationship of the character required for a
right for damages by law on maritime accidents).
France: in the case of Cass. (civ.) (March u, I936) Revue Crit. I9]61 7I4
with Note by NIBOYET (1), 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. I]I no. 66 with Note by
CosTE-FLORET, recognition made in Saigon, Indo-China, by an English father
was considered invalid on the ground of English law, but treated as a confirmation of the natural obligation imposed on the illegitimate father in French
conception. The court applied French law without considering the con.fticts
problems involved which are new and doubtful.
90 See mpra p. 592 and infra pp. 654-658.
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irrespective of recognition 91 or irrespective of a recognition
other than as specified by the statute itself. 92

IV.

MoTHER AND FATHER

Modern statutes determine expressly the law under which
an illegitimate mother may sue the procreator or cohabitant
for the costs of pregnancy, delivery, and support. Again, they
may variously refer to the laws of the mother, 93 the mother
and child, 94 or the defendant. 95 Courts without express statutory provisions will incline to the law of the forum. 96
A problem of classification ought to be reported in this
connection. French practice gives the mother an action against
the father, ostensibly on the ground of a tort consisting in the
illegitimate intercourse, but actually as a substitute for the
remedies of support missing in the written law. The courts
award the woman, together with her own damages, alimony
on behalf of the child. Under which conflicts rule should such
a claim be subordinated in a non-French jurisdiction whose
municipal law establishes for the analogous purpose specific
family obligations? A reasonable answer should eliminate all
technical legal constructions and envisage the social purpose
of the claim. The adequate conflicts rule to deal with these
institutions is evidently bound to be independent from tort
91 United States: Moen v. Moen (I9oz) I6 S.D. zio, 9z N. W. I3 (since
under the South Dakota law every illegitimate child inherits, it is entirely immaterial what right Norwegian law attached to the recognition).
92 Van Horn v. Van Horn (I899) Io7 Iowa Z47> 77 N. W. 846 (a notorious
recognition suffices under the Iowa inheritance law, irrespective of the significance given the recognition in New Jersey).
93
Germany: EG. art. zr.
Greece: C. C. (I940) art. ZI; MARIDAKIS, Revue Crit. I938, 347 indicates
as motive of the draft, that the mother needed protection.
94
Poland: Law of I 9z6, art. z I.
95
Japan: Law of June IS, 1898, art. Z1,
:China: Law of Aug. s, 1918, art. 16.
96
E.g., the Netherlands: Law of the mother: Amsterdam (Dec. 13, 1929)
W. u193 Rb. Groningen (May ZI, 193z) W. 193z, 12479 (law of the place of
cohabitation-in the Netherlands). Rb. den Haag (Nov. z9, I934) W. I936,
no. 6sz. Fo~ former views see KosTERS 54z.
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considerations as well as from a narrow meaning of "family"
law, going directly to the question of what an illegitimate
mother is entitled to demand from her cohabitant. 97 It follows that, if the cohabitation took place in France, French
and German courts should apply to a French mother the
French remedy, and if the facts occurred in Germany? the
German family law. 98
The French courts, however, oppose to the German law
their "ordre public." 99

V.

CoNCLUSIONS

The state of chaosreported in this part could easily be reduced by a simpler, if not uniform, approach. The legitimate family ought not to be denied a unified legal regulation;
it was an entirely sound idea that the law of its head should
govern all relations of the family. The two main objections
to this axiom raised in the last decades are unconvincing. One
of these objections is associated with the nationality principle
in Continental Europe. In view of the modern trend toward
granting separate nationalities to married women and children, the conclusion is popular that the national law of the
father must yield its dominant role; that it must either concur with the children's laws or even give way to them completely. ~his may be logical, but it amounts to a new inroad upon the nationality principle itself. This principle, then,
is no longer, if it ever was, suitable as the main vehicle of
conflicts law. It will be abolished some day. So long as it is
maintained, however, the objection should be disregarded.
The only practical method consists in determining the events
affecting the life of the family according to the national law of
97 To this extent the theory of the writer, 5 Z.ausl.PR. ( I9 3 I) 26 5 has been
approximately allowed by NEUNER, Der Sinn IIO and RAAPE, so Recueili934
IV 528 to 533·
98 NEUNER and RAAPE (precedent note) seem to draw more radical conclusions.
99 App.Douai (March I, I939) Bull. Inst. Int. 1940,81 no. I1032.

PARENTAL RELATIONS
the father and, after his death, that of the mother. The other
reason for opposing the rule of the parent's law has been
derived from the need of the child to be protected. We have
tried to show that the benefit of the child ought to be protected by all legislatures and all courts rather than exclu.:..
sively by the law and the jurisdiction to which the child belongs, often only accidentally. Conflicts law must presuppose
equality among the particular national laws, statutes, and
tribunals.
Consequently, it is natural that in the countries devoted to
the principle of domicil the law of the domicil of the family
head at the birth of the child determines the latter's legitimacy; furthermore, his law at the time of a legitimation or
adoption governs the conditions and effects of such acts, as
at later dates it indicates the rights and duties following from
legitimate father-child relations. The inheritance law of a
domicil acquired after legitimate birth, legitimation, or adoption ought not to change any of their effects, unless there
is a distinct, exceptional public policy, either prohibitive or
permissive, at the forum of inheritance.
The only question less definitely answerable by theoretical
and practical considerations is concerned with the American
peculiarity of ascribing different positions to a child with respect to his father and his mother. The ideas and consequences
of this peculiarity have not been fully explained, to the knowledge of the writer.
Entirely different is the nature of the problems arising from
illegitimate filiation; French and other conflicts laws should
not have formed a category of "filiation" comprehending
all children. Of course, any act of acknowledgment or recognition by a parent is governed simply by the law of this parent.
Moreover, something can be said for the personal law of the
mother with respect to her relationship to the child. But the
relations to the procreator which are derived from conception,
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birth, or cohabitation cannot be referred, without artifices, to
the place where any one of the three persons involved was
domiciled, or was a national, and still less to the contacts at
the time of the action. As it is very important for the purpose
of a serviceable conflicts rule not to base it on any special domestic construction of the liabilities or the rights of the parties,
the simplest contact, viz., with the place of the birth, is the
most commendable. The danger that, before giving birth,
the mother may move to a locality where the law is unfavorable to her or the child, is negligible; an improvement for the
child is welcome.
These suggestions are not meant, however, to supersede the
system under which bastardy proceedings are now authorized
in this country. Support is awarded under similar considerations throughout the country, and interstate relations are the
only ones to be considered. Hence, the chief concern is with
jurisdiction, which naturally is found at the father's domicil
as well as where personal jurisdiction over him is obtained at
the mother's domicil. Every court applies its own law.
Lex fori, as a matter of fact, can be defended in this doctrine
with comparatively better justification than anywhere else.
In international matters, however, it should be avoided.
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Adoption
I.
I.

PRELI~fiNARY

OBSERVATIONS

Definition of Adoption

I

N some archaic civilizations, including the Greek, Roman,
and Japanese, adoption has been the means of continuing a house and ancestor cult threatened with extinction.
Hence, the original type of this institution implies that the
adoptive son be considered exactly in the position of a veritable legitimate male issue (Greek: vlos fJETos, made son). In
much later periods, adoption was used with the primary object
of securing the welfare of a child. In this application, the class
of persons capable of participating in the transaction was considerably enlarged (e.g., to include female adopters), and
new varieties of adoption were introduced, with restricted
effects, particularly in that the rights to be acquired by the
adopter would be limited to care and education.
As a result, the national legislations present a much varied
picture. In a number of countries, such as Scotland, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay,
adoption has never been introduced. The recent Civil Code of
Guatemala abolished the formerly existing institution of
adoption, because it had led to misuse by despoiling the assets
and exploiting the labor of minors. 1 In most of the world,
however, adoption in one form or another has been recognized
by statute. The common law countries, including England,
finally have followed this trend. However, many legislators
have thought that they had to surround the institution with
1 MATOS 394 no. Z77·
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formidable obstacles, while a strong modern current favors
adoption as. the best means of caring for destitute children.
New adoption laws in France 2 and many other countries/1
which facilitate adoption through careful investigations by
advisory offices, evidence this tendency ..
The variety of policy considerations behind the national
legislations is amazing. The Roman requirements implied by
the saying, ((adoptio imitatur naturam," have suggested many
rules regarding age and family conditions of the parties, but
these rules often also have been rejected, as for instance in
the Code Napoleon which prohibited any adoption of minors
in order to protect infants against exploitation. This rule,
recently repealed in France and Belgium, still exists in other
countries. On the other hand, only infants may be adopted
in England, Sweden, and some of the United States. Southwest Africa requires that the sixteenth year be not completed.
Other fundamental differences characterize the effects of
"adoption." In this country, some statutes declare that the
adopted person is to be considered a legitimate child to all
legal intents and purposes, but others follow the French
method of enumerating the specific rights and duties affected.
Although the latter method. is generally accompanied by
broad construction of the statutory texts, 4 the results are not
necessarily in favor of a standard of full legitimacy. Contrary
to general custom, by some laws the natural father retains
parental power, and by American and some foreign statutes
adoption does not preclude marriage with the adopter. The
child's name is subject to many variations. The statutes also
exhibit the greatest diversity with respect to the rights of in2 France: Law of June 19, 1923.
3 Belgium: Law of March 22, I 940.
Chile: Laws No. 5,343 of 1934, and No. 7,613 of 1943.
Italy: C. C. (1942) arts. 291ff.; etc.
4
4 VERNIER 406, §§ 261ff.
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terstate inheritance from and by the adopted parent, the child,
and the natural family.
An important difference consists in the fact that in many
laws the private contract effecting an adoption is construed as
the very core of the transaction, the state acting only to
authorize the agreement, while in other statutes the official
decree ordering adoption on a party's application constitutes
the essence of the act. In the latter case, the decree may be
granted either as an act of discretionary power or as corresponding to a right of the parties who have complied with
the legal conditions of adoption. Validity and revocability of
the transaction depend largely upon these premises.
Finally, the state agencies intervening differ, and official
action either precedes or follows the private agreement.
Thus, adoption forms an exemplar of the difficulties that
may present themselves in formulating a U;niform definition.
As a matter of fact, the description of adoption given in the
Restatement as a "relation of the parent and child created by
law between persons who are not in fact parent and child," 5
is certainly too narrow, since in a number of legislations
parents may adopt their natural children. If taken literally,
this definition seems also to exclude all those institutions bearing the name of adoption that do not grant as respects both
parties the full status of parent and child. Is this the real
meaning, and, if so, is it right?
A clear answer to these questions would facilitate the discussion of certain problems concerning succession upon death
by and from foreign adopted children. In the midst of this
confused discussion, a well elaborated American decision
ventured to proclaim that "A person is either adopted or not;
a woman is either married or not.... there is no such thing
as a limited status of adoption." 6 This is manifest error and~
5 Restatement § I 42 comment a.
8 /nreRiemann'sEstate (I927) 124 Kan. 539 at 542,545,262 Pac. I6-IS,
confumin~ the view held in Bilderback v. Clark (1920) 106 Kan. 737 at 742,
I

89 Pac. 977, 98o.
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a very prejudicial one. A woman is indeed either married or
unmarried, and, likewise, a child is legitimate or illegitimate,
but there are adopted children of totally different kinds. It is
of primary importance that each type should be understood
and recognized according to its merits.
No wonder that it is hard to know what is meant by adoption in every one of the national conflicts rules. At any rate,
the concept of adoption held in the municipal law of the forum
is of no direct avail. Instead, a sound construction of the
existing rules depends to some extent upon their own character. Where a conflicts rule emerges from the patriarchal thinking still characteristic of most family laws and therefore
simply refers to the law of the adopter, especially the father,
it is logical to assume that this rule is to be applied only to
transactions creating a rather complete parent-child relation
and not to an act exclusively conferring a right of inheritance
upon the child. Again, if a conflicts rule calls for the law of
the child only, this rule may embrace those kinds of adoption
that contemplate only quasi-familial care and education.
Quite reasonably, a German draft of I 929 provided for the
application of the national law of the child to govern foster
parenthood, 7 though the primary German rule determines
adoption according to the national law of the parent. Thus,
the scope of conflicts rules dealing with "adoption" may vary.
One limit, however, exists; no institution can be designated
as adoption, unless it makes the child legitimate in relation
to the adopting parent. An "adoption by the Nation" of
French war orphans is, of course, not recorded in a Swiss
register of civil status. 8
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
American writers and the Restatement speak of the ((law
governing adoption as a status"; 9 they probably mean the
2.

1

See RAAPE

601

VIII no.

4·

8 SwissBB1. 19:z4 II, :z9 no. 15.
o Restatement § 14:z (within "status," not "juriadiction"). Similar MINOJ.
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law of the forum at the domicil of a party. However, in his
treatise, Beale exclusively discusses jurisdiction for adoption.
American and English courts, in fact, appear not to be concerned with choice of law problems but only with the question
what courts have the power to create adoptions with extraterritorial effect. If so, common law is again in opposition to
civil law, which sharply distinguishes between jurisdictional
and conflicts rules and in principle applies foreign statutes.
In the civil law countries, jurisdiction for adoption does
not offer much of a problem, since for this purpose foreigners
usually enjoy the "hospitality" of the courts. It is true that
access of foreigners to the courts for the purpose of adoption
was questioned in France/ 0 but it now seems assured everywhere. A number of countries, however, refrain from taking
jurisdiction, if the homeland does not approve of it.
The main question in these countries is concerned with
choice of law, that is, primarily with selecting the law applicable to adoption of or by foreigners in the forum, but
regularly the same conflicts rule suffices to determine recognition of foreign adoptions.
The difference of method between reference to a foreign
personal law and simple application of the law of the forum
seems fundamental. It is tempting to think that the personal
law is more obviously to be complied with when the whole act
is thought to be chiefly founded upon the contract of the
parties. On the other hand, if the act of a governmental agency
or court is the essentially constitutive part within the structure
of adoption, the personal law of the parties may be neglected.
However, distinctions are not so neat in actual practice. In this
country, the personal law is never considered, although the
civil law view emphasizing the significance of the private contract of adoption has left deep traces in many statutes.
221, 222 § ror; STUMBERG 307; Note, "Descent of Foreign Lands to Child
Legitimated by Adoption," 36 Harv. L. Rev. (1922) 85.
10 The controversy on which see WEiss, 2 Traite, 234 was ended by the Law
'of June 19 1 1923 1 amending C. C. art. 345 par. r.
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II.
I.

AnoPTION oF oR BY FoREIGNERs WITHIN THE FoRuM

Law of the Forum

(a) United States. Although the cases are known to be
rather scarce and confused and certainly are contradictory, a
prevailing opinion seems to be forming to the effect that two
different grounds for assuming jurisdiction are open to election.
In the first place, it is agreed that a child can be adopted in
the state of its domicil, irrespective of the domicil and residence
of the adopting parents. 11 In the second place, th,ere is increasing authority for concurrent j~risdiction of the state
where the adopting parents are domiciled. The Restatement
does not approve of this view, except when this state has
jurisdiction over the person having legal custody of the
child or when the child is a waif and subject to the jurisdiction
of the state. 12 But the consent of the natural parents or the
guardian, wherever they may live, should suffice. 13 The few
cases which may be looked to as authority seem to justify the
unconditional jurisdiction of the adopter's domicil. 14
The domicil of the child as a basis of jurisdiction 15 has,
however, been questioned. Sometimes, a mere domicil'by
operation of law, locating the child with its natural father or
guardian, has been held insufficient without actual residence at
the same place. 16 Moreover, actual residence, particularly if
habitual, has been preferred to a merely formal domicil, since
the state where the child is dwelling is believed to have more
ability to control the person of the child and to be more
interested in its welfare. 17 In reality, neither domicil nor
GooDRICH 383 § 142 n. so, 51; Restatement § 142 (a).
Restatement § 142 (b); cj. 2 BEALE 713 § 142.2.
13 LORENZEN, 6 Repert. 349 no. 341.
.
14
GooDRICH 383 § 142 n. 53·
1
$ Strictly required by 2. BEALE 713 § 142.2 and Restatement§ 142.
16
Blanchard v. State ex rel. Wallace (1925) 30 N.Mex. 459, 238 Pac. 1004.
17
See esp. STUMBERG 3o8ff., who invokes Stearns v. Allen (1903) 183 Mass.
404, 407, 67 N. E. 349 (child in Massachusetts with technical domicil in Scot11
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residence, especially in large cities, guarantees that a court will
be able to exercise effective supervision. On the other hand,
every court, not excluding that of the adopter, will ordinarily
be eager to safeguard the well-being of the chi1d. 18 The
modern means of communication and the social relief agencies
facilitate obtaining information. The interest of the child's
consanguineous family will be better cared for by the court of
the formal domicil of the child. 19
These principles determine equally the granting of an
adoption and the recognition of a foreign adoption.
(b) British Law. Under the British Adoption of Children
Act, 1926/ 0 an adoption order is not granted, unless the applicant is domiciled and resident in England and the infant
is a British subject and resident in England. No provision is
made regarding adoptions by British subjects domiciled
abroad nor for children of foreign nationality, except that
they are excluded from adoption proceedings in England. It
is difficult to believe that no foreign adoption would be recognized with respect to British subjects, as has been suggested. 21
The implication seems rather to be "that the domicile of the
adopter at the time of the adoption is alone material." 22 But
certainly hardships are caused by the tenacious reluctance of
English courts to acknowledge that the adopter has transferred his domicil from England to a foreign country. 23
land); Rizo v. Burruel (1921) 23 Ariz. 137, 202 Pac. 234; Taylor v. Collins
(1927) 172 Ark. 541,289 S. W. 466.
18 See GOODRICH 383 § 142 n. 54·
l9 C/. the propositions as to choice of law in England by MANN, "Legitimation and Adoption in Private International Law," 57 Law Q. Rev. (1941) 112,
123 n. 44·
20 16 & 17 Geo. V, c. 29 (1926).
21 DICEY 535 n. u; 2 BEALE§ I4J.I.
22 FALCONBRIDGE, "Conflict of Laws-Legitimation by Adoption or Recognition," 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 37, at 39·
23 KEITH, "Some Problems in the Conflict of Laws," 16 Bell Yard (1935)
4, 6 (a Scotchman resident but not considered "domiciled" in England cannot
adopt the daughter of his deceased brother, even though the brother was domiciled in England and the daughter is resident there) ,
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In Canada similar restrictions obtain. Indeed, a Canadian
court has held that the adoption of a child domiciled with its
natural parents in Alberta and adopted by order of an Alberta
court, while the adoptive parents were domiciled in Saskatchewan, was invalid in the latter province. 24 Must all parties be
domiciled in the same province? Falconbridge sees a solution
of this strange conflict only in uniform and reciprocal legislation by the provinces grounded on the principle of the child's
domicil. 25 But we may infer that the system of exclusive application of the law of the forum tends to absurd results,
notably in the case where the different jurisdictions of the
parties do not recognize each other's decrees. In Quebec, jurisdiction is granted, if one party is domiciled there. 26
(c) Scandinavian Countries. The domicil of the adopter
determines the state where adoption must be sought under the
Scandinavian Convention on Family Law (art. u), which
also decides expressly that the law of the forum is applicable
(art. I 2). With respect to adoptions in other foreign countries,
the law of the forum governs under the Danish adoption law
of I 923, with certain exceptions for Danes adopting abroad
and foreign children adopted in Denmark. 27 More consideration is given to foreign law by the conflicts rules of Norway 28
and Sweden. 29
(d) Law of the forum governing formalities everywhere.
It is in the nature of a state act, necessary in all countries to
some extent to effect adoption, that all formalities required
by the municipal law of the court (or other acting agency)
must be observed. Also, recognition in another country de24
Culver v. Culver and Gammie [1933] 2 D. L. R. 538 1 with reference to
Haultain, C. J. S., in Burnfiel v. Burnfiel (Sask.) [1926] 2 D. L. R. 129.
25
3 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 85 p. 171.
26
Quebec: Adoption Act, R. s. Q. I94I, c. 324, s. s; cf. I JoHNSON 349·
27 BORUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 221 no. 54·
28
Law of April 2 1 1 9 I 7 as amended by laws of September 2 3, I 9 2 I 1 and May

24, 1935, §§ 29, 30.
25
Law of June 141 I9I7 with amendments,§§ 261 27.
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pends on compliance with the formalities prescribed by the
law under which the act is alleged to have been performed. 30
Illustration: An oral adoption agreement, completely performed by the adopted person and concluded within the
state, 31 will be given effect as creating a status by a Missouri
court of equity, but is regarded as ineffective by a Missouri
court, if concluded in Rhode Island and invalid according to
the laws of such state. 32
Courts are naturally inclined to apply this principle with
enhanced rigor when it comes to determining their own judicial procedure. Under the duty of applying foreign personal
law, conflicts arise. Thus, German courts, in the case of a Soviet
Russian adopter, refuse to confirm the contract because under
the Soviet law adoption is created by mere state act. 33 In applying a foreign law requiring that the court examine the
social advantages enuring to the child by the adoption, German courts even took it for granted that they were unable to
intervene, because under the German Civil Code the courts
(other than the court of custody) had only to inquire into the
fulfillment of certain legal conditions. They refused, therefore, to authorize adoptions by French, Rumanian, and all
other adopters whose personal law requires a substantive in-.
vestigation of the child's benefit by the court. 34 If, however,
a foreign personal law is to be applied at all, as prescribed by
the German conflicts law, and jurisdiction is not doubtful, the
30 It is sometimes asserted that the parties may constitute an adoption in any
country according to their personal law, since the maxim loctts regit actum is
only of optional application. But there is no proof of actual force of this assumption which overlooks the significance of the administrative act.
31 Buck v. Meyer (1916) 195 Mo. App. 287, 190 S. W. 997·
32
Mutual Life of New York v. Benson (1940) 34 F. Supp. 859.
33 KG. (April 7, 1933) IPRspr. 1934, no. 67; Bay. ObLG. (Oct. 3'' 1934)
JW. 1935> II90·
34
KG. (June 30, 1922) 42. ROLG. 188; KG. (Jan. 15, 1932.) 6 Z.ausl.PR.
(1932) 3II, IPRspr. 1932, no. 98; KG. (March 10, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, no.
53, and still after a fundamental change of the adoption law by a law of November 23, 1933, see decision KG. (Sept. 6, 1935) 13 Jahrb. FG. '75· This
practice was abandoned however by KG. (Nov. 8, 1935) JW. 1936, 53·
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procedure should be adjusted so as not to frustrate the
purpose of the institution. 35 This cooperative attitude has been
recommended in France. 36 Remarkably, the Finnish statute
directly provides that formalities essential under the national
law of both parties should be observed so far as possible. 37
2.

Systems of Personal Law

(a) Law of the adopter. Still starting from the postulate
that one sole law should govern a family, many conflicts rules
determine the substantive requisites of adoption exclusively
according to the personal law of the adopter. 38 As, according
to the municipal laws, a married person generally needs some
joint action or consent of the other spouse for adopting a child,
the situation where the spouses have different personal laws
raises difficulties. The principle of personal law is best applied
to this case, each spouse being distinctively subjected to his or
her own law. 39
In this system, the child's interests are protected just as
well or badly as the personal law of the adopter provides. In
the prevailing construction of the German statutory rules, for
instance, the personal law of the adopted person is not conSee RAAPE 597i RABEL, 6 Z.ausl.PR. (1932) 310.
NIBOYET 776 no. 662,
,
37
Finnish Law of Dec. s, 1929, § 25.
38 Germany: EG. art. 2 2 par. 1 (the father) •
Poland: Law of 1926, art. 23 (the adopter); cf. SuLKOWSKI, "Conception
du droit international prive d'apres la doctrine et la pratique en Pologne," 41
Recueil1932 III 696ff.
Italy: C. C. (1938) Disp. Prel. art. ro par. 2 and C. C. (1942) Disp. Prel.
art. 20 par. 2, adding to the text of the final draft-"national law of the
adopter"-the words: "at the time of the adoption."
Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Dec. 21, 1926) Clunet 1928, 479 (a minor
child of Belgian nationality adopted in France, where the prohibition in C. C.
art. 346 of adoption of minors was abolished by a law of 1923 while it continued in Belgium).
France: App. d'Aix {March r6, 1909) Revue 1909, i42; SURVILLE 464 no.
3 16; 3 ARMIN JON 55 nos. 53, 54·
Brazil (former law): Sup. Trib. Fed. {Jan. 16, 1940) 56 Arch. Jud. 421
{adoption made in Brazil; Italian law applied to capacity and consent of adoptive parent and natural mother of Italian nationality),
39
See RAAPE s8o, but also 589 (par. 4).
35
36
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. sidered, unless he be a German/ 0 but it follows only that
the provisions of the internal law of the forum, requiring the
consent of the child or otherwise protecting it, are applicable.
Illustrations: (i) Where a German adopts a Danish child,
the contract of adoption can be made, according to § 1 7so,
par. I of the German Civil Code, by the child's guardian with
authcJrization of the court. As the Danish principle of domicil
refers to the local German law, the German court has jurisdiction. (KG. (June 7, 1929) IPRspr. I929, no. 88.)
(ii) Adoption of a Swedish illegitimate child by a German
depends on the consent of the illegitimate mother, according
to § I747 of the German Civil Code, but not subject to
authorization of the Swedish king as required by Swedish law.
(RG. (July I I, 1929) I25 RGZ. 265, IPRspr. 1929, no. 89.)
(b) Consideration of the child's law. In opposition to exclusive control of the law of the adopter, it has been postulated
that the law of the child should govern those requirements
which may be established for the protection of the child's status
against hasty or dangerous alterations. 41 This category was
understood to include those provisions that require a certain
age 42 or full age 43 of the adopted person, or his consent or
that of the persons and authorities charged with his personal
care. 44 To the law of the adoptive parent are left the requirements concerning the adopter's age, any requisite difference in
age between the parties, the absence of legitimate issue, or
other interests of the family into which the adopted person is
40 See the decision following in the text; and KG. (June 30, I 922) 42 ROLG.
I88, I89; KG. (Oct. z9, I9z6) IPRspr. I9Z6-I9Z7, no. 8I; LG. Dresden
(Dec. zo, I9z9) and OLG. Dresden (Feb. I8, I930) IPRspr. I93I, nos. ·9o,
91. Contra: most writers, see RAAPE 550, 4 FRANKENSTEIN I74•
41 This theory was prominently developed by BAR 547 § I99 and NIBOYET
775, 776 no. 659· In different manner: BATIFFOL, I Repert. zsz nos. 3, 5;
4 FRANKENSTEIN I7I•
42
WEISS, 4 Traite 113.
43 When minora could not be adopted in France, before the Law of June 19,
I9z3, adoption abroad was considered void; see Trib. Valenciennes (infra n. 47).
«RoLIN, z Principes I 67, I 68 nos. 634, 635; PILLET, I Traite Pratique
65I, 65z no. 319.; Greece: C. C. (I940) art. z3 par. I; Germany: EG. art. 22
par. z (as to German children).
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to enter. For instance, adoption of natural children by their
parents was forbidden by the Italian Civil Code of 1865 (art.
205) but permitted by French practice. 45 As this matter concerns the adopter's family, under this principle, an Italian
could not adopt his own illegitimate child in France. A
Frenchman would be permitted adoption of his natural child
in Italy, if it were not considered contrary to public policy. 46
(c) Exclusive application of the child's personal law. In
some recent opinions, the law of the child governs exclusively
all conditions of adoption. 47 This thesis is based on the unwarranted identification of the child's law with the law best
securing its welfare.
(d) Both laws cumulatively applied. Finally, in one of
those well-known attempts to cumulate the laws where a
choice between them seems hard, adoption is said to depend
on all the requirements stipulated in each law of both the
parties. 48 Such a mechanical addition results in not applying
any one of the statutes and in impeding a transaction that all
students of juvenile welfare wish greatly to foster.
Consideration of the law of a foreign party is accomplished
45

Cass. (May IJ 1 I868) D.I868.I.249·
2 FIORE 3Ioff. no. 76x; SURVILLE 464ff. no. 3I6.
47
France: Trib. civ. Valenciennes (June I8, I9I4) Clunet I9I9 1 242 (a
minor girl of French nationality adopted by German parents; the decision may
have rested also upon French public policy); Cour Paris (Jan. I41 I926) Clunet
I927, 64I. Writers limit themselves generally to the application of French
law to French children.
Italy: App. Milano (May 91 I91o) Clunet 1913 1 243.
Egypt: Trib. Alexandria (I926 no. I84) Clunet 1928, II12 (American
woman adopting a Greek child; Novella I 7 of Emperor Leo applied) •
Soviet Russia: Law of January 4 1 1928, art. 6 (see MAKAROV 421): where
adopting and adopted parties belong to different Soviet Republics, the consul
shall apply the law l;)f the child, if known, otherwise the law of the adopter, or,
last, what law the adopter demands.
48
Austrian OGH. (April I 51 I930) Zentralblatt I93I 1 I30 no. 33 1 Clunet
I932, I98. Probably of this type Japan, Law of I898, art. I9; China, Law of
Aug. 51 I9I8, art. I4l Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text
of I94o, art. 23 (difficult to understand). Advocated by BROCHER 333, DEsPAGNET 848, 849 no. 284;, BARTIN in 9 Aubry et Rau § 55 5 at I 76, and n. 2;
BARTIN, 2 Principes § 276 at I66; DIENA, 2 Prine. I 86; CAVAGLIERI 2471 2
ZITELMANN 8831 4 FRANKENSTEIN I7I n. 41 LEWALD 1531 contra: RAAPE 549•
46
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in a much sounder way in those statutes that prohibit authorization of adoptions, unless these are recognized as valid by the
laws of both parties. 49 That is, this rule has a proper place,
provided that recognition is granted in the foreign country in
a broad-minded spirit without insisting on the fulfillment of
peculiar domestic requirements.
In the Finnish enactment, it is added that the adoptive relationship, if the adopter is a foreigner, cannot be rescinded in
Finland, except if the adopter is there domiciled and the rescission is recognized in his national country. 50
(e) Special rules on the effect of adoption. In those jurisdictions where the personal law of the adoptive father governs
the act creating adoption, the same law of the adoptive parent
may govern the effect of adoption 51 at any later moment, in
the same way as a parent's law governs creation and effect of a
legitimate parent-child relation. This means that, in the case
of a change of personal law, later events are governed by the
personal law of the time being. \Vhere, however, the law of
the child is influential in the constitution of the family relationship, this law is not appropriate to regulate the ensuing relationship within the adoptive family. 52 Therefore, the statutes
involved have mostly restricted the child's law to the creation
of adoption and applied the parent's law to its effects. 53 In
another, not more attractive, opinion advocated by Italian and
49

Finland: Law of Dec. 5, I 929, § 24 par. 2.
Norway: Law of April 2, I9I7 with amendments of September 23, I9ZI, and
May 24, I935> § 29 par. I.
Sweden: Law of June I4, 19I7 with amendments,§ 2.6 par. I.
Switzerland: Just. Dept. June 30, 1928, 25 SJZ. 8o.
60 Finland: Law of I929, § 24 par. 2.
~ 1 See for example, Germany: EG. arts. 22. and I9; Italy: C. C. (I942.) Disp.
Prel. art. 20 par. 2.
62
This however has been proposed by WEISS, 4 Traite I2.6; BATIFFOL, I
Repert. 2.55 no. 2.3.
63 Japan: Law of I898, art. I9 par. 2; China: Law of I9I8, art. I4 par. 2;
Finland: Law of 1929, § 26; France: 6 LAURENT 77 no. 39; SURVILLE 464ff.
no. 316; PrLLJ!:T, 1 Traite Pratique 6sz no. 320. Poland: Law of 1926, art.
I9 par. 2, and Greece: C. C. (1940) art. 23 par. 2, extend their reference to
the last common nationality to the effects of adoption.
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French writers, the law of the child governs the child's position in its natural family, including reciprocal inheritance
rights, while the adoptive relationship is determined by the
parent's law. 5 4 Pillet has, in despair, suggested that the judge
be allowed free choice of law. 55

III.
I.

REcoGNITION oF FoREIGN AooPTION

Conditions of Recognition

The above described English and American jurisdictional
rules seem to imply that a foreign adoption will be recognized,
if the jurisdiction assumed by the foreign state is based either
on the adopter's domicil or, in the American view, on the
domicil of the child. It is true that, not even among the sister
states, does this principle appear clearly settled. The Supreme
Court of the United States has had occasion to proclaim that
the Federal Constitution did not oblige a state to recognize
legitimations and adoptions made in another state. 56 The
underlying doubts are connected, however, with the specific
effect of adoption upon inheritance rather than with the
principles of recognition. It seems that there is no serious question respecting recognition in general.
Whether in addition to the two grounds for jurisdiction
mentioned above, adoptions occurring in the national state of
the adopter are to be recognized, may be questioned. There
is no compelling reason for recognition, for instance, where an
American child resident in the United States is adopted in a
54 2 FIORE 296, 297,298 no. 752; DESPAGNET 850 no. 286; VALERY 1153
no. 814; NIBOYET 778 no. 665. This solution has been reproduced in Codigo
Bustamante art. 74 with the modification that the adopter's law governs "in so
far as his estate is concerned," and that of the adopted person "in respect to the
name, the rights and duties which he retains regarding his natural family, as
well as to his own estate in regard to the adopting person," while the right to
maintenance is left to public policy (art. 76) •
Contra: see RAAPE 594·
.
55
PILLET, Principes 324 no. 154, renouncing any rule.
56
Hoodv.McGehee (1915) 237U.S.6u.
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German court 117 pursuant to German law by a German domiciled and resident in the United States. 58
Exclusive jurisdiction is claimed over nationals by the frequently cited Austrian and Hungarian traditions 59 and by the
Scandinavian states. Swedes and Norwegians cannot be adopted
abroad without permission of the king. 6 ° Finns need the permission of their Minister of Justice. 61 Otli.er states generally
reserve judicial activity in status matters of nationals to their
own tribunals. France and Belgium require that nationals
should seek supplementary authorization at their home
court. 62 Italy subjects recognition even to the procedure of
exequatur. 63 Recently the National Socialist innovations in
German adoption law have inspired the view that a foreign
adoption of a German always needs confirmation by a German
court in order to have effect in that country. 64
Opposition of public policy to foreign adoptions has formed
a natural problem in countries in which no form of adoption
has been instituted. In England, which until recently belonged in this category, no case has occurred, but Dicey pronounced his decided opposition to the recognition of any
foreign adoption and impressed Beale and the American Restatement with this theory. This il).fiuence, together with the
common law tradition, repugnant to adoption, was strong
enough to prevent recognition of an American adoption in
Canada even after the Canadian reform laws, on the ground
~ 7 § 66 par. 2 of the German Law on Voluntary Jurisdiction.
~ KIPP, in KIPP-WOLFF, Familienrecht § 99 n. I :z.

59 Austria: supra p. 398; Hungary: ScHWARTZ, 41 Z.int.R. (1929) 107 at
182.
·
60
Sweden: Law on Adoption of June 14, 1917 with amendments, §26 par.
:1.; Norway: Law on Adoption of April 2, I 9 1 7 as amended by laws of Sept. 2 3,
1921, and May 24, 1935, § 29 par. 2.
61 Finland: Law of 1929, § 24 par. 1 sentence 2.
62 RoLIN, 2 Principes 171 no. 63 71 Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ. 659 no. 149.
63
Cass. civ. (June 24, 1932) Monitore 1932, 929, Clunet 1933, 454; cf.
App. Genova (Dec. x6, 1932) Monitore 1933, 225.
Contra for France, WEiss, 4 Traite 130.
64-RAA.PE, 2 D. IPR. :uo.
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that this legislation had no retroactive effect. 65 The court,
using this argument, overlooked that not the reform law but
the strength of the present public policy was in question. In
the Netherlands, foreign adoptions seem to be recognized
when the national laws of both parties permit it, but naturally
not when one party is of Dutch nationality.88
Remarkably, the opposite liberal view has been taken in
Portugal, 67 Argentina, 68 and Guatemala. 69
In countries with adoption, the domestic law is frequently
applied to a foreign adoption to which a subject of the forum
is a party, at least insofar as it is thought that this individual
must be protected. In France and in Latin countries,70 public
policy is invoked in such cases for almost all internal conditions of adoption as being of "international public order."
Adoption between foreigners in their own national states
should be and is regularly recognized without any such limitations. 71 But a French decision was concerned with the following case: A Russian married couple, the husband forty-nine,
the wife forty-five years old, adopted in I 9 I 2 in Russia a child
of twelve years. The transaction was perfectly valid under
Russian law; it would not have been allowed under article
343 of the French code, as it stood at that time, requiring a
fifty-year age of the adopter and full age of the adopted per65 Burnfiel v. Burnfiel [I 9z6] z D• L. R. u9; Haultain, C. ]. S., in this
strange decision acknowledged that the case was absolutely similar to that contrarily decided in In re Throssel [I9Io] u W. L. R. 683. In both cases the
adoption had been made by decree in Iowa.
66 VAN HASSELT, 6 Repert. 635 no. Z03·
67
See Sup. Trib. Lisbonne (May IS, I934) Nouv. Revue I935> 4z4; supra
pp. I 77-I 78.
68
See z V1co uS, no. 17z.
69
MATOS 394 no. Z77·
7 France: Trib. civ. Valenciennes (June 18, 19I4) Clunet 1919, z4z. Italy:
App. Palermo (June u, 1931) Z4 Rivista (193z) 563, Clunet 1933, 1091.
VALERY II51 no. 8u.
71 Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. zz 1 no. 56.
The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (April 7, 19zo) W. I06Jz (child of foreign nationality born in the Netherlands).

°

PARENTAL RELATIONS
son. Instead of simply recognizing the foreign act, the court
of Paris declared it effective only because in the meantime the
' been changed so as to require forty years
French provision had
of the adopter and fifteen years of age difference. 72 The implied claim to control an entirely foreign act by the municipal
law of the forum is absurd.
2.

Effects of Recognition

Where no obstacle arises from jurisdictional considerations or public policy of the forum, it may yet be dubious to
what extent the foreign created adoption is effective at the
forum. The only consistent solution of this question is given
in such statutes as that of Quebec:
"A person resident outside of the Province who has been
adopted according to the laws of the United Kingdom or any
part of the British possessions other than the Province of
Quebec or of any foreign country, shall possess in this Province the same rights of succession that he would have had
in the said United Kingdom or part of the British possessions
or in the said foreign country in which he was adopted." 73
The French-Belgian doctrine has always supported the
clear principle that the effect of adoption is governed by the
applicable foreign law. 74
The Swiss Federal Tribunal in a quite recent case has left
no doubt on the application of the Swiss intestate portion for
legitimate children (including adopted children), to a girl
adopted in Moscow in 1912. It expressly states that her adoption had taken place according to the then Russian law "not
72
Cour Paris (Jan. :z., 1936) Gaz.Pal.x936.1.55I, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 159
no. 83, criticized by BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937, 42.7, but apparently approved
by CosTE-FLORET, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. x6o.
73 Quebec: 14 Geo. V, c. 75 s. 14 (192.4) as amended by 25-26 Geo. V, c.
67 s. 2. (1935), R, s. 1941, c. 324 s. :u.
Similar, Alberta, Infants Act, 1913 (:z.), c. 13, s. 33, and Domestic Relations
Act. R. S. A. 1942., c. 3oo, s. 49; unification proposed by 1 JOHNSON 3 53.
14
WEISS, 4 Traite 118; 6 LAURENT 75 no. 3 7; ROLIN, 2 Principes 172 no.
638.
'
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only as a so-called contractual adoption without inheritance
right, but as a fully operating one conferring rights equal to
those of a legitimate child." 75
Indeed, foreign adoptions should be recognized, if at all,
to exactly the extent to which they have been created as
measured by the entire legislation of the state of adoption;
they should not be given either more or less effect. One would
think that in th~ United States the same solution must
smoothly flow from the recognition of adoption orders rendered by the domiciliary court either of the parent or the
child, but things have taken another course. The question has
been much discussed in this country and recently also a little
in German literature.
Before entering into the main subject of the controversy
regarding inheritance rights, it may be permissible to indicate
the points where disturbances seem to have set in.
(a) General attention has been devoted to the problems of
recognition arising in the succession upon death to the adopted
parents or sometimes to the adopted child, or to property of
the natural parents. It should be noticed, however, that statutes on adoption differ widely also on other points such as alimentary support quoad the child's consanguineous family, the
paternal power of the natural father, the name of the child,
et cetera. In the United States, many statutes terminate the
effects of the natural parent-child relation in the case of adoption, while others make it "exceedingly difficult to find in
the legislative pronouncements any intent to work a complete
severance of parental relationship and substitution of
parent." 76
Again, the effect of adoption between the adoptive parties
seems reduced in South Carolina to property rights, 77 and
75
76
77

BG. (Oct. :u, 1943) 69 BGE. II 357, 363.
§ 261 at 406; cf. Suppl. I 27ff.
South Carolina: Code of Laws 1942, C. C.§ 8679.

4 VERNIER

6so

PARENTAL RELATIONS

courts in Mississippi may limit the right of the adopted child
to certain benefits. 78
If we face this broad field, recognition of the foreign act
with its proper effects appears to be the only suitable maxim.
Certain countries, of course, headed by France, will indulge
in large exceptions, also in this respect, on the ground of public policy. 79
(b) The reluctance of the Dutch and English jurists in
earlier periods to conceive an extraterritorial effect of judicial
acts and to acknowledge a "status unknown to the forum," as
we have seen, finally resulted in the similarity doctrine, expressed by the Restatement in§ 143:
"The status of adoption, created by the law of a state having
jurisdiction to create it, will be given the same effect in another state as is given by the latter state to the status of
adoption when created by its own law." 80
The foregoing section probably was exclusively influenced by
consideration of inheritance problems. Another section,§ 305,
expresses a second time the same idea in application to distribution; the adopted person shall be treated "as if he. were a
natural-born legitimate child of his adoptive parent if the
law that regulates distribution gives such effect to adoption."
Even in limitation to the problems of distribution, it is amazing, not only that no foreign adoption should be recognized
in a country not knowing adoption, but also that every foreign
adoption of whatever extent should be treated like a full
adoption, if the law governing inheritance does so with respect
to adoptions performed within the state. 81 This unexpected
78
79

1269, cf. 4 VERNIER§ z6I at 406.
WEiss, 4 Traite I zo; BATIFFOL, I Repert.
2.56 no. 2.5; prohibition to marry (C. C. art. 354): z FIORE 39 no. 539; BATIFFOL, I Repert. zs6 no. z6; on C. C. arts. 343-346 (before reform): VALERY
II5I no. 812; BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. I937, 427.
80 2 BEALE § I43·I classifies, correspondingly, the cases along the distinction
whether or not the adopted foreign child is treated like a child adopted at the
forum.
81 See the critical analysis by YNTEMA, "The Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws," 36 Col. L. Rev. (I936) 2.12.
Miss.: Code Ann. (I942)
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dogma has certainly not found favor with American courts, but
it does contribute to obscure the picture. It has caused, at
least, more readiness to recognize an adoption similar to the
domestic type than a ~issimilar one, which is an unfortunate
starting point.
Certain Canadian statutes avoid enlarging the rights created
by foreign adoption, but they share the main rule of the Restatement. For instance, the Ontario statute provides that:
"A person ... adopted in accordance with the laws of the
province where he is domiciled, shall be entitled to the same
rights of succession as to property in Ontario as he would have
had in the province in which he was adopted but not exceeding
the right he would have had if adopted under this Act." 82
(c) Faced with their usual topic, viz., the share to which
foreign adopted children are. entitled in a succession, American
courts have decided from case to case, as results seemed warranted by the circumstances, although in some instances they
have been influenced by the formalistic arguments frequent
in English and Canadian courts. Unfortunately, a theoretical
point has been introduced. The courts and their annotators usually distinguish whether a right to inherit by or from an
adopted person has been established by the state where the
adoption has been performed and, if so, whether the statute
giving the right is an adoption statute or an inheritance statute.
To illustrate, it has been said in a remarkably explicit note that,
if the right of inheritance has been limited in the state of
adoption, the restriction may be imposed either upon the status
or upon the right to succession. The first is to be presumed, if
the child, by the statute of the state of adoption, has been
granted the full position of a natural child in relation to the
82

Ontario {I917) I7 Geo. V, c. 53 s. I3 1 re-enacted R. S. 0, I937 1 c. 1I8 s. I3.
Similar, British Columbia, Adoption Act. R.S.B.C. I936, c. 6 s. II; PrinceEdward Island, Adoption Act, I9 3 o, c. I 2. s. I 5 and Children's Act {I 940) c. u,
8, U4o
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adopter, but not to his collateral relatives; this limitation, then,
has to be recognized in the state of inheritance. Where, however, adopted children are placed in second rank, to favor
the legitimate issue primarily entitled, the limitation concerns the hereditary right. 83
It is submitted that the courts are facing an impossible task
with this method. It suffices to observe what distinctions,
verbal interpretations, and inferences a modern author has felt
obligated to propose, "in order to decide whether a right asserted by a claimant should be treated as one which flows from
status, if at all, or as one which is given irrespective of the existence or non-existence of ·status." 84 More appropriately, it
has been repeatedly asserted that statutes of adoption and statutes of inheritance of the same state must be read together.
In fact, the entire effect of adoption is either defined at one
. place in the laws, namely, in the chapter on adoption, or has
to be deduced from both categories of statutory provisions
taken together. Usually, there is neither any legislative intention nor any sound reason for presuming by interpretation,
that one group of provisions should govern only domestic
adoptions and the other foreign adoptions, or that one group
should prevail in the domestic courts only and the other have
extraterritorial effect. Nor is it the task of these internal provisions to make such distinctions. It is up to the law of conflicts
to find the solution. As has been contended above, the entire
legislation of the state of adoption defines the effects to be
recognized.
(d) Two practical considerations may guide us. On the one
hand, it is inadmissible that an adopter could change the effect
of an adoption by changing his domicil. He would be able to
do just that, if the statute of distribution at his last domicil
83

L. R. A. 1916 A 668; similar for legitimation 73 A. L. R. 958.
TAINTOR,1 "Legitimation, Legitimacy and Recognition ill the Conflict of
Laws," 18 Can. Bar Rev, (1940) 589, 691, at 703. RAAPE 592. attempts
similar distinctions.
84
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were given predominance in construing the previously made
adoption. On the other hand, an adopter who has not by the
adoption created inheritance rights is free to maintain the
effects of the transaction or to supplement them by gift or by
will, so far as the statute of distributions allows him. It is no
natural task of conflicts law to demolish these results of
private law.
3· Effect on Inheritance Rights in Particular
In order to distinguish the scope of the conflicts rule on
adoption from those concerning succession upon death, it is
justly said that the law governing succession determines
whether adopted children as a class are competent to succeed,
and the law governing the creation of adoption determines
whether a certain person is an adopted child. 85 This, however,
does not answer all questions.
(a) Construction of language. Where a testator has devised or bequeathed property to his or other people's "children" or "issue," it was argued, especially in Canadian cases,
that children or issue born in wedlock are meant. This was
contended even after the introduction of adoption into the
legislation, at least in construing older wills. 86 The traditional
opposition of the common law to adoption was still effective,
though in British Columbia the contrary opinion was followed
even where a will used the term "heirs." 87 It may now be
assumed that the intention underlying a will or deed is to be
85 See for instance GooDRICH, "Legitimation and Adoption in the Conflict of
Laws," zz Mich. L. Rev. (19z4) 637 and Handbook 384 ff.; LoRENZEN, 6
Repert. 349 no. 34z; Notes, L. R. A. 1916 A 666 and 65 L. R. A, 186.
Germany: RAAPE 591 H. and RAAPE, "Les rapports juridiques entre parents
et enfants," so Recueil1934 IV 401, so8 no. 81.
86 Supreme Court of Canada: Donald, Baldwin & Mooney [19z9] z D. L. R.
Z44 (Washington adoption).
Qntario Supreme Court: Re Skinner (19z9) 64 0. L. R. 245, [1929] 4 D. L.
R. 427 (Ohio adoption). See FALCONBRIDGE, Cases on the Conflict of Laws (ed.
4> 1938) 170.
87 In re McGillivray, Purcell v. Hendricks [1925] 3D. L. R. 854.
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construed according to the mere factual circumstances, and
statutes are not to be deemed any longer to demand legitimate
birth or blood relationship.
(b) Major rights acquired by foreign act. 88 A group of
cases is characterized by larger rights granted in the state of
adoption than in the state of distribution. In particular, the
statute applicable. to the succession may be wholly ignorant of
the kind of adoption accomplished abroad. We have to distinguish as follows:
(i) Law of situs of immovables. A social and ethical background such as lay behind the famous Statute of Merton (A.D.
1236) 89 and still continued at the time of the English case
of Birtwhistle v. Vardill (A.D. I 840) 90 may well have required birth in lawful wedlock as the sole title to succession to
land. This conception, however, seems finally to have lost
its hold in the English land law. But it survives strangely in
the Alabama courts, 91 while in Florida foreign adopted children are excluded unless they become citizens of the state. 92
The Supreme Court of Mississippi overruled its former acceptance of this conception in I 9 I 7 with the express denial of a
public policy preventing the adopted child from inheriting. 93
Surprisingly in one decision, the French Court of Cassation also
applied the law of the situs rather than that governing adoption, as a pretext for sticking to French law. 9 '
88

See YNTEMA, 2 Giur. Comp. DIP. 358 sub (C).
20 Henry III, c. 9 (u36).
90
7 Cl. and F. 895.
11 Brown v. Finley (x9o8) 157 Ala. 424, 47 So. 577; cf. on legitimation
the Lingen case (x871) 45 Ala. 410, supra p. 585 1 n. 157·
9 ZTankersley v. Davis (1937) u8 Fla. 507, 175 So. sox.
93
Brewer v. Browning (1917) II5 Miss. 358 1 76 So. 267, overruling
Fisher v. Browning (1914) 107 Miss. 729, 66 So. 132.
94
Cass. (req.) (April 21, 1931) D.19JI.x.sz, S.I9JI.I.J77> Clunet 1932,
142, Revue 1932· j26; Contra: BARTIN, "Adoption et transmission hereditaire,"
Clunet 1932, 5; NrBOYET, Decision note, Revue 1932, 541, Favorable to the
decision, however, WENGLER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 167 n. 1; LEWALD, Regles
generales des conB.its de lois ( x941) 1 37.
89

ADOPTION

6ss

(ii) Local policy. Apart from such peculiar prohibitive
policy claimed for the laws of succession and leaving aside the
bulk of the cases, which offer no problem because both states
involved grant similar positions to adopted children, 95 there.
is authority denying that local policy should normally intervene.96
This view was applied to the problem of inheritance from
natural parents. In Slattery v. The Hartford Connecticut
Trust Company, 91 an individual adopted in Michigan claimed
his share in his natural father's estate and was successful in
Connecticut. The statute of Michigan maintains, that of Connecticut terminates, the right of inheritance of an adoptee
from his native parents. The Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut held that, as the right of inheritance of the child
was not lost by the statute of Michigan, he could claim it; the
legislature of Connecticut debarring a child from such a right
"has not attempted to lay down any rule applicable in the
case of children coming here from another state where they
have been adopted under laws which do not take away that
right." 98 This argument is equivalent to saying, as we did,
that the extension of the inheritance rule to foreign cases with
foreign elements is up to the conflicts rule, and that, under
this rule, adoptions made in the domiciliary state must be
recognized with their own effects. The restriction imposed on
the statute by this conception is not only equitable and justified
by the anomalous structure of the Connecticut type of adoption, 99 but consistent with the advisable general postulates.
95

See YNTEMA, z Giur. Comp. DIP. 357 sub (A).
For this opinion also FALCONBRIDGE, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 85 p. 171.
In re Finkenzeller's Estate (1929) 105 N.J. Eq. 44, 146 Atl. 656; Keegan v.
Geraghty (1881) 101 Ill. z6.
97
Slattery v. The Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. (1932) 115 Conn. 163,
161 Atl. 79, commented by YNTEMA and DE NovA in 2 Giur. Comp. DIP.
352 ff. no. 169.
95
There follow excellent explanations why public policy is not contrary to
recognizing such a provision "dissimilar" to the domestic regulation.
99
See YNTEMA, 2 Giur. Comp. DIP. 359, against criticism of the decision in
81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1932) zq.
96
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The case demonstrates with particular clarity the necessity of
protecting by adequate conflicts rules those legal effects which
the parties to a transaction were entitled to foresee.
Yet the contrary view was recently taken by the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania 100 refusing intestate succession to
grandchildren from their natural grandmother through their
mother adopted by unrelated persons in Ohio. The Court
construed section I 6 (b) of the intestate statute of Pennsylvania, excluding adopted children from taking from or
through their natural parents, to the effect of including all
foreign adopted children and their issue. This thesis is not
justified by the argument that "to hold otherwise would
create a power in another state to limit and nullify the authority of this state to determine for itself how property shall
descend on intestacy." The intention of the Pennsylvania
statute cannot be changed by another state, but why should a
statute intend implicitly to exclude foreign adopted children
whose adoption did not abolish their status in their natural
families where it was done? The only sound method is to leave
the application of the intestate statute to the conflicts rule
which should not be dubious.
The climax, so to speak, of incomity seems reached by Frey
v. Nielson/ 01 where an inheritance statute of New Jersey
admitting adopted children was construed to be restricted to
children adopted in New Jersey. Also, in the Netherlands,
where a foreign party has acquired Dutch nationality, a former
adoption of or by this party will not be recognized. 102 This
refusal, however, is not ascribed to the Dutch statute of distribution; it denies the entire family law relationship by adoption and is based on public policy regarding Dutch nationals.
100
In re Crossley's Estate (1939) 135 Pa. Super. Ct. p4, 7 Atl. (zd) 539J
noted Z4 Minn. L. Rev. (1940) z68.
101
Freyv.Nielson (1916) 99 N.J. Eq. 135,131 Atl. 765; the Note, "Conflict
of Laws-Inheritance by Adopted Child," zs Mich. L. Rev. (19z6) 189 is uncritical.
102 VAN HASSELT, 6 Repert. 636 no. Z03•
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Another outstanding case, Brown v. Finley, 108 has been
sharply criticized by European writers. 104 The Alabama court
refused a right of distribution to a person adopted in Georgia,
because the adoption had not been registered at the probate
court as required in Alabama, though not in Georgia. The
refusal has been called a denial of international private law.
(c) Major rights granted by the statute of distribution.
Where inheritance rights are conferred by the law of succession
and denied by the law presiding over adoption, in a logical
solu~ion the original effect of the act cannot be enlarged by the
law of another state. This some American cases state. 105
Opposition, in part, is based again on the formal argument
that a foreign statute depriving an adopted child of inheritance is a statute of distribution and as such not susceptible of
extraterritorial application. 106 There is no proof for that assumption, and the result comes as a startling surprise to the
parties. Where an English woman has adopted an English
child in England, all parties, at least their solicitors, have
understood that no right upon death was implied; why should
the legal situation be reversed by the woman's moving to New
Hampshire and dying ~here? 107
Some decisions, however, are based on quite different considerations that :flow from a sound policy. The statute of
103
Brown v. Finley (I9o8) I 57 Ala. 4241 47 So. 577 1 reproduced in 22
Z.int.R. (I9I'2) I64.
104
LEWALD, "Question de droit international des successions," 9 Recueil I925
IV 75 n. 3; RAAPE, "Les rapports juridiques entre parents et enfants," so Recueil I934 IV 509 n. I.
105
Estate of Sunderland (I882) 6o Iowa 732 1 13 N. W. 665; Meader v.
Archer (I889) 65 N.H. 2I4; Shaver v. Nash (I93o) I8I Ark. 1112, 29 S. W.
(zd) 298; Shick v. Howe (I9o8) I37 Iowa 249, II4 N. W. 9I6; Ross. v. Ross
(I878) 129 Mass. 243 1 37 Am. Rep. 321; Boaz v. Swinney (I909) 79 Kan.
332,99 Pac. 6zi, overruled in In re Riemann's Estate (I927) 124 Kan. 539,
262 Pac. I6, infra n. II o.
See Note, 73 A. L. R. 96I 1 97 3; YNTEMA, 2 Giur. Comp. DIP. 35 7; WENGLER,
8 Z.ausl.PR. (I934) I63 n. 2.
I06 This argument is invoked by STUMBERG1 3I o; also RAAPE, so Recueil
I934• IV 509 no. 82.
107
Thus far of the same opinion RAAPE, so Recueili934 1 IV, 5II no. 85.
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distribution may allow a share to all children, inclusive of
illegitimates, so as to eliminate any discrimination among
children. 108 Furthermore, courts have resorted to a permissive
public policy in cases in which adoptive children were a
class of persons entitled in the forum; explanation of the
child's unfavorable treatment by the statute creating adoption
is found in an antiquated prejudice against bastards. 109 Thus,
in In re Riemann's Estate, the Illinois statutory provision,
denying the child's relationship with the relatives of the
adopter, was considered a "peculiar discrimination," repugnant
to the "generous spirit" underlying the law of Kansas. 110 In
Pfeifer v. Wright, 111 the progressive view was expressly directed against the tradition extending from the Statute of
Merton to such cases as Keegan v. Geraghty and Frey v. Nielson.
But public policy should not be overdone. The Mississippi
court says poignantly:
"It would be unjust to both parent and child, to hold that
the mere fact of moving to another state would upset and unsettle this relationship. It is of the utmost importance that the
status of this character should be maintained so far as it is
possible. . . ." 112
108 In re Crowell's Estate (1924) 124 Me. 71, 126 Atl. 178 (an "adoption
into the family" in Nova Scotia had no legal significance in this province, but
fulfilled the conditions for inheritance in Maine).
109 Anderson v. French (1915) 77 N.H. 509, 93 Atl. 1042 (estate of adopter); Calhoun v. Bryant (1911) 28 S. D. 266 1 133 N. W. 266 (estate of
adoptive child) .
110
In re Riemann's Estate (1927) 124 Kan. 539, 262 Pac. 16,
111
Pfeifer v. Wright (1930) 41 F. (zd) 464.
112
Brewer v. Browning (1917) 115 Miss. 358 at 369, 76 So. 267 1 overruling
Fisher v. Browning, supra n. 93·
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also Table of Statutes sub Condefinition, 632.
ventions.
effects, 64-4--658.
Argentina
exclusive jurisdiction, 64-6.
domiciliary principle, .f.OD-.f-02,
foreign, 64-5-658.
4-2 5- 4 26, 44 8.
foJ:Illalities, 639-64-1.
foreign legitimation by state act,
jurisdiction, 635-639.
municipal laws, 632-635.
589.
marital property, 34-0, 34-6, 34-8,
public policy, 64-6-64-8.
unknown to the forum, I 76-178,
351, 356.
marriage requirements, 24-7.
64-6-64-7·
prohibition of divorce, 222,n. I 68,
Adultery (Remarriage), 27o-2 7 I.
406, 4-26-4-27> 431, 4-32,Ago, 57·
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Alcorta, I 7.
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324--326,
525-529, d'Argentre, 14-, 15, 61.
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Asser, I 7.
Americans Abroad
Austria
breach of promise, 202-203.
capacity of Austrian abroad, I 16consular marriages, 238.
117.
divorce, 4-06,4-37, 4-4-7-44-9• 4-50,
foreign divorce, 497, 509-510.
4-72-4-73, 4-77, 492,n ..f.O,
foreign marriage of Austrians,
495,n.Ip, 512-5I3.
117, 283.
domicil, I H·
Austrian Draft
full age, I.f-7, 193·
of 1913 of an international primarital property, 3.f.I,n.35, 34-2,
vate law, 26.
352-353, 359,n.IZ2, 362, Authorization of Domicil
372.
France, 77,n.30, J •.p.
· marriage, 220,n.77, 263.
Autonomy
parental rights, 607.
of the parties, 83.
renvoi, general concept, 129,
IH-135, 263.
Babinski, 23.
Anknupfungspunkt, 4-3·
Balladore-Pallieri, z 3·
Annulment of Marriage, 53 5-5 5 I. Bar, 8, 18.
·
Antonescu, 17·
Barbey, 24.
Anzilotti, 16, 17, 62, 72.
Bartin, IO, I.f., 15, 28, 44, 47, 52,
Apatrides, 122-IZ.f..
55, 65.
Aprioristic Theories, 9, 68.
Batiffol, 24.
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Beale, I2-I4, 6I, 62.
Beauffremont Case, 507.
Beck, I9.
Beckett, 23.
Belgium
literature, ],n.II, J4.;n.36.
Beseler, I 8.
Bevilaqua, I 7.
Bigamy, 502.
Bills of Exchange
capacity to make binding, I 8?I88. See also Capacity.
Birth
beginning of personality, legal
status, I63-I64.
Bohlau, Helene, Case, 49I,n.IJ4..
Bohm, I8.
Brazil
foreign divorce, 496-497, SOI,
52Q-52I.
marital property, 348, 361.
marital relations, 305-307.
marriage requirements, 249·
nationality law, I 3 7.
renvoi, So.
separation, 435·
Brocher, I 8.
Burge, I2.
Bustamante, I], 32.
Calandrelli, I 7.
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general concept, what law governs, 94, I79-I96.
classification, I 79-I 8 2.
infants, I]2-I74·
special, I62-I63.
to carry on business, I 7 I, 3 I6.
to contract, I87-188, 3I4.
to have rights and duties, I02,
I6I-I62, 3IS.
to have "standing in court", I62,
I

8 I.

to marry, 243·
Case Law
national and international significance, 38-39.
Cavaglieri, 16•.

Change of Legislation
effect on marital relations, 354364.
Change of Personal Law, I47-I49,
354-364,449-458,sos,s62~

564, 574· See also Status;
Domicil.
Characterization. See also Classification.
general concept, 44, 45·
adoption, 634, 648-658.
capacity of married women, 3 I I3 I4.
claims for support, 53.
community property, 373-374·
connecting factors, 60.
domicil, I42-I47·
domicil by operation of law,. I 4 I,n.I59, 3IO, 6os-6o6.
engagement to marry, 20I-204·
formalities of marriage, 208-2 IO.
inheritance, 374-384, 59I-592,
648-658.
legitimation, 59I-592.
marital property law, 333-334,
342, 374-382.
marriage settlements, 364.
mutability of marital law, 36I362.
parental consent, 209, 266-268.
primary and secondary, 65.
religious marriage rites, 2 I 4-2 I 6.
statute of frauds, so-s2.
successoral pacts, 57-58.
theory, 47-60.
Cheatham, 24.
Cheshire, 23.
Children. See also Divorce; Parent and Child.
action for contesting paternity,
567, 6os.
action for declaration of paternity,
6I4.
adulterine, 570, 579, 58 2-5 8 5,
59Q-59I, 62].
custody, 531-534·
domicil, 604-606.
exceptio plurium, 6 1 6-6 2 1.
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illegitimate, 6Io-63 I.
father and child, 6I 3-628.
father and mother, 628-629.
mother and child, 6I0-6I2.
intere~t, 559> 562.
legitimate, 55 7.
nationality, 6I8-6I9, 622.
of invalid marriage; 568-570.
personal law, 559> 56I-562, 575577> 594> 6I I, 642-644•
presumptions as to conception,
566, 621.
recognition, 612-6 I 3, 624-628.
support, 603-604, 621-622.
Chile
capacity, I I 7.
foreign divorce, 499-500.
substantive requirements for marriage, 248.
China
conflicts law, origin, 26.
Choice of Law by the Parties, 8 3-8 7.
Civil Procedure. See also Table of
Statutes.
Hague Convention of July I 7,
1905, 31.
Classification. See also Characterization.
concept, 44-45.
adoption and inheritance, 648658.
alimony and torts, 628-629.
capacity, I 7<J-I8o.
community property, 373-374.
legitimation and inheritance,
591-592.
marital and tort laws, 322.
marital law and inheritance, 374382.
marriage settlements, 364.
married women's capacity, 3 I I -

314-·

parental relations and torts, 6o6.
recognition and inheritance, 627.
relations of illegitimate children,
613-616.
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Clunet, 15.
Codifications of Conflicts Law, 2628. See also Table of Statutes.
C6digo Bustamante, 32-33, 37-38.
See also Table of Statutes.
"on personal law," 1 I 5·
Collusion, 397, 47 5·
Colonies
marriage, 2 I 9·
Comitas Gentium, 6I-63. See also
Territorialism.
Commercial Acts, Capacity for, I 72.
Commercial N arne, 170.
Common Law Marriage, 2 I o, 2 I 9,
223-224·
Community Property Systems, 332333, 336, 339> 357> 362.
composition, 373-374.
Comparative Method, I I, s8-S9·
Composite National Laws
differentsystems, I24-137·
Conflict Rules. See also Table of
Statutes.
codifications, 26-28.
independent, 94--95·
internationalization, 96-98.
interpretation, 44, 47-60.
parts and structure, 42-67.
policy considerations, 89--92.
purpose, 87-92.
specialization, 92-94.
Conjugal Rights.
action for restitution of, 307-309.
Connecting Factor, 43·
Consent by Husband. See Married
Women. ·
·
Consent to Marriage, 265.
of parents, 266-269, 598.
Consular Marriages, 22o-222, 236240.
See also Americans
Abroad.
Contact, 43·
Contracts, Types of, 93·
Contrat de Mariage, 294-·
Conventions, 29-36. See also Table
of Statutes.
Cook, Walter Wheeler, I3, 20, 23,
24, 54> 88.
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Cormack, 83.
Cowan, 87.
Customary Law, 38-..p.
Czechoslovakia. See also Table of
Statutes.
drafts of I924 and I.93I, 27.
Damages for Breach of Promise, zoo.
Darras, I 5·
DarJis Case, 469, 5I3, 5I5.
Death
in common disaster, legal pre·
sumption, I67-I68.
legalpresumption, I64-I67. See
also Absentees.
Declaration of Death
bythecourts, I64-I67, I76.
restricted to domestic assets, I 6 5.
Deductive Methods, 68.
Defective Formalities, 23o-23I.
marriage celebration, 229-2 3 I.
Delibazione, 474·
Denmark. See also Table of Statutes.
domicil, concept, I 39·
marriage formalities, substantive
requirements, 249, 256.
·renvoi, 79·
Depe(age, 93·
Deserters. See also Marriage, intrinsic requirements.
ability · to procure marriage licenses, 28 I.
Despagnet, 48
Dicey, I I, 23, 61.
Diena, I6.
Directive Marriage Requirements,
288.
Dispensation to Marry, 276, 286.
Divorce. See also Americans Abroad,
divorce; Judicial Separation.
concepts, historical, 396, 426.
alimony, 325-326, 525-529.
based on foreign law, 428-429.
cause having arisen outside state of
domicil, 408,452-458.
change of domicil or nationality,
449-458.
collusion, 397, 475·

consular, 4I9.
cumulative application of national
laws, 429-439, 44I,n.230,
455·
custody of children, 53 I -5 34·
decrees, 4 I 7-4 I 9·
different national laws involved,
44Q-445·
disposition of property, 53o-5 3 I.
domiciliary law, 40Q-402, 42 5426, 448, 456-457•
effect on one party only, 284,
442-445>500, 5I7-5I9·
effects of non-recognized divorce,
5I7-szi.
effects of valid divorce, 52I-534·
evasion, 453,457-458, 504-5 IO.
ex parte proceedings, 395-396,
403-406.
Greek Orthodox laws, 4I 5, 4I8,
42Q-422.
grounds, 436-445, 45 5-456,
465.
Hague Convention, 3 I. See also
Table of Statutes.
Jewish laws, 4I4-416, 4I 8, 438,
440.
jurisdiction, 396-42 z, 49 I -494·
at domicil, 399-416.
at residence, 407.
based on consent of defendant,
397·
exclusive, 397-399, 491-492.
in t'em, 399, 404.
national courts, 397-399.
restricted by lex fOt'i, 407-410,
458.
restricted by national law, 4 I o417.
lex fot'i applied, 391,441-445.
lex loci celebt'ationis, 426-42 7.
migratory, 393-395·
mills, 388-390, 393-395, 406,
493> 510.
municipal laws, 387-390.
nationality principle, 391, 427446.
of foreigners, 385-387.

INDEX
Divorce (continued)
opportunity for defense, 494·
permissibility, 429-43 3·
private, 417.
procedure, 416-417.
prohibited, 387, 417,n.I IO, 430,
496-502, 5I7·
public policy, 392-393.
permissive, 439-440.
prohibitive, 43o-432, 436439·
recognition, 462-516.
scope, 482-484.
religious, 4 I 3-4 I 7 and passim,
385-461.
renvoi, 446-448.
requiring valid marriage, 419422.
residence requirement, 408-po,
454. 46o-46I.
res judicata, 484.
similar grounds, 437-439· 502504.
statistics, 394-3 9 5.
without judicial litigation, 48 s491.
Divorced Person, Marriage Prohibition, Spanish law, I 37,
272, 501-502.
Domicil
concept
general, I40.
English and American, I 49·
authorized French view, 77,n.3o,
I4I.
basis for divorce, 40Q-402, 42 5426,448,456-457.
by choice, I 1 o.
by operation of law, I I I, 141,
I6o,n.3, 309-3 IO, 406-407,
595, 6o4-6o6, 6u~
change
effect on divorce, 449-458,
505.
effect on marital property,
354-364.
e,ffect on parental relations,
562-564, 574·
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effect on status, I48-149.
characterization, 142-147.
common to both spouses, 40o402.
compromises between different
systems of national laws, I 5S157·
determination, I 39-14 7.
in marital relations, 300, 3 I 9·
in parental relations, 560, 57,1575> 587-588, 594·
last, I 30.
last common, 40I-402.
matrimonial, 261, 263-264, 345,
347> 399-400.
of illegitimate children, 6 I I, 6 I 7,
625.
of origin, I09, 13I-I32.
of wife, 40o-403.
principle of, I09, 25C)-26I.
rationale, I49-I 58.
rules in parts of the British Empire, 129.
test of effects of marriage on property, 348-349·
Dominion Nationality, I 29.
Donnedieu de Vabres, H., I 5·
Dowry, 336, 598.
Dumoulin, I4, 85, 343·
Dutch School, 7,n.12.
Ecclesiastical Courts, 246-24 7, 48 5.
E/zevertrag, 294. •

Emancipation, I 74·
Emigration, Influence on Nationality Principle, I 53-I 54·
Engagement to Marry, I 99-204.
England
literature, I I, 28.
adoption, 638-639.
annulment of marriage, 537-543.
foreign, 42.1.
capacity, 19o-19I.
cases ex misericordia, 234, 4-2I422.
consent of parents, 209, 267-268.
consular marriages, 2 2o-2 2 3.
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England (continued)
divorce
foreign, 46 3-46 5, 48 I.
grounds, 436.
jurisdiction, 40o-402, 44-8,
458.
domicil, concept, I0<}-1 II, 139,
142.
marital property, 340, 346, 355·
marital relations, 299·
marital settlement, 366-368.
marriage, substantive requirements, 259-261.
personal law, 102-105, IO<J-I I I.
renvoi, 7 5-77.
support, 325, 611, 622.
Espinola, I 7.
Evasion
of divorce laws, 453, 457-458,
504-SIO.
of marriage formalities, 2 3 I-2 32.
of substantive requirements for
marriage, 2 5 I -2 58.
Expectancies, 377-3 79·
Expectation of the Parties
concerning property rights, 87.
Extradition
principle of double criminality,
134-135> n.I37·
Falconbridge, 24.
Family Expense Statutes, 318-3 20.
Federal Law
of the United States, 39·
Fedozzi, I 6, I 7.
Ferrari Case, 442-443, 452, 457,
460.
Fiore, 8.
Foelix, 8.
Foreign Corporations, 4·
Forgo Case, 73·
Formalities
as distinguished from procedure,
210.
of marriage, 207-242.
Forum Perpetuatur, 449-450.
Foster, 23.
Fragistas, 23.

France
literature, 7,n.11, I4-I6, 25.
adoption, 647-648.
capacity, 188.
colonial marriages, 219.
consular marriages, 221-222,
236-237·
divorce, 406, 428; 436, 442443,452, 457> 460.
domicil, authorization, 77 ,n. 30,
I41.
dowry, 336.
foreign divorce, 4 7 I-4 7 5.
fraude a la loi, 443-44-6, 507509·
identification card, I41-I42,
4IO,n.8I.
illegitimate child, 612-613, 618620, 623, 629.
immovables, 34I-342, 353, 359,
362.
immutability, marital property,
355> 359·
marital relations, 305, 3I6, 3I8,
319-320, 322, 324.
marriage settlement, 8 5, 366.
implied contract theory, 343348.
national interest, doctrine, 188.
nationality laws, I 36, I 38.
nationality principle, 1 I 2.
possession d'etat, 2 3 I.
putative marriage, 545-548.
recognition of child, 612-613.
renvoi, 73·
secret foreign marriages, laws to
prevent, 226-229.
territorialism, principle, I 52.
unity of family, principle, 34I,
342, 353; 359> 362.
wife's lien, 326-327, 336.
Frankenstein, Io ..
Full Age, Acquired by Marriage,
I73·
Galgano, 23.
Gebhard, 18, 26.
Gerber, 18.
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Hague Conventions, 26, 30-32, 36.
Germany
See also Table of Statutes.
law, 26.
Hancock, 24-.
literature, I 7-I 8, 20-2 3·
certificates for marriage, 286,- Harper, 24-.
Harrison, Frederick, I 9·
n. I 84-.
declaration of death, I 64--I 67.
Heilmann, I 3·
dissolution of conjugal union, 4-33, History of Conflicts Law, 6-I I.
Holzschuher, I].
4-88.
Homologfl(io, 4-74-, 4-96.
foreign divorces, 4-75-478.
law concerning Soviet divorces, Huber, Ulrich, 6I, 63.
Husband and Wife. See also Domi4-89-4-90.
cil; Marital Property; Marlimping marriages, 233, 284-.
riage Settlements.
marital property, 342, 359-360,
action for restoration of conjugal
372-374-·
nationality laws, I 39·
rights, 307-309.
agreements preceding divorce,
personal relations between husband and wife, 302, 305, 308,
323, 525, 53I.
alimony, 525-529.
3I8-3I9, 324·
racial laws, 28 I ,n. I 64-.
capacity of married women, 3 37stateless persons, I 2 3-1 24.
338, 35I, 352-353·
Gierke, I 8, 88.
earnings, 33 9·
Gifts Between Husband and Wife,
gifts, 32I-322, 525.
3 2 I-322, 52 5·
lawsuits, 322.
Gould v. Gould, I4-0, 470, 503.
personal relations, 294--327.
Greece
power to obligate, 3 I 8-3 20.
literature, I 9·
property relations, 32 8-3 8 2.
consular marriages, 236-240.
support, duty, 324--326.
foreign marriages, 278.
transactions, 3 I 6, 3 I 8-3 2 3.
marriage, conflicts rule modified
with third parties, 3 I 7-3 zo,
by religious requirements, 2 I 3370-373·
2I6, 2I8.
wife's lien, 326-327, 336.
Greek Orthodox Rite, 2 I 3-2 I 6,
4-85-486, 565.
Immovables
Gretna Green Marriages, 224-.
American rule, 328-329, 337Griswold, 24-, 8 3.
34-I, 369-370.
Guardianship of Minors
Civil law rules, 6oi-6o2.
Hague Convention, 3 I.
English rule, 585, 654-.
Impediments, 24-3· ,
Haddock v. Haddock, 386,4-67.
Implied Marriage Contract
Hague Academy of International
different doctrines, 343-34-8.
Law, 25.
Impotence, 269-270, 54-4-,n·49·
Hague Convention, Sixth, I2I, I23. Inductive Methods, 68.
See also Table of Statutes.
Infants, I]2-I74-·
Hague Convention on Conflict of Inheritance Laws
'Nationality Laws of I930,
marital property, 374--382.
I2I-I22. See also Table of
parent and child, 59I-592, 627,
Statutes.
64-8-658.
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Injures Graoes, 389, 436-438.
Insanity, I 8 I.
Intention of the Parties
legal effect, 8 3·
Interdiction, I 7 5- I 76.
Hague Convention, 3 I. See also
Table of Statutes.
Interest Pursued by Conflicts Law
in marital property, 297.
policy considerations, 90.
Internal Rules, 4, 42.
International Custom, 38-40.
International Jurisdiction for Divorce, 492-493.
International School
concept, 7-8.
Interpretation of Conflicts Rules, 44,
47-60.
Interregional Law on Status, I 26128.
Italy
literature, I 6.
Canon marriage with civil effects,
2I6,n.62, 2I7,n.63, 223, 543·
capacity, commercial conflicts
rule, former, I9I, I92.
foreign annulments, recognition,
543-544·
foreign divorce, anti-divorce policy of the forum, 496, 50o50I, 508.
foreign marriages, 277.
nationality, principle, I I 3, I 8 5,
192.
renvoi, So, I 3 I-I 33·
Japan, Conflicts Law, 26. See also
Table of Statutes.
Jewish Marriage, 2 I 3-2 I 6, 2 I 9·
Jitta, 1 7·
Judicial Separation, 385, 407, 43343 5> 5 29-5 30.
conversion to divorce, 487-488.
Jurisdiction, 3-4.
for adoption, 635-639.
for divorce, 396-422, 49I-494·

Jurisdictional Rules, 3· See also
Law of Conflicts.
Just Results of Conflicts Law
policy considerations, 90-91.
Kahn, 11, 18, 47, 52, 65, 86.
Keller, 17.
Kent, 12.
Kosters, I 7.
Kuhn, Arthur K., 26.
Lapradelle, I 5, 2 5.
Lasala Llanas, I 7.
Latin America. See also Table of
Statutes.
treatises, I 7.
capacity, I I7-I I9.
to marry, 256,276, 279·
divorce
jurisdiction, 400.
recognition, 479-480.
marrage requirements, 249-29 I,
256-257·
Laurent, 8, IO.
Law Applicable
meaning, 60-67.
Law of Conflicts, 3, I 9·
Law of the Forum. See also Public
Policy.
concept, 4 3.
adoption, 637-639.
applied to subjects of the forum,
305-306, 35Q-35I,44I-445>
596, 6I9.
divorce, 392-393, 422-42 5,
42]-429, 496-504.
effects, 523-524.
ecclesiastical courts, 246.
illegitimacy, 6 I 6, 628.
legitimate birth, 561.
legitimation, 577-578.
parental relations, 599·
Law of Place of Celebration
effect on marital property, 3 52.
marriage
formalities, 21 o-z 32·
intrinsic requirements, 244,
24]-251.

INDEX
Law of Place of Contracting, Capacity, I82.
Leflar, 24.
Legal Relation, as Object of Conflicts Rules, 45·
Legitimacy
presumption, 566.
status, 55 7-5 58.
Legitimate Birth, 559-564.
decisive time, 562-563.
necessary prerequisite for inheriting land, 58 5. See also Lex
Situs.
Legitimatio per Rescr$'ptum Principis, 586.
Legitimation, 57I-592.
concept, 556-557.
by subsequent marriage, 57 I-58 5.
by voluntary act, 586-589.
decisive time, 57I-574, 580.
effects, 57 7.
inheritance rights, 589-592.
invalid subsequent marriage, 580581.
public policy, permissive and prohibitive, 582-585.
recognition of child, formal acknowledgment, 557, 573-574,
579-580.
renvoi, 577-578.
unknown to the forum, I76-I78.
Lepretre, 24.
Lerebours-Pigeonniere, I 5.
Leroux v. Brown, 50-52.
Leuinron Case, 4I4.
Lewald, 2 I, 22.
Lex Fori. See also Law of the
Forum.
concept, 43·
Lex Loci Celebrationis. See Law of
the Place of Celebration.
Lex Loci Contractus, I 82.
Lex Situs. See also Immovables.
immovables, American rule, 32 8329·
legitimate birth required, 58 5,
654·
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marital property law, 3 3 5-343.
renvoi, 352.
Liechtenstein. See also Table of
Statutes.
law, 28.
Limping Marriages, 233, 284, 42042I,444-445,5I8-5I9,565566.
Literature, 3-26.
Lizardi Case, I88.
Local Conceptions, 94·
Local Law, Theory, 63.
Localization, 42.
Locus Regit Actum, 2IO.
Logic
concepts in the development of
conflicts law, 69-70.
Lorenzen, I3, 23, 25.
Louisiana. See also Table of Statutes.
capacity, I85, I86. See also
Personal Law.
domicil, principle, I34-I85, I93·
See also Domicil.
marital property, 34I, 343, 346.
See also Marital Property.
Majority, Legal Attainment, I 73I74·
Makarov, 25.
Mancini, IO, I 8 5·
Mandat tacite, 3I8.
Mareschal Case, I38, 6I9,n.40.
Maridakis, I9.
Marital Property, 328-382. See
also Husband and Wife.
concept, 294-297, 328-335,
374-382.
change in legislation, 3 54·
change in status, 354-364.
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